Formal Analysis

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A Langley - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Formal Analysis and strategic decision making
    Omega, 1991
    Co-Authors: A Langley
    Abstract:

    The extensive use of Formal Analysis in decisions has often been seen as evidence of the adoption of a "rational", comprehensive mode of strategic decision making and the rejection of social interactive and political modes of decision making. Based on a study of the role of Formal Analysis in strategic decisions in three organizations, this article suggests that on the contrary, Formal Analysis and social interactive decision processes are inextricably linked--in fact, a greater need for social interaction may cause a greater need for Formal Analysis. The elements of a new framework for describing the strategic decision making process and the role of Formal Analysis within it are proposed. This framework is based on the idea that organizational decision making is the outcome of interactions between different individuals with different levels of Formal authority and expertise and different opinions and motivations. The framework is then used to identify types of situations in which Formal Analysis may be more or less productive. It is suggested that excessive or insufficient uses of Formal Analysis in decision making cannot be blamed entirely on decision participants' cognitive styles or analytical competence. Such phenomena may in fact be caused mainly by the structural features of the decision situation in which opportunities for Analysis are embedded.

Stephan Wesemeyer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • STM - Formal Analysis of V2X Revocation Protocols
    Security and Trust Management, 2017
    Co-Authors: Jorden Whitefield, Helen Treharne, Steve Schneider, Andrew Paverd, Frank Kargl, Liqun Chen, Stephan Wesemeyer
    Abstract:

    Research on vehicular networking (V2X) security has produced a range of securitymechanisms and protocols tailored for this domain, addressing both security and privacy. Typically, the security Analysis of these proposals has largely been inFormal. However, Formal Analysis can be used to expose flaws and ultimately provide a higher level of assurance in the protocols. This paper focusses on the Formal Analysis of a particular element of security mechanisms for V2X found in many proposals, that is the revocation of malicious or misbehaving vehicles from the V2X system by invalidating their credentials. This revocation needs to be performed in an unlinkable way for vehicle privacy even in the context of vehicles regularly changing their pseudonyms. The Rewire scheme by Forster et al. and its subschemes Plain and R-token aim to solve this challenge by means of cryptographic solutions and trusted hardware. Formal Analysis using the Tamarin prover identifies two flaws: one previously reported in the lierature concerned with functional correctness of the protocol, and one previously unknown flaw concerning an authentication property of the R-token scheme. In response to these flaws we propose Obscure Token (O-token), an extension of Rewire to enable revocation in a privacy preserving manner. Our approach addresses the functional and authentication properties by introducing an additional key-pair, which offers a stronger and verifiable guarantee of successful revocation of vehicles without resolving the long-term identity. Moreover O-token is the first V2X revocation protocol to be co-designed with a Formal model.

  • Formal Analysis of V2X Revocation Protocols
    arXiv: Cryptography and Security, 2017
    Co-Authors: Jorden Whitefield, Helen Treharne, Steve Schneider, Andrew Paverd, Frank Kargl, Liqun Chen, Stephan Wesemeyer
    Abstract:

    Research on vehicular networking (V2X) security has produced a range of security mechanisms and protocols tailored for this domain, addressing both security and privacy. Typically, the security Analysis of these proposals has largely been inFormal. However, Formal Analysis can be used to expose flaws and ultimately provide a higher level of assurance in the protocols. This paper focusses on the Formal Analysis of a particular element of security mechanisms for V2X found in many proposals: the revocation of malicious or misbehaving vehicles from the V2X system by invalidating their credentials. This revocation needs to be performed in an unlinkable way for vehicle privacy even in the context of vehicles regularly changing their pseudonyms. The REWIRE scheme by Forster et al. and its subschemes BASIC and RTOKEN aim to solve this challenge by means of cryptographic solutions and trusted hardware. Formal Analysis using the TAMARIN prover identifies two flaws with some of the functional correctness and authentication properties in these schemes. We then propose Obscure Token (OTOKEN), an extension of REWIRE to enable revocation in a privacy preserving manner. Our approach addresses the functional and authentication properties by introducing an additional key-pair, which offers a stronger and verifiable guarantee of successful revocation of vehicles without resolving the long-term identity. Moreover OTOKEN is the first V2X revocation protocol to be co-designed with a Formal model.

