The Experts below are selected from a list of 38013 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Xinwen Zhang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Design and Implementation of Efficient Integrity Protection for Open Mobile Platforms
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 2014Co-Authors: Xinwen Zhang, Jeanpierre Seifert, Onur AciicmezAbstract:The security of mobile devices such as cellular phones and smartphones has gained extensive attention due to their increasing usage in people's daily life. The problem is challenging as the computing environments of these devices have become more open and general-purpose while at the same time they have the constraints of performance and user experience. We propose and implement SEIP, a simple and efficient but yet effective solution for the Integrity Protection of real-world cellular phone platforms, which is motivated by the disadvantages of applying traditional Integrity models on these performance and user experience constrained devices. The major security objective of SEIP is to protect trusted services and resources (e.g., those belonging to cellular service providers and device manufacturers) from third-party code. We propose a set of simple Integrity Protection rules based upon open mobile operating system environments and application behaviors. Our design leverages the unique features of mobile devices, such as service convergence and limited permissions of user installed applications, and easily identifies the borderline between trusted and untrusted domains on mobile platforms. Our approach, thus, significantly simplifies policy specifications while still achieves a high assurance of platform Integrity. SEIP is deployed within a commercially available Linux-based smartphone and demonstrates that it can effectively prevent certain malware. The security policy of our implementation is less than 20 kB, and a performance study shows that it is lightweight.
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seip simple and efficient Integrity Protection for open mobile platforms
International Conference on Information and Communication Security, 2010Co-Authors: Xinwen Zhang, Jeanpierre Seifert, Onur AciicmezAbstract:SEIP is a simple and efficient but yet effective solution for the Integrity Protection of real-world cellular phone platforms, which is motivated by the disadvantages of applying traditional Integrity models on these performance and user experience constrained devices. The major security objective of SEIP is to protect trusted services and resources (e.g., those belonging to cellular service providers and device manufacturers) from third party code. We propose a set of simple Integrity Protection rules based upon open mobile operating system environments and respective application behaviors. Our design leverages the unique features of mobile devices, such as service convergence and limited permissions of user installed applications, and easily identifies the borderline between trusted and untrusted domains on mobile platform. Our approach thus significantly simplifies policy specifications while still achieves a high assurance of platform Integrity. SEIP is deployed within a commercially available Linux-based smartphone and demonstrates that it can effectively prevent certain malware. The security policy of our implementation is less than 20kB, and a performance study shows that it is lightweight.
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ICICS - SEIP: simple and efficient Integrity Protection for open mobile platforms
Information and Communications Security, 2010Co-Authors: Xinwen Zhang, Jeanpierre Seifert, Onur AciicmezAbstract:SEIP is a simple and efficient but yet effective solution for the Integrity Protection of real-world cellular phone platforms, which is motivated by the disadvantages of applying traditional Integrity models on these performance and user experience constrained devices. The major security objective of SEIP is to protect trusted services and resources (e.g., those belonging to cellular service providers and device manufacturers) from third party code. We propose a set of simple Integrity Protection rules based upon open mobile operating system environments and respective application behaviors. Our design leverages the unique features of mobile devices, such as service convergence and limited permissions of user installed applications, and easily identifies the borderline between trusted and untrusted domains on mobile platform. Our approach thus significantly simplifies policy specifications while still achieves a high assurance of platform Integrity. SEIP is deployed within a commercially available Linux-based smartphone and demonstrates that it can effectively prevent certain malware. The security policy of our implementation is less than 20kB, and a performance study shows that it is lightweight.
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GRID - Building dynamic Integrity Protection for multiple independent authorities in virtualization-based infrastructure
2009 10th IEEE ACM International Conference on Grid Computing, 2009Co-Authors: Ge Cheng, Xinwen Zhang, Hai Jin, Deqing Zou, Guofu XiangAbstract:In grid and cloud computing infrastructures, the Integrity of a computing platform is a critical security requirement in order to provide secure and honest computing environments to service providers and resource consumers. However, due to the fact that software components running on a single platform are usually provided and maintained by different authorities which are potentially untrusted to each other, the problem to monitor and protect runtime system Integrity become very challenging and has not been well addressed yet. In this paper, we present a virtualization based dynamic Integrity Protection method which ensures that only appropriate authorities can control over their components without interfering with other component providers or authorities. In our solution, Integrity requirements defined by the authorities of upper components (e.g., service middleware and applications) are respected by preventing the underlying components (e.g., operating system) from exposing their sensitive data, which can be caused by update of the underlying components or other malicious actions. We implement our solution on Xen-based platform, and our evaluation results show that the solution is effective for Integrity Protection with acceptable performance overhead.
