The Experts below are selected from a list of 327 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Daniel Cardona - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Unions, Qualification Choice, and Output
Social Science Research Network, 2008Co-Authors: Daniel Cardona, Fernando Sánchez LosadaAbstract:The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of the unions' bargaining power on Production and wages. In our model a competitive final good is produced from two substitutable intermediate Goods. One of them is produced in a unionized unskilled sector and the other in a unionized skilled one. Potential workers decide at their cost to become skilled or remain unskilled and, thus, labor supplies are determined endogenously. We find that in a right-to-manage bargaining framework, the reallocation of the labor supplies due to a change in the unskilled (or skilled) unions' bargaining power may have a positive impact on the final Goods Production. At the same time, total labor earnings increase with the unskilled unions' bargaining power if the final Goods Production increases too. We also show that minimum wage legislation is equivalent in its effects to an increase in the bargaining power of the unskilled unions. However, in an efficient bargaining framework, an increase in the unskilled (or skilled) unions' bargaining power has always a negative impact on the final Goods Production.
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Unions, qualification choice, and output
Oxford Economic Papers, 2006Co-Authors: Daniel Cardona, Fernando Sánchez-losadaAbstract:The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of the unions' bargaining power on Production and wages. In our model a competitive final good is produced from two substitutable intermediate Goods. One of them is produced in a unionized unskilled sector and the other in a unionized skilled one. Potential workers decide at their cost to become skilled or remain unskilled and, thus, labor supplies are determined endogenously. We find that in a right-to-manage bargaining framework, the reallocation of the labor supplies due to a change in the unskilled (or skilled) unions' bargaining power may have a positive impact on the final Goods Production. At the same time, total labor earnings increase with the unskilled unions' bargaining power if the final Goods Production increases too. We also show that minimum wage legislation is equivalent in its effects to an increase in the bargaining power of the unskilled unions. However, in an efficient bargaining framework, an increase in the unskilled (or skilled) unions' bargaining power has always a negative impact on the final Goods Production. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.
Fernando Sánchez Losada - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Unions, Qualification Choice, and Output
Social Science Research Network, 2008Co-Authors: Daniel Cardona, Fernando Sánchez LosadaAbstract:The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of the unions' bargaining power on Production and wages. In our model a competitive final good is produced from two substitutable intermediate Goods. One of them is produced in a unionized unskilled sector and the other in a unionized skilled one. Potential workers decide at their cost to become skilled or remain unskilled and, thus, labor supplies are determined endogenously. We find that in a right-to-manage bargaining framework, the reallocation of the labor supplies due to a change in the unskilled (or skilled) unions' bargaining power may have a positive impact on the final Goods Production. At the same time, total labor earnings increase with the unskilled unions' bargaining power if the final Goods Production increases too. We also show that minimum wage legislation is equivalent in its effects to an increase in the bargaining power of the unskilled unions. However, in an efficient bargaining framework, an increase in the unskilled (or skilled) unions' bargaining power has always a negative impact on the final Goods Production.
Fernando Sánchez-losada - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Unions, qualification choice, and output
Oxford Economic Papers, 2006Co-Authors: Daniel Cardona, Fernando Sánchez-losadaAbstract:The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of the unions' bargaining power on Production and wages. In our model a competitive final good is produced from two substitutable intermediate Goods. One of them is produced in a unionized unskilled sector and the other in a unionized skilled one. Potential workers decide at their cost to become skilled or remain unskilled and, thus, labor supplies are determined endogenously. We find that in a right-to-manage bargaining framework, the reallocation of the labor supplies due to a change in the unskilled (or skilled) unions' bargaining power may have a positive impact on the final Goods Production. At the same time, total labor earnings increase with the unskilled unions' bargaining power if the final Goods Production increases too. We also show that minimum wage legislation is equivalent in its effects to an increase in the bargaining power of the unskilled unions. However, in an efficient bargaining framework, an increase in the unskilled (or skilled) unions' bargaining power has always a negative impact on the final Goods Production. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.
Kelle Howson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Doing good by drinking wine? Ethical value networks and upscaling of wine Production in Australia, New Zealand and South Africa
European Planning Studies, 2019Co-Authors: John Overton, Warwick E. Murray, Kelle HowsonAbstract:There has been a rise in recent decades of consumer campaigns to promote more ethically responsible food and consumer Goods Production. These campaigns have spanned movements such as fair trade, fo...
Michael Lundholm - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Decentralizing Public Goods Production
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2008Co-Authors: Michael LundholmAbstract:Decentralized decisions, to a bureau with a given budget, about the Production of public Goods is analyzed within a general equilibrium model with a representative agent and no pure profits. Contrary to previous results on decentralization it is shown that sequential decentralization (i) does not necessarily imply aggregate Production efficiency and (ii) need not be optimal even if all public Goods are neutral. Also, cost-benefit criteria are derived and the marginal cost of public funds is characterized.
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Decentralising Public Goods Production
2004Co-Authors: Michael LundholmAbstract:Decentralised decisions, to a bureau with a given budget, about the Production of public Goods is analysed within a general equilibrium model with a representative agent and no pure profits. It is shown that decentralisation (i) does not necessarily imply aggregate Production effciency and (ii) need not be optimal even if all public Goods are neutral. Also, cost benefit criteria are derived and the marginal cost of public funds is characterised.
