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Kondrótová Katarína - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Zpravodajská komunita Spojených států amerických: Byla adekvátně zReformována po teroristických útocích v září 2001?
    Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2017
    Co-Authors: Kondrótová Katarína
    Abstract:

    Cílem této práce bude identifikovat selhání a nedostatky zpravodajské komunity Spojených států amerických, které umožnily provedení teroristických útoků v září 2001, a posléze zanalyzovat, jestli na ně Reforma z roku 2004 reagovala adekvátně. Práce bude sledovat vývoj zpravodajských praktik ve Spojených státech, se zaměřením na selhání které nastali před a počas září 2001. Následně rozebere Reformní zákon Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act z roku 2004 a zhodnotí, jestli napravil tato selhání a vylepšil tím kontrateroristické opatření v kontextu Spojených států, a teda i mezinárodně. Práce by měla poskytnout odpovědi na nasledující otázky: Byl zákon IRTPA vhodnou reakcí na teroristické útoky v září 2001? Jaký byl jeho dopad na americkou zpravodajskou komunitu?The purpose of this thesis will be to identify the failures and shortcomings of the US Intelligence community which allowed the 9/11 terrorist attacks to take place, and analyze whether the subsequent Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 managed to address them appropriately. The paper will examine the development of Intelligence practices in the USA, focusing on the failures that occurred before and during 9/11, and analyze the appositeness of the 2004 Reform for fixing these failures and improving counter-terrorism measures in the US and internationally. Towards the end, it should provide answers to the following questions: Was the IRTPA a suitable response to 9/11? How did it affect the American Intelligence community

  • Zpravodajská komunita Spojených států amerických: Byla adekvátně zReformována po teroristických útocích v září 2001?
    Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2017
    Co-Authors: Kondrótová Katarína
    Abstract:

    The purpose of this thesis will be to identify the failures and shortcomings of the US Intelligence community which allowed the 9/11 terrorist attacks to take place, and analyze whether the subsequent Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 managed to address them appropriately. The paper will examine the development of Intelligence practices in the USA, focusing on the failures that occurred before and during 9/11, and analyze the appositeness of the 2004 Reform for fixing these failures and improving counter-terrorism measures in the US and internationally. Towards the end, it should provide answers to the following questions: Was the IRTPA a suitable response to 9/11? How did it affect the American Intelligence community

Margo Schlanger - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Intelligence legalism and the national security agency s civil liberties gap
    Social Science Research Network, 2015
    Co-Authors: Margo Schlanger
    Abstract:

    This paper examines the National Security Agency, its compliance with legal constraints and its respect for civil liberties. But even if perfect compliance could be achieved, it is too paltry a goal. A good oversight system needs its institutions not just to support and enforce compliance but also to design good rules. Yet as will become evident, the offices that make up the NSA’s compliance system are nearly entirely compliance offices, not policy offices; they work to improve compliance with existing rules, but not to consider the pros and cons of more individually-protective rules and try to increase privacy or civil liberties where the cost of doing so is acceptable. The NSA and the administration in which it sits have thought of civil liberties and privacy only in compliance terms. That is, they have asked only “Can we (legally) do X?” and not “Should we do X?” This preference for the can question over the should question is part and parcel, I argue, of a phenomenon I label “Intelligence legalism,” whose three crucial and simultaneous features are imposition of substantive rules given the status of law rather than policy; some limited court enforcement of those rules; and empowerment of lawyers. Intelligence legalism has been a useful corrective to the lawlessness that characterized surveillance prior to Intelligence Reform, in the late 1970s. But I argue that it gives systematically insufficient weight to individual liberty, and that its relentless focus on rights, and compliance, and law has obscured the absence of what should be an additional focus on interests, or balancing, or policy. More is needed; additional attention should be directed both within the NSA and by its overseers to surveillance policy, weighing the security gains from surveillance against the privacy and civil liberties risks and costs. That attention will not be a panacea, but it can play a useful role in filling the civil liberties gap Intelligence legalism creates. Part I first traces the roots of Intelligence legalism to the last generation of Intelligence disclosures and resulting Reform, in the late 1970s. Part I then goes on to detail the ways in which Intelligence legalism is embedded in both the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) and Executive Order 12,333, which governs American Intelligence practices, and why the result is a civil liberties gap. Part II discusses the ways in which NSA’s compliance and oversight institutions likewise embody Intelligence legalism. I then move in Part III to some shortcomings of this system, and in particular the ways in which the law and NSA’s compliance regulations and infrastructure fall short of full civil liberties policy evaluation. In Part IV, I examine some of the many Reforms that have recently been proposed, analyzing in particular those that might fill that gap. In light of the existing institutional arrangements, I sketch some thoughts on how they could do so most effectively.