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DBSec - Towards System Integrity Protection with Graph-Based Policy Analysis
Data and Applications Security XXIII, 2009Co-Authors: Xinwen Zhang, Gail-joon AhnAbstract:Identifying and protecting the trusted computing base (TCB) of a system is an important task, which is typically performed by designing and enforcing a system security policy and verifying whether an existing policy satisfies security objectives. To efficiently support these, an intuitive and cognitive policy analysis mechanism is desired for policy designers or security administrators due to the high complexity of policy configurations in contemporary systems. In this paper, we present a graph-based policy analysis methodology to identify TCBs with the consideration of different system applications and services. Through identifying information flows violating the Integrity Protection of TCBs, we also propose resolving principles to using our developed graph-based policy analysis tool.
Timothy Fraser - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy - LOMAC: Low Water-Mark Integrity Protection for COTS environments
Proceeding 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. S&P 2000, 2000Co-Authors: Timothy FraserAbstract:We hypothesize that a form of kernel-resident access control based Integrity Protection can gain widespread acceptance in commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) environments, provided that it couples some useful Protection with a high degree of compatibility with existing software, configurations, and practices. To test this hypothesis, we have developed a highly compatible free open-source prototype called LOMAC, and released it on the Internet. LOMAC is a dynamically loadable extension for COTS Linux kernels that provides Integrity Protection based on Low Water-Mark access control. We present a classification of existing access control models with regard to compatibility, concluding that models similar to Low Water-Mark are especially well suited to high-compatibility solutions. We also describe our practical strategies for dealing with the pathological cases in the Low Water-Mark model's behavior which include a small extension of the model, and an unusual application of its concepts.
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lomac low water mark Integrity Protection for cots environments
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2000Co-Authors: Timothy FraserAbstract:We hypothesize that a form of kernel-resident access control based Integrity Protection can gain widespread acceptance in commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) environments, provided that it couples some useful Protection with a high degree of compatibility with existing software, configurations, and practices. To test this hypothesis, we have developed a highly compatible free open-source prototype called LOMAC, and released it on the Internet. LOMAC is a dynamically loadable extension for COTS Linux kernels that provides Integrity Protection based on Low Water-Mark access control. We present a classification of existing access control models with regard to compatibility, concluding that models similar to Low Water-Mark are especially well suited to high-compatibility solutions. We also describe our practical strategies for dealing with the pathological cases in the Low Water-Mark model's behavior which include a small extension of the model, and an unusual application of its concepts.
Xuxian Jiang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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SACMAT - Towards a VMM-based usage control framework for OS kernel Integrity Protection
Proceedings of the 12th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies - SACMAT '07, 2007Co-Authors: Min Xu, Xuxian Jiang, Ravi Sandhu, Xinwen ZhangAbstract:Protecting kernel Integrity is one of the fundamental security objectives in building a trustworthy operating system (OS). For this end, a variety of approaches and systems have been proposed and developed. However, access control models used in most of these systems are not expressive enough to capture important security requirements such as continuous policy enforcement and mutable process and object attributes. Even worse, most existing Protection mechanisms in these systems reside in the same space as the running OS, which unfortunately can be disabled or subverted after an attacker successfully exploits kernel-level vulnerabilities (or features) to compromise the OS kernel. The increasing number of kernel-level root kit attacks clearly demonstrates this threat. In this paper we present a simple but effective usage control model UCONKI with unique properties of decision continuity and attribute mutability for OS kernel Integrity Protection. Further, to enforce UCONKI security policies, we propose a virtual machine monitor (VMM) based architecture that is isolated and protected from other untrusted processes inside a virtual machine (VM). We have implemented a proof-of-concept prototype in Linux to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach. Our experiments with 18 real-world kernel rootkits show that our approach is able to successfully detect and prevent all kernel Integrity violations from them. Beyond kernel Integrity Protection, we also explore additional opportunities for general OS security, such as the confinement of process activities as well as the Protection of system utility programs at the VMM level.
