The Experts below are selected from a list of 317232 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Kumar Venkataraman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
the impact of legal and Political Institutions on equity trading costs a cross country analysis
2006Co-Authors: Venkat R Eleswarapu, Kumar VenkataramanAbstract:We conjecture that macro-level Institutions affect equity trading costs through their impact on information risk and investor participation. In a study of trading costs for 412 NYSE-listed American Depository Receipts (ADRs) from 44 countries, we find that, after controlling for firm-level determinants of trading costs, effective spreads and price impact of trades are significantly lower for stocks from countries with better ratings for judicial efficiency, accounting standards, and Political stability. Trading costs are significantly higher for stocks from French civil law countries than from common law countries. Overall, we conclude that improvements in legal and Political Institutions will lower the cost of liquidity in financial markets. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.
-
the impact of legal and Political Institutions on equity trading costs a cross country analysis
2005Co-Authors: Venkat R Eleswarapu, Kumar VenkataramanAbstract:We conjecture that macro-level Institutions will affect equity trading costs through their impact on information risk and investor participation. The key findings from our study of trading costs for 412 NYSE-listed ADRs from 44 countries are as follows. After controlling for firm-level determinants of trading costs and home country market share, effective spreads and price impact of trades are significantly lower for stocks from countries with better ratings for judicial efficiency, accounting standards, and Political stability. Trading costs are significantly higher for stocks from French civil law countries than from common law countries. We confirm the robustness of our results in various analyses. Overall, we conclude that improvements in legal and Political Institutions will lower the cost of liquidity in stock markets.
Heather Wendt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
class forces Political Institutions and state intervention subnational economic development policy in the united states 1971 1990
2006Co-Authors: Craig J Jenkins, Kevin T Leicht, Heather WendtAbstract:The United States has experienced a significantdevolution of social and economic policy responsibilities to the states sincethe early 1970s. In an attempt to improve tax bases and generate jobs, stateand local governments have adopted proactive economic development policies thattarget favored industries, promoting state intervention in the privatemarketplace. The development of these policies is examined here in terms of:(1) the articulation of class interests, (2) state-level PoliticalInstitutions, (3) prior Political legacies, (4) underlying production regimes,and (5) interactions of strong Political Institutions and classmobilization. An annual pooled cross-sectional time series design is used to capture theadoption of entrepreneurial, industrial recruitment, and labor marketregulation development policies in the lower 48 states. Results highlight theenduring role of class and state capacities to mediate and condition theeffects of organized class actors in the United States. In addition to businesspower and strong state capacities, the Political legacies of 1930s welfarepolicy innovations and mezocorporatist bargaining potential condition theeffects of business power. (LKB)
-
class forces Political Institutions and state intervention subnational economic development policy in the united states 1971 1990
2006Co-Authors: Craig J Jenkins, Kevin T Leicht, Heather WendtAbstract:The United States has experienced a major devolution of social and economic policy responsibilities to the states. Subnational industrial policies to create jobs and qualitative economic growth are key to this devolution. The authors examine the development of these policies in terms of (1) the articulation of class interests, (2) state‐level Political Institutions, (3) prior Political legacies, (4) underlying production regimes, and (5) interactions of strong Political Institutions and class mobilization. An annual pooled cross‐sectional time‐series analysis of three state‐level economic development policies (entrepreneurial, industrial recruitment, and labor market regulation) shows that in addition to business power and strong state capacities, the Political legacies of 1930s welfare policy innovations and mezocorporatist bargaining potential condition the effects of business power.
Venkat R Eleswarapu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
the impact of legal and Political Institutions on equity trading costs a cross country analysis
2006Co-Authors: Venkat R Eleswarapu, Kumar VenkataramanAbstract:We conjecture that macro-level Institutions affect equity trading costs through their impact on information risk and investor participation. In a study of trading costs for 412 NYSE-listed American Depository Receipts (ADRs) from 44 countries, we find that, after controlling for firm-level determinants of trading costs, effective spreads and price impact of trades are significantly lower for stocks from countries with better ratings for judicial efficiency, accounting standards, and Political stability. Trading costs are significantly higher for stocks from French civil law countries than from common law countries. Overall, we conclude that improvements in legal and Political Institutions will lower the cost of liquidity in financial markets. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.
-
the impact of legal and Political Institutions on equity trading costs a cross country analysis
2005Co-Authors: Venkat R Eleswarapu, Kumar VenkataramanAbstract:We conjecture that macro-level Institutions will affect equity trading costs through their impact on information risk and investor participation. The key findings from our study of trading costs for 412 NYSE-listed ADRs from 44 countries are as follows. After controlling for firm-level determinants of trading costs and home country market share, effective spreads and price impact of trades are significantly lower for stocks from countries with better ratings for judicial efficiency, accounting standards, and Political stability. Trading costs are significantly higher for stocks from French civil law countries than from common law countries. We confirm the robustness of our results in various analyses. Overall, we conclude that improvements in legal and Political Institutions will lower the cost of liquidity in stock markets.
Craig J Jenkins - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
class forces Political Institutions and state intervention subnational economic development policy in the united states 1971 1990
2006Co-Authors: Craig J Jenkins, Kevin T Leicht, Heather WendtAbstract:The United States has experienced a significantdevolution of social and economic policy responsibilities to the states sincethe early 1970s. In an attempt to improve tax bases and generate jobs, stateand local governments have adopted proactive economic development policies thattarget favored industries, promoting state intervention in the privatemarketplace. The development of these policies is examined here in terms of:(1) the articulation of class interests, (2) state-level PoliticalInstitutions, (3) prior Political legacies, (4) underlying production regimes,and (5) interactions of strong Political Institutions and classmobilization. An annual pooled cross-sectional time series design is used to capture theadoption of entrepreneurial, industrial recruitment, and labor marketregulation development policies in the lower 48 states. Results highlight theenduring role of class and state capacities to mediate and condition theeffects of organized class actors in the United States. In addition to businesspower and strong state capacities, the Political legacies of 1930s welfarepolicy innovations and mezocorporatist bargaining potential condition theeffects of business power. (LKB)
-
class forces Political Institutions and state intervention subnational economic development policy in the united states 1971 1990
2006Co-Authors: Craig J Jenkins, Kevin T Leicht, Heather WendtAbstract:The United States has experienced a major devolution of social and economic policy responsibilities to the states. Subnational industrial policies to create jobs and qualitative economic growth are key to this devolution. The authors examine the development of these policies in terms of (1) the articulation of class interests, (2) state‐level Political Institutions, (3) prior Political legacies, (4) underlying production regimes, and (5) interactions of strong Political Institutions and class mobilization. An annual pooled cross‐sectional time‐series analysis of three state‐level economic development policies (entrepreneurial, industrial recruitment, and labor market regulation) shows that in addition to business power and strong state capacities, the Political legacies of 1930s welfare policy innovations and mezocorporatist bargaining potential condition the effects of business power.
Rabah Arezki - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
-
effects of international food price shocks on Political Institutions in low income countries evidence from an international food net export price index
2014Co-Authors: Rabah Arezki, Markus BruecknerAbstract:We examine the effects of variations in the international food prices on Political Institutions in low-income countries. Our empirical analysis exploits that the economic impact of changes in the international food prices differs across countries depending on whether countries are net food importers or exporters. We construct an international food net-export price index that captures this heterogeneity. Our panel fixed effects analysis yields that in low-income countries within-country variations in the international food net-export price index are significantly negatively related to democratic Institutions. We further explore the mechanisms driving this relationship along the economic and the conflict dimensions.