The Experts below are selected from a list of 10848 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Richard S J Tol - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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unilateral regulation of bilateral trade in greenhouse gas emission permits
Ecological Economics, 2005Co-Authors: Katrin Rehdanz, Richard S J TolAbstract:This paper considers the coordination of domestic markets for tradable emission permits where countries determine their own emission reduction targets, using a two-Country model. Linking such schemes is beneficial to both countries but may cause the exporting Country to decrease its emission reduction target and export more permits. This in turn would not only reduce the costs for both countries as less emissions have to be reduced, but it also lowers the environmental benefits of the Importing Country. One price instrument (tariff) and two quantity instruments (discount, quota) to prevent the exporting Country from issuing more permits are examined. Each instrument restricts trade and alters the terms of trade for the two countries. The Importing Country (and regulator) prefers an import tariff and an import quota to a carbon discount. If the exporting Country releases additional permits, the Importing Country should not try to keep total emissions constant, as that would be ineffective and maybe even counterproductive. Instead, the Importing Country should aim to keep the total import constant; this would impose costs on the exporting Country that are independent of the policy instrument; an import quota would be the cheapest option for the Importing Country. An import quota would also stress the idea of supplementary of the flexible mechanism as it increases the share of emissions reduced domestically. Compliance and liability issues constrain the market further. However, both the Importing and the exporting Country would prefer that the permit seller is liable in case of non-compliance, as sellers' liability would less constrain the market.
Gilbert E Metcalf - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the design of a carbon tax
Social Science Research Network, 2009Co-Authors: David A Weisbach, Gilbert E MetcalfAbstract:We consider the design of a tax on greenhouse gas emissions for a developed Country such as the United States. We consider three sets of issues: the optimal tax base, issues relating to the rate (including the use of the revenues and rate changes over time) and trade. We show that a well-designed carbon tax can capture about 80% of U.S. emissions by taxing fewer than 3,000 taxpayers and up to almost 90% with a modest additional cost. We recommend full or partial delegation of rate setting authority to an agency to ensure that rates reflect new information about the costs of carbon emissions and of abatement. Adjustments should be made to the income tax to ensure that a carbon tax is revenue neutral and distributionally neutral. Finally, we propose an origin-based system for trade with countries that have an adequate carbon tax and a system of border taxes for imports from countries without a carbon tax. We suggest a system that imposes presumptive border tax adjustments with the ability of an individual firm to prove that a different rate should apply. The presumptive tax could be based either on average emissions for production of the item by the exporting Country or by the Importing Country.
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the design of a carbon tax
Research Papers in Economics, 2008Co-Authors: Gilbert E Metcalf, David A WeisbachAbstract:We consider the design of a tax on greenhouse gas emissions for a developed Country such as the United States. We consider three sets of issues: the optimal tax base, issues relating to the rate (including the use of the revenues and rate changes over time) and trade. We show that a well-designed carbon tax can capture about 80% of U.S. emissions by taxing fewer than 3,000 taxpayers and up to almost 90% with a modest additional cost. We recommend full or partial delegation of rate setting authority to an agency to ensure that rates reflect new information about the costs of carbon emmissions and of abatement. Adjustments should be made to the income tax to ensure that a carbon tax is revenue neutral and distributionally neutral. Finally, we propose an origin-based system for trades with countries that have an adequate carbon tax. We suggest a system that imposes presumptive border tax adjustments with the ability of an individual firm to prove that a different rate should apply. The presumptive tax could be based either on average emissions for production of the item by the exporting Country or by the Importing Country.
Daniel Traca - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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corruption and bilateral trade flows extortion or evasion
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2010Co-Authors: Pushan Dutt, Daniel TracaAbstract:Abstract We analyze the impact of corruption on bilateral trade, highlighting its dual role in terms of extortion and evasion. Corruption taxes trade, when corrupt customs officials in the Importing Country extort bribes from exporters (extortion effect); however, with high tariffs, corruption may be trade enhancing when corrupt officials allow exporters to evade tariff barriers (evasion effect). We derive and estimate a corruption-augmented gravity model, where the effect of corruption on trade flows is ambiguous and contingent on tariffs. Empirically, corruption taxes trade in the majority of cases, but in high-tariff environments (covering 5% to 14% of the observations) their marginal effect is trade enhancing.
