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Shunit Reiter - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Institutional Reform--prerequisites for providing a life of quality for mentally retarded residents.
    Research in developmental disabilities, 1991
    Co-Authors: Shunit Reiter
    Abstract:

    The present paper is a socio-ecological description of Institutional Reforms implemented at Kfar Tikvah, Israel. Kfar Tikvah is a community for approximately 130 moderately mentally retarded individuals. For the purpose of Institutional Reforms the organizational structure of the kibbutz system was adopted, but without adherence to its underlying philosophy. As a first stage in Institutional Reform the application of the kibbutz structure proved successful. However, for Reforms to achieve the goal of providing residents with quality of life, structural changes are not enough and a clear philosophical orientation is needed.

Jason Parkin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Aging Injunctions and the Legacy of Institutional Reform Litigation
    Vanderbilt Law Review, 2017
    Co-Authors: Jason Parkin
    Abstract:

    IntroductionWhat will become of aging Institutional Reform injunctions? Sixty years have now passed since the Supreme Court first endorsed the notion that courts could order system-wide Reforms intended to bring government agencies into compliance with the law.1 During that time, Institutional Reform litigation has transformed countless bureaucracies notorious for resisting change, including public school systems, social services agencies, correctional facilities, housing authorities, and police departments.2 The injunctions that result from these lawsuits comprise a body of binding, enforceable obligations that supplement the rights and requirements created by constitutional, statutory, and regulatory law. As time passes, however, how long these injunctions will remain in force is far from clear.Although Institutional Reform litigation has been the subject of much legal scholarship, comparatively little attention has been paid to how its remedial phase should come to an end. As this novel form of litigation rose to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s, it sparked heated debates among scholars. The cases were controversial from the beginning, as they involved judges (usually federal) compelling government agencies (usually state and local) to honor the rights (usually federal) of individuals who interact with those agencies. Its proponents viewed Institutional Reform litigation as an important tool for ensuring that governmental entities comply with the law,3 while critics objected on federalism, separation of powers, and judicial legitimacy and capacity grounds.4 More recently, public law scholars have shifted their focus to the increasingly hostile terrain facing plaintiffs bringing new lawsuits challenging governmental policies and practices. Aside from law review articles commenting on the winding down of school desegregation remedies,5 the fate of existing Institutional Reform injunctions has been largely ignored.6Unlike academics, the litigants and judges involved with Institutional Reform litigation do not have the luxury of ignoring questions related to the end stages of these injunctions. Although the Supreme Court has rarely addressed when and how Institutional Reform injunctions should conclude, its most recent ruling on this topic-the 2009 decision in Horne v. Flores-emphasized that Institutional Reform injunctions must be easier to terminate than all other types of injunctions.7 In response, government defendants have moved aggressively to overturn or dissolve long-standing injunctions.8 This has altered the dynamic of Institutional Reform litigation in recent years, as previously victorious plaintiffs are finding themselves on the defensive, fighting to preserve remedies won at earlier stages of the litigation.9But government motions to terminate injunctions represent only part of the story when it comes to the death of Institutional Reform injunctions. The remedies are also coming to an end in two less visible-but no less important-ways. First, Institutional Reform injunctions are terminating according to their own design.10 An Institutional Reform injunction can be written so that it applies in perpetuity, or it can specify the terms of its demise in a termination or "sunset" provision. Such provisions are typically triggered by the passage of a specified period of time or by the defendant's satisfaction of performance benchmarks. Whether bargained for by parties as part of a consent decree or inserted by judges fashioning a litigated remedial order, these provisions have become common as defendants and judges seek to avoid long-term court oversight and enforcement of Institutional Reform injunctions.Second, Institutional Reform injunctions are terminating due to disuse.11 Even when Institutional Reform injunctions are in effect on paper, they remain viable only as long as the parties and the court continue to implement and enforce them. For injunctions issued five, ten, twenty, thirty, or even forty years ago, this can be quite a difficult task. …

  • Aging Injunctions and the Legacy of Institutional Reform Litigation
    2017
    Co-Authors: Jason Parkin
    Abstract:

    Institutional Reform litigation has been an enduring feature of the American legal system since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown v. Board of Education. The resulting injunctions have transformed countless bureaucracies notorious for resisting change, including public school systems, housing authorities, social services agencies, correctional facilities, and police departments. But these injunctions face an uncertain future. The Supreme Court has held that Institutional Reform injunctions must be easier to terminate than all other injunctions issued by the federal courts. Some Institutional Reform injunctions go unenforced or are forgotten entirely. Others expire due to sunset provisions. At the same time, doctrinal shifts have made it more difficult for plaintiffs to win new injunctions in Institutional Reform cases. Scholars have been tracing the decline of Institutional Reform litigation for years, but little attention has been paid to the fate of the countless injunctions that remain in place. This Article sheds light on this essential but overlooked aspect of Institutional Reform litigation. First, it identifies three ways that Institutional Reform injunctions are dying off — by dissolution, by design, and by disuse — and the implications of each form of injunction death. Then, it argues that scholars, judges, and litigants must rethink their approach to the end stages of Institutional Reform injunctions, offering strategies to ensure that current and future injunctions are not terminated prematurely. This Article thus adds an important new perspective to the debate over the legacy of Institutional Reform litigation.

