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Samantha Besson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Holders of Human Rights
The Oxford Handbook of Global Justice, 2020Co-Authors: Samantha BessonAbstract:International Human Rights law and practice reveal an ambivalent approach to the personal scope of Human Rights: Human Rights are often less equal or general than they claim and are claimed to be. The inequalities of Human Rights are of two kinds: some vulnerable individuals are also protected by special Rights, thus drawing an internal boundary within the scope of Human Rights-holders, while others have limited or no Human Rights at all, thus delineating an external boundary around the scope of Human Rights-holders. This chapter presents an argument that fits and justifies the core of the practice of international Human Rights law regarding the scope of Human Rights-holders, while criticizing it at the same time for some of its contradictions. More specifically, it argues for an egalitarian reading of Human Rights, before accounting on that basis for the Humanity-based, capacity-related, and individualistic boundaries of Human Rights, on the one hand, and defending it against the tendency to expand the scope of special Rights beyond what it refers to as justified “non-discriminatory Rights” and “developing Rights,” on the other.
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Legal Human Rights Theory
2016Co-Authors: Samantha BessonAbstract:The chapter's concern is meta‐theoretical and pertains to the nature of Human Rights theory. Interestingly, most Human Rights theorists do not spend much time stating what their theory is a theory of, and hence what kind of theory it should be. The chapter argues in favour of taking the legal dimension of Human Rights more seriously and, more specifically, for a legal theory of Human Rights. Making Human Rights law the object of Human Rights theory has two advantages: one substantive and the other methodological. First of all, it makes for a deeper understanding of the nature of Human Rights as a practice, and hence of many questions in Human Rights theory. A second benefit lies in the resources of legal theorizing, and in particular the latter's experience in explaining and evaluating normative practises. A related contribution of the proposed legal Human Rights theory is that it can bridge the gap that has grown within existing Human Rights theories between Human Rights practice and Human Rights standards, and so‐doing reconcile so‐called “political” and “ethical” Human Rights theories out of their sterile opposition.
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Subsidiarity in International Human Rights Law. What is Subsidiary about Human Rights ?
The American Journal of Jurisprudence, 2016Co-Authors: Samantha BessonAbstract:Subsidiarity is en vogue in international Human Rights law. From a largely implicit and mainly jurisprudential principle used in discrete guises by international Human Rights courts, it has become increasingly present in Human Rights reasoning and is about to become entrenched in the text of international Human Rights treaties. Past the usual truisms about States having the primary responsibility to secure Human Rights and international Human Rights institutions having only a supervisory function, however, the notion, role and justification of subsidiarity in international Human Rights law remain very difficult to capture. Broadly speaking, scholarly strategies have divided into two groups. Most authors focus on one aspect of subsidiarity (usually the margin of appreciation of domestic authorities), while fewer look for the broader underpinning principle. The former often neglect the broader question, however, while the latter have often been lured by one dimension of the prestigious history of the principle of subsidiarity and conflate subsidiarity in international Human Rights law with one or many of its different conceptions in other legal and political contexts (e.g. in a federal state or in the European Union). In this article, I argue that the concept of subsidiarity is at play in international Human Rights law, but that Human Rights subsidiarity is very different from the other conceptions of subsidiarity we know of. To understand it, we need to go back to the relationship between Human Rights and (democratic) politics and, accordingly, to the role of international Human Rights law and its complementary relation to domestic Human Rights law. The proposed argument is three-pronged. After a first section on subsidiarity in international Human Rights law and the different shapes it takes in practice, the second section compares Human Rights subsidiarity with the subsidiarity encountered in other social, political and legal contexts, and does so with respect to different dimensions of subsidiarity: its subjects, objects, functions, justifications, tests, limits and reviews. The third section draws various implications of the specificity of Human Rights subsidiarity, and in particular for how we should go about interpreting it and addressing some of the challenges it is currently facing in practice.
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The Bearers of Human Rights Duties and Responsibilities for Human Rights - A Quiet (R)Evolution
Social Philosophy and Policy, 2015Co-Authors: Samantha BessonAbstract:Recent years have seen an increase of interest on the part of Human Rights theorists in the “supply-side” of Human Rights, i.e., in the duties or obligations correlative to Human Rights. Nevertheless, faced with the practically urgent and seemingly simple question of who owes the duties related to international Human Rights, few Human Rights theorists provide an elaborate answer. While some make a point of fitting the Human Rights practice and hence regard states as the sole Human Rights duty-bearers merely by referring to that practice, others criticize the “state-centric” approach to Human Rights duty-bearers and expand the scope of the latter to include any international institution beyond the state and even private actors. Curiously, however, even those more expansive accounts of Human Rights duty-bearers are usually very evasive about why it should be so and especially how it should work. The time has come to broach anew the issue of the bearers of Human Rights duties, and responsibilities of international institutions in Human Rights theory, addressing two challenges: focusing on relational and directed Human Rights duties specifically and not on duties of global justice in general, thereby distinguishing between Human Rights duty-bearers and other bearers of responsibilities for Human Rights, on the one hand, and accounting for and justifying the point of international Human Rights law and practice in this respect, thereby also securing internal arguments for reform, on the other. The essay’s argument is four-pronged. It starts with a few reminders about the relational nature of Human Rights and the relationship between Human Rights and duties and what this means for the specification of Human Rights duties. It then focuses more specifically on the identification of Human Rights duty-bearers, i.e., states and international institutions of jurisdiction like the European Union (EU), and the allocation of Human Rights duties to them. The third section of the article is devoted to the concurrent moral responsibilities for Human Rights that are incurred by other various responsibility-bearers outside institutions of jurisdiction. In the final section, the essay considers the (quiet) revolution potential of the EU’s fast-developing Human Rights’ duties, and discusses the normative implications of the development of universal international institutions’ Human Rights duties stricto sensu for international law and politics more generally.