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corruption and bilateral trade flows extortion or evasion
Social Science Research Network, 2007Co-Authors: Pushan Dutt, Daniel TracaAbstract:This paper analyzes the impact of corruption on bilateral trade flows, highlighting the dual role of corruption in terms of extortion and evasion. On one hand, corruption taxes trade, when corrupt customs officials in the Importing Country extort bribes from exporters (the extortion effect); on the other, if tariffs are high, corruption may be trade enhancing, when the corrupt officials allow exporters to evade tariff barriers (the evasion effect). The paper derives and estimates a corruption-augmented gravity model that shows that the effect of corruption on trade flows is ambiguous and is contingent on the level of tariffs. The predictions are borne out in the data: corruption taxes trade in the majority of cases, but in high tariff environments (covering 5-14% of the observations,) its marginal effect is trade-enhancing.
Pushan Dutt - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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corruption and bilateral trade flows extortion or evasion
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2010Co-Authors: Pushan Dutt, Daniel TracaAbstract:Abstract We analyze the impact of corruption on bilateral trade, highlighting its dual role in terms of extortion and evasion. Corruption taxes trade, when corrupt customs officials in the Importing Country extort bribes from exporters (extortion effect); however, with high tariffs, corruption may be trade enhancing when corrupt officials allow exporters to evade tariff barriers (evasion effect). We derive and estimate a corruption-augmented gravity model, where the effect of corruption on trade flows is ambiguous and contingent on tariffs. Empirically, corruption taxes trade in the majority of cases, but in high-tariff environments (covering 5% to 14% of the observations) their marginal effect is trade enhancing.
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corruption and bilateral trade flows extortion or evasion
Social Science Research Network, 2007Co-Authors: Pushan Dutt, Daniel TracaAbstract:This paper analyzes the impact of corruption on bilateral trade flows, highlighting the dual role of corruption in terms of extortion and evasion. On one hand, corruption taxes trade, when corrupt customs officials in the Importing Country extort bribes from exporters (the extortion effect); on the other, if tariffs are high, corruption may be trade enhancing, when the corrupt officials allow exporters to evade tariff barriers (the evasion effect). The paper derives and estimates a corruption-augmented gravity model that shows that the effect of corruption on trade flows is ambiguous and is contingent on the level of tariffs. The predictions are borne out in the data: corruption taxes trade in the majority of cases, but in high tariff environments (covering 5-14% of the observations,) its marginal effect is trade-enhancing.
Prakash Loungani - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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measuring energy security trends in the diversification of oil and natural gas supplies
Energy Policy, 2011Co-Authors: Gail Cohen, Frederick L Joutz, Prakash LounganiAbstract:We present evidence on one facet of energy security in OECD economies - the extent of diversification in sources of oil and natural gas supplies. Viewed from the perspective of the energy-Importing countries as a whole, there has not been much change in diversification in oil supplies over the last decade, but diversification in sources of natural gas supplies has increased steadily. We document the cross-Country heterogeneity in the extent of diversification. We also show how the extent of diversification changes if account is taken of the political risk attached to suppliers; the size of the Importing Country; and transportation risk.
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measuring energy security trends in the diversification of oil and natural gas supplies
Energy Policy, 2011Co-Authors: Gail Cohen, Frederick L Joutz, Prakash LounganiAbstract:We present evidence on one facet of energy security in OECD economies—the extent of diversification in sources of oil and natural gas supplies. Viewed from the perspective of the energy-Importing countries as a whole, there has not been much change in diversification in oil supplies over the last decade, but diversification in sources of natural gas supplies has increased steadily. We document the considerable cross-Country heterogeneity in the extent of diversification. We also show how the extent of diversification changes if account is taken of the political risk attached to suppliers; the size of the Importing Country; and transportation risk.
