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Marc Flandreau - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • high and dry the liquidity and credit of colonial and Foreign Government debt in the london stock exchange 1880 1910
    The Journal of Economic History, 2017
    Co-Authors: Matthieu Chavaz, Marc Flandreau
    Abstract:

    We gather the most comprehensive database of Government bonds for the first globalisation era to date to conduct the first historically informed study of the importance of liquidity for colonial and sovereign yield spreads. Considering both liquidity and credit shows that the two markets were segmented: credit was the most important factor in the pricing of sovereign debt, but liquidity predominated in the colonial market, explaining 10% to 39% of colonial yield spreads. This reflected both different market microstructures and bond clienteles, themselves influenced by heterogeneous political, institutional and financial arrangements. The flows from the colonies to British ‘ordinary’ investors in the form of illiquidity premia should be taken into account in future studies of the political economy of empire.

  • bondholders versus bond sellers investment banks and conditionality lending in the london market for Foreign Government debt 1815 1913
    European Review of Economic History, 2012
    Co-Authors: Marc Flandreau, Juan H. Flores
    Abstract:

    This paper offers a theory of conditionality lending in nineteenth-century international capital markets. We argue that ownership of reputation signals by prestigious banks rendered them able and willing to monitor Government borrowing. Monitoring was a source of rent, and it led bankers to support countries facing liquidity crises in a manner similar to modern descriptions of 'relationship' lending to corporate clients by 'parent' banks. Prestigious bankers' ability to implement conditionality loans and monitor countries' financial policies also enabled them to deal with solvency. We find that, compared with prestigious bankers, bondholders' committees had neither the tools nor the prestige required for effectively dealing with defaulters. Hence such committees were far less important than previous research has claimed. Copyright , Oxford University Press.

  • Global Financial Brands and the Underwriting of Foreign Government Debt since 1815
    Handbook of Key Global Financial Markets Institutions and Infrastructure, 2012
    Co-Authors: Marc Flandreau, Juan H. Flores, Norbert Gaillard, Sebastián Nieto-parra
    Abstract:

    This chapter covers the long-term evolution of the primary market for Foreign Government debt. It discusses the role of financial intermediaries as underwriters and distributors of securities, providers of information, and lending of last resort services since the early nineteenth century, and the evolution of this role. The chapter underscores the role of the prestige of global financial brands in sustaining early Foreign debt markets and its weakening in the modern era.

  • The Changing Role of Global Financial Brands in the Underwriting of Foreign Government Debt (1815-2010)
    2011
    Co-Authors: Marc Flandreau, Juan H. Flores, Norbert Gaillard, Sebastián Nieto-parra
    Abstract:

    This paper covers the long-term evolution of the primary market for Foreign Government debt. We discuss the role of financial intermediaries as underwriters and distributors of securities, providers of information, and lending of last resort services since the early 19th century, and the evolution of this role. We underscore the role of the prestige of global financial brands in sustaining early Foreign debt markets and its weakening in the modern era.

  • to err is human us rating agencies and the interwar Foreign Government debt crisis
    European Review of Economic History, 2011
    Co-Authors: Marc Flandreau, Norbert Gaillard, Frank Packer
    Abstract:

    During the 1930s, rating agencies took up a central role in regulatory supervision that they still have today. The proximate cause for this changeover was the economic shock of the Great Depression. Exploring the performance of rating agencies in assessing the risks of sovereign debt, an important segment of the bond market, we do not find that superior forecasting capacities can explain the agencies' growing importance.

Farok J Contractor - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Smriti Mallapaty - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Arye L. Hillman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Protectionist policies as the regulation of international industry
    Public Choice, 1990
    Co-Authors: Arye L. Hillman
    Abstract:

    The political feasibility of protectionist policies that regulate international industry derives from the absence of overt collusion among domestic import-competing producers. The regulation of international industry cannot be explicit since Governments would thereby be perceived to be approving (or instigating) international collusion. Hence, voluntary export restraints have been popularly presented with a focus on the difficulties confronted by domestic import-competing producers and a de-emphasis on the mutual gains to domestic and Foreign producers from monitoring by a Foreign Government of a restrictive export cartel arrangement. Similarly, trigger-price mechanisms have popularly been explained in terms of the need for anti-dumping measures to preserve ‘fair’ competition. Likewise, the involuntary export tax derived in the first instance from an administratively validated (but, as demonstrated by Kalt's econometric analysis, contentious) complaint of ‘unfair’ Foreign competition. Voluntary export restraints, trigger-price mechanisms, and involuntary export taxes are however protectionist devices, the beneficiaries of which can transcend national jurisdictions, and which have in common the characteristic that the gains to domestic industry interests derive from the regulation of Foreign competitors.

Sims, Karen Elizabeth - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Unauthorized disclosure: can behavioral indicators help predict who will commit unauthorized disclosure of classified national security information?
    Monterey California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2015
    Co-Authors: Sims, Karen Elizabeth
    Abstract:

    Approved for public release; distribution is unlimitedFederal Government security-cleared personnel have been disclosing federal Government classified national security information, whether to a Foreign Government or the United States media, at an increasing rate since the 1980s. Can common personal or psychological characteristics or motivations be identified from historical cases that could indicate the likelihood of a current or potential federal employee to disclose national security information without authorization? Reasons for unauthorized disclosure range from financial, to whistle-blowing, to a desire to change international policy, to sympathy and strong ties with a Foreign Government. The focus of this research is on the behavioral characteristics that are similar or different between known, studied historical cases of personnel associated with the federal Government who have disclosed classified information without authorization. Upon review of existing data, the prevalent behavioral characteristic of the cases is one of a disgruntled employee (ideology/disillusionment/loyalty). A disgruntled employee becomes the largest concern as an insider threat, one who is willing to compromise his or her feelings of loyalty to the organization and the nation for a myriad of reasons.Senior Security Specialist, Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Chief Security Officer, Washington, D