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towards a vmm based usage control framework for os kernel Integrity Protection
Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies, 2007Co-Authors: Xuxian Jiang, Ravi Sandhu, Xinwen ZhangAbstract:Protecting kernel Integrity is one of the fundamental security objectives in building a trustworthy operating system (OS). For this end, a variety of approaches and systems have been proposed and developed. However, access control models used in most of these systems are not expressive enough to capture important security requirements such as continuous policy enforcement and mutable process and object attributes. Even worse, most existing Protection mechanisms in these systems reside in the same space as the running OS, which unfortunately can be disabled or subverted after an attacker successfully exploits kernel-level vulnerabilities (or features) to compromise the OS kernel. The increasing number of kernel-level root kit attacks clearly demonstrates this threat. In this paper we present a simple but effective usage control model UCONKI with unique properties of decision continuity and attribute mutability for OS kernel Integrity Protection. Further, to enforce UCONKI security policies, we propose a virtual machine monitor (VMM) based architecture that is isolated and protected from other untrusted processes inside a virtual machine (VM). We have implemented a proof-of-concept prototype in Linux to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach. Our experiments with 18 real-world kernel rootkits show that our approach is able to successfully detect and prevent all kernel Integrity violations from them. Beyond kernel Integrity Protection, we also explore additional opportunities for general OS security, such as the confinement of process activities as well as the Protection of system utility programs at the VMM level.
Ravi Sandhu - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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SACMAT - Towards a VMM-based usage control framework for OS kernel Integrity Protection
Proceedings of the 12th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies - SACMAT '07, 2007Co-Authors: Min Xu, Xuxian Jiang, Ravi Sandhu, Xinwen ZhangAbstract:Protecting kernel Integrity is one of the fundamental security objectives in building a trustworthy operating system (OS). For this end, a variety of approaches and systems have been proposed and developed. However, access control models used in most of these systems are not expressive enough to capture important security requirements such as continuous policy enforcement and mutable process and object attributes. Even worse, most existing Protection mechanisms in these systems reside in the same space as the running OS, which unfortunately can be disabled or subverted after an attacker successfully exploits kernel-level vulnerabilities (or features) to compromise the OS kernel. The increasing number of kernel-level root kit attacks clearly demonstrates this threat. In this paper we present a simple but effective usage control model UCONKI with unique properties of decision continuity and attribute mutability for OS kernel Integrity Protection. Further, to enforce UCONKI security policies, we propose a virtual machine monitor (VMM) based architecture that is isolated and protected from other untrusted processes inside a virtual machine (VM). We have implemented a proof-of-concept prototype in Linux to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach. Our experiments with 18 real-world kernel rootkits show that our approach is able to successfully detect and prevent all kernel Integrity violations from them. Beyond kernel Integrity Protection, we also explore additional opportunities for general OS security, such as the confinement of process activities as well as the Protection of system utility programs at the VMM level.
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towards a vmm based usage control framework for os kernel Integrity Protection
Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies, 2007Co-Authors: Xuxian Jiang, Ravi Sandhu, Xinwen ZhangAbstract:Protecting kernel Integrity is one of the fundamental security objectives in building a trustworthy operating system (OS). For this end, a variety of approaches and systems have been proposed and developed. However, access control models used in most of these systems are not expressive enough to capture important security requirements such as continuous policy enforcement and mutable process and object attributes. Even worse, most existing Protection mechanisms in these systems reside in the same space as the running OS, which unfortunately can be disabled or subverted after an attacker successfully exploits kernel-level vulnerabilities (or features) to compromise the OS kernel. The increasing number of kernel-level root kit attacks clearly demonstrates this threat. In this paper we present a simple but effective usage control model UCONKI with unique properties of decision continuity and attribute mutability for OS kernel Integrity Protection. Further, to enforce UCONKI security policies, we propose a virtual machine monitor (VMM) based architecture that is isolated and protected from other untrusted processes inside a virtual machine (VM). We have implemented a proof-of-concept prototype in Linux to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach. Our experiments with 18 real-world kernel rootkits show that our approach is able to successfully detect and prevent all kernel Integrity violations from them. Beyond kernel Integrity Protection, we also explore additional opportunities for general OS security, such as the confinement of process activities as well as the Protection of system utility programs at the VMM level.
