The Experts below are selected from a list of 281169 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Ferdinand Von Siemens - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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monitored by your friends not your foes strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority
Games and Economic Behavior, 2014Co-Authors: Silvia Dominguezmartinez, Randolph Sloof, Ferdinand Von SiemensAbstract:In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the Implementation Decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to exploit any information gathered by the worker, but also reduces the worker's incentives to gather information. Both effects are influenced by the interest alignment between manager and worker. Our data confirm the prediction that optimal monitoring depends non-monotonically on the interest alignment between managers and workers. Managers also show some preferences for control that seem to be driven by loss aversion. We also find mild evidence for hidden benefits and costs of control. However, behavioral biases have only limited effects on organizational outcomes.
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monitoring your friends not your foes strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority
Research Papers in Economics, 2010Co-Authors: Silvia Dominguezmartinez, Randolph Sloof, Ferdinand Von SiemensAbstract:In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the Implementation Decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to better exploit the information gathered by the worker, but also reduces the worker's incentives to gather information in the first place. Both effects of monitoring are influenced by the interest alignment between manager and worker. Our data confirms the theoretical predictions that optimal monitoring depends non-monotonically on the level of interest alignment. We also find evidence for hidden costs of control and preferences for control, but these have no substantial effects on organizational outcomes.
Silvia Dominguezmartinez - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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monitored by your friends not your foes strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority
Games and Economic Behavior, 2014Co-Authors: Silvia Dominguezmartinez, Randolph Sloof, Ferdinand Von SiemensAbstract:In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the Implementation Decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to exploit any information gathered by the worker, but also reduces the worker's incentives to gather information. Both effects are influenced by the interest alignment between manager and worker. Our data confirm the prediction that optimal monitoring depends non-monotonically on the interest alignment between managers and workers. Managers also show some preferences for control that seem to be driven by loss aversion. We also find mild evidence for hidden benefits and costs of control. However, behavioral biases have only limited effects on organizational outcomes.
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monitoring your friends not your foes strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority
Research Papers in Economics, 2010Co-Authors: Silvia Dominguezmartinez, Randolph Sloof, Ferdinand Von SiemensAbstract:In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the Implementation Decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to better exploit the information gathered by the worker, but also reduces the worker's incentives to gather information in the first place. Both effects of monitoring are influenced by the interest alignment between manager and worker. Our data confirms the theoretical predictions that optimal monitoring depends non-monotonically on the level of interest alignment. We also find evidence for hidden costs of control and preferences for control, but these have no substantial effects on organizational outcomes.
Randolph Sloof - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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monitored by your friends not your foes strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority
Games and Economic Behavior, 2014Co-Authors: Silvia Dominguezmartinez, Randolph Sloof, Ferdinand Von SiemensAbstract:In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the Implementation Decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to exploit any information gathered by the worker, but also reduces the worker's incentives to gather information. Both effects are influenced by the interest alignment between manager and worker. Our data confirm the prediction that optimal monitoring depends non-monotonically on the interest alignment between managers and workers. Managers also show some preferences for control that seem to be driven by loss aversion. We also find mild evidence for hidden benefits and costs of control. However, behavioral biases have only limited effects on organizational outcomes.
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monitoring your friends not your foes strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority
Research Papers in Economics, 2010Co-Authors: Silvia Dominguezmartinez, Randolph Sloof, Ferdinand Von SiemensAbstract:In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the Implementation Decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to better exploit the information gathered by the worker, but also reduces the worker's incentives to gather information in the first place. Both effects of monitoring are influenced by the interest alignment between manager and worker. Our data confirms the theoretical predictions that optimal monitoring depends non-monotonically on the level of interest alignment. We also find evidence for hidden costs of control and preferences for control, but these have no substantial effects on organizational outcomes.
Ahmed N. Abdalla - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Evaluating the managerial behavior of managing knowledge in Chinese SMEs
Information Technology and Management, 2013Co-Authors: Ahmed N. AbdallaAbstract:Recently, the evaluation of knowledge management has become increasingly significant. Nevertheless, few relevant studies explicitly distinguished knowledge management performance from knowledge management effectiveness. This paper covers both sides and introduces a new knowledge management measurement index. It establishes a comprehensive evaluation model by measuring three stages of knowledge management behavior: environmental analysis, knowledge management activity planning, and knowledge management Implementation Decision making. Data were collected through questionnaires from 100 small and medium sized enterprises in China. The statistical results show that the three stages positively and significantly contribute to the index. The environmental analysis influences most, with the knowledge management activity planning less and the knowledge management Implementation Decision making least. Finally, it proposes some useful suggestions for enterprises to assess, to predict and to guide their knowledge management practice.
Shonali Krishnaswami - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the role of domain ontology for medical emergency management in mass gatherings
Decision Support Systems, 2010Co-Authors: Pari Delir Haghighi, Frada Burstein, Arkady Zaslavsky, Paul Arbon, Shonali KrishnaswamiAbstract:Mass gatherings are common events that typically attract large crowds of people. If such events are not properly planned, coordinated and managed with regard to health and safety issues, they can become hazardous and lead to injuries, illnesses and deaths. Conducting a safe and successful mass gathering event requires effective planning and management including the provision of timely medical care and response. To achieve these goals, there is a need for a unifying and formal model/framework of mass gatherings that can be applied across all the emergency agencies and events, and used in support of time-critical Decision making for medical emergency management in this context. However, the absence of a common knowledge structure and conceptual model in Medical Emergency Management in Mass Gathering (MEMMG), acknowledged in the literature, limits our understanding of such events and impedes the effectiveness of Decision support systems in these environments. In this paper, we propose domain ontology for MEMMG that represents main concepts of mass gatherings and their characteristics and relationships in a standard and formal manner. The proposed domain ontology is an instantiation and extension of DOEM (Domain Ontology for Emergency Management) that represents major generic concepts in the emergency management and can be used as information structure for the development of various emergency management Decision support systems. We illustrate application of such an ontology to the classical Intelligence-Design-Choice-Implementation Decision support model.