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The Bearers of Human Rights Duties and Responsibilities for Human Rights: A Quiet (R)Evolution
Social Philosophy and Policy, 2015Co-Authors: Samantha BessonAbstract:Recent years have seen an increase of interest on the part of Human Rights theorists in the \textquotedblleftsupply-side\textquotedblright of Human Rights, i.e., in the duties or obligations correlative to Human Rights. Nevertheless, faced with the practically urgent and seemingly simple question of who owes the duties related to international Human Rights, few Human Rights theorists provide an elaborate answer. While some make a point of fitting the Human Rights practice and hence regard states as the sole Human Rights duty-bearers merely by referring to that practice, others criticize the \textquotedblleftstate-centric\textquotedblright approach to Human Rights duty-bearers and expand the scope of the latter to include any international institution beyond the state and even private actors. Curiously, however, even those more expansive accounts of Human Rights duty-bearers are usually very evasive about why it should be so and especially how it should work. The time has come to broach anew the issue of the bearers of Human Rights duties, and responsibilities of international institutions in Human Rights theory, addressing two challenges: focusing on relational and directed Human Rights duties specifically and not on duties of global justice in general, thereby distinguishing between Human Rights duty-bearers and other bearers of responsibilities for Human Rights, on the one hand, and accounting for and justifying the point of international Human Rights law and practice in this respect, thereby also securing internal arguments for reform, on the other. The essay\textquoteRights argument is four-pronged. It starts with a few reminders about the relational nature of Human Rights and the relationship between Human Rights and duties and what this means for the specification of Human Rights duties. It then focuses more specifically on the identification of Human Rights duty-bearers, i.e., states and international institutions of jurisdiction like the European Union (EU), and the allocation of Human Rights duties to them. The third section of the article is devoted to the concurrent moral responsibilities for Human Rights that are incurred by other various responsibility-bearers outside institutions of jurisdiction. In the final section, the essay considers the (quiet) revolution potential of the EU\textquoteRights fast-developing Human Rights\textquoteright duties, and discusses the normative implications of the development of universal international institutions\textquoteright Human Rights duties stricto sensu for international law and politics more generally.
Lynn Angela Mowson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Human Rights & Animal Ethics Research Network | Human Rights & Animal Ethics Research Network
2016Co-Authors: Lynn Angela MowsonAbstract:Human Rights & Animal Ethics Research Network: Human Rights & Animal Ethics Research Network - The Faculty of Arts is...
George Ulrich - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Human Rights Diplomacy: Contemporary Perspectives - Human Rights diplomacy : contemporary perspectives
2011Co-Authors: Amrei Mueller, Michael O'flaherty, Zdzisław Kędzia, George UlrichAbstract:Foreword Kyung-wha Kang, Deputy UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Notes on Contributors Acknowledgments 1 Introduction 2 Framework for the Analysis of Human Rights Diplomacy George Ulrich 3 A Short Reflection on Human Rights Diplomacy Robert Archer 4 The Role of Human Rights Ambassadors in Human Rights Diplomacy - Perspectives from Spain Silvia Escobar 5 The Human Rights Diplomacy of Small States Eamonn Mac Aodha 6 The European Union as a Human Rights Actor Toby King 7 Human Rights Diplomacy and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Thomas Hammarberg and Isil Gachet 8 Human Rights Diplomacy from a UN Perspective: A Complement to Advocacy Ibrahim Salama 9 The United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies as Diplomatic Actors Michael O'Flaherty 10 Human Rights Diplomacy of the UN Secretary-General Bertrand Ramcharan 11 Human Rights Diplomacy of the United Nations Security Council Joanna Weschler 12 Conference Diplomacy and Human Rights Zdzislaw Kedzia 13 Human Rights Diplomacy: The NGO Role Peggy Hicks 14 National Human Rights Institutions as Diplomacy Actors Kirsten Roberts 15 The Relevance of the Multi-Stakeholder Approach and Multi-Track Diplomacy for Human Rights Diplomacy Wolfgang Benedek Annex: Report on the High-Level Workshop on Human Rights Diplomacy, Venice, 30-31 January 2009 Select Bibliography.
