The Experts below are selected from a list of 360 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Sidney Leung - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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top management turnover firm performance and Government Control evidence from china s listed state owned enterprises
The International Journal of Accounting, 2012Co-Authors: Sidney LeungAbstract:Abstract Using a sample of 916 Chinese listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2001 to 2005, we find that the likelihood of top management turnover is negatively associated with firm performance, suggesting the existence of an effective corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy that is highly Controlled by Government. We also find that the negative turnover–performance relationship is stronger when the SOE is directly held by the central or local Government, holding a monopolistic position in a local economy or in a strategic/regulated industry. The results indicate that the market-based corporate governance mechanism that disciplines top executives as a result of poor performance is not only used in Chinese SOEs, but is used more frequently when the governance Control of SOEs is more intense. Our findings support the notion that Government Control strengthens rather than weakens the turnover–performance governance mechanism. Our additional analysis shows that this complementary effect is stronger in regions that lack pro-market institutions, such as investor protections and a functioning capital market.
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top management turnover firm performance and Government Control evidence from china s listed state owned enterprises
Social Science Research Network, 2010Co-Authors: Sidney LeungAbstract:Using a sample of 916 Chinese listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2001 to 2005, we find the likelihood of top management turnover is negatively associated with firm performance, suggesting the existence of an effective market-based corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy that is highly Controlled by Government. We also find that the negative turnover-performance relationship is stronger when the SOE is held by central Government, directly held by local Government, holds a monopolistic position in local economy or in a strategic/regulated industry. The results indicate that the market-based corporate governance mechanism that punishes top executives as a result of poor performance is not only used in Chinese SOEs, but is more frequently used when the governance Control of SOEs is more intensive. Our findings support the notion that Government Control strengthens rather than weakens the turnover-performance governance mechanism. Our additional analysis shows that this complementary effect persists in the regions lack of pro-market institutions such as investor protections and functioning capital market.
Walid Saffar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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national culture and privatization the relationship between collectivism and residual state ownership
Journal of International Business Studies, 2016Co-Authors: Narjess Boubakri, Omrane Guedhami, Chuck C Y Kwok, Walid SaffarAbstract:Using a large hand-collected database of 605 privatized firms from 48 countries, we examine the relationship between the collectivism measure of culture and residual state ownership in privatized firms. We find that the continued role of Government in privatized firms is positively related to collectivism. This result is robust to using alternative measures of collectivism and Government Control, as well as when we address the endogeneity of collectivism. Finally, we examine the economic outcomes of culture at the firm level, focusing primarily on performance, efficiency, risk-taking, and valuation measures. We report that privatized firms with high residual state ownership exhibit lower performance, valuation, efficiency, and risk-taking in collectivist societies. Our results suggest that formal institutions are not, as sustained by previous studies, the main/exclusive constraints on the privatization reform.
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the role of state and foreign owners in corporate risk taking evidence from privatization
Journal of Financial Economics, 2013Co-Authors: Narjess Boubakri, Jeanclaude Cosset, Walid SaffarAbstract:Using a unique database of 381 newly privatized firms from 57 countries, we investigate the impact of shareholders' identity on corporate risk-taking behavior. We find strong and robust evidence that state (foreign) ownership is negatively (positively) related to corporate risk-taking. Moreover, we find that high risk-taking by foreign owners depends on the strength of country-level governance institutions. Our results suggest that relinquishment of Government Control, openness to foreign investment, and improvement of country-level governance institutions are key determining factors of corporate risk-taking in newly privatized firms.
Narjess Boubakri - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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post privatization state ownership and bank risk taking cross country evidence
Journal of Corporate Finance, 2020Co-Authors: Narjess Boubakri, Sadok El Ghoul, Omrane Guedhami, Mahmud HossainAbstract:Abstract We examine the relation between state residual ownership and bank risk-taking for privatized banks from 45 countries. Applying propensity score matching, we find that privatized banks tend to exhibit higher levels of risk-taking post-privatization than their publicly listed non-privatized counterparts. Moreover, partially privatized banks exhibit higher levels of risk-taking than fully privatized banks. We also observe a positive and significant relation between the level of residual state ownership and risk-taking. These findings are consistent with the distorted objectives associated with Government Control, as suggested by the political benefits of Control, and with the soft budget constraint views of state ownership. The distortion can be mitigated by the quality of a country's institutional and regulatory environments. Finally, our results show that the effect of state ownership on risk-taking is more pronounced in countries with a higher dominance of state-owned enterprises, and it was more prevalent during the global financial crisis.
