The Experts below are selected from a list of 360 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Morten Bennedsen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the value of local political connections in a low corruption environment
Journal of Financial Economics, 2013Co-Authors: Mario Daniele Amore, Morten BennedsenAbstract:We use exogenous changes in Danish local municipality sizes to identify a large positive effect of political power on the profitability of firms related by family to local Politicians. Our difference-in-differences estimate is consistent with a unitary elasticity of connected firms’ performance to political power (as measured by population per elected politician). Increasing power boosts firms’ operating returns, especially in industries relying heavily on public demand. Focusing on arguably the world's least corrupt country, we highlight the importance of corporate rent seeking at local governmental levels, which account for nearly half of total public expenditures.
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the value of local political connections in a low corruption environment
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Mario Daniele Amore, Morten BennedsenAbstract:We use exogenous changes in Danish local municipality sizes to identify a large positive effect of political power on the profitability of firms related by family to local Politicians. Our difference-in-differences estimate is consistent with a unitary elasticity of connected firms' performance to political power (as measured by population per elected politician). Increasing power boosts firms' operating returns, especially in industries relying heavily on public demand. We confirm our main finding via several alternative models. Focusing on arguably the world's least corrupt country, we highlight the importance of corporate rent seeking at local governmental levels, which account for nearly half of total public expenditures.
Mario Daniele Amore - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the value of local political connections in a low corruption environment
Journal of Financial Economics, 2013Co-Authors: Mario Daniele Amore, Morten BennedsenAbstract:We use exogenous changes in Danish local municipality sizes to identify a large positive effect of political power on the profitability of firms related by family to local Politicians. Our difference-in-differences estimate is consistent with a unitary elasticity of connected firms’ performance to political power (as measured by population per elected politician). Increasing power boosts firms’ operating returns, especially in industries relying heavily on public demand. Focusing on arguably the world's least corrupt country, we highlight the importance of corporate rent seeking at local governmental levels, which account for nearly half of total public expenditures.
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the value of local political connections in a low corruption environment
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Mario Daniele Amore, Morten BennedsenAbstract:We use exogenous changes in Danish local municipality sizes to identify a large positive effect of political power on the profitability of firms related by family to local Politicians. Our difference-in-differences estimate is consistent with a unitary elasticity of connected firms' performance to political power (as measured by population per elected politician). Increasing power boosts firms' operating returns, especially in industries relying heavily on public demand. We confirm our main finding via several alternative models. Focusing on arguably the world's least corrupt country, we highlight the importance of corporate rent seeking at local governmental levels, which account for nearly half of total public expenditures.
Oliver Vanden Eynde - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Building connections: Political corruption and road construction in India
Journal of Development Economics, 2018Co-Authors: Jonathan Lehne, Jacob Shapiro, Oliver Vanden EyndeAbstract:Politically-driven corruption is a pervasive challenge for development, but evidence of its welfare effects are scarce. Using data from a major rural road construction programme in India we document political influence in a setting where Politicians have no official role in contracting decisions. Exploiting close elections to identify the causal effect of coming to power, we show that the share of contractors whose name matches that of the winning politician increases by 83% (from 4% to 7%) in the term after a close election compared to the term before. Regression discontinuity estimates at the road level show that political interference raises the cost of road construction and increases the likelihood that roads go missing.
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Building connections: Political corruption and road construction in India
2016Co-Authors: Jonathan Lehne, Jacob N. Shapiro, Oliver Vanden EyndeAbstract:Politically-driven corruption is a pervasive challenge for development, but evidence of its welfare effects is scarce. Using data from a major rural road construction programme in India we document political influence in a setting where Politicians have no official role in contracting decisions. Exploiting close elections to identify the causal effect of coming to power, we show that the share of contractors whose name matches that of the winning politician increases by 63% (from 4% to 6.4%). Regression discontinuity estimates at the road level show that political interference raises costs, lowers quality, and increases the likelihood that roads go missing.
