The Experts below are selected from a list of 180 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Susan M Sanchez - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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team 4 nato msg 088 data farming in support of nato case study on Force Protection scythe proceedings and bulletin of the international data farming community issue 11 18 21
2011Co-Authors: Jarkko Kylmala, Susan M Sanchez, Markus Holscher, Alexander Zimmermann, Jens Hartmann, Paul J Sanchez, Johan Shubert, Gudrun Wagner, Stephan Seichter, Andre GeigerAbstract:Geiger, A., S. Mayer, P. Sanchez, S. Sanchez, K. Jokinen, J. Kylmala, J. Schubert, K. Ng, S. Seichter, J. Hartmann, A. Zimmermann, M. Holscher, D. Kallfass, and G. Wagner (2012). "Team 4: NATO MSG-088 Data farming In support of NATO case study on Force Protection." Scythe: Proceedings and Bulletin of the International Data Farming Community Issue 11: 18-21.
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defense and homeland security applications of multi agent simulations
Winter Simulation Conference, 2007Co-Authors: Thomas W Lucas, Susan M Sanchez, Felix Martinez, Lisa R Sickinger, Jonathan W RoginskiAbstract:Department of Defense and Homeland Security analysts are increasingly using multi-agent simulation (MAS) to examine national security issues. This paper summarizes three MAS national security studies conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School. The first example explores equipment and employment options for protecting critical infrastructure. The second case considers non-lethal weapons within the spectrum of Force-Protection options in a martitime environment. The final application investigates emergency (police, fire, and medical) responses to an urban terrorist attack. There are many potentially influential factors and many sources of uncertainty associated with each of these simulated scenarios. Thus, efficient experimental designs and computing clusters are used to enable us to explore many thousands of computational experiments, while simultaneously varying many factors. The results illustrate how MAS experiments can provide valuable insights into defense and homeland security operations.
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military applications of agent based simulations
Winter Simulation Conference, 2004Co-Authors: Thomas M Cioppa, Thomas W Lucas, Susan M SanchezAbstract:There continues to be increasing interest from a broad range of disciplines in agent-based and artificial life simulations. This includes the Department of Defense---which uses simulations heavily in its decision making process. Indeed, military conflicts can have many attributes that are consistent with complex adaptive systems---such as many entities interacting with some degree of autonomy, each of which is continually making decisions to satisfy a variety of sometimes conflicting objectives. In this paper, we present three applications of agent-based simulations used to analyze military problems. The first uses the MANA model to explore the ability of the U.S. Army's network-based Future Force to perform with degraded communications. The second studies how unmanned surface vehicles can be used in Force Protection missions with the Pythagoras model. The last example examines the standard Army squad size with an integrated effort using MANA, Pythagoras, and the high-resolution simulation JANUS.
Jonathan W Roginski - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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defense and homeland security applications of multi agent simulations
Winter Simulation Conference, 2007Co-Authors: Thomas W Lucas, Susan M Sanchez, Felix Martinez, Lisa R Sickinger, Jonathan W RoginskiAbstract:Department of Defense and Homeland Security analysts are increasingly using multi-agent simulation (MAS) to examine national security issues. This paper summarizes three MAS national security studies conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School. The first example explores equipment and employment options for protecting critical infrastructure. The second case considers non-lethal weapons within the spectrum of Force-Protection options in a martitime environment. The final application investigates emergency (police, fire, and medical) responses to an urban terrorist attack. There are many potentially influential factors and many sources of uncertainty associated with each of these simulated scenarios. Thus, efficient experimental designs and computing clusters are used to enable us to explore many thousands of computational experiments, while simultaneously varying many factors. The results illustrate how MAS experiments can provide valuable insights into defense and homeland security operations.
Francois Tanguayrenaud - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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risk taking and Force Protection
Social Science Research Network, 2011Co-Authors: David Luban, Dan Priel, Francois TanguayrenaudAbstract:This paper addresses two questions about the morality of warfare: (1) how much risk must soldiers take to minimize unintended civilian casualties caused by their own actions (“collateral damage”), and (2) whether it is the same for the enemy's civilians as for one's own.The questions take on special importance in warfare where one side is able to attack the other side from a safe distance, but at the cost of civilian lives, while safeguarding civilians may require soldiers to take precautions that expose them to greater risk. In a well-known article, Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin argue that while soldiers must rank the Protection of their own civilians above their own Protection, they must rank their own Protection above that of enemy civilians. Avishai Margalit and Michael Walzer responded that the only morally relevant distinction is between combatants and non-combatants, not the identity of the non-combatants. The present paper concludes that Margalit and Walzer are correct. Although soldiers may take extra risks on behalf of their own civilians, the minimally acceptable risk for enemy civilians is the same as the minimally acceptable risk for their own.In response to the first question, the paper emphasizes two chief points. First is the equal worth of military and civilian lives, which implies a weak form of “risk egalitarianism”: even if morality often permits people to transfer risk from themselves to others, transferring large risks to others in order to spare oneself from smaller risks is morally wrong, because indirectly it treats oneself as more valuable than the other. Second, I explore the possibility that soldiers belong to a profession in which honor may require them to take risks for civilians. This is particularly true when the risks to civilians come from the soldiers’ own violence. The second question is whether soldiers’ special obligation to protect their own people (not other people) creates a higher minimum standard of care for their own people (and not other people). I answer no, because the special obligation is to protect their people from enemy violence, while the dilemma is whether to protect civilians from the soldiers’ own violence. The responsibility to protect the innocent from violence of one’s own making is a universal, not a special, obligation. Thus, in both questions 1 and 2, the fact that soldiers themselves create the violence that endangers civilians plays a crucial role in the answers.The concluding sections address two crucial loose ends. First is the question of whether soldiers might in fact be more valuable than civilians (including their own civilians) because they are not only human beings, but also “military assets.” The paper answers no, because this way of thinking involves illegitimate double counting of the soldier’s value, coupled with a refusal to double count the value of anyone else. Second is the related question of whether minimizing military casualties might turn out to be a military necessity because the civilian population is deeply casualty-averse, and the war effort requires their political support. Again the answer is no: otherwise, the less will to fight a country has, the less moral and legal obligation it has to fight well.