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national culture and privatization the relationship between collectivism and residual state ownership
Journal of International Business Studies, 2016Co-Authors: Narjess Boubakri, Omrane Guedhami, Chuck C Y Kwok, Walid SaffarAbstract:Using a large hand-collected database of 605 privatized firms from 48 countries, we examine the relationship between the collectivism measure of culture and residual state ownership in privatized firms. We find that the continued role of Government in privatized firms is positively related to collectivism. This result is robust to using alternative measures of collectivism and Government Control, as well as when we address the endogeneity of collectivism. Finally, we examine the economic outcomes of culture at the firm level, focusing primarily on performance, efficiency, risk-taking, and valuation measures. We report that privatized firms with high residual state ownership exhibit lower performance, valuation, efficiency, and risk-taking in collectivist societies. Our results suggest that formal institutions are not, as sustained by previous studies, the main/exclusive constraints on the privatization reform.
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the role of state and foreign owners in corporate risk taking evidence from privatization
Journal of Financial Economics, 2013Co-Authors: Narjess Boubakri, Jeanclaude Cosset, Walid SaffarAbstract:Using a unique database of 381 newly privatized firms from 57 countries, we investigate the impact of shareholders' identity on corporate risk-taking behavior. We find strong and robust evidence that state (foreign) ownership is negatively (positively) related to corporate risk-taking. Moreover, we find that high risk-taking by foreign owners depends on the strength of country-level governance institutions. Our results suggest that relinquishment of Government Control, openness to foreign investment, and improvement of country-level governance institutions are key determining factors of corporate risk-taking in newly privatized firms.
Xueyong Zhan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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embedded Government Control and nonprofit revenue growth
Public Administration Review, 2017Co-Authors: Na Ni, Xueyong ZhanAbstract:This research combines insights from resource dependence and institutional theories to examine the growth of Chinese nonprofit revenues. We propose the concept of “embedded Government Control” (EGC) to capture the complexity of Government-nonprofit relationship: Government regulation of nonprofits’ public fundraising qualification and the political embeddedness of nonprofits with the Government. Using a dataset of 2,159 Chinese philanthropic foundations for the period of 2005-2012, we tested hypotheses about the implications of EGC for nonprofit revenues in China following two major external shocks, the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008 and the Guo Meimei scandal in 2011. Our empirical analysis shows that EGC can help philanthropic foundations get more Government subsidies, donations, and market revenue. Yet, external shocks may either strengthen or weaken the enabling role of EGC in helping foundations acquire relatively more donations.
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embedded Government Control and nonprofit revenue growth
Public Administration Review, 2017Co-Authors: Xueyong ZhanAbstract:This research combines insights from resource dependence and institutional theories to examine the growth of Chinese nonprofit revenues. The authors propose the concept of embedded Government Control (EGC) to capture the complexity of the Government–nonprofit relationship along two dimensions: Government regulation of nonprofits’ public fund-raising qualifications and the political embeddedness of nonprofits with the Government. Using a data set of 2,159 Chinese philanthropic foundations for the period 2005–12, the authors test hypotheses about the implications of EGC for nonprofit revenues in China following two major external shocks: the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008 and the Guo Meimei scandal in 2011. The empirical analysis shows that EGC can help philanthropic foundations obtain more Government subsidies, donations, and market revenues. However, external shocks may either strengthen or weaken the enabling role of EGC in helping foundations acquire relatively more donations.
Konstantin Sonin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Government Control of the media
Journal of Public Economics, 2014Co-Authors: Scott Gehlbach, Konstantin SoninAbstract:Abstract We present a formal model of Government Control of the media to illuminate variation in media freedom across countries and over time. Media bias is greater and state ownership of the media more likely when the Government has a particular interest in mobilizing citizens to take actions that further some political objective but are not necessarily in citizens' individual best interest; however, the distinction between state and private media is smaller. Large advertising markets reduce media bias in both state and private media but increase the incentive for the Government to nationalize private media. Media bias in state and private media markets diverge as Governments become more democratic, whereas media bias in democracies and autocracies converge as positive externalities from mobilization increase.
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Government Control of the Media
Research Papers in Economics, 2008Co-Authors: Scott Gehlbach, Konstantin SoninAbstract:We present a formal model of Government Control of the media to illuminate variation in media freedom across countries and over time, with particular application to less democratic states. The extent of media freedom depends critically on two variables: the mobilizing character of the Government and the size of the advertising market. Media bias is greater and state ownership of the media more likely when the need for mobilization is large; however, the distinction between state and private media is smaller. Large advertising markets reduce media bias in both state and private media, but increase the incentive for the Government to nationalize private media. We illustrate these arguments with a case study of media freedom in postcommunist Russia, where media bias has responded to the mobilizing needs of the Kremlin and Government Control over the media has grown in tandem with the size of the advertising market.
