Faction

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Fernanda R C Almeida - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Luciano Da Silva Lopes - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Sibao Chen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • anti inflammatory activities and mechanisms of action of the petroleum ether fraction of rosa multiflora thunb hips
    Journal of Ethnopharmacology, 2011
    Co-Authors: Lijia Xu, Yan Ye, Chion Chan, Zhiling Yu, Sibao Chen
    Abstract:

    Abstract Ethnopharmacological relevance The hip of Rosa multiflora Thunb. has been traditionally used as a dietary supplement and a herbal remedy for the treatment of various diseases including cold, flu, inflammation, osteoarthritis, rheumatoid arthritis and chronic pain in China. Aims of the study To explore the anti-inflammatory ingredient of the hip of R. multiflora Thunb. and its mechanism of action. Materials and methods The ethanol extract of the hip of R. multiflora Thunb. was fractioned with petroleum ether, ethyl acetate and water, and each fraction was screened for anti-inflammatory activity in xylene-induced mouse ear edema model. Three more models, acetic acid-induced mouse vascular permeation, cotton pellet-induced rat granuloma, and carrageenan-induced rat hind paw edema were also employed to verify the anti-inflammatory effect of the identified fraction. To explore the mechanism of action, the activity of inducible nitric oxide synthase (iNOS) and the level of nitric oxide (NO) in sera, as well as mRNA expression level of cyclo-oxygenase-2 (COX-2) in inflammatory tissues of rats with carrageenan-induced hind paw edema were measured. GC–MS technology was applied to identify the active components in the active fraction. Results and conclusions The petroleum ether fraction (PEF) was identified to be the active fraction in inflammation animal models (i.e., oral administration of PEF (168.48, 42.12 and 10.53 mg/kg) evoked a significantly ( P P P P R. multiflora Thunb. in inflammatory disorders.

Jide Nzelibe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • in praise of Faction how special interests benefit constitutional order
    Northwestern University Law Review, 2015
    Co-Authors: Jide Nzelibe
    Abstract:

    ABSTRACT-Political Factions are rarely treated as normatively desirable entities in constitutional or international law. On the contrary, they are either regarded as forces that thwart the general welfare or as sources of chronic political instability. Thus, the conventional wisdom often focuses on how to deploy institutional or legal structures that minimize the influence of Faction. By contrast, this Essay argues that the institutions of constitutional and international law that are forged by self-interested Factions can create significant side benefits for the rest of the society. At bottom, such institutions are likely to be more durable and energetic than those created by disinterested or high-minded social designers. Thus, rather than focus on trying to curtail the influence of Faction in shaping political institutions, it may make more sense to broaden the scope of such influence to be as inclusive as possible.INTRODUCTIONA bedrock assumption of democratic theorizing is that if one wants good and enduring constitutional and international institutions, one ought to suppress as much as possible the influence of self-interested Factions.1 This Essay suggests a contrary view. Take away the role of self-interested Factions in institutional design and you risk being left with institutions that are unstable, weak, and lacking in energy. Across a wide swath of issue areas, from international trade to war powers, Factions have played a beneficial role in designing and shaping relevant political institutions. At its core, this Essay argues that at least in some critical respects, we may want to encourage a greater-not lesser-role for self-interested Factions in the design and maintenance of framework institutions of constitutional and international law.In many ways, the role assigned to Factions in this account is rooted in a reverse Madisonian logic. According to Madison, our structure of separation of powers acts to diminish the role of Factions by fueling institutional competition between the political branches in which "ambition must be made to counteract ambition."2 By contrast, in the framework espoused here, institutional actors do not operate as a countervailing force against the influence of Factions. Instead of being harnessed by other institutional actors, powerful Factions will attempt to co-opt these diverse institutional actors to serve their narrow policy and electoral ambitions. But here is the catch: those self-interested ambitions will often, though not always, overlap with what is socially beneficial for other groups in society.Overall, the thrust of this Essay's argument is that we should view the private benefits that Factions extract from pushing their preferred institutional arrangements as socially desirable. The possibility of obtaining private benefits may spur Factions to create and maintain valuable political institutions. To be sure, sometimes the role of Factional self-interest in institutional politics can become excessive and counterproductive. The solution should not be, however, to weaken or diminish the influence of Factions, but instead to control their undesirable excesses through measures that discourage corruption and arbitrary governance. But having a system where rules are generally enforced "by the book" among major Factions does not entail that those rules always have to be fair to all groups in society or enhance the general welfare. Indeed, in many instances, the rules may be skewed in favor of certain groups. This will often prove sufficient for long-term political stability, even if certain Factions are favored, provided that the rules do not threaten the interests of the most powerful Factions.The analysis here implies that the preoccupation with overcoming or managing Faction has obscured a more fruitful approach to institutional design in constitutional and international law. There is no need to accept the notion that for constitutional democracy to flourish one needs efficient institutions that promote the interests of the majority of voters at the expense of narrow or minority Factions. …

  • in praise of Faction how special interests benefit constitutional order
    Social Science Research Network, 2015
    Co-Authors: Jide Nzelibe
    Abstract:

    Political Factions are rarely treated as normatively desirable entities in constitutional or international law. On the contrary, they are either are regarded as forces that thwart the general welfare or as sources of chronic political instability. In response, the conventional wisdom often focuses on how to deploy institutional or legal structures that minimize the influence of Faction. By contrast, this Essay argues that the institutions of constitutional and international law that are forged by self-interested Factions can create significant side benefits for the rest of the society. At bottom, such institutions are likely to be more durable and energetic than those created by disinterested or high-minded social designers. Thus, rather than focus on trying to curtail the influence of Faction in shaping political institutions, it may make more sense to broaden the scope of such influence to be as inclusive as possible.

R Marques - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.