The Experts below are selected from a list of 3966 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Thomas Piketty - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • a theory of optimal Inheritance Taxation
    Econometrica, 2013
    Co-Authors: Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez
    Abstract:

    This paper derives optimal Inheritance Tax formulas that (a) capture the key equityeciency trade-o, (b) are expressed in terms of estimable sucient statistics, (c) are robust to the underlying structure of preferences. We consider dynamic stochastic models with general and heterogeneous bequest tastes and labor productivities. We limit ourselves to simple but realistic linear or two-bracket Tax structures to obtain tractable formulas. We show that long-run optimal Inheritance Tax rates can always be expressed in terms of distributional parameters, aggregate behavioral elasticities and social preferences for redistribution. Importantly, those results carry over with tractable modications to (a) the case with social discounting (instead of steady-state welfare maximization), (b) the case with partly accidental bequests, (c) the standard Barro-Becker dynastic model. In all cases, the optimal Inheritance Tax rate increases with the concentration of bequest received and decreases with the elasticity of aggregate bequests to the net-of-Tax rate. The optimal Tax rate is positive and quantitatively large if concentration is high, the elasticity is low and society cares mostly about those receiving little Inheritance. In contrast, the optimal Tax rate is negative when society cares mostly about inheritors. We propose a calibration using micro-data for France and the United States. We nd that for realistic parameters

  • a theory of optimal Inheritance Taxation
    PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique", 2013
    Co-Authors: Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez
    Abstract:

    This paper derives optimal Inheritance Tax formulas that capture the key equity-efficiency trade-off, are expressed in terms of estimable sufficient statistics, and are robust to the underlying structure of preferences. We consider dynamic stochastic models with general and heterogeneous bequest tastes and labor productivities. We limit ourselves to simple but realistic linear or two-bracket Tax structures to obtain tractable formulas. We show that long-run optimal Inheritance Tax rates can always be expressed in terms of aggregate earnings and bequest elasticities with respect to Tax rates, distributional parameters, and social preferences for redistribution. Those results carry over with tractable modifications to (a) the case with social discounting (instead of steady-state welfare maximization), (b) the case with partly accidental bequests, (c) the standard Barro-Becker dynastic model. The optimal Tax rate is positive and quantitatively large if the elasticity of bequests to the Tax rate is low, bequest concentration is high, and society cares mostly about those receiving little Inheritance. We propose a calibration using micro-data for France and the United States. We find that, for realistic parameters, the optimal Inheritance Tax rate might be as large as 50%-60%--or even higher for top bequests, in line with historical experience.

  • a theory of optimal Inheritance Taxation
    2012
    Co-Authors: Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez
    Abstract:

    This paper derives optimal Inheritance Tax formulas that (a) capture the key equity-efficiency trade-off, (b) are expressed in terms of estimable sufficient statistics, (c) are robust to the underlying structure of preferences. We consider dynamic stochastic models with general and heterogeneous bequest tastes and labor productivities. We limit ourselves to simple but realistic linear or two-bracket Tax structures to obtain tractable formulas. We show that long-run optimal Inheritance Tax rates can always be expressed in terms of distributional parameters, aggregate behavioral elasticities and social preferences for redistribution. Importantly, those results carry over with tractable modifications to (a) the case with social discounting (instead of steady-state welfare maximization), (b) the case with partly accidental bequests, (c) the standard Barro-Becker dynastic model. In all cases, the optimal Inheritance Tax rate increases with the concentration of bequest received and decreases with the elasticity of aggregate bequests to the net-of-Tax rate. The optimal Tax rate is positive and quantitatively large if concentration is high, the elasticity is low and society cares mostly about those receiving little Inheritance. In contrast, the optimal Tax rate is negative when society cares mostly about inheritors. We propose a calibration using micro-data for France and the United States. We find that for realistic parameters the optimal Inheritance Tax rate might be as large as 50%-60% - or even higher for top bequests, in line with historical experience.

  • income inequality in france 1901 1998
    Journal of Political Economy, 2003
    Co-Authors: Thomas Piketty
    Abstract:

    The objective of this research is to document and to explain trends in inequality in 20th century France. Data from income Tax returns (1915-98), wage Tax returns (1919-98) and Inheritance Tax returns (1902-94), is used in order to compute fully homogeneous, yearly estimates of income inequality, wage inequality and wealth inequality. The main conclusion is that the decline in income inequality that took place during the first half of the 20th century was mostly accidental. In France and possibly in a number of other developed countries as well wage inequality has actually been extremely stable in the long run, and the secular decline in income inequality is for the most part a capital income phenomenon. Holders of very large fortunes were severely hit by major shocks during the 1914-45 period, and were never able to fully recover from these shocks, probably because of the dynamic effects of progressive Taxation on capital accumulation and pre-Tax income inequality.

