The Experts below are selected from a list of 11232 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Mathieu Faure - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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2013: Consistency of vanishingly smooth fictitious play
2016Co-Authors: Mathieu FaureAbstract:We discuss consistency of Vanishingly Smooth Fictitious Play, a strategy in the context of game theory, which can be regarded as a smooth fictitious play procedure, where the smoothing parameter is time-dependent and asymptotically vanishes. This answers a question initially raised by Drew Fudenberg and Satoru Takahashi. Key words: Smooth fictitious play; no regret; consistency; nonautonomous differential inclusions MSC2000 Subject Classification: Primary: 91B06, 62C12; Secondary: 37B26, 37B5
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Consistency of Vanishingly Smooth Fictitious Play
Mathematics of Operations Research, 2013Co-Authors: Michel Benaïm, Mathieu FaureAbstract:We discuss consistency of vanishingly smooth fictitious play, a strategy in the context of game theory, which can be regarded as a smooth fictitious play procedure, where the smoothing parameter is time dependent and asymptotically vanishes. This answers a question initially raised by Drew Fudenberg and Satoru Takahashi.
Dermot Leahy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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strategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies
The Economic Journal, 2000Co-Authors: Peter J Neary, Dermot LeahyAbstract:We characterise optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and Tirole's "animal spirits" taxonomy of business strategies. Without government commitment, there is an additional basis for intervention, whose sign depends on the strategic substitutability between future policy and current actions. We consider a variety of applications (to R&D spillovers, consumer switching costs, etc.) and also extensions to constrained second-best policies.
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strategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, 1998Co-Authors: Peter J Neary, Dermot LeahyAbstract:In this paper characterise optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and Tirole''s "fat cats and top dogs" taxonomy of business strategies. Without government commitment, there is an additional basis for intervention, whose sign depends on the strategic substitutability between future policy and current actions. We consider a variety of applications (to R&D spillovers, consumer switching costs, etc.) and extensions to second-best, revenue-constrained and entry-promotion policies.
Peter J Neary - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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strategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies
The Economic Journal, 2000Co-Authors: Peter J Neary, Dermot LeahyAbstract:We characterise optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and Tirole's "animal spirits" taxonomy of business strategies. Without government commitment, there is an additional basis for intervention, whose sign depends on the strategic substitutability between future policy and current actions. We consider a variety of applications (to R&D spillovers, consumer switching costs, etc.) and also extensions to constrained second-best policies.
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strategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, 1998Co-Authors: Peter J Neary, Dermot LeahyAbstract:In this paper characterise optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and Tirole''s "fat cats and top dogs" taxonomy of business strategies. Without government commitment, there is an additional basis for intervention, whose sign depends on the strategic substitutability between future policy and current actions. We consider a variety of applications (to R&D spillovers, consumer switching costs, etc.) and extensions to second-best, revenue-constrained and entry-promotion policies.
Michel Benaïm - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Consistency of Vanishingly Smooth Fictitious Play
Mathematics of Operations Research, 2013Co-Authors: Michel Benaïm, Mathieu FaureAbstract:We discuss consistency of vanishingly smooth fictitious play, a strategy in the context of game theory, which can be regarded as a smooth fictitious play procedure, where the smoothing parameter is time dependent and asymptotically vanishes. This answers a question initially raised by Drew Fudenberg and Satoru Takahashi.
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Stochastic Approximations and Differential Inclusions; Part II: Applications
2005Co-Authors: Michel Benaïm, Josef Hofbauer, Sylvain SorinAbstract:We apply the theoretical results on ``stochastic approximations and differential inclusions'' developed in Benaïm Hofbauer and Sorin (2003) to several adaptive processes used in game theory including: classical and generalized approachability, no-regrets procedures (Hart and Mas-Colell), smooth fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine)
David K. Levine - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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An Approximate Dual-Self Model and Paradoxes of Choice Under Risk
Journal of Economic Psychology, 2014Co-Authors: Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Zacharias ManiadisAbstract:We derive a simplified version of the model of Fudenberg and Levine [2006, 2011] and show how this approximate model is useful in explaining choice under risk. We show that in the simple case of three outcomes, the model can generate indifference curves that “fan out” in the Marshack-Machina triangle, and thus can explain the well-known Allais and common ratio paradoxes that models such as prospect theory and regret theory are designed to capture. At the same time, our model is consistent with modern macroeconomic theory and evidence and generates predictions across a much wider set of domains than these models.
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An Approximate Dual-Self Model and Paradoxes of Choice under
2013Co-Authors: Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Zacharias ManiadisAbstract:We derive a simplified version of the model of Fudenberg and Levine [2006, 2011] and show how this approximate model is useful in explaining choice under risk. We show that in the simple case of three outcomes, the model can generate indifference curves that “fan out ” in the Marshack-Machina triangle, and thus can explain the well-known Allais and common ratio paradoxes that models such as prospect theory and regret theory are designed to capture. At the same time, our model is consistent with modern macroeconomic theory and evidence and generates predictions across a much wider set of domains than these models
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A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games - A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games
2008Co-Authors: Drew Fudenberg, David K. LevineAbstract:This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
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Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction
Journal of Economic Theory, 2002Co-Authors: Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, David K. LevineAbstract:In order to model the subjective uncertainty of a player over the behavior strategies of an opponent, one must consider the player's beliefs about the opponent's play at information sets that the player thinks have probability zero. This corregendum uses “trembles†to provide a definition of the convex hull of a set of behavior strategies. This corrects a definition we gave in [E. Dekel, D. Fudenberg, and D. K. Levine, 1999, J. Econ. Theory 89, 165–185], which led to two of the solution concepts we defined there not having the properties we intended.
