The Experts below are selected from a list of 40020 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Stephane Villeneuve - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Technology choice under several uncertainty sources
    European Journal of Operational Research, 2010
    Co-Authors: Catherine Bobtcheff, Stephane Villeneuve
    Abstract:

    We analyze a model of irreversible investment with two sources of uncertainty. A risk-neutral decision maker has the choice between two mutually exclusive projects under Input Price and output Price uncertainty. We propose a complete study of the shape of the rational investment region and we prove that it is never optimal to invest when the alternative investments generate the same payoff independently of its size. A key feature of this bidimensional degree of uncertainty is thus that the payoff generated by each project is not a sufficient statistic to make a rational investment. In this context, our analysis provides a new motive for waiting to invest: the benefits associated with the dominance of one project over the other. As an illustration, we apply our methodology to power generation under uncertainty.

Olivier Bonroy - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • On the benefits of contractual inefficiency in quality-differentiated markets
    Oxford Economic Papers, 2015
    Co-Authors: Emanuele Bacchiega, Olivier Bonroy
    Abstract:

    Contractual inefficiencies within supply chains increase an Input Price above its marginal cost, therefore they are considered detrimental to consumer surplus. We argue that such inefficiencies may be beneficial to consumers in quality-differentiated markets. Indeed, enhancing contractual efficiency in high-quality supply chains may adversely affect the market structure by driving low-quality vertical chains out of the market and consequently reduce consumer surplus. Due to the finiteness property, (counter-)integration in the low-quality channel does not allow this channel to be in business. Our result holds irrespective of whether the contractual inefficiencies originate from the double marginalization or the ‘commitment effect’.

  • Downstream labeling and upstream Price competition
    European Economic Review, 2012
    Co-Authors: Olivier Bonroy, Stéphane Lemarié
    Abstract:

    This paper analyses the economic consequences of labeling in a setting with two vertically related markets. Labeling on the downstream market affects upstream Price competition through two effects: a differentiation effect and a ranking effect. The magnitude of these two effects determines who in the supply chain will receive the benefits and who will bear the burden of labeling. For instance, whenever the ranking effect dominates the differentiation effect, the low-quality upstream firm loses from labeling while all downstream actors are individually better off. By decreasing the low-quality Input Price, the label acts as a subsidy and leads to an increase of the downstream market welfare. This analysis furthers our understanding of the economic consequences of labeling in cases like those of GMOs or restaurants.

  • Downstream labeling and upstream Price competition
    2010
    Co-Authors: Olivier Bonroy, Stéphane Lemarié
    Abstract:

    The paper analyses the economic consequences of labeling in a setting with two vertically related markets. Labeling on the downstream market affects upstream Price competition through two effects : a differentiation effect and a ranking effect. The magnitude of these two effects determines who in the supply chain will receive the benefits and who will bear the burden of labeling. For instance, whenever the ranking effect dominates the differentiation effect, the low quality upstream firm loses from labeling while all downstream actors are individually better off. By decreasing the low quality Input Price, the label acts then as a subsidy which assures an increase of the downstream market welfare. This analysis furthers our understanding of the economic consequences of the public labeling in cases like restaurants or GMOs.

Ioannis N. Pinopoulos - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Upstream horizontal mergers involving a vertically integrated firm
    Journal of Economics, 2019
    Co-Authors: Ioannis N. Pinopoulos
    Abstract:

    We study upstream horizontal mergers when one of the merging parties is vertically integrated. Under observable contracting in the pre-merger case, we show that such type of mergers always harm consumers. However, under unobservable contracting in the pre-merger case, the Input Price may decrease and consumer surplus may increase as a result of the merger even in the absence of exogenous cost-synergies between merging firms. A necessary condition for this finding is that the unintegrated downstream firm is more cost-efficient than the downstream division of the integrated firm.

  • Input Price discrimination and upstream R&D investments
    Review of Industrial Organization, 2019
    Co-Authors: Ioannis N. Pinopoulos
    Abstract:

    We study the welfare effects of Input Price discrimination when an upstream firm that supplies two cost-asymmetric downstream firms undertakes RD but it always decreases long-run welfare. Thus, with unobservable two-part tariffs, a ban on Input Price discrimination is detrimental to welfare even when its effect on upstream R&D investments is positive.

  • Input Price Discrimination and Upstream R&D Investments
    Review of Industrial Organization, 2019
    Co-Authors: Ioannis N. Pinopoulos
    Abstract:

    We study the welfare effects of Input Price discrimination when an upstream firm that supplies two cost-asymmetric downstream firms undertakes R&D investments. With observable two-part tariffs, banning discrimination always decreases R&D levels and long-run welfare. Under unobservable two-part tariffs, banning discrimination may increase or decrease R&D levels—depending on the degree of downstream cost-asymmetry; but it always decreases long-run welfare. Thus, with unobservable two-part tariffs, a ban on Input Price discrimination is detrimental to welfare even when its effect on upstream R&D investments is positive.