Jonathan Lehne - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Building connections: Political corruption and road construction in India
Journal of Development Economics, 2018Co-Authors: Jonathan Lehne, Jacob Shapiro, Oliver Vanden EyndeAbstract:Politically-driven corruption is a pervasive challenge for development, but evidence of its welfare effects are scarce. Using data from a major rural road construction programme in India we document political influence in a setting where Politicians have no official role in contracting decisions. Exploiting close elections to identify the causal effect of coming to power, we show that the share of contractors whose name matches that of the winning politician increases by 83% (from 4% to 7%) in the term after a close election compared to the term before. Regression discontinuity estimates at the road level show that political interference raises the cost of road construction and increases the likelihood that roads go missing.
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Building connections: Political corruption and road construction in India
2016Co-Authors: Jonathan Lehne, Jacob N. Shapiro, Oliver Vanden EyndeAbstract:Politically-driven corruption is a pervasive challenge for development, but evidence of its welfare effects is scarce. Using data from a major rural road construction programme in India we document political influence in a setting where Politicians have no official role in contracting decisions. Exploiting close elections to identify the causal effect of coming to power, we show that the share of contractors whose name matches that of the winning politician increases by 63% (from 4% to 6.4%). Regression discontinuity estimates at the road level show that political interference raises costs, lowers quality, and increases the likelihood that roads go missing.
Alberto Alesina - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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old and young Politicians
Social Science Research Network, 2016Co-Authors: Alberto Alesina, Traviss Cassidy, Ugo TroianoAbstract:We explore the effects of a politician's age by using data on the universe of Italian mayoral elections. We find that younger Politicians are more likely to be reelected and are also more likely to move to higher levels of elected government. In addition, we find that younger Politicians are more likely to engage in political budget cycles in expenditures. Thus younger Politicians behave more strategically in response to electoral incentives, perhaps because they expect to have a longer political career. We discuss and rule out several alternative interpretations.
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old and young Politicians
Research Papers in Economics, 2015Co-Authors: Alberto Alesina, Ugo Troiano, Traviss CassidyAbstract:We evaluate the effect of a politician’s age on political governance, reelection rates,and policies using data on Italian local governments. Our results suggest that younger Politicians are more likely to behave strategically in response to election incentives: they increase spending and obtain more transfers from higher levels of government in preelection years. We argue that is a sign of stronger career concerns incentives. The results are robust to adopting three different identification strategies: fixed-effects regression, standard regression discontinuity design, and an augmented regression discontinuity design that controls for residual heterogeneity.
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Bureaucrats or Politicians
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004Co-Authors: Alberto Alesina, Guido TabelliniAbstract:Policies are typically chosen by Politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates the criteria that should lead a society to allocate policy tasks to elected policymakers (Politicians) or non elected bureaucrats. Politicians are preferable for tasks that do not involve too much specific technical ability relative to effort; there is uncertainty about ex post preferences of the public and flexibility is valuable; time inconsistency is not an issue; small but powerful vested interests do not have large stakes in the policy outcome; effective decisions over policies require taking into account policy complementarities and compensating the losers. We then compare this normative benchmark with the case in which Politicians choose when to delegate and we show that the two generally differ.
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bureaucrats or Politicians
Research Papers in Economics, 2004Co-Authors: Alberto Alesina, Guido TabelliniAbstract:Policies are typically chosen by Politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates the criteria that should lead a society to allocate policy tasks to elected policymakers (Politicians) or non elected bureaucrats. Politicians tend to be preferable for tasks that have the following features: they do not involve too much specific technical ability relative to effort; there is uncertainty ex ante about ex post preferences of the public and flexibility is valuable; time inconsistency is not an issue; small but powerful vested interests do not have large stakes in the policy outcome; effective decisions over policies require taking into account policy complementarities and compensating the losers; the policies imply redistributive conflicts among large groups of voters. The reverse apply to the attribution of prerogatives to bureaucrats.
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bureaucrats or Politicians
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004Co-Authors: Alberto Alesina, Guido TabelliniAbstract:Policies are typically chosen by Politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates the e fficiency criteria for allocating policy tasks to elected policymakers (Politicians) or non elected bureaucrats. Politicians are more efficient for tasks that do not involve too much specific technical ability relative to effort; there is uncertainty about ex post preferences of the public and flexibility is valuable; time inconsistency is not an issue; small but powerful vested interests do not have large stakes in the policy outcome; effective decisions over policies require taking into account policy complementarities and compensating the losers. We then compare this benchmark with the case in which Politicians choose when to delegate and we show that the two generally differ.
