The Experts below are selected from a list of 129108 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Rachel Brewster - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the remedy gap Institutional Design retaliation and trade law enforcement
The George Washington Law Review, 2011Co-Authors: Rachel BrewsterAbstract:One of the major innovations of the World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) is the regulation of sanctions in response to violations of trade law. The DSU requires governments to receive multilateral approval before suspending trade concessions and limits the extent of retaliation to prospective damages. In addition, the DSU permits governments to impose only conditional sanctions: sanctions for violations that continue after the dispute resolution process is complete. This enforcement regime creates a remedy gap: governments cannot respond, even to obvious breaches, until the end of the dispute resolution process (and then only to the extent of prospective damages). This gap might not be particularly important if the dispute resolution process were short. In practice, however, the WTO dispute resolution process has proven increasingly time consuming. This Article explores the growth of delays in the WTO dispute resolution process and the increasing significance of the remedy gap. It highlights how the DSU system essentially provides respondent states with an option to violate trade rules for several years without facing trade retaliation. The remedy gap also has counterproductive effects on settlement negotiations: the system gives respondent states few reasons to settle before the end of dispute resolution unless the states are compensated for doing so. Finally, this system may lead frustrated complaining states to subvert the DSU regime by acting outside of the legal framework. This Article discusses several solutions to the remedy gap, most notably creating a procedure where WTO panels can issue preliminary injunctions. * Assistant Professor, Harvard Law School. My thanks to Gabby Blum, Glenn Cohen, Einer Elhauge, John Goldberg, Jack Goldsmith, Jim Greiner, Larry Helfer, Vicki Jackson, Daryl Levinson, Katerina Linos, Eric Posner, Ben Roin, Jed Shugerman, Kathy Speir, Paul Stephan, Matthew Stephenson, Alan Sykes, Joel Trachtman, Mark Wu, the Duke University Law School Faculty Workshop, and the University of Michigan Law School Faculty Workshop for helpful comments on this paper. Andrew Breidenbach, Zack Hill, and Martha Vega-Gonzalez provided excellent research assistance. In the interests of full disclosure, it should be noted that I worked for the United States Trade Representative’s Office (“USTR”) during the time the United States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton case was proceeding through World Trade Organization dispute settlement. The views in this paper are my own and do not represent the views of the USTR or
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the remedy gap Institutional Design retaliation and trade law enforcement
Social Science Research Network, 2011Co-Authors: Rachel BrewsterAbstract:One of the major innovations of the World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) is the regulation of sanctions in response to violations of trade law. The DSU requires governments to receive multilateral approval before suspending trade concessions and limits the extent of retaliation to prospective damages. In addition, the DSU permits governments to impose only conditional sanctions: sanctions for violations that continue after the dispute resolution process is complete. This enforcement regime creates a remedy gap: governments cannot respond, even to obvious breaches, until the end of the dispute resolution process (and then only to the extent of prospective damages). This gap might not be particularly important if the dispute resolution process were short. In practice, however, the WTO dispute resolution process has proven increasingly time consuming. This Article explores the growth of delays in the WTO dispute resolution process and the increasing significance of the remedy gap. It highlights how the DSU system essentially provides respondent states with an option to violate trade rules for several years without facing trade retaliation. The remedy gap also has counterproductive effects on settlement negotiations: the system gives respondent states few reasons to settle before the end of dispute resolution unless the states are compensated for doing so. Finally, this system may lead frustrated complaining states to subvert the DSU regime by acting outside of the legal framework. This Article discusses several solutions to the remedy gap, most notably creating a procedure where WTO panels can issue preliminary injunctions.
Ronald B Mitchell - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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problem structure Institutional Design and the relative effectiveness of international environmental agreements
Global Environmental Politics, 2006Co-Authors: Ronald B MitchellAbstract:To accurately assess the relative effectiveness of international environmental agreements requires that we pay greater attention to how problem structures influence both Institutional Design and the outcomes we use to evaluate Institutional effects. Analyzing multiple agreements allows us to move beyond claims that an agreement was influential to claims regarding which variables explain that influence, to examine how Institutional influence depends on other factors and to evaluate an agreement's effectiveness relative to other agreements and non-Institutional influences. Accounting for problem structure is crucial to such endeavors because problem structure variables may be alternatives to or interact with Institutional variables and because Institutional Design is endogenous to the problem structure-outcome relationship. The shortcomings related to incorporating problem structure in extant effectiveness research can be overcome through four strategies: carefully describing analytically useful variation in problem structure, selecting cases to limit variation in problem structure, evaluating problem structure variables and their influence on Design and behavior, and evaluating effectiveness in terms appropriate to the problem structure. (c) 2006 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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problem structure Institutional Design and the relative effectiveness of international environmental agreements
Global Environmental Politics, 2006Co-Authors: Ronald B MitchellAbstract:To accurately assess the relative effectiveness of international environmental agreements requires that we pay greater attention to how problem structures influence both Institutional Design and the outcomes we use to evaluate Institutional effects. Analyzing multiple agreements allows us to move beyond claims that an agreement was influential to claims regarding which variables explain that influence, to examine how Institutional influence depends on other factors and to evaluate an agreement's effectiveness relative to other agreements and non-Institutional influences. Accounting for problem structure is crucial to such endeavors because problem structure variables may be alternatives to or interact with Institutional variables and because Institutional Design is endogenous to the problem structure-outcome relationship. The shortcomings related to incorporating problem structure in extant effectiveness research can be overcome through four strategies: carefully describing analytically useful variation i...
