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David Rueda - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • social democracy constrained Indirect Taxation in industrialized democracies
    British Journal of Political Science, 2007
    Co-Authors: Pablo Beramendi, David Rueda
    Abstract:

    The determinants of the welfare state have received a great deal of attention in the comparative political economy literature. An analysis of the role that Indirect Taxation plays in the politics of advanced industrial societies is, however, missing. This article demonstrates that a full understanding of the links between redistribution, social democracy and corporatism is impossible without a closer look at Indirect Taxation. Conventional wisdom is questioned and it is shown that social democratic governments in corporatist environments find themselves in a paradoxical situation. They need to support the welfare state by relying upon a fundamentally regressive policy instrument: Indirect Taxation. It is also shown that social democratic governments can minimize the use of consumption taxes as part of their redistributive strategy only in non-corporatist settings. In exploring these issues, this article illuminates alternative routes for the pursuit of equality in a context of declining corporatist arrangements. The demand for redistribution is fairly inelastic across industrialized democracies. Even when social expenditures become very expensive, the demand for them decreases with great difficulty. 1 A cursory examination of fiscal policy across OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation Development) governments reveals a striking fact: the countries more often ruled by social democratic parties are also characterized by the highest tax burden on consumption income and the highest levels of welfare state effort throughout the 1965–95 period. If taxes on consumption are seen as a regressive fiscal device applied to general consumption goods (rather than luxury goods), this pattern poses a puzzle for partisanship theory. Social democratic parties are assumed to protect the interests of citizens in the bottom half of the income distribution, 2 and yet they seem to make ample use of a tool that clearly undermines this goal. How can we explain the coexistence of large redistributive efforts on the expenditure side with the use of regressive tools on the revenue side?

  • Social Democracy Constrained: Indirect Taxation in Industrialized Democracies
    British Journal of Political Science, 2007
    Co-Authors: Pablo Beramendi, David Rueda
    Abstract:

    The determinants of the welfare state have received a great deal of attention in the comparative political economy literature. An analysis of the role that Indirect Taxation plays in the politics of advanced industrial societies is, however, missing. This article demonstrates that a full understanding of the links between redistribution, social democracy and corporatism is impossible without a closer look at Indirect Taxation. Conventional wisdom is questioned and it is shown that social democratic governments in corporatist environments find themselves in a paradoxical situation. They need to support the welfare state by relying upon a fundamentally regressive policy instrument: Indirect Taxation. It is also shown that social democratic governments can minimize the use of consumption taxes as part of their redistributive strategy only in non-corporatist settings. In exploring these issues, this article illuminates alternative routes for the pursuit of equality in a context of declining corporatist arrangements.

Guy Laroque - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Pablo Beramendi - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • social democracy constrained Indirect Taxation in industrialized democracies
    British Journal of Political Science, 2007
    Co-Authors: Pablo Beramendi, David Rueda
    Abstract:

    The determinants of the welfare state have received a great deal of attention in the comparative political economy literature. An analysis of the role that Indirect Taxation plays in the politics of advanced industrial societies is, however, missing. This article demonstrates that a full understanding of the links between redistribution, social democracy and corporatism is impossible without a closer look at Indirect Taxation. Conventional wisdom is questioned and it is shown that social democratic governments in corporatist environments find themselves in a paradoxical situation. They need to support the welfare state by relying upon a fundamentally regressive policy instrument: Indirect Taxation. It is also shown that social democratic governments can minimize the use of consumption taxes as part of their redistributive strategy only in non-corporatist settings. In exploring these issues, this article illuminates alternative routes for the pursuit of equality in a context of declining corporatist arrangements. The demand for redistribution is fairly inelastic across industrialized democracies. Even when social expenditures become very expensive, the demand for them decreases with great difficulty. 1 A cursory examination of fiscal policy across OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation Development) governments reveals a striking fact: the countries more often ruled by social democratic parties are also characterized by the highest tax burden on consumption income and the highest levels of welfare state effort throughout the 1965–95 period. If taxes on consumption are seen as a regressive fiscal device applied to general consumption goods (rather than luxury goods), this pattern poses a puzzle for partisanship theory. Social democratic parties are assumed to protect the interests of citizens in the bottom half of the income distribution, 2 and yet they seem to make ample use of a tool that clearly undermines this goal. How can we explain the coexistence of large redistributive efforts on the expenditure side with the use of regressive tools on the revenue side?

