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United States. Government Accountability Office. - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Medicare: Contractors and Private Plans Play a Major Role in Administering Benefits
    United States. Government Accountability Office., 2014
    Co-Authors: United States. Government Accountability Office.
    Abstract:

    Testimony issued by the government accountability office with an abstract that begins "The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) reformed the way the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency that administers Medicare, contracts with claims administration contractors. From its inception, the process for selecting Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) claims administration contractors was stipulated by Congress and differed from most other federal contracts in that, among other things, the Medicare contracts were not awarded through a competitive process. The MMA repealed limitations on the types of contractors CMS could use and required that CMS use competitive procedures to select new contracting entities to process medical claims and provide incentives for contractors to provide quality services. CMS has implemented the MMA contracting reform requirements by shifting and consolidating all claims administration tasks to new entities called Medicare Administrative Contractors. CMS is currently in the process of further consolidating these contracts. The agency also uses other contractors to review claims to ensure payments are proper and investigate potential fraud.

  • Information Technology: HUD's Expenditure Plan Satisfied Statutory Conditions; Sustained Controls and Modernization Approach Needed
    United States. Government Accountability Office., 2014
    Co-Authors: United States. Government Accountability Office.
    Abstract:

    A letter report issued by the government accountability office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) fiscal year 2013 information technology (IT) expenditure plan satisfied the two sets of statutory conditions contained in the appropriations act. Regarding the first set of conditions, the plan identified for each project the functional and performance capabilities to be delivered, mission benefits, life-cycle costs, and key milestones. For example, for the Federal Housing Administration Transformation's Portfolio Evaluation Tool project, the plan identified functional capabilities such as the ability to produce on-demand reports to assess financial impacts and risks. The plan also satisfied the second set of conditions by demonstrating that each project was in compliance with HUD's enterprise architecture, was being managed in accordance with applicable life-cycle policies and guidance, conformed to capital planning and investment control requirements, and was supported by an adequately staffed project office. For instance, it included assessments demonstrating how projects conformed to requirements for planning and controlling investments. By satisfying these conditions, the plan should better inform the decision making of HUD's appropriations committees on current modernization projects.

  • Public Transit: Challenges Funding, Investing in Systems, and Coordinating Services
    United States. Government Accountability Office., 2014
    Co-Authors: United States. Government Accountability Office.
    Abstract:

    Testimony issued by the government accountability office with an abstract that begins "The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) authorized $10.6 and $10.7 billion for fiscal years 2013 and 2014, respectively, for public transit, but did not address long-term funding. Federal funds available for FTA's transit programs come from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury and the Mass Transit Account of the Highway Trust Fund. The Highway Trust Fund supports surface transportation programs, including highways and transit, and is funded through motor fuel and other highway use taxes; however, revenues have eroded over time because federal fuel tax rate stagnation, fuel efficiency improvements, and the use of alternative fuel vehicles. In May 2013, the Congressional Budget office estimated that to maintain current spending levels plus inflation between 2015 and 2022, the Fund will require over $132 billion more than it is expected to take in over that period. GAO reported that while Congress transferred over $50 billion in general revenues to the Fund since fiscal year 2008, this approach may not be sustainable given competing demands for funding. For these reasons funding surface transportation remains on GAO's High-Risk List.

  • Fiscal Year 2013 Agreed-Upon Procedures: Excise Tax Distributions to the Airport and Airway Trust Fund and the Highway Trust Fund
    United States. Government Accountability Office., 2013
    Co-Authors: United States. Government Accountability Office.
    Abstract:

    Correspondence issued by the government accountability office with an abstract that begins "GAO performed the procedures contained in the enclosures to this report, which it agreed to perform solely to assist the Department of Transportation's Inspector General in ascertaining whether the net excise tax revenue distributed to the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF) and the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2013, is supported by the underlying records. GAO was not engaged to perform, and did not perform, an examination, the objective of which would have been to express an opinion on the amount of net excise taxes distributed to the AATF and the HTF during fiscal year 2013. Accordingly, GAO does not express such an opinion. This report is solely for the use of the office of Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Transportation and should not be used by those who have not agreed to the procedures or have not taken responsibility for the sufficiency of the procedures for their purposes.

  • Cargo Tank Trucks: Improved Incident Data and Regulatory Analysis Would Better Inform Decisions about Safety Risks
    United States. Government Accountability Office., 2013
    Co-Authors: United States. Government Accountability Office.
    Abstract:

    A letter report issued by the government accountability office with an abstract that begins "The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's (PHMSA) incident data cannot be used to reliably identify risks from incidents involving collisions with and spills from tank trucks' bottom lines ("wetlines") because the incidents are not specifically identified in PHMSA's database and the data contain inaccuracies. PHMSA requires carriers to report hazardous material incidents, but the reporting form does not specifically capture wetline incidents. PHMSA officials identify wetline incidents through a resource-intensive process of reviewing carrier-reported incident narratives and other information. However, GAO found that the narratives do not always clearly indicate whether an incident is wetline related and that information about the consequences of incidents, including fatalities, is not always accurate. PHMSA has made efforts to improve its data, such as adding quality checks, but this has not affected how wetline incidents are reported, and inaccuracies remain.

