Farm Programs

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James W. Richardson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Different Size Cotton Farms in the Texas Southern High Plains: A Simulation Approach
    2016
    Co-Authors: Edward G. Smith, James W. Richardson
    Abstract:

    Eight Texas High Plains cotton Farms, ranging in size from 189 acres to 5,570 acres, were simulated under six alternative Farm program provisions to determine the likely structural impacts of these Programs. The results indicate mid-size Farms benefit more from Farm Programs than either small or large Farms since the Programs allow them to remain in business. Denying mid-size commercial Farms access to the Farm program would likely accelerate the trend towards a bimodal distribution of Farm sizes on the High Plains.

  • SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS DECEMBER, 1973 Farm Programs, PESTICIDE USE, AND SOCIAL COSTS*
    2015
    Co-Authors: James W. Richardson
    Abstract:

    Environmentalists attack agricultural pesticides substituting pesticides for cropland and to estimate because of adverse drift effects during application, effects of alternative Farm Programs, an aggregate run-off into streams and persistence in the production function for agriculture is useful. From environment. The Environmental Protection Agency this function the estimated marginal rate of (EPA) has banned DDT and currently is considering substitution of cropland for pesticides gives an cancellation of its registration of mirex, 2,4,5,-T, and indication of the change in pesticide use for a given dieldrin [4]. change in cropland. Also, estimates of input costs and Emotionalism rather than economics appears to resource use can be made from such a function. be guiding environmental groups in their fight against An aggregate production function is estimated pesticides. As agriculture's pesticide use comes under for the 1965-1969 time period. The Cobb-Douglas more and more pressure from the public, U.S. Farm functional form is used because of its previous use in Programs are likely to come under attack because aggregate economic studies, ease of estimating they may have encouraged Farmers to substitute parameters, and because provision for diminishing pesticides for cropland. The "Farm program " for the factor returns and constant elasticity of factor past decade has restricted acres planted and substitution are reasonably consistent with reality

  • The Farm Level Impacts of Operating the Current Farm Bill at Reduced Federal Budget Spending Levels
    2007
    Co-Authors: J. Marc Raulston, James W. Richardson, Steven L. Klose, Joe L. Outlaw
    Abstract:

    Reduced federal spending on Farm Programs is a reality that U.S. producers will likely face in the near future as the debate over the next Farm bill looms. Less money will likely be available in the federal budget for Farm program spending under the next Farm bill. Also, additional players will potentially be involved as issues such as WTO compliance of Farm Programs come to the forefront of the debate. In essence, more players will be competing for a shrinking pool of funds allotted for federal Farm program spending.

  • POLICY GOALS AND THE DESIGN OF Farm Programs: AN EVALUATION OF FAIR
    1999
    Co-Authors: Ronald D. Knutson, James W. Richardson, Edward G. Smith, David P. Anderson, Rene F. Ochoa
    Abstract:

    Evaluating the performance of our current Farm Programs initially requires a specification of policy goals. In performing this exercise, we conclude that the goals have changed, much like the policies have changed. We then evaluate whether the current set of policies will fulfill the goals in a politically acceptable manner. It is concluded that this is questionable, at least in the short run. Moreover, it is concluded that, regardless of what is done in policy terms, the Farm structure will continue to undergo dramatic change. Policies will affect the rate of change in structure, but not the direction which will continue toward fewer but larger integrated Farms.

  • Sectoral Implications of Farm Program Modifications
    American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1992
    Co-Authors: Ching-cheng Chang, Bruce A. Mccarl, James W. Mjelde, James W. Richardson
    Abstract:

    The overall and distributional effects of Farm Programs and selected revisions are examined using a mathematical programming sector model. The model incorporates market distortions caused by price supports, target prices, program participation, deficiency payments and marketing loans. Current Farm Programs are found to increase producer prices, depress consumer prices, and in turn result in excess production and higher consumption and exports. Domestic and foreign consumers as well as domestic producers are subsidized by Farm Programs. Social deadweight loss occurs as government payments exceed welfare benefits received by consumers and producers. Society as a whole benefits from reductions in program provisions.

Jae Ha Lee - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • volatility in wheat spot and futures markets 1950 1993 government Farm Programs seasonality and causality
    Social Science Research Network, 1998
    Co-Authors: Susan J. Crain, Jae Ha Lee
    Abstract:

    We explore how wheat spot and futures market volatility has been impacted by government Farm Programs during the 1950- 1993 period. We find that changing volatility in both markets is highly associated with changing Farm Programs. The mandatory allotment Programs of the 1950's and early 1960's (1/3/50 - 4/10/64) were associated with low volatility, while the voluntary Programs initiated in the mid 1960's seem to have induced high volatility (4/11/64 - 12/22/85). Both market-driven loan rates and conservation reserve Programs appear to have helped volatility revert to lower levels since the mid 1980's (12/23/85 - 12/30/93). We also examine seasonality and causality in conjunction with the Farm Programs.