  • Social Democracy Constrained: Indirect Taxation in Industrialized Democracies
    British Journal of Political Science, 2007
    Co-Authors: Pablo Beramendi, David Rueda
    Abstract:

    The determinants of the welfare state have received a great deal of attention in the comparative political economy literature. An analysis of the role that Indirect Taxation plays in the politics of advanced industrial societies is, however, missing. This article demonstrates that a full understanding of the links between redistribution, social democracy and corporatism is impossible without a closer look at Indirect Taxation. Conventional wisdom is questioned and it is shown that social democratic governments in corporatist environments find themselves in a paradoxical situation. They need to support the welfare state by relying upon a fundamentally regressive policy instrument: Indirect Taxation. It is also shown that social democratic governments can minimize the use of consumption taxes as part of their redistributive strategy only in non-corporatist settings. In exploring these issues, this article illuminates alternative routes for the pursuit of equality in a context of declining corporatist arrangements.

Tom Truyts - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Signaling and Indirect Taxation
    Journal of Public Economics, 2012
    Co-Authors: Tom Truyts
    Abstract:

    Commodities communicate. We investigate optimal Indirect Taxation when both the intrinsic qualities of goods and signaling motivate consumption choices. Optimal Indirect taxes are introduced into a monotonic signaling game. We provide sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the D1 sequential equilibrium strategies. In the case of pure costly signaling, signaling goods can in equilibrium be taxed without burden. When commodities serve both intrinsic consumption and signaling, optimal taxes are characterized by a Ramsey rule, which deals with distortions resulting from signaling.Belgian Science Polic

  • Signaling and Indirect Taxation
    Journal of Public Economics, 2011
    Co-Authors: Tom Truyts
    Abstract:

    Commodities communicate. We investigate optimal Indirect Taxation when both the intrinsic qualities of goods and signaling motivate consumption choices. Optimal Indirect taxes are introduced into a monotonic signaling game. We provide sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the D1 sequential equilibrium strategies. In the case of pure costly signaling, signaling goods can in equilibrium be taxed without burden. When commodities serve both intrinsic consumption and signaling, optimal taxes are characterized by a Ramsey rule, which deals with distortions resulting from signaling.

  • Signaling and Indirect Taxation
    SSRN Electronic Journal, 2010
    Co-Authors: Tom Truyts
    Abstract:

    Commodities communicate. Consumers choose a consumption bundle both for its intrinsic characteristics and for what this bundle communicates about their qualities (or .identity.) to spectators. We investigate optimal Indirect Taxation when consumption choices are motivated by two sorts of concerns: intrinsic consumption and costly signaling. Optimal Indirect taxes are introduced into a monotonic signaling game with a finite typespace of consumers. We provide sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the D1 sequential equilibrium in terms of strategies. In the case of pure costly signaling, signaling goods can in equilibrium be taxed without burden and the optimal quantity taxes on these goods are infinite. When commodities serve both intrinsic consumption and signaling, optimal taxes can be characterized by a generalization of the Ramsey rule, which also deals with the distortions resulting from signaling.

Stéphane Gauthier - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Optimal grouping of commodities for Indirect Taxation
    Journal of Public Economics, 2008
    Co-Authors: Pascal Belan, Stéphane Gauthier, Guy Laroque
    Abstract:

    Indirect taxes contribute to a sizeable part of government revenues around the world. Typically there are few different tax rates, and the goods are partitioned into classes associated with each rate. The present paper studies how to group the goods in these few classes. We take as given the number of tax rates and study the optimal aggregation (or classification) of commodities of the fiscal authority in a second best setup. The results are illustrated on data from the United Kingdom.

  • Optimal Indirect Taxation with a restricted number of tax rates
    Journal of Public Economics, 2006
    Co-Authors: Pascal Belan, Stéphane Gauthier
    Abstract:

    This paper analyzes the optimal structure of Indirect Taxation when the number of available tax rates is smaller than the number of taxable commodities. Such a constraint requires to choose the levels of tax rates and the groups of commodities that will be taxed at equal rates (or exempted). In a partial equilibrium framework, with a single agent and a low amount of tax collection, it is shown that the process of allocation of commodities to groups depends on both price elasticities and consumption spendings. Still, the optimal tax structure displays a weak form of the inverse elasticity rule; consumption spendings influence the size of the fiscal base, and may lead to many tax exemptions.

  • Optimal Indirect Taxation with a restricted number of tax rates
    Journal of Public Economics, 2006
    Co-Authors: Pascal Belan, Stéphane Gauthier
    Abstract:

    International audienceThis paper analyzes the optimal structure of Indirect Taxation when the number of available tax rates is smaller than the number of taxable commodities. Such a constraint requires to choose the levels of tax rates and the groups of commodities that will be taxed at equal rates (or exempted). In a partial equilibrium framework, with a single agent and a low amount of tax collection, it is shown that the process of allocation of commodities to groups depends on both price elasticities and consumption spendings. Still, the optimal tax structure displays a weak form of the inverse elasticity rule; consumption spendings influence the size of the fiscal base, and may lead to many tax exemptions