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Ernst Fehr - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Normative foundations of Human Cooperation
Nature Human Behaviour, 2018Co-Authors: Ernst Fehr, Ivo SchurtenbergerAbstract:Fehr and Schurtenberger show that the prevailing evidence supports the view that social norms are causal drivers of Human Cooperation and explain major Cooperation-related regularities. Norms also guide peer punishment and people have strong preferences for institutions that support norm formation. A large literature shares the view that social norms shape Human Cooperation, but without a clean empirical identification of the relevant norms almost every behaviour can be rationalized as norm driven, thus rendering norms useless as an explanatory construct. This raises the question of whether social norms are indeed causal drivers of behaviour and can convincingly explain major Cooperation-related regularities. Here, we show that the norm of conditional Cooperation provides such an explanation, that powerful methods for its empirical identification exist and that social norms have causal effects. Norm compliance rests on fundamental Human motives (‘social preferences’) that also imply a willingness to punish free-riders, but normative constraints on peer punishment are important for its effectiveness and welfare properties. If given the chance, a large majority of people favour the imposition of such constraints through the migration to institutional environments that enable the normative guidance of Cooperation and norm enforcement behaviours.
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normative foundations of Human Cooperation
Nature Human Behaviour, 2018Co-Authors: Ernst Fehr, Ivo SchurtenbergerAbstract:A large literature shares the view that social norms shape Human Cooperation, but without a clean empirical identification of the relevant norms almost every behaviour can be rationalized as norm driven, thus rendering norms useless as an explanatory construct. This raises the question of whether social norms are indeed causal drivers of behaviour and can convincingly explain major Cooperation-related regularities. Here, we show that the norm of conditional Cooperation provides such an explanation, that powerful methods for its empirical identification exist and that social norms have causal effects. Norm compliance rests on fundamental Human motives (‘social preferences’) that also imply a willingness to punish free-riders, but normative constraints on peer punishment are important for its effectiveness and welfare properties. If given the chance, a large majority of people favour the imposition of such constraints through the migration to institutional environments that enable the normative guidance of Cooperation and norm enforcement behaviours.
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Human Altruism – Proximate Patterns and Evolutionary Origins
Analyse & Kritik, 2005Co-Authors: Ernst Fehr, Urs FischbacherAbstract:AbstractAre people selfish or altruistic? Throughout history this question has been answered on the basis of much introspection and little evidence. It has been at the heart of many controversial debates in politics, science, and philosophy. Some of the most fundamental questions concerning our evolutionary origins, our social relations, and the organization of society are centered around issues of altruism and selfishness. Experimental evidence indicates that Human altruism is a powerful force and unique in the animal world. However, there is much individual heterogeneity and the interaction between altruists and selfish individuals is key for understanding the evolutionary dynamics as well as the proximate patterns of Human Cooperation. Depending on the environment, a minority of altruists can force a majority of selfish individuals to cooperate or, conversely, a few egoists can induce a large number of altruists to defect. Current gene-based evolutionary theories cannot explain important patterns of Human altruism pointing towards the need for theories of cultural evolution and gene-culture coevolution.
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Social norms and Human Cooperation
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2004Co-Authors: Ernst Fehr, Urs FischbacherAbstract:The existence of social norms is one of the big unsolved problems in social cognitive science. Although no other concept is invoked more frequently in the social sciences, we still know little about how social norms are formed, the forces determining their content, and the cognitive and emotional requirements that enable a species to establish and enforce social norms. In recent years, there has been substantial progress, however, on how Cooperation norms are enforced. Here we review evidence showing that sanctions are decisive for norm enforcement, and that they are largely driven by non-selfish motives. Moreover, the explicit study of sanctioning behavior provides instruments for measuring social norms and has also led to deeper insights into the proximate and ultimate forces behind Human Cooperation.
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the nature of Human altruism
Nature, 2003Co-Authors: Ernst Fehr, Urs FischbacherAbstract:Some of the most fundamental questions concerning our evolutionary origins, our social relations, and the organization of society are centred around issues of altruism and selfishness. Experimental evidence indicates that Human altruism is a powerful force and is unique in the animal world. However, there is much individual heterogeneity and the interaction between altruists and selfish individuals is vital to Human Cooperation. Depending on the environment, a minority of altruists can force a majority of selfish individuals to cooperate or, conversely, a few egoists can induce a large number of altruists to defect. Current gene-based evolutionary theories cannot explain important patterns of Human altruism, pointing towards the importance of both theories of cultural evolution as well as gene–culture co-evolution.