  • Input Price discrimination with secret linear contracting
    2018
    Co-Authors: Ioannis N. Pinopoulos
    Abstract:

    We study the welfare effects of Input Price discrimination when an unconstrained upstream supplier uses linear contracts that are unobservable by downstream firms. With homogeneous final goods, we show that banning Input Price discrimination decreases welfare. This finding is in contrast to that in the existing literature that considers observable linear contracts. When final goods are sufficiently differentiated, it is shown that banning Input Price discrimination increases welfare. This result is in contrast to that in the existing literature that considers unobservable two-part tariff contracts.

  • Input Price discrimination, two-part tariff contracts and bargaining
    2017
    Co-Authors: Ioannis N. Pinopoulos
    Abstract:

    We consider an upstream supplier who bargains with two cost-asymmetric downstream firms over the terms of interim observable two-part tariff contracts: contracts are initially secret (acceptance decisions are based on beliefs) but downstream firms observe the accepted contract terms before competing in Prices. We show that the more efficient downstream firm pays a higher Input Price than its less efficient rival, a finding that is in stark contrast to the previous findings in the literature on Input Price discrimination with two-part tariff contracts. We also show that a ban on Input Price discrimination will reduce both consumer and total welfare when the upstream supplier bargains the common two-part tariff contract with the less efficient firm. This result is interesting from a policy perspective since it implies that even though under discriminatory Input Prices the upstream supplier favors the “wrong” firm, non-discriminatory Input pricing can make things even worse in terms of welfare.

Hong Hwang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Input Price discrimination, technology licensing and social welfare
    International Review of Economics & Finance, 2017
    Co-Authors: Kuo-feng Kao, Hong Hwang
    Abstract:

    This paper examines the welfare effect of third-degree Input Price discrimination in the presence of technology licensing by an outside innovator. It is found that discriminatory pricing induces the innovator to issue more licenses to downstream firms which improves the overall production efficiency of the downstream market and makes discriminatory pricing more socially desirable than uniform pricing. However, if the level of innovation is endogenously determined by the outside innovator, Price discrimination suppresses his R&D incentive, which reduces the social welfare and makes the welfare effect of Price discrimination ambiguous.

  • Input Price Discrimination and Social Welfare in the Presence of Technology Licensing
    2013
    Co-Authors: Kuo-feng Kao, Hong Hwang
    Abstract:

    The literature on Input Price discrimination has shown that third-degree Price discrimination by an upstream firm is welfare-deteriorating as the upstream firm charges more (less) efficient downstream firms a higher (lower) Input Price which distorts the production efficiency. (See, for example, Katz (1987) and DeGraba (1990)) In this paper, we examine the welfare effect of third-degree Input Price discrimination in the presence of technology licensing by an outside innovator in a vertically related market with one upstream monopolist and n homogeneous downstream oligopolists. It is found that the innovator tends to license its technology to more downstream firms if the upstream firm engages in discriminatory pricing. This improves the overall production efficiency of the downstream firms and makes discriminatory pricing more socially desirable than uniform pricing, which is opposite to the general outcome in the literature.

  • welfare output allocation and Price discrimination in Input markets
    經濟論文, 2011
    Co-Authors: Chinsheng Chen, Hong Hwang, Cheng-hau Peng
    Abstract:

    We analyze the Price decision of an upstream monopolist who produces and sells an intermediate good to downstream markets where a backward-integrated chain store competes with many local retailers. It is shown that the upstream monopolist may charge a more efficient local retailer a lower Input Price under Price discrimination. This finding is of interest as it goes against the standard conclusion in the Input Price discrimination literature. Moreover, contrary to the general findings in the literature in which Input Price discrimination is welfare-deteriorating, we find that Input Price discrimination improves social welfare if the positive output allocation efficiency effect outweighs the negative production efficiency effect. These results are robust even if the chain store is not backward integrated.

Finn Forsund - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Rate of return regulation and the Le Chatelier principle
    Journal of Productivity Analysis, 2014
    Co-Authors: Gerald Granderson, Finn Forsund
    Abstract:

    This paper examines whether rate-of return regulation alters the Input quantities firms use to produce their selected output level when the corresponding Input Prices change, in a manner similar to the Le Chatelier principle. More specifically, would the change in a rate regulated firm’s Input quantity due to a change in its Input Price be less Price elastic than the unregulated firm’s change in the Input quantity due to a change in its Input Price. We follow Färe and Logan ( 1986 ), Nelson and Wohar ( 1983 ) in estimating a rate regulated cost function and capital Input share system of equations. Using a 1992–2000 panel of 34 US major investor-owned electric utilities, empirical results indicate that the regulated own-Input Price elasticities of demand for labor and fuel are less Price elastic than their corresponding unregulated own-Input Price elasticities of demand (a Le Chatelier principle type effect). Having a fuel clause (1) reduces the firm’s willingness to substitute from fuel to either non-fuel (capital, labor) Input when the Price of fuel rises, and (2) enhances the firm’s willingness to substitute from non-fuel Inputs to fuel when the Price of non-fuel Inputs rises.