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Steven Shavell - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Any Non-Welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle: Reply
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2004Co-Authors: Louis Kaplow, Steven ShavellAbstract:In our 2001 article in the Journal of Political Economy, we show that any non-welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto Principle. In their Comment, Fleurbaey, Tungodden, and Chang question whether our result is fully general without imposing what they regard to be strong assumptions (transitivity and independence). However, as we explain in this Reply, their argument is irrelevant to the thrust of our article. Specifically, their argument concedes that if any particular society uses any non-welfarist Principle, there may be a conflict with the Pareto Principle. This result means that the vast multitude of Principles proposed by policy-makers, philosophers, and others indeed fall within our demonstration.
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Any Non‐welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle: Reply
Journal of Political Economy, 2001Co-Authors: Louis Kaplow, Steven ShavellAbstract:The public at large, many policymakers, and a number of economists hold views of social welfare that are non‐welfarist. That is, they attach some importance to factors other than the effects of policies on individuals’ utilities. We show, however, that any non‐welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto Principle.
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any non welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto Principle reply
Journal of Political Economy, 2001Co-Authors: Louis Kaplow, Steven ShavellAbstract:The public at large, many policymakers, and a number of economists hold views of social welfare that are non‐welfarist. That is, they attach some importance to factors other than the effects of policies on individuals’ utilities. We show, however, that any non‐welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto Principle.
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Any Non‐welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle
Journal of Political Economy, 2001Co-Authors: Louis Kaplow, Steven ShavellAbstract:The public at large, many policymakers, and a number of economists hold views of social welfare that are non‐welfarist. That is, they attach some importance to factors other than the effects of policies on individuals’ utilities. We show, however, that any non‐welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto Principle
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notions of fairness versus the Pareto Principle on the role of logical consistency
2000Co-Authors: Louis Kaplow, Steven ShavellAbstract:Most legal academics and policymakers believe that weight should be accorded to conceptions of fairness in evaluating legal policies. In other writings, we have demonstrated that adherence to any notion of fairness will sometimes lead to a conflict with the Pareto Principle. That is, to endorse a notion of fairness is to endorse the view that it can be desirable to adopt a legal rule that will reduce the well-being of every person in society. In this comment, we will be arguing that Howard Chang's position in his reply to one of our articles, in which he suggests that it is possible to imagine some notions of fairness under which this conflict does not exist, is tantamount to an abandonment of logical consistency in normative assessment of policy.
Louis Kaplow - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Pareto Principle and Competing Principles
Social Science Research Network, 2005Co-Authors: Louis KaplowAbstract:The Pareto Principle, the seemingly incontrovertible dictum that if all individuals prefer some regime to another then so should society, may conflict with competing Principles. Arrow's impossibility theorem and Sen's liberal paradox are two notable examples. Subsequent work indicates more broadly that the Pareto Principle conflicts with all non-welfarist Principles. This essay surveys these results, including various extensions thereof, and offers perspectives on the conflict, drawing on classical and contemporary work in political economy and economic psychology.
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Any Non-Welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle: Reply
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2004Co-Authors: Louis Kaplow, Steven ShavellAbstract:In our 2001 article in the Journal of Political Economy, we show that any non-welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto Principle. In their Comment, Fleurbaey, Tungodden, and Chang question whether our result is fully general without imposing what they regard to be strong assumptions (transitivity and independence). However, as we explain in this Reply, their argument is irrelevant to the thrust of our article. Specifically, their argument concedes that if any particular society uses any non-welfarist Principle, there may be a conflict with the Pareto Principle. This result means that the vast multitude of Principles proposed by policy-makers, philosophers, and others indeed fall within our demonstration.
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Any Non‐welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle: Reply
Journal of Political Economy, 2001Co-Authors: Louis Kaplow, Steven ShavellAbstract:The public at large, many policymakers, and a number of economists hold views of social welfare that are non‐welfarist. That is, they attach some importance to factors other than the effects of policies on individuals’ utilities. We show, however, that any non‐welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto Principle.
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any non welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto Principle reply
Journal of Political Economy, 2001Co-Authors: Louis Kaplow, Steven ShavellAbstract:The public at large, many policymakers, and a number of economists hold views of social welfare that are non‐welfarist. That is, they attach some importance to factors other than the effects of policies on individuals’ utilities. We show, however, that any non‐welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto Principle.