Kai Zeng - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Message Integrity Protection Over Wireless Channel: Countering Signal Cancellation via Channel Randomization
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2020Co-Authors: Yanjun Pan, Yantian Hou, Ryan M. Gerdes, Kai Zeng, Asaduzzaman Towfiq, Bedri A. CetinerAbstract:Physical layer message Integrity Protection and authentication by countering signal-cancellation has been shown as a promising alternative to traditional pure cryptographic message authentication protocols, due to the non-necessity of neither pre-shared secrets nor secure channels. However, the security of such an approach remained an open problem due to the lack of systematic security modeling and quantitative analysis. In this paper, we first establish a novel signal cancellation attack framework to study the optimal signal-cancellation attacker's behavior and utility using game-theory, which precisely captures the attacker's knowledge using its correlated channel estimates in various channel environments as well as the online nature of the attack. Based on theoretical results, we propose a practical channel randomization approach to defend against signal cancellation attack, which exploits state diversity and swift reconfigurability of reconfigurable antenna to increase randomness and meanwhile reduce correlation of channel state information. We show that by proactively mimicking the attacker and placing restrictions on the attacker's location, we can bound the attacker's knowledge of channel state information, thereby achieve a guaranteed level of message Integrity Protection in practice. Besides, we conduct extensive experiments and simulations to show the security and performance of the proposed approach. We believe our novel threat modeling and quantitative security analysis methodology can benefit a wide range of physical layer security problems.
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message Integrity Protection over wireless channel by countering signal cancellation theory and practice
Computer and Communications Security, 2015Co-Authors: Yantian Hou, Ryan M. Gerdes, Ruchir Chauhan, Kai ZengAbstract:Physical layer message Integrity Protection and authentication by countering signal-cancellation has been shown as a promising alternative to traditional pure cryptographic message authentication protocols, due to the non-necessity of neither pre-shared secrets nor secure channels. However, the security of such an approach remained an open problem due to the lack of systematic security modeling and quantitative analysis. In this paper, we first establish a novel correlated jamming framework to study the optimal signal-cancellation attacker's behavior and utility using game-theory, which precisely captures the attacker's knowledge using its correlated channel estimates in various channel environments. Besides, we design a practical physical layer message Integrity Protection protocol based on ON/OFF keying and Manchester coding, which provides quantitative security guarantees in the real-world. Such a guarantee is achieved by bounding the attacker's knowledge about the future channel via proactively measuring channel statistics (mimic the attacker), so as to derive a lower-bound to the defender's signal-detection probability under optimal correlated jamming attacks. We conduct extensive experiments and simulations to show the security and performance of the proposed scheme. We believe our novel threat modeling and quantitative security analysis methodology can benefit a wide range of physical layer security problems.
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AsiaCCS - Message Integrity Protection over Wireless Channel by Countering Signal Cancellation: Theory and Practice
Proceedings of the 10th ACM Symposium on Information Computer and Communications Security - ASIA CCS '15, 2015Co-Authors: Yantian Hou, Ryan M. Gerdes, Ruchir Chauhan, Kai ZengAbstract:Physical layer message Integrity Protection and authentication by countering signal-cancellation has been shown as a promising alternative to traditional pure cryptographic message authentication protocols, due to the non-necessity of neither pre-shared secrets nor secure channels. However, the security of such an approach remained an open problem due to the lack of systematic security modeling and quantitative analysis. In this paper, we first establish a novel correlated jamming framework to study the optimal signal-cancellation attacker's behavior and utility using game-theory, which precisely captures the attacker's knowledge using its correlated channel estimates in various channel environments. Besides, we design a practical physical layer message Integrity Protection protocol based on ON/OFF keying and Manchester coding, which provides quantitative security guarantees in the real-world. Such a guarantee is achieved by bounding the attacker's knowledge about the future channel via proactively measuring channel statistics (mimic the attacker), so as to derive a lower-bound to the defender's signal-detection probability under optimal correlated jamming attacks. We conduct extensive experiments and simulations to show the security and performance of the proposed scheme. We believe our novel threat modeling and quantitative security analysis methodology can benefit a wide range of physical layer security problems.