Urs Fischbacher - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Human Altruism – Proximate Patterns and Evolutionary Origins
Analyse & Kritik, 2005Co-Authors: Ernst Fehr, Urs FischbacherAbstract:AbstractAre people selfish or altruistic? Throughout history this question has been answered on the basis of much introspection and little evidence. It has been at the heart of many controversial debates in politics, science, and philosophy. Some of the most fundamental questions concerning our evolutionary origins, our social relations, and the organization of society are centered around issues of altruism and selfishness. Experimental evidence indicates that Human altruism is a powerful force and unique in the animal world. However, there is much individual heterogeneity and the interaction between altruists and selfish individuals is key for understanding the evolutionary dynamics as well as the proximate patterns of Human Cooperation. Depending on the environment, a minority of altruists can force a majority of selfish individuals to cooperate or, conversely, a few egoists can induce a large number of altruists to defect. Current gene-based evolutionary theories cannot explain important patterns of Human altruism pointing towards the need for theories of cultural evolution and gene-culture coevolution.
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Social norms and Human Cooperation
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2004Co-Authors: Ernst Fehr, Urs FischbacherAbstract:The existence of social norms is one of the big unsolved problems in social cognitive science. Although no other concept is invoked more frequently in the social sciences, we still know little about how social norms are formed, the forces determining their content, and the cognitive and emotional requirements that enable a species to establish and enforce social norms. In recent years, there has been substantial progress, however, on how Cooperation norms are enforced. Here we review evidence showing that sanctions are decisive for norm enforcement, and that they are largely driven by non-selfish motives. Moreover, the explicit study of sanctioning behavior provides instruments for measuring social norms and has also led to deeper insights into the proximate and ultimate forces behind Human Cooperation.
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the nature of Human altruism
Nature, 2003Co-Authors: Ernst Fehr, Urs FischbacherAbstract:Some of the most fundamental questions concerning our evolutionary origins, our social relations, and the organization of society are centred around issues of altruism and selfishness. Experimental evidence indicates that Human altruism is a powerful force and is unique in the animal world. However, there is much individual heterogeneity and the interaction between altruists and selfish individuals is vital to Human Cooperation. Depending on the environment, a minority of altruists can force a majority of selfish individuals to cooperate or, conversely, a few egoists can induce a large number of altruists to defect. Current gene-based evolutionary theories cannot explain important patterns of Human altruism, pointing towards the importance of both theories of cultural evolution as well as gene–culture co-evolution.
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strong reciprocity Human Cooperation and the enforcement of social norms
Public Economics, 2003Co-Authors: Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher, Simon GächterAbstract:This paper provides strong evidence challenging the self-interest assumption that dominates the behavioral sciences and much evolutionary thinking. The evidence indicates that many people have a tendency to voluntarily cooperate, if treated fairly, and to punish non-cooperators. We call this behavioral propensity ‘strong reciprocity’ and show empirically that it can lead to almost universal Cooperation in circumstances in which purely self-interested behavior would cause a complete breakdown of Cooperation. In addition, we show that people are willing to punish those who behaved unfairly towards a third person or who defected in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a third person. This suggests that strong reciprocity is a powerful device for the enforcement of social norms like, e.g., food-sharing norms or collective action norms. Strong Reciprocity cannot be rationalized as an adaptive trait by the leading evolutionary theories of Human Cooperation, i.e., by kin selection theory, reciprocal altruism theory, indirect reciprocity theory and costly signaling theory. However, multi-level selection theories and theories of cultural evolution are consistent with strong reciprocity.
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Strong reciprocity, Human Cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms
Human Nature, 2002Co-Authors: Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher, Simon GächterAbstract:This paper provides strong evidence challenging the self-interest assumption that dominates the behavioral sciences and much evolutionary thinking. The evidence indicates that many people have a tendency to voluntarily cooperate, if treated fairly, and to punish noncooperators. We call this behavioral propensity “strong reciprocity” and show empirically that it can lead to almost universal Cooperation in circumstances in which purely self-interested behavior would cause a complete breakdown of Cooperation. In addition, we show that people are willing to punish those who behaved unfairly towards a third person or who defected in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a third person. This suggests that strong reciprocity is a powerful device for the enforcement of social norms involving, for example, food sharing or collective action. Strong reciprocity cannot be rationalized as an adaptive trait by the leading evolutionary theories of Human Cooperation (in other words, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, and costly signaling theory). However, multilevel selection theories of cultural evolution are consistent with strong reciprocity.
Joseph Henrich - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the origins and psychology of Human Cooperation
Annual Review of Psychology, 2021Co-Authors: Joseph Henrich, Michael MuthukrishnaAbstract:Humans are an ultrasocial species. This sociality, however, cannot be fully explained by the canonical approaches found in evolutionary biology, psychology, or economics. Understanding our unique s...