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Any Non‐welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle
Journal of Political Economy, 2001Co-Authors: Louis Kaplow, Steven ShavellAbstract:The public at large, many policymakers, and a number of economists hold views of social welfare that are non‐welfarist. That is, they attach some importance to factors other than the effects of policies on individuals’ utilities. We show, however, that any non‐welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto Principle
David Godwin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A Closer Look at the Pareto Principle for Software
Software Quality Professional Magazine, 2007Co-Authors: Mechelle Gittens, David GodwinAbstract:[This abstract is based on the authors’ abstract.] An empirical study of three hypotheses considers the evidence of the Pareto Principle as it relates to the distribution of software defects in code. Two related Principles are investigated: the distri..
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The vital few versus the trivial many: examining the Pareto Principle for software
29th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC'05), 2005Co-Authors: Mechelle Gittens, Yong Kim, David GodwinAbstract:This paper discusses the Pareto Principle as it relates to the distribution of software defects in code. We look at evidence in the context of both the software test team, and users of the software. We also investigate two related Principles. The first Principle is that the distribution of defects in code relates to the distribution of complexity in code. The second Principle is that how we define complexity relates to the distribution of defects in code. We present this work as an empirical study of three general hypotheses investigated for large production-level software; we show that the essence of the Principle holds, while precise percentages do not.
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COMPSAC (1) - The vital few versus the trivial many: examining the Pareto Principle for software
29th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC'05), 1Co-Authors: Mechelle Gittens, Yong Kim, David GodwinAbstract:This paper discusses the Pareto Principle as it relates to the distribution of software defects in code. We look at evidence in the context of both the software test team, and users of the software. We also investigate two related Principles. The first Principle is that the distribution of defects in code relates to the distribution of complexity in code. The second Principle is that how we define complexity relates to the distribution of defects in code. We present this work as an empirical study of three general hypotheses investigated for large production-level software; we show that the essence of the Principle holds, while precise percentages do not.
Jianfeng Nie - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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using Pareto Principle to improve efficiency for selection of qos web services
Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, 2010Co-Authors: Lican Huang, Jianfeng NieAbstract:With the rapid increase of Web services, we can have a chance to select the best Qos Web Service among multiple candidate Web Services with the same semantic functions. To obtain the best Qos Web Service, a huge amount of computations on all the candidate Web Services are required to computed. This will lead to less efficiency. To improve selection performance, we use Pareto Principle to calculate only small part of Web Services.
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CCNC - Using Pareto Principle to Improve Efficiency for Selection of Qos Web Services
2010 7th IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, 2010Co-Authors: Lican Huang, Jianfeng NieAbstract:With the rapid increase of Web services, we can have a chance to select the best Qos Web Service among multiple candidate Web Services with the same semantic functions. To obtain the best Qos Web Service, a huge amount of computations on all the candidate Web Services are required to computed. This will lead to less efficiency. To improve selection performance, we use Pareto Principle to calculate only small part of Web Services.
Susumu Cato - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Weak independence and the Pareto Principle
Social Choice and Welfare, 2016Co-Authors: Susumu CatoAbstract:In this paper, the independence of irrelevant alternatives and the Pareto Principle are simultaneously weakened in the Arrovian framework of social choice. Moreover, we also relax transitivity of social preferences. We show that impossibility remains under weaker versions of Arrow’s original conditions. Our results complement the recent work by Coban and Sanver (Soc Choice Welf 43(4):953–961, 2014 ).
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Social choice, the strong Pareto Principle, and conditional decisiveness
Theory and Decision, 2013Co-Authors: Susumu CatoAbstract:This paper examines social choice theory with the strong Pareto Principle. The notion of conditional decisiveness is introduced to clarify the underlying power structure behind strongly Paretian aggregation rules satisfying binary independence. We discuss the various degrees of social rationality: transitivity, semi-transitivity, the interval-order property, quasi-transitivity, and acyclicity.
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Social choice without the Pareto Principle: a comprehensive analysis
Social Choice and Welfare, 2011Co-Authors: Susumu CatoAbstract:This article provides a systematic analysis of social choice theory without the Pareto Principle, by revisiting the method of Murakami Yasusuke. This article consists of two parts. The first part investigates the relationship between rationality of social preference and the axioms that make a collective choice rule either Paretian or anti-Paretian. In the second part, the results in the first part are applied to obtain impossibility results under various rationality requirements of social preference, such as S-consistency, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, the interval-order property, and acyclicity.