  • volatility in wheat spot and futures markets 1950 1993 government Farm Programs seasonality and causality
    Journal of Finance, 1996
    Co-Authors: Susan J. Crain, Jae Ha Lee
    Abstract:

    We explore how wheat spot and futures market volatility has been impacted by government Farm Programs during the 1950-1993 period. We find that changing volatility in both markets is highly associated with changing Farm Programs. The mandatory allotment Programs of the 1950s and early 1960s (1/3/50-4/10/64) were associated with low volatility, while the voluntary Programs initiated in the mid 1960s seem to have induced high volatility (4/11/64-12/22/85). Both market-driven loan rates and conservation reserve Programs appear to have helped volatility revert to lower levels since the mid 1980s (12/23/85-12/30/93). We also examine seasonality and causality in conjunction with the Farm Programs. WE EXPLORE HOW WHEAT spot and futures price volatility has been impacted by government Farm Programs. Many studies have examined the effects of various Farm policies (McKinnon (1967), Blakeslee (1980), Miranda and Helmberger

  • Volatility in Wheat Spot and Futures Markets, 1950–1993: Government Farm Programs, Seasonality, and Causality
    The Journal of Finance, 1996
    Co-Authors: Susan J. Crain, Jae Ha Lee
    Abstract:

    We explore how wheat spot and futures market volatility has been impacted by government Farm Programs during the 1950-1993 period. We find that changing volatility in both markets is highly associated with changing Farm Programs. The mandatory allotment Programs of the 1950s and early 1960s (1/3/50-4/10/64) were associated with low volatility, while the voluntary Programs initiated in the mid 1960s seem to have induced high volatility (4/11/64-12/22/85). Both market-driven loan rates and conservation reserve Programs appear to have helped volatility revert to lower levels since the mid 1980s (12/23/85-12/30/93). We also examine seasonality and causality in conjunction with the Farm Programs. WE EXPLORE HOW WHEAT spot and futures price volatility has been impacted by government Farm Programs. Many studies have examined the effects of various Farm policies (McKinnon (1967), Blakeslee (1980), Miranda and Helmberger

Susan J. Crain - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • volatility in wheat spot and futures markets 1950 1993 government Farm Programs seasonality and causality
    Social Science Research Network, 1998
    Co-Authors: Susan J. Crain, Jae Ha Lee
    Abstract:

    We explore how wheat spot and futures market volatility has been impacted by government Farm Programs during the 1950- 1993 period. We find that changing volatility in both markets is highly associated with changing Farm Programs. The mandatory allotment Programs of the 1950's and early 1960's (1/3/50 - 4/10/64) were associated with low volatility, while the voluntary Programs initiated in the mid 1960's seem to have induced high volatility (4/11/64 - 12/22/85). Both market-driven loan rates and conservation reserve Programs appear to have helped volatility revert to lower levels since the mid 1980's (12/23/85 - 12/30/93). We also examine seasonality and causality in conjunction with the Farm Programs.

  • volatility in wheat spot and futures markets 1950 1993 government Farm Programs seasonality and causality
    Journal of Finance, 1996
    Co-Authors: Susan J. Crain, Jae Ha Lee
    Abstract:

    We explore how wheat spot and futures market volatility has been impacted by government Farm Programs during the 1950-1993 period. We find that changing volatility in both markets is highly associated with changing Farm Programs. The mandatory allotment Programs of the 1950s and early 1960s (1/3/50-4/10/64) were associated with low volatility, while the voluntary Programs initiated in the mid 1960s seem to have induced high volatility (4/11/64-12/22/85). Both market-driven loan rates and conservation reserve Programs appear to have helped volatility revert to lower levels since the mid 1980s (12/23/85-12/30/93). We also examine seasonality and causality in conjunction with the Farm Programs. WE EXPLORE HOW WHEAT spot and futures price volatility has been impacted by government Farm Programs. Many studies have examined the effects of various Farm policies (McKinnon (1967), Blakeslee (1980), Miranda and Helmberger

  • Volatility in Wheat Spot and Futures Markets, 1950–1993: Government Farm Programs, Seasonality, and Causality
    The Journal of Finance, 1996
    Co-Authors: Susan J. Crain, Jae Ha Lee
    Abstract:

    We explore how wheat spot and futures market volatility has been impacted by government Farm Programs during the 1950-1993 period. We find that changing volatility in both markets is highly associated with changing Farm Programs. The mandatory allotment Programs of the 1950s and early 1960s (1/3/50-4/10/64) were associated with low volatility, while the voluntary Programs initiated in the mid 1960s seem to have induced high volatility (4/11/64-12/22/85). Both market-driven loan rates and conservation reserve Programs appear to have helped volatility revert to lower levels since the mid 1980s (12/23/85-12/30/93). We also examine seasonality and causality in conjunction with the Farm Programs. WE EXPLORE HOW WHEAT spot and futures price volatility has been impacted by government Farm Programs. Many studies have examined the effects of various Farm policies (McKinnon (1967), Blakeslee (1980), Miranda and Helmberger

Daniel A. Sumner - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • evolution of the economics of agricultural policy
    American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2010
    Co-Authors: Daniel A. Sumner, Julian M. Alston, Joseph W Glauber
    Abstract:

    Agricultural economists helped develop Farm Programs to respond to the dire economic situation of the 1920s and 1930s. Some early authors appreciated that such policies created problems in markets for commodities and inputs. Over time, our understanding of agricultural issues and policies has deepened. Through the application of improved models and tools of analysis to more extensive data, we have developed better answers to old questions, and have responded to changing policy instruments, market contexts, and policy concerns. This article traces the evolution of our deepening economic understanding of the causes and consequences of agricultural policy.