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how exploitation launched Human Cooperation
Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 2019Co-Authors: Rahul Bhui, Joseph Henrich, Maciej ChudekAbstract:Cooperation plays a crucial role in primate social life. However, the evolution of large-scale Human Cooperation from the cognitive fundamentals found in other primates remains an evolutionary puzzle. Most theoretical work focuses on positive reciprocity (helping) or coordinated punishment by assuming well-defined social roles or institutions (e.g., punishment pools), sophisticated cognitive abilities for navigating these, and sufficiently harmonious communities to allow for mutual aid. Here we explore the evolutionary and developmental origins of these assumed preconditions by showing how negative indirect reciprocity (NIR)—tolerated exploitation of those with bad reputations—can suppress misbehavior to foster harmonious communities, favor the cognitive abilities often assumed by other models, and support costly adherence to norms (including contributing to public goods). With minimal cognitive prerequisites, NIR sustains Cooperation when exploitation is inefficient (victims suffer greatly; exploiters gain little), which is more plausible earlier in Human evolutionary history than the efficient helping found in many models. Moreover, as auxiliary opportunities to improve one’s reputation become more frequent, the communal benefits provided in equilibrium grow, although NIR becomes harder to maintain. This analysis suggests that NIR could have fostered prosociality across a broader spectrum of primate societies and set the stage for the evolution of more complex forms of positive Cooperation. The evolutionary origins of Human Cooperation and prosociality remain an evolutionary puzzle. Theoretical models exploring the dynamics which shaped our ancestors’ interactions stimulate empirical investigations by anthropologists, primatologists, psychologists, archeologists and others, whose results in turn refine and direct theoretical inquiry. Common experience has focused this scholarly synergy on positive Cooperation (cooperating by helping) and largely neglected the distinct and important challenge of negative Cooperation (cooperating by not exploiting). Our contribution puts negative Cooperation back in the spotlight. We outline what makes negative Cooperation, especially negative indirect reciprocity, different and potentially more potent than positive Cooperation, and present a simple model of how it emerges, shapes interactions, and can form a dynamic foundation that catalyzes more sophisticated forms of Cooperation.
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Human Cooperation the hunter gatherer puzzle
Current Biology, 2018Co-Authors: Joseph HenrichAbstract:In tracing the roots of Human Cooperation, researchers have gleaned insights from the sociality of contemporary hunter-gatherers. A new study among the Hadza, one of the few surviving foraging populations, challenges popular approaches to Cooperation while suggesting a central role for cultural transmission.
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Rapid cultural adaptation can facilitate the evolution of large-scale Cooperation
Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 2011Co-Authors: Robert Boyd, Peter J Richerson, Joseph HenrichAbstract:Over the past several decades, we have argued that cultural evolution can facilitate the evolution of large-scale Cooperation because it often leads to more rapid adaptation than genetic evolution, and, when multiple stable equilibria exist, rapid adaptation leads to variation among groups. Recently, Lehmann, Feldman, and colleagues have published several papers questioning this argument. They analyze models showing that cultural evolution can actually reduce the range of conditions under which Cooperation can evolve and interpret these models as indicating that we were wrong to conclude that culture facilitated the evolution of Human Cooperation. In the main, their models assume that rates of cultural adaption are not strong enough compared to migration to maintain persistent variation among groups when payoffs create multiple stable equilibria. We show that Lehmann et al. reach different conclusions because they have made different assumptions. We argue that the assumptions that underlie our models are more consistent with the empirical data on large-scale cultural variation in Humans than those of Lehmann et al., and thus, our models provide a more plausible account of the cultural evolution of Human Cooperation in large groups.
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constraining free riding in public goods games designated solitary punishers can sustain Human Cooperation
Proceedings of The Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 2009Co-Authors: Rick Ogorman, Joseph Henrich, Mark Van VugtAbstract:Much of Human Cooperation remains an evolutionary riddle. Unlike other animals, people frequently cooperate with non-relatives in large groups. Evolutionary models of large-scale Cooperation require not just incentives for Cooperation, but also a credible disincentive for free riding. Various theoretical solutions have been proposed and experimentally explored, including reputation monitoring and diffuse punishment. Here, we empirically examine an alternative theoretical proposal: responsibility for punishment can be borne by one specific individual. This experiment shows that allowing a single individual to punish increases Cooperation to the same level as allowing each group member to punish and results in greater group profits. These results suggest a potential key function of leadership in Human groups and provides further evidence supporting that Humans will readily and knowingly behave altruistically.