Jim Ife - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Human Rights and Social Work: The Three Generations of Human Rights
Human Rights and Social Work, 2001Co-Authors: Jim IfeAbstract:The academic literature on Human Rights has been dominated by three disciplines: law, philosophy and politics. Although social workers have for a long time liked to talk about Rights (Centre for Human Rights 1994; Tan & Envall 2000), especially welfare Rights, Rights-based practice, and the Rights of particular disadvantaged groups, a thorough analysis of Human Rights and their implications has not been prominent in the social work literature, and lawyers, political scientists and philosophers have dominated the discourse. In terms of Human Rights practice – the theme of this book – the field has been dominated by lawyers, who are widely regarded as the main Human Rights professionals. Most edited collections of articles on Human Rights, and journals dedicated to Human Rights, are written and edited by lawyers, and the law is commonly seen as the primary mechanism for the safeguarding of Human Rights and the prevention of Human Rights abuses (Beetham 1999). Emphasis has been on legislation and on Human Rights treaties and conventions, and much of the literature is concerned with their analysis and implementation (Mahoney & Mahoney 1993). Many countries have Human Rights commissions, whose membership is dominated by people with legal training, and which operate in a legal or quasilegal way, for example by hearing complaints and making judgments which have legal force. There is no doubt that legal processes and the practice of the legal profession have contributed a great deal towards the establishment and the safeguarding of Human Rights, and that lawyers have an important role to play in this regard.
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Human Rights and Social Work: Human Rights: Beyond Traditional Formulations
Human Rights and Social Work, 1Co-Authors: Jim IfeAbstract:T he academic literature on Human Rights has been dominated by three disciplines: law, philosophy and politics. Although social workers have for a long time liked to talk about Rights (Centre for Human Rights 1994; Tan & Envall 2000), especially welfare Rights, Rights-based practice, and the Rights of particular disadvantaged groups, a thorough analysis of Human Rights and their implications has not been prominent in the social work literature, and lawyers, political scientists and philosophers have dominated the discourse. In terms of Human Rights practice – the theme of this book – the field has been dominated by lawyers, who are widely regarded as the main Human Rights professionals, though there is now the beginnings of a social work literature on Human Rights (Solas 2000; Reichert 2003, 2007). Most edited collections of articles on Human Rights, and journals dedicated to Human Rights, are written and edited by lawyers, and the law is commonly seen as the primary mechanism for the safeguarding of Human Rights and the prevention of Human Rights abuses (Beetham 1999; Douzinas 2000). Emphasis has been on legislation and on Human Rights treaties and conventions, and much of the literature is concerned with their analysis and implementation (Mahoney & Mahoney 1993). Many countries have Human Rights commissions, whose membership is dominated by people with legal training, and which operate in a legal or quasi-legal way, for example by hearing complaints and making judgments which have legal force.
Alain Zysset - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Human Rights theory and Human Rights history - A tale of two odd bedfellows
2012Co-Authors: Samantha Besson, Alain ZyssetAbstract:The burgeoning of recent publications on Human Rights shows how fashionable an object of study international Human Rights have become lately, and this especially among philosophers and historians. Curiously, however, given that joint development, Human Rights theorists and Human Rights historians seem to be following separate paths, without much interaction between them besides historians ‘showcas[ing] the theoretical and philosophical debates about the meaning of Human Rights and theorists gesturing at some of the historical origins of the concept of Human Rights usually to then distance themselves from them. The specific question that arises for Human Rights theorists in this context is not only whether Human Rights history should matter for their normative endeavour, but also how it could be integrated methodologically in the latter, if at all. Is Human Rights history more than a source of information for the philosopher of Human Rights? Should it be used, for instance, to identify the object of Human Rights theorizing and then maybe to interpret it? And may it provide a critical tool for non-ideal Human Rights theories?
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Human Rights theory and Human Rights history : A tale of two odd bedfellows
Ancilla Iuris, 2012Co-Authors: Samantha Besson, Alain ZyssetAbstract:The burgeoning of recent publications on Human Rights shows how fashionable an object of study international Human Rights have become lately, and this especially among philosophers and historians. Curiously, however, given that joint development, Human Rights theorists and Human Rights historians seem to be following separate paths, without much interaction between them besides historians \textquoteleftshowcas[ing] the theoretical and philosophical debates about the meaning of Human Rights and theorists gesturing at some of the historical origins of the concept of Human Rights usually to then distance themselves from them. The specific question that arises for Human Rights theorists in this context is not only whether Human Rights history should matter for their normative endeavour, but also how it could be integrated methodologically in the latter, if at all. Is Human Rights history more than a source of information for the philosopher of Human Rights? Should it be used, for instance, to identify the object of Human Rights theorizing and then maybe to interpret it? And may it provide a critical tool for non-ideal Human Rights theories?