  • income inequality in france 1901 1998
    Journal of Political Economy, 2003
    Co-Authors: Thomas Piketty
    Abstract:

    This paper uses data from income Tax returns (1915–98), wage Tax returns (1919–98), and Inheritance Tax returns (1902–94) in order to compute homogeneous, yearly estimates of income, wage, and wealth inequality for twentieth‐century France. The main conclusion is that the decline in income inequality that took place during the first half of the century was mostly accidental. In France, and possibly in a number of other countries as well, wage inequality has been extremely stable in the long run, and the secular decline in income inequality is for the most part a capital income phenomenon. Holders of large fortunes were badly hurt by major shocks during the 1914–45 period, and they were never able to fully recover from these shocks, probably because of the dynamic effects of progressive Taxation on capital accumulation and preTax income inequality.

Daniel Waldenstrom - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Inheritance Taxation in sweden 1885 2004 the role of ideology family firms and Tax avoidance
    Social Science Research Network, 2015
    Co-Authors: Magnus Henrekson, Daniel Waldenstrom
    Abstract:

    This paper studies the evolution of Swedish Inheritance Taxation since the late nineteenth century to its abolition in 2004. Our contribution is twofold. First, we compute the annual effective Inheritance Tax rates for different sizes of bequests, if the inherited assets were family firm equity or not, accounting for all relevant exemptions, deductions and valuation discounts. Second, we attempt to explain changes in Inheritance Taxation over time. Ideology appears to be the main driver of the sharp Tax increases of the 1930s through the 1960s. Wartime economies with higher pressures on the people induced politicians to raise Inheritance Taxes on the wealthy, primarily during the First World War. We also document increased opportunities for Tax planning for the wealthy, most notably a series of Tax cuts on inherited family firms in the 1970s. This rise in avoidance opportunities for the rich while middle-class heirs face growing Inheritance Tax rates undermined the legitimacy of the Tax and led to its repeal.

  • Inheritance Taxation in sweden 1885 2004 the role of ideology family firms and Tax avoidance
    Research Papers in Economics, 2014
    Co-Authors: Magnus Henrekson, Daniel Waldenstrom
    Abstract:

    This paper studies the evolution of the modern Swedish Inheritance Taxation from its introduction in 1885 to its abolishment in 2004. Our contribution is twofold. First, we compute annual effective Inheritance Tax rates for differently sized bequests and different types of inherited assets (non-firm wealth and family firm equity), ac-counting for all relevant exemptions, deductions and valuation discounts. Second, we try to account for the changes in Inheritance Taxation. Ideology rather than mass mobili-zation or revenue maximization appears to drive the sharp Tax increases of the 1930s through the 1960s. We document increased opportunities for Tax planning for the wealthy, in particular a series of drastic Tax cuts on inherited family firms from the 1970s onwards. This rise of avoidance opportunities for the rich, while more and more middle-class heirs paid notable Inheritance Taxes, contributed to a loss of legitimacy for the Tax and its ultimate repeal in 2004

Magnus Henrekson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Inheritance Taxation in sweden 1885 2004 the role of ideology family firms and Tax avoidance
    Social Science Research Network, 2015
    Co-Authors: Magnus Henrekson, Daniel Waldenstrom
    Abstract:

    This paper studies the evolution of Swedish Inheritance Taxation since the late nineteenth century to its abolition in 2004. Our contribution is twofold. First, we compute the annual effective Inheritance Tax rates for different sizes of bequests, if the inherited assets were family firm equity or not, accounting for all relevant exemptions, deductions and valuation discounts. Second, we attempt to explain changes in Inheritance Taxation over time. Ideology appears to be the main driver of the sharp Tax increases of the 1930s through the 1960s. Wartime economies with higher pressures on the people induced politicians to raise Inheritance Taxes on the wealthy, primarily during the First World War. We also document increased opportunities for Tax planning for the wealthy, most notably a series of Tax cuts on inherited family firms in the 1970s. This rise in avoidance opportunities for the rich while middle-class heirs face growing Inheritance Tax rates undermined the legitimacy of the Tax and led to its repeal.