Attila Szolnoki - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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statistical physics of Human Cooperation
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Matjaz Perc, Jillian J Jordan, David G Rand, Zhen Wang, Stefano Boccaletti, Attila SzolnokiAbstract:Extensive Cooperation among unrelated individuals is unique to Humans, who often sacrifice personal benefits for the common good and work together to achieve what they are unable to execute alone. The evolutionary success of our species is indeed due, to a large degree, to our unparalleled other-regarding abilities. Yet, a comprehensive understanding of Human Cooperation remains a formidable challenge. Recent research in social science indicates that it is important to focus on the collective behavior that emerges as the result of the interactions among individuals, groups, and even societies. Non-equilibrium statistical physics, in particular Monte Carlo methods and the theory of collective behavior of interacting particles near phase transition points, has proven to be very valuable for understanding counterintuitive evolutionary outcomes. By studying models of Human Cooperation as classical spin models, a physicist can draw on familiar settings from statistical physics. However, unlike pairwise interactions among particles that typically govern solid-state physics systems, interactions among Humans often involve group interactions, and they also involve a larger number of possible states even for the most simplified description of reality. The complexity of solutions therefore often surpasses that observed in physical systems. Here we review experimental and theoretical research that advances our understanding of Human Cooperation, focusing on spatial pattern formation, on the spatiotemporal dynamics of observed solutions, and on self-organization that may either promote or hinder socially favorable states.
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statistical physics of Human Cooperation
Physics Reports, 2017Co-Authors: Matjaz Perc, Jillian J Jordan, David G Rand, Zhen Wang, Stefano Boccaletti, Attila SzolnokiAbstract:Abstract Extensive Cooperation among unrelated individuals is unique to Humans, who often sacrifice personal benefits for the common good and work together to achieve what they are unable to execute alone. The evolutionary success of our species is indeed due, to a large degree, to our unparalleled other-regarding abilities. Yet, a comprehensive understanding of Human Cooperation remains a formidable challenge. Recent research in the social sciences indicates that it is important to focus on the collective behavior that emerges as the result of the interactions among individuals, groups, and even societies. Non-equilibrium statistical physics, in particular Monte Carlo methods and the theory of collective behavior of interacting particles near phase transition points, has proven to be very valuable for understanding counterintuitive evolutionary outcomes. By treating models of Human Cooperation as classical spin models, a physicist can draw on familiar settings from statistical physics. However, unlike pairwise interactions among particles that typically govern solid-state physics systems, interactions among Humans often involve group interactions, and they also involve a larger number of possible states even for the most simplified description of reality. The complexity of solutions therefore often surpasses that observed in physical systems. Here we review experimental and theoretical research that advances our understanding of Human Cooperation, focusing on spatial pattern formation, on the spatiotemporal dynamics of observed solutions, and on self-organization that may either promote or hinder socially favorable states.
Valerio Capraro - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a model of Human Cooperation in social dilemmas
PLOS ONE, 2013Co-Authors: Valerio CapraroAbstract:Social dilemmas are situations in which collective interests are at odds with private interests: pollution, depletion of natural resources, and intergroup conflicts, are at their core social dilemmas. Because of their multidisciplinarity and their importance, social dilemmas have been studied by economists, biologists, psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists. These studies typically explain tendency to Cooperation by dividing people in proself and prosocial types, or appealing to forms of external control or, in iterated social dilemmas, to long-term strategies. But recent experiments have shown that Cooperation is possible even in one-shot social dilemmas without forms of external control and the rate of Cooperation typically depends on the payoffs. This makes impossible a predictive division between proself and prosocial people and proves that people have attitude to Cooperation by nature. The key innovation of this article is in fact to postulate that Humans have attitude to Cooperation by nature and consequently they do not act a priori as single agents, as assumed by standard economic models, but they forecast how a social dilemma would evolve if they formed coalitions and then they act according to their most optimistic forecast. Formalizing this idea we propose the first predictive model of Human Cooperation able to organize a number of different experimental findings that are not explained by the standard model. We show also that the model makes satisfactorily accurate quantitative predictions of population average behavior in one-shot social dilemmas.
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a model of Human Cooperation in social dilemmas
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Valerio CapraroAbstract:Social dilemmas are situations in which collective interests are at odds with private interests: pollution, depletion of natural resources, and intergroup conflicts, are at their core social dilemmas. Because of their multidisciplinarity and their importance, social dilemmas have been studied by economists, biologists, psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists. These studies typically explain tendency to Cooperation by dividing people in proself and prosocial types, or appealing to forms of external control or, in iterated social dilemmas, to long-term strategies. But recent experiments have shown that Cooperation is possible even in one-shot social dilemmas without forms of external control and the rate of Cooperation typically depends on the payoffs. This makes impossible a predictive division between proself and prosocial people and proves that people have attitude to Cooperation by nature.The key innovation of this article is in fact to postulate that Humans have attitude to Cooperation by nature and consequently they do not act a priori as single agents, as assumed by standard economic models, but they forecast how a social dilemma would evolve if they formed coalitions and then they act according to their best forecast. Formalizing this idea we argue the first predictive model of Human Cooperation able to organize a number of different experimental findings that are not explained by the standard model. We show also that the model makes satisfactorily accurate quantitative predictions of population average behavior in one-shot social dilemmas.