Thomas W Lucas - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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defense and homeland security applications of multi agent simulations
Winter Simulation Conference, 2007Co-Authors: Thomas W Lucas, Susan M Sanchez, Felix Martinez, Lisa R Sickinger, Jonathan W RoginskiAbstract:Department of Defense and Homeland Security analysts are increasingly using multi-agent simulation (MAS) to examine national security issues. This paper summarizes three MAS national security studies conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School. The first example explores equipment and employment options for protecting critical infrastructure. The second case considers non-lethal weapons within the spectrum of Force-Protection options in a martitime environment. The final application investigates emergency (police, fire, and medical) responses to an urban terrorist attack. There are many potentially influential factors and many sources of uncertainty associated with each of these simulated scenarios. Thus, efficient experimental designs and computing clusters are used to enable us to explore many thousands of computational experiments, while simultaneously varying many factors. The results illustrate how MAS experiments can provide valuable insights into defense and homeland security operations.
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military applications of agent based simulations
Winter Simulation Conference, 2004Co-Authors: Thomas M Cioppa, Thomas W Lucas, Susan M SanchezAbstract:There continues to be increasing interest from a broad range of disciplines in agent-based and artificial life simulations. This includes the Department of Defense---which uses simulations heavily in its decision making process. Indeed, military conflicts can have many attributes that are consistent with complex adaptive systems---such as many entities interacting with some degree of autonomy, each of which is continually making decisions to satisfy a variety of sometimes conflicting objectives. In this paper, we present three applications of agent-based simulations used to analyze military problems. The first uses the MANA model to explore the ability of the U.S. Army's network-based Future Force to perform with degraded communications. The second studies how unmanned surface vehicles can be used in Force Protection missions with the Pythagoras model. The last example examines the standard Army squad size with an integrated effort using MANA, Pythagoras, and the high-resolution simulation JANUS.
David Luban - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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risk taking and Force Protection
Social Science Research Network, 2011Co-Authors: David Luban, Dan Priel, Francois TanguayrenaudAbstract:This paper addresses two questions about the morality of warfare: (1) how much risk must soldiers take to minimize unintended civilian casualties caused by their own actions (“collateral damage”), and (2) whether it is the same for the enemy's civilians as for one's own.The questions take on special importance in warfare where one side is able to attack the other side from a safe distance, but at the cost of civilian lives, while safeguarding civilians may require soldiers to take precautions that expose them to greater risk. In a well-known article, Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin argue that while soldiers must rank the Protection of their own civilians above their own Protection, they must rank their own Protection above that of enemy civilians. Avishai Margalit and Michael Walzer responded that the only morally relevant distinction is between combatants and non-combatants, not the identity of the non-combatants. The present paper concludes that Margalit and Walzer are correct. Although soldiers may take extra risks on behalf of their own civilians, the minimally acceptable risk for enemy civilians is the same as the minimally acceptable risk for their own.In response to the first question, the paper emphasizes two chief points. First is the equal worth of military and civilian lives, which implies a weak form of “risk egalitarianism”: even if morality often permits people to transfer risk from themselves to others, transferring large risks to others in order to spare oneself from smaller risks is morally wrong, because indirectly it treats oneself as more valuable than the other. Second, I explore the possibility that soldiers belong to a profession in which honor may require them to take risks for civilians. This is particularly true when the risks to civilians come from the soldiers’ own violence. The second question is whether soldiers’ special obligation to protect their own people (not other people) creates a higher minimum standard of care for their own people (and not other people). I answer no, because the special obligation is to protect their people from enemy violence, while the dilemma is whether to protect civilians from the soldiers’ own violence. The responsibility to protect the innocent from violence of one’s own making is a universal, not a special, obligation. Thus, in both questions 1 and 2, the fact that soldiers themselves create the violence that endangers civilians plays a crucial role in the answers.The concluding sections address two crucial loose ends. First is the question of whether soldiers might in fact be more valuable than civilians (including their own civilians) because they are not only human beings, but also “military assets.” The paper answers no, because this way of thinking involves illegitimate double counting of the soldier’s value, coupled with a refusal to double count the value of anyone else. Second is the related question of whether minimizing military casualties might turn out to be a military necessity because the civilian population is deeply casualty-averse, and the war effort requires their political support. Again the answer is no: otherwise, the less will to fight a country has, the less moral and legal obligation it has to fight well.