  • the effects of agricultural research and Farm subsidy policies on human nutrition and obesity
    2005 Annual meeting July 24-27 Providence RI, 2005
    Co-Authors: Julian M. Alston, Daniel A. Sumner, Stephen A Vosti
    Abstract:

    Agricultural policies including Farm Programs and R&D are said to have contributed to obesity by making food commodities cheaper and thereby encouraging consumption. This paper explores the links from agricultural policy to food prices and consumption and suggests that contribution of agricultural policy to obesity is not so clear.

  • Farm Programs AND RELATED POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
    1995
    Co-Authors: Daniel A. Sumner
    Abstract:

    Farm policy in the United States has evolved slowly in the six decades since the New Deal created most of the basic Programs that continue to govern U.S. agriculture. The durability of Farm Programs is often remarked upon, but views differ about the implications. The advanced age of Farm Programs is one of the standard criticisms of Farm policy. Critics point out that agriculture has been transformed since the 1930s, but the Programs have changed relatively little. They argue that the original rationales, that might have been appropriate in the first half of the 20th Century, no longer apply as we enter the 21st Century. Program supporters note that under the current Farm Programs, agriculture has prospered and benefited consumers and producers alike. Further, program defenders argue that the Farm Programs have been built into the very fabric of agriculture in America, and that it would be unfair to change the rules of the game now, for no compelling reason. Finally, they claim that it would be deeply unwise to take the risk of destroying a successful industry by undermining the regulatory foundations that govern U.S. agriculture.

  • TARGETING Farm Programs
    Contemporary Economic Policy, 1991
    Co-Authors: Daniel A. Sumner
    Abstract:

    “Targeting” in the agricultural policy context generally means directing payments to small or financially vulnerable Farms or to poor Farm families. This may seem a worthy objective. If Farm Programs were designed to act as welfare, then focusing the benefits on the needy clearly would be appropriate. Payments now are roughly the difference between the market price per unit produced and a high government price per unit. Therefore, Farms with more output get larger payments. Further, revising Farm Programs to act as aid to the needy would be difficult. Targeting amendments currently proposed generally are unworkable and likely would do little to change the actual distribution of benefits. Finally, because Farmers currently are eligible for other aid Programs and because few producers of significant output meet general welfare criteria, seemingly little real reason exists for attempting to convert Farm Programs rather than simply phasing down the payment levels overall.

Ronald D. Lacewell - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • The Edwards Aquifer Water Resource Conflict: USDA Farm Program resource‐use incentives?
    Water Resources Research, 1999
    Co-Authors: Glenn D. Schaible, Bruce A. Mccarl, Ronald D. Lacewell
    Abstract:

    This paper summarizes economic and hydrological analyses of the impacts of the 1990 and 1996 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Farm Programs on irrigation water withdrawals from the Edwards Aquifer in south central Texas and on aquifer-dependent spring flows that support threatened and endangered species. Economic modeling, a regional producer behavioral survey, as well as institutional and Farm characteristic analyses are used to examine likely irrigation water-use impacts. Hydrologie modeling is used to examine spring flow effects. Study results show that 1990 USDA commodity Programs caused producers to require less irrigation water, in turn increasing rather than decreasing aquifer spring flows. Market economic factors are the dominant criteria influencing producer irrigation decisions. Farm-tenure arrangements and aquifer management responsibilities of the Edwards Aquifer Authority indicate that the 1996 Farm Act's PFC payment program will not cause an increase in irrigation withdrawals. Broader actions such as long-term water supply enhancement/conservation Programs, dry-year water-use reduction incentives and water markets all provide tools for Edwards water-use conflict resolution. USDA Farm Programs do not apparently play a material part in the total debate.

  • The Edwards Aquifer's Water Resource Conflict: USDA Farm Program Increase Irrigation Water-Use?
    1999
    Co-Authors: Glenn D. Schaible, Bruce A. Mccarl, Ronald D. Lacewell
    Abstract:

    This paper summarizes an economic and hydrological analysis of the impact of 1990 and 1996 USDA Farm Programs on irrigation water withdrawals from the Edwards Aquifer in South-Central Texas, and on spring flows which support endangered species. Economic modeling and, a regional survey institutional analysis are used to examine likely irrigation water use impacts. Hydrological modeling is used to examine spring flow effects. Study results show that 1990 USDA commodity program components cause producers to require less water, in turn increasing rather than decreasing aquifer spring flows. Farm tenure arrangements and Edwards Aquifer Authority water management activities, indicate that 1996 Farm Act provisions will not cause an increase in irrigation withdrawals. Broader actions such as long-term water supply enhancement/conservation Programs, dry-year water use reduction incentives and water markets all provide tools for Edwards water use conflict resolution. USDA Farm Programs do not apparently play a material part in the total debate.