Andy Hall - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • The soil sciences in India: Policy lessons for agricultural innovation
    Research Policy, 2006
    Co-Authors: Rajeswari S. Raina, Sunita Sangar, V. Rasheed Sulaiman, Andy Hall
    Abstract:

    Abstract There is increasing demand for Institutional Reform in the agricultural sciences. This paper presents lessons from the content and directions in soil science research in India, to make a case for Institutional Reform in the agricultural sciences. It demonstrates how existing Institutional and organizational contexts shape the research content of the soil sciences and its sub-disciplines. These contexts also shape the capacity of the soil sciences to understand and partner with other components of the wider natural resource management (NRM) innovation systems. The professional association has received little attention in the innovation systems literature, even within the nuanced, context specific and historically sensitive accounts of innovation. As a professional association, the Indian Society of Soil Sciences (ISSS) plays a limited role currently, with little engagement with the key professional and social issues that confront the soil sciences. The ISSS is presented here as a potential actor in the NRM innovation systems. The paper argues that with the involvement of the ISSS, the existing discipline-based, commodity oriented, linear and instrumentalist problem solving approach in the soil sciences can be Reformed to a learning and partnership based innovation systems approach, enabling professional excellence, field level technology utilization, along with substantial policy and donor support.

Shangjin Wei - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • trade liberalization and embedded Institutional Reform evidence from chinese exporters
    The American Economic Review, 2013
    Co-Authors: Amit K Khandelwal, Peter K Schott, Shangjin Wei
    Abstract:

    If trade barriers are managed by inefficient institutions, trade liberalization can lead to greater-than-expected gains. We examine Chinese textile and clothing exports before and after the elimination of externally imposed export quotas. Both the surge in export volume and the decline in export prices following quota removal are driven by net entry. This outcome is inconsistent with a model in which quotas are allocated based on firm productivity, implying misallocation of resources. Removing this misallocation accounts for a substantial share of the overall gain in productivity associated with quota removal. (JEL F13, F14, L67, O14, O19, P23, P33) Institutions that distort the efficient allocation of resources across firms can have a sizable effect on economic outcomes. Hsieh and Klenow (2009), for example, estimate that distortions in the Chinese economy reduce manufacturing productivity by 30 to 50 percent relati ve to an optimal distribution of capital and labor across existing manufacturers. While research in this area often concentrates on misallocation among existing firms, distortions can also favor incumbents at the expense of entrants. Trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas can obviously distort resource allocation along these “intensive” and “extensive” margins, and estimation of the productivity growth associated with their removal is a traditional line of inquiry in international trade. But gains from trade liberalization may be larger than expected if the institutions created to manage the barriers impose their own, additional drag on productivity (e.g., arbitrary enforcement of quotas and tariffs). In that case, trade liberalization induces two gains: the first from the elimination of the embedded institution, and the second from the removal of the trade barrier itself. In this article, we examine productivity growth among Chinese exporters following the removal of externally imposed quotas. Under the global Agreement on Textile and Clothing, previously known (and referred to in this article) as the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA), textile and clothing exports from China and other de veloping

  • trade liberalization and embedded Institutional Reform evidence from chinese exporters
    2012
    Co-Authors: Amit K Khandelwal, Peter K Schott, Shangjin Wei
    Abstract:

    If trade barriers are managed by inefficient institutions, trade liberalization can lead to greater-than-expected gains. We examine Chinese textile and clothing exports before and after the removal of externally imposed quotas. Both the surge in export volumes and the decline in prices after the quota removal are driven by net entry, implying that the pre-liberalization quota allocation is not based on firm productivity. Removing this misallocation accounts for a substantial share of the overall productivity gains associated with the quota removal.

  • trade liberalization and embedded Institutional Reform evidence from chinese exporters
    National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011
    Co-Authors: Amit K Khandelwal, Peter K Schott, Shangjin Wei
    Abstract:

    If trade barriers are managed by inefficient institutions, trade liberalization can lead to greater-than-expected gains. We examine Chinese textile and clothing exports before and after the elimination of externally imposed export quotas. We find that the surge in export value and decline in export prices following quota removal is driven by net entry, and show that this dominance is inconsistent with use of a productivity-based allocation of quota licenses by the Chinese government. Our counterfactual implies that elimination of misallocated quotas raised the overall productivity gain of quota removal by 28 percent.

Michael Johnston - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Fighting Systemic Corruption: Social Foundations for Institutional Reform
    The European Journal of Development Research, 1998
    Co-Authors: Michael Johnston
    Abstract:

    While Institutional Reforms enhancing transparency and accountability in state and economic institutions are indispensable parts of any anti-corruption strategy, they also need a long-term social foundation, particularly where corruption is systemic. Social empowerment – expanding and protecting the range of political and economic resources, and alternatives, open to ordinary citizens – is one way to address this task. Social empowerment entails strengthening civil society in order to enhance its political and economic vitality, providing more orderly paths of access and rules of interaction between state and society, and balancing economic and political opportunities. Development strategies aimed particularly at hitherto-excluded people and regions within a country are of particular importance. Social empowerment does not involve wholly new remedies, but rather the judicious coordination of a variety of familiar development and anti-corruption policies. Where it is successful, social empowerment will not totally eradicate corruption. It can, however, provide necessary support for Institutional Reforms, weaken the combinations of monopoly, discretion, and lack of accountability that make for systemic corruption, and help Institutionalise Reform for the long term by linking it to lasting interests contending in active political and social processes.