Murphy L Smith - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • contrast and foundation of the public oversight roles of the u s government accountability office and the u k national audit office
    Public Administration Review, 2008
    Co-Authors: Simon Dominic Norton, Murphy L Smith
    Abstract:

    This paper examines and compares, according to the New Public Management approach, the U.S. watchdog, the government accountability office, in its ability to oversee and call to account the executive branch of government, and its U.K. counterpart, the National Audit office. Results of this examination indicate that the government accountability office is more effective than its U.K. counterpart. Its greater effectiveness is attributable to the fact that it derives its powers and legitimacy from a written constitution; in contrast, in the United Kingdom there is no equivalent document defining the relationship between the state and the citizenry. As a consequence, the powers, duties, and self-perception of the National Audit office are significantly weaker and more mutable than those of the government accountability office.

Asif M Shahan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the dilemma of the supreme audit institutions autonomy or relevance a case study of the government accountability office gao
    Social Science Research Network, 2014
    Co-Authors: Asif M Shahan
    Abstract:

    The "Institutions of accountability" (IOA) are considered as important instruments for ensuring horizontal accountability and of these, the role played by the Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) is particularly important. These SAIs are set up based on the constitutional and legal framework of countries and they help the legislatures to enforce accountability, reduce fiduciary risk and measure the outcome of different programs. Even though the SAIs are supposed to be "autonomous" and free from all types of political pressure, while performing their roles and responsibilities, these institutions have to interact with different political actors. As a result of this interaction, the SAIs, through concentrating on measuring the performance of different government programs/agencies, have started playing an important role in the political/policy arena and this has made the SAIs more relevant in the political realm. Consequently, the SAIs are now facing a unique dilemma - whereas autonomy requires that the SAIs be completely independent from the political actors while performing its duties, relevance requires keeping close connection with these actors so that their recommendations are being implemented. In other words, if the institution concentrates too much on protecting its autonomy by maintaining its distance from the other political actors, it may fail in affecting the policies/programs as per its recommendations. On the other hand, if the institution focuses on being relevant in the policy arena by interacting with the political actor, it may find itself vulnerable to political demand or pressure and thereby, may lose its autonomy. This paper has attempted to capture the dynamics of the autonomy-relevance dilemma faced by the SAIs and explore the strategies adopted by these institutions in dealing with this. While doing that, it has made an effort to develop a theoretical framework as a way to begin unpacking the political relationships and roles played by SAIs throughout the world

Simon Dominic Norton - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Contrast and Foundation of the Public Oversight Roles of the Public U.S. government accountability office and the U.K. united States National Audit office versus United
    2016
    Co-Authors: Simon Dominic Norton, L. Murphy Smith, Soviet Union, L Murphy
    Abstract:

    This paper examines and compares, according to the New Public Management approach, the U.S. watchdog, the government accountability office, in its ability to oversee and call to account the executive branch of gov ernment, and its U.K. counterpart, the National Audit office. Results of this examination indicate that the Gov ernment accountability office is more effective than its U.K. counterpart. Its greater effectiveness is attributable to the fact that it derives its powers and legitimacy from a written constitution; in contrast, in the United Kingdom there is no equivalent document defining the relationship between the state and the citizenry. As a consequence, the powers, duties, and self perception of the National Audit office are significantly weaker and more mutable than those of the government accountability office.

  • contrast and foundation of the public oversight roles of the u s government accountability office and the u k national audit office
    Public Administration Review, 2008
    Co-Authors: Simon Dominic Norton, Murphy L Smith
    Abstract:

    This paper examines and compares, according to the New Public Management approach, the U.S. watchdog, the government accountability office, in its ability to oversee and call to account the executive branch of government, and its U.K. counterpart, the National Audit office. Results of this examination indicate that the government accountability office is more effective than its U.K. counterpart. Its greater effectiveness is attributable to the fact that it derives its powers and legitimacy from a written constitution; in contrast, in the United Kingdom there is no equivalent document defining the relationship between the state and the citizenry. As a consequence, the powers, duties, and self-perception of the National Audit office are significantly weaker and more mutable than those of the government accountability office.

Douglas A Brook - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • transitions in defense management reform a review of the government accountability office s chief management officer recommendation and comments for the new administration
    Social Science Research Network, 2008
    Co-Authors: Philip J Candreva, Douglas A Brook
    Abstract:

    The government accountability office believes the answer to the U.S. Defense Department’s persistent management problems is to be found in the creation of a new position, chief management officer, to oversee defense business transformation. The recommendation for this position is reviewed and used to raise questions and spur inquiry in the areas of evidence-based reform, the relationship between policy and administration, auditor overreach, and sustaining reforms through transition. The latter portion is expanded in this time of transition, and recommendations are made to the new administration to develop a management agenda, to the defense career executives to facilitate the transition, and to the next comptroller general to consider how the government accountability office’s varied roles produce outputs that align with the desired outcomes in both the policy and administration domains.