  • Inheritance Taxation in sweden 1885 2004 the role of ideology family firms and Tax avoidance
    Research Papers in Economics, 2014
    Co-Authors: Magnus Henrekson, Daniel Waldenstrom
    Abstract:

    This paper studies the evolution of the modern Swedish Inheritance Taxation from its introduction in 1885 to its abolishment in 2004. Our contribution is twofold. First, we compute annual effective Inheritance Tax rates for differently sized bequests and different types of inherited assets (non-firm wealth and family firm equity), ac-counting for all relevant exemptions, deductions and valuation discounts. Second, we try to account for the changes in Inheritance Taxation. Ideology rather than mass mobili-zation or revenue maximization appears to drive the sharp Tax increases of the 1930s through the 1960s. We document increased opportunities for Tax planning for the wealthy, in particular a series of drastic Tax cuts on inherited family firms from the 1970s onwards. This rise of avoidance opportunities for the rich, while more and more middle-class heirs paid notable Inheritance Taxes, contributed to a loss of legitimacy for the Tax and its ultimate repeal in 2004

Emmanuel Saez - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • a theory of optimal Inheritance Taxation
    Econometrica, 2013
    Co-Authors: Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez
    Abstract:

    This paper derives optimal Inheritance Tax formulas that (a) capture the key equityeciency trade-o, (b) are expressed in terms of estimable sucient statistics, (c) are robust to the underlying structure of preferences. We consider dynamic stochastic models with general and heterogeneous bequest tastes and labor productivities. We limit ourselves to simple but realistic linear or two-bracket Tax structures to obtain tractable formulas. We show that long-run optimal Inheritance Tax rates can always be expressed in terms of distributional parameters, aggregate behavioral elasticities and social preferences for redistribution. Importantly, those results carry over with tractable modications to (a) the case with social discounting (instead of steady-state welfare maximization), (b) the case with partly accidental bequests, (c) the standard Barro-Becker dynastic model. In all cases, the optimal Inheritance Tax rate increases with the concentration of bequest received and decreases with the elasticity of aggregate bequests to the net-of-Tax rate. The optimal Tax rate is positive and quantitatively large if concentration is high, the elasticity is low and society cares mostly about those receiving little Inheritance. In contrast, the optimal Tax rate is negative when society cares mostly about inheritors. We propose a calibration using micro-data for France and the United States. We nd that for realistic parameters

  • a theory of optimal Inheritance Taxation
    PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique", 2013
    Co-Authors: Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez
    Abstract:

    This paper derives optimal Inheritance Tax formulas that capture the key equity-efficiency trade-off, are expressed in terms of estimable sufficient statistics, and are robust to the underlying structure of preferences. We consider dynamic stochastic models with general and heterogeneous bequest tastes and labor productivities. We limit ourselves to simple but realistic linear or two-bracket Tax structures to obtain tractable formulas. We show that long-run optimal Inheritance Tax rates can always be expressed in terms of aggregate earnings and bequest elasticities with respect to Tax rates, distributional parameters, and social preferences for redistribution. Those results carry over with tractable modifications to (a) the case with social discounting (instead of steady-state welfare maximization), (b) the case with partly accidental bequests, (c) the standard Barro-Becker dynastic model. The optimal Tax rate is positive and quantitatively large if the elasticity of bequests to the Tax rate is low, bequest concentration is high, and society cares mostly about those receiving little Inheritance. We propose a calibration using micro-data for France and the United States. We find that, for realistic parameters, the optimal Inheritance Tax rate might be as large as 50%-60%--or even higher for top bequests, in line with historical experience.

  • a theory of optimal Inheritance Taxation
    2012
    Co-Authors: Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez
    Abstract:

    This paper derives optimal Inheritance Tax formulas that (a) capture the key equity-efficiency trade-off, (b) are expressed in terms of estimable sufficient statistics, (c) are robust to the underlying structure of preferences. We consider dynamic stochastic models with general and heterogeneous bequest tastes and labor productivities. We limit ourselves to simple but realistic linear or two-bracket Tax structures to obtain tractable formulas. We show that long-run optimal Inheritance Tax rates can always be expressed in terms of distributional parameters, aggregate behavioral elasticities and social preferences for redistribution. Importantly, those results carry over with tractable modifications to (a) the case with social discounting (instead of steady-state welfare maximization), (b) the case with partly accidental bequests, (c) the standard Barro-Becker dynastic model. In all cases, the optimal Inheritance Tax rate increases with the concentration of bequest received and decreases with the elasticity of aggregate bequests to the net-of-Tax rate. The optimal Tax rate is positive and quantitatively large if concentration is high, the elasticity is low and society cares mostly about those receiving little Inheritance. In contrast, the optimal Tax rate is negative when society cares mostly about inheritors. We propose a calibration using micro-data for France and the United States. We find that for realistic parameters the optimal Inheritance Tax rate might be as large as 50%-60% - or even higher for top bequests, in line with historical experience.

Oscar Erixson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.