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Dan Fenske - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • all enemies foreign and domestic erasing the distinction between foreign and domestic Intelligence Gathering under the fourth amendment
    Northwestern University Law Review, 2008
    Co-Authors: Dan Fenske
    Abstract:

    INTRODUCTION 344 I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE WARRANT AND PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIREMENTS ......... 348 H. THE POLICY RATIONALES FOR WARRANTS AND PROBABLE CAUSE IN THE DOMESTIC Intelligence-Gathering CONTEXT 355 A. Warrants Provide a Neutral and Detached Decisionmaker 356 B. Warrants Prevent Overdeterrence 359 C. Warrants Protect Minority Groups from Discrimination 364 D. Warrants Prevent Stifling of Political Dissent 368 E. Warrants Protect Against Police Perjury and Judicial Bias 371 III. BETTER SOLUTIONS TO Intelligence-Gathering ABUSE 374 A. Limitation on the Use of Seized Evidence for Purposes Other than Domestic Intelligence or Counterterrorism 375 B. Require Politically Accountable Executive Officials to Approve All Warrantless Domestic Surveillance 377 C. Harsh Penalties for Those Who Abuse Their Authority 378 D. Expanded Whistleblower Protection for Insiders Who Expose Illegal Surveillance 378 E. Oversight and Reporting Requirements 379 F. Expanded Administrative Remedies for Violations of the Fourth Amendment 379 G. Other Solutions 380 CONCLUSION 381 INTRODUCTION Imagine two scenarios. In the first, an American citizen with a connection to al Qaeda conspires with his cohorts, also American citizens, to attack the United States using biological warfare agents. He surveils potential sites for the attack-a high-rise tower, an athletic stadium, a government facility-and acquires some of the materials needed to carry out the attack. Meanwhile, his coconspirators are busy in their makeshift lab concocting the biological agent to be used in the attack. The members of the group communicate with each other and with their financial and ideological backers overseas via cell phone, email, and in person. They live in an American city, biding their time as they wait for their superiors to give them the final go-ahead. The second scenario is identical to the first, except that no overseas superiors direct and finance the operation. Instead, our terrorist cell is out on its own, unconnected to-though ideologically compatible with-al Qaeda. Even without its master in a foreign land, the group has the resources necessary to carry out the attack. In effect, the threat posed in both scenarios is identical.1 Despite the indistinguishable threats posed by these two groups, the United States government is substantially more likely to thwart an attack by the group in the first scenario. The President has greater authority to conduct counterterrorism surveillance and Intelligence Gathering against groups with foreign connections than against groups with no foreign connections. This dichotomy derives from the Supreme Court's decision in the Keith case, which held that a warrant is required for a domestic Intelligence search to comport with the Fourth Amendment.2 Thus, unlike investigations into groups with foreign connections, domestic terrorist investigations are subject to far more stringent requirements under the Fourth Amendment.3 Over the last few years, much of the scholarship on the Fourth Amendment and Intelligence Gathering has focused on foreign Intelligence Gathering within the United States.4 President Bush's January 2005 authorization of warrantless electronic surveillance of al Qaeda-related communications with overseas connections has generated a wealth of commentary, most of it analyzing whether such conduct violates the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),5 or whether Congress can constitutionally limit the President's power to conduct foreign Intelligence surveillance within the United States. …

  • all enemies foreign and domestic erasing the distinction between foreign and domestic Intelligence Gathering under the fourth amendment
    Social Science Research Network, 2007
    Co-Authors: Dan Fenske
    Abstract:

    Many individuals argue that warrants, whether for domestic or foreign Intelligence Gathering in the United States, should be required because they provide a check on executive discretion. This Comment challenges that assertion. Instead, it argues that warrants provide only marginal privacy-protecting benefits while imposing real costs on Intelligence Gathering. Instead of emphasizing warrants in the domestic Intelligence Gathering context - defined as Intelligence Gathering against threats with no foreign connections - the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness touchstone should supplant the focus the Supreme Court has placed on warrants and probable cause in determining compliance with the Fourth Amendment. Reasonableness inherently involves the weighing of the various interests on both sides of an issue, and can therefore readily take account of the waxing and waning of threats posed against the United States. That is, Fourth Amendment doctrine can fluctuate in relation to the degree of threat posed by particular targets, and its enforcement mechanisms can be relaxed where doing so is reasonably necessary to counter-act those threats. This Comment adds to the contemporary debate over domestic surveillance by examining the policy rationales for a warrant requirement in the context of the unique conditions and demands of domestic Intelligence Gathering. It ultimately finds that none of the normal justifications for requiring warrants can support the warrant requirement in this context. Instead, it argues that through a combination of legislative action and expansion of existing Supreme Court precedent in other areas, our nation can best safeguard the values of the Fourth Amendment while still giving the Executive the flexibility necessary to conduct vital domestic counter-terrorism activities.

Brian Blakemore - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Clare Chambers-jones - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Policing cyber hate, cyber threat and cyber terrorism
    International Journal of Police Science and Management, 2013
    Co-Authors: Clare Chambers-jones
    Abstract:

    In late August 2012 the Government Forum of Incident Response and Cyber security Teams (GFIRST) gathered in Atlanta to discuss cyber threats and how new realities are emerging and how new forms of regulation are needed. At the same time Policing cyber hate, cyber threat and cyber terrorism was published. This comprehensive book brings together a divergent problem and tackles each with a candid exploration. The book has ten chapters and covers aspects such as extortion via the internet, the psychological aspects of cyber hate and terrorism, how cyber terrorism can be policed; how knowledge can be managed in relation to cyber terrorism; the Intelligence Gathering and police systems and most importantly the challenge of national and international convergence of cyber security strategies.

Thomas C Ormerod - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • noncoercive human Intelligence Gathering
    Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 2020
    Co-Authors: Coral J Dando, Thomas C Ormerod
    Abstract:

    Despite widespread recognition that coercive methods for Intelligence Gathering are unethical and counterproductive, there is an absence of empirical evidence for effective alternatives. We compared 2 noncoercive methods-the Modified Cognitive Interview (MCI) and Controlled Cognitive Engagement (CCE)-adapted for Intelligence Gathering by adding a moral frame to encourage interviewees to consciously consider sharing Intelligence. Participants from the general population experienced an unexpected live event where equipment was damaged, and an argument ensued. Prior to interview, participants were incentivized to withhold information about a target individual implicated in the event. CCE yielded more target information more frequently than MCI (67% vs. 36%). Similarly, framing yielded target information more often (65% vs. 39%). The effects of interview and framing appear to be additive rather than interactive. Our results indicate combining noncoercive interview methods with moral framing can enhance Intelligence gain. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Anthony Bergin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • draft guidelines for military and Intelligence Gathering activities in the eez and their means and manner of implementation and enforcement
    Marine Policy, 2005
    Co-Authors: Hasjim Djalal, Alexander Yankov, Anthony Bergin
    Abstract:

    Abstract Specific voluntary guidelines are proposed for military and Intelligence Gathering activities in the EEZ. Views on the guidelines range from strong reservations regarding any restrictions on these activities to support for some restrictions. There is general support for the effort to promote mutual understanding and agreement on the rights and obligations of the maritime powers which do not want any rules and coastal States that want some predictability and protection against intimidation. The challenge is to find a practical way of handling these issues. Suggestions are provided regarding requisite specific assurances and the process for implementing and enforcing any such guidelines. State consent and State practice will play a significant role in this process.