The Experts below are selected from a list of 4539 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Philippe Mongin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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approval voting and arrow s Impossibility Theorem
Social Choice and Welfare, 2015Co-Authors: Philippe Mongin, Francois ManiquetAbstract:Approval voting has attracted considerable attention in voting theory, but it has rarely been investigated in an Arrovian framework of collective preference (”social welfare”) functions and never been connected with Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. The article explores these two directions. Assuming that voters have dichotomous preferences, it first characterizes approval voting in terms of its collective preference properties and then shows that these properties become incompatible if the collective preference is also taken to be dichotomous. As approval voting and majority voting happen to share the same collective preference function on the dichotomous domain, the positive result also bears on majority voting, and is seen to extend May’s and Inada’s early findings on this rule. The negative result is a novel and perhaps surprising version of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, because the axiomatic inconsistency here stems from the collective preference range, not the individual preference domain.
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approval voting and arrow s Impossibility Theorem
Social Science Research Network, 2011Co-Authors: Philippe Mongin, Francois ManiquetAbstract:Approval voting has attracted considerable interest among voting theorists, but they have rarely investigated it in the Arrovian frame-work of social welfare functions (SWF) and never connected it with Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. This note explores these two directions. Assuming that voters have dichotomous preferences, it first characterizes approval voting in terms of its SWF properties and then shows that these properties are incompatible if the social preference is also taken to be dichotomous. The positive result improves on some existing characterizations of approval voting in the literature, as well as on Arrow's and May's classic analyses of voting on two alternatives. The negative result corresponds to a novel and perhaps surprising version of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.
Francois Maniquet - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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approval voting and arrow s Impossibility Theorem
Social Choice and Welfare, 2015Co-Authors: Philippe Mongin, Francois ManiquetAbstract:Approval voting has attracted considerable attention in voting theory, but it has rarely been investigated in an Arrovian framework of collective preference (”social welfare”) functions and never been connected with Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. The article explores these two directions. Assuming that voters have dichotomous preferences, it first characterizes approval voting in terms of its collective preference properties and then shows that these properties become incompatible if the collective preference is also taken to be dichotomous. As approval voting and majority voting happen to share the same collective preference function on the dichotomous domain, the positive result also bears on majority voting, and is seen to extend May’s and Inada’s early findings on this rule. The negative result is a novel and perhaps surprising version of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, because the axiomatic inconsistency here stems from the collective preference range, not the individual preference domain.
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approval voting and arrow s Impossibility Theorem
Social Science Research Network, 2011Co-Authors: Philippe Mongin, Francois ManiquetAbstract:Approval voting has attracted considerable interest among voting theorists, but they have rarely investigated it in the Arrovian frame-work of social welfare functions (SWF) and never connected it with Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. This note explores these two directions. Assuming that voters have dichotomous preferences, it first characterizes approval voting in terms of its SWF properties and then shows that these properties are incompatible if the social preference is also taken to be dichotomous. The positive result improves on some existing characterizations of approval voting in the literature, as well as on Arrow's and May's classic analyses of voting on two alternatives. The negative result corresponds to a novel and perhaps surprising version of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.
Vladik Kreinovich - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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decision making beyond arrow s Impossibility Theorem with the analysis of effects of collusion and mutual attraction
International Journal of Intelligent Systems, 2009Co-Authors: Hung T Nguyen, Olga Kosheleva, Vladik KreinovichAbstract:In 1951, K.J. Arrow proved that, under certain assumptions, it is impossible to have group decision-making rules that satisfy reasonable conditions like symmetry. This Impossibility Theorem is often cited as a proof that reasonable group decision-making is impossible. We start our article by remarking that Arrow's result covers only those situations when the only information we have about individual preferences is their binary preferences between the alternatives. If we follow the main ideas of modern decision making and game theory and also collect information about the preferences between lotteries (i.e., collect the utility values of different alternatives), then reasonable decision-making rules are possible, e.g., Nash's rule in which we select an alternative for which the product of utilities is the largest possible. We also deal with two related issues: how we can detect individual preferences if all we have is preferences of a subgroup and how we take into account the mutual attraction between participants. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Mikayla Kelley - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a note on murakami s Theorems and incomplete social choice without the pareto principle
Social Choice and Welfare, 2020Co-Authors: Wesley H Holliday, Mikayla KelleyAbstract:In Arrovian social choice theory assuming the independence of irrelevant alternatives, Murakami (Logic and social choice, Dover Publications, New York, 1968) proved two Theorems about complete and transitive collective choice rules satisfying strict non-imposition (citizens’ sovereignty), one being a dichotomy Theorem about Paretian or anti-Paretian rules and the other a dictator-or-inverse-dictator Impossibility Theorem without the Pareto principle. It has been claimed in the later literature that a Theorem of Malawski and Zhou (Soc Choice Welf 11(2):103–107, 1994) is a generalization of Murakami’s dichotomy Theorem and that Wilson’s Impossibility Theorem (J Econ Theory 5(3):478–486, 1972) is stronger than Murakami’s Impossibility Theorem, both by virtue of replacing Murakami’s assumption of strict non-imposition with the assumptions of non-imposition and non-nullness. In this note, we first point out that these claims are incorrect: non-imposition and non-nullness are together equivalent to strict non-imposition for all transitive collective choice rules. We then generalize Murakami’s dichotomy and Impossibility Theorems to the setting of incomplete social preference. We prove that if one drops completeness from Murakami’s assumptions, his remaining assumptions imply (i) that a collective choice rule is either Paretian, anti-Paretian, or dis-Paretian (unanimous individual preference implies noncomparability) and (ii) that adding proposed constraints on noncomparability, such as the regularity axiom of Eliaz and Ok (Games Econ Behav 56:61–86, 2006), restores Murakami’s dictator-or-inverse-dictator result.
Satish K Jain - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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decoupled liability and efficiency an Impossibility Theorem
Review of Law & Economics, 2012Co-Authors: Satish K JainAbstract:A basic feature of tort law is that of coupled liability: the damages awarded to the victim equal the liability imposed on the injurer. This feature of tort law is incorporated in the very definition of a liability rule by postulating that the shares of loss borne by the two parties sum to one. In this paper the relationship between this feature of tort law and efficiency is investigated. It is shown that coupled liability is necessary for efficiency, i.e., if a rule is such that it invariably gives rise to efficient outcomes then it must be the case that under it the liability is coupled. In other words, no rule with decoupled liability can be such that it always yields efficient outcomes.
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decoupled liability and efficiency an Impossibility Theorem
Social Science Research Network, 2009Co-Authors: Satish K JainAbstract:A basic feature of tort law is that of coupled liability. The damages awarded to the victim equal liability imposed on the injurer. This feature of tort law is incorporated in the very definition of a liability rule by postulating that the shares of loss borne by the two parties sum to one. In this paper the relationship between this feature of tort law and efficiency is investigated. It is shown that coupled liability is necessary for efficiency, i.e., if a rule is such that it invariably gives rise to efficient outcomes then it must be the case that under it the liability is coupled. In other words, no rule with decoupled liability can be such that it always yields efficient outcomes.