James A Burch - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • a domestic Intelligence agency for the united states a comparative analysis of domestic Intelligence agencies and their implications for homeland security
    Homeland Security Affairs, 2007
    Co-Authors: James A Burch
    Abstract:

    OverviewThe safest place in the world for a terrorist to be is inside the United States. . . . As long as terrorists don't do something that trips them up against our laws, they can do pretty much all they want. [Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor] 1Several paradigms were altered on 9/11. The U.S. Intelligence community, largely focused on state actors, now faced the threat posed by elusive terrorists. The community also had to address the asymmetry posed by the terrorists' use of unconventional and relatively unsophisticated methods to inflict loss of life and damage - a more complex Intelligence task. Lastly, due to terrorist disregard for national borders, laws, and transnational financing, the United States had to change its concept of foreign versus domestic Intelligence. 2The area of domestic Intelligence raises several issues. First, law enforcement and Intelligence operate in different worlds - one seeks to prosecute, the other to gather information. 3 Second, with the development of multiple state fusion centers and the creation of additional organizations focused on Intelligence, there is a corresponding increase in bureaucratization. This adds to the challenge of sharing information. Lastly and perhaps most importantly, there are issues concerning the protection of civil liberties and effective oversight.The challenge in developing a viable domestic Intelligence capability for the United States centers on how to organize these capabilities optimally within the larger U.S. Intelligence framework, how to ensure streamlined information sharing between foreign Intelligence and the multitude of law enforcement agencies, and how best to implement oversight mechanisms to protect civil liberties and ensure accountability of Intelligence operations. Organizational mechanisms, information sharing, and oversight are the three critical components to instituting an effective domestic Intelligence capability.One of the proposed constructs to meet these organizational and information sharing challenges is to create a domestic Intelligence agency. The United States is unique among Western or highly industrialized countries in that it does not possess one. This paper examines the feasibility, suitability, and acceptability of instituting a domestic Intelligence agency in the United States from the viewpoint of organization, information sharing, and oversight. It will assess the domestic Intelligence organizations of three countries that possess liberal democratic institutions - the United Kingdom's Military Intelligence 5 (MI5), the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), and India's Intelligence Bureau (IB) - to determine their relative effectiveness in countering terrorism, identify their strengths and shortfalls, and determine applicable policy recommendations for the United States.Specific criteria are used to establish a measure of assessment for a domestic Intelligence agency. In this case, the criteria are derived from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), which partners with countries to promote governance and determine recommendations that promote government Reform. Examples of some criteria are the subordination of Intelligence to national laws, effective coordination, and oversight.Examining countries with similar democratic institutions, threats, and (in the case of Australia and India) geographic scope will result in identifying key factors for instituting an effective domestic Intelligence capability for the United States. This examination will also determine whether current Intelligence Reform policies are targeting perceived Intelligence shortfalls and offer additional recommendations. It will also determine whether the establishment of a domestic Intelligence agency is feasible, acceptable, and suitable to meeting the asymmetric threats of the 21st century.IntroductionAl Qaeda conducted a devastating strike on 9/11 by using airliners as weapon of mass destruction (WMD). …

Loch K Johnson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • accountability and america s secret foreign policy keeping a legislative eye on the central Intelligence agency
    Foreign Policy Analysis, 2005
    Co-Authors: Loch K Johnson
    Abstract:

    Intelligence accountability (“oversight”) encompasses the supervision of a vast range of secret activities and 15 major agencies. Oversight since 1975 has been robust compared to earlier years; yet it continues to fall short of goals espoused by the Church Committee that year, as well as by subsequent panels advocating Intelligence Reform. Lawmakers have responded responsibly to Intelligence surprises (“fire alarms”), carrying out probes into domestic spying, assassination plots, and other questionable covert actions, counterIntelligence vulnerabilities, and major Intelligence failures. They have paid less attention, though, to the day-to-day “police-patrolling” that might uncover weaknesses and eliminate the need for emergency firefighting. Individual members in both branches of Congress have displayed a significant commitment to oversight activities, and now and then the full oversight committees have worked energetically as a unit. Mostly, however, Intelligence accountability since 1975 has been a story of discontinuous motivation, ad hoc responses to scandals, and reliance on the initiative of just a few members of Congress—mainly the occasional dedicated committee chair—to carry the burden. Despite the recommendations of several scholarly studies and government reports, absent still is a comprehensive approach to Intelligence review that mobilizes most, if not all, of the members of the House and Senate standing committees on Intelligence toward a systematic plan of police-patrolling, without waiting for fire alarms.

Arum, Fitri Atur - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • REPOSISI INTELIJEN NEGARA DALAM BADAN INTELIJEN NEGARA PASCA UNDANG-UNDANG NOMOR 17 TAHUN 2011 TENTANG INTELIJEN NEGARA
    'Universitas Janabadra', 2019
    Co-Authors: Arum, Fitri Atur
    Abstract:

    ABSTRACT            Intelligence is essentially a matter relating to the information needed not as an objective, but as material or instruments for decision making. Intelligence can be seen as the process of gathering and processing information, information as a product, and the organization that handles it. Therefore the main Intelligence activity is gathering and searching for information, evaluating information, integrating, analyzing, concluding, and estimating the dynamics of national security using scientific methods. The function of state Intelligence within the framework of Intelligence Reform