  • Formal Analysis of V2X Revocation Protocols
    Security and Trust Management, 2017
    Co-Authors: Jorden Whitefield, Helen Treharne, Steve Schneider, Andrew Paverd, Frank Kargl, Liqun Chen, Stephan Wesemeyer
    Abstract:

    Research on vehicular networking (V2X) security has produced a range of securitymechanisms and protocols tailored for this domain, addressing both security and privacy. Typically, the security Analysis of these proposals has largely been inFormal. However, Formal Analysis can be used to expose flaws and ultimately provide a higher level of assurance in the protocols. This paper focusses on the Formal Analysis of a particular element of security mechanisms for V2X found in many proposals, that is the revocation of malicious or misbehaving vehicles from the V2X system by invalidating their credentials. This revocation needs to be performed in an unlinkable way for vehicle privacy even in the context of vehicles regularly changing their pseudonyms. The Rewire scheme by Förster et al. and its subschemes Plain and R-token aim to solve this challenge by means of cryptographic solutions and trusted hardware. Formal Analysis using the Tamarin prover identifies two flaws: one previously reported in the lierature concerned with functional correctness of the protocol, and one previously unknown flaw concerning an authentication property of the R-token scheme. In response to these flaws we propose Obscure Token (O-token), an extension of Rewire to enable revocation in a privacy preserving manner. Our approach addresses the functional and authentication properties by introducing an additional key-pair, which offers a stronger and verifiable guarantee of successful revocation of vehicles without resolving the long-term identity. Moreover O-token is the first V2X revocation protocol to be co-designed with a Formal model.

Hajo A. Reijers - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Yuan Chao-wei - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Formal Analysis Method of Security Protocol
    Computer Engineering, 2010
    Co-Authors: Yuan Chao-wei
    Abstract:

    This paper researches on quick and efficient Formal Analysis of security protocol,and presents the concept of trust domain.Diagrammatic Analysis is adopted,which makes deduction of protocol more clear and intuitive.This method analyzes the trust domain of protocol entity directly,which makes Analysis easier.Experimental results show that the method is faster and more intuitive compared with traditional methods.It provides ways and basis for finding redundancies of security protocols.

Benjamin Aziz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • A temporal blockchain: A Formal Analysis
    Proceedings - 2016 International Conference on Collaboration Technologies and Systems CTS 2016, 2016
    Co-Authors: Richard Dennis, Gareth Owenson, Benjamin Aziz
    Abstract:

    This paper presents a possible solution to a fundamental limitation facing all blockchain-based systems; scalability. We propose a temporal " rolling " blockchain which solves the problem of its current exponential growth, instead replacing it with a constant fixed-size blockchain. We conduct a thorough Analysis of related work and present a Formal Analysis of the new rolling blockchain, comparing the results to a traditional blockchain model to demonstrate that the deletion of data from the blockchain does not impact on the security of the proposed blockchain model before concluding our work and presenting future work to be conducted.

  • CTS - A Temporal Blockchain: A Formal Analysis
    2016 International Conference on Collaboration Technologies and Systems (CTS), 2016
    Co-Authors: Richard Dennis, Gareth Owenson, Benjamin Aziz
    Abstract:

    This paper presents a possible solution to a fundamental limitation facing all blockchain-based systems; scalability. We propose a temporal rolling blockchain which solves the problem of its current exponential growth, instead replacing it with a constant fixed-size blockchain. We conduct a thorough Analysis of related work and present a Formal Analysis of the new rolling blockchain, comparing the results to a traditional blockchain model to demonstrate that the deletion of data from the blockchain does not impact on the security of the proposed blockchain model before concluding our work and presenting future work to be conducted.