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situation structure and Institutional Design reciprocity coercion and exchange
International Organization, 2001Co-Authors: Ronald B Mitchell, Patricia M KeilbachAbstract:States experiencing negative externalities caused by other states' behaviors have incentives to devise international institutions to change those behaviors. The institutions states create to counter incentives to defect vary in whether and how they expand Institutional scope to accomplish that goal. When facing symmetric externalities, states tend to devise narrow institutions based on issue-specific reciprocity. When facing asymmetric externalities, or upstream/downstream problems, states tend to broaden Institutional scope using linkage strategies. When victims of an externality are stronger than its perpetrators, the resulting institutions, if any are devised, are likely to incorporate the negative linkage of sanctions or coercion. When victims are weaker, exchange institutions relying on the positive linkage of rewards are more likely. We illustrate the influence of situation structure on Institutional Design with three cases: international whaling, ozone-layer depletion, and Rhine River pollution.
David Wilson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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social capital and local governance exploring the Institutional Design variable
Political Studies, 2001Co-Authors: Vivien Lowndes, David WilsonAbstract:This article argues that Robert Putnam's social capital thesis is too society-centred and undervalues state agency and associated political factors. It explores the role of Institutional Design in explaining how governments can shape the development of social capital and its potential influence upon democratic performance. New Labour's programme of ‘democratic renewal’ within British local government provides an excellent opportunity to assess the relevance of Institutional Design to arguments about social capital and democracy. We propose that prospects for the creation and mobilization of social capital may depend as much upon the process as the content of Institutional Design.
Alex Waddan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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implementing health care reform in the united states intergovernmental politics and the dilemmas of Institutional Design
Health Policy, 2014Co-Authors: Daniel Beland, Philip Rocco, Alex WaddanAbstract:The Affordable Care Act (ACA) was enacted, and continues to operate, under conditions of political polarization. In this article, we argue that the law's intergovernmental structure has amplified political conflict over its implementation by distributing governing authority to political actors at both levels of the American federal system. We review the ways in which the law's demands for Institutional coordination between federal and state governments (and especially the role it preserves for governors and state legislatures) have created difficulties for rolling out health-insurance exchanges and expanding the Medicaid program. By way of contrast, we show how the Institutional Design of the ACA's regulatory reforms of the insurance market, which diminish the reform's political salience, has allowed for considerably less friction during the implementation process. This article thus highlights the implications of multi-level Institutional Designs for the post-enactment politics of major reforms.
Luc Fransen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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multi stakeholder governance and voluntary programme interactions legitimation politics in the Institutional Design of corporate social responsibility
2012Co-Authors: Luc FransenAbstract:A variety of innovative Institutional forms have emerged within the context of voluntary attempts to address pressing social and environmental issues. Among such institutions, the prevailing wisdom is that those characterized as encompassing multi-stakeholder -governance are generally seen as having greater legitimacy than other forms of voluntary action, and such institutions have proliferated as a result. At the same time, business-driven programs that exclude societal stakeholder groups are believed to be increasingly emerging as competitors to multi-stakeholder-governed programs. This paper explores the relationship between these two trends and, in particular, highlights the potential for competition between multi-stakeholder and business-driven programs to lead to a diverse range of outcomes which are shaped by legitimation politics. This perspective emphasizes the open-ended and contingent nature of voluntary program interactions, and the importance of strategy and choice of voluntary programs and their participants in shaping the Institutional Design of programs. Drawing upon a review of prior research and an in-depth case study of business-driven voluntary programs within the European multi-product retail industry, the study shows that one key implication of legitimation politicking is a divergence between the surface appearance of the governance of programs and the programs’ actual Institutional Design.
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multi stakeholder governance and voluntary programme interactions legitimation politics in the Institutional Design of corporate social responsibility
Socio-economic Review, 2012Co-Authors: Luc FransenAbstract:A variety of innovative Institutional forms have emerged within the context of voluntary attempts to address pressing social and environmental issues. Among such institutions, the prevailing wisdom is that those characterized as encompassing multi-stakeholder governance are generally seen as having greater legitimacy than other forms of voluntary action, and such institutions have proliferated as a result. At the same time, business-driven programmes that exclude societal stakeholder groups are believed to be increasingly emerging as competitors to multi-stakeholder-governed programmes. This paper explores the relationship between these two trends and, in particular, highlights the potential for competition between multi-stakeholder and business-driven programmes to lead to a diverse range of outcomes which are shaped by legitimation politics. This perspective emphasizes the open-ended and contingent nature of voluntary programme interactions and the importance of strategy and choice of voluntary programmes and their participants in shaping the Institutional Design of programmes. Drawing upon a review of prior research and an in-depth case study of business-driven voluntary programmes within the European multi-product retail industry, the study shows that one key implication of legitimation politicking is a divergence between the surface appearance of the governance of programmes and the programmes’ actual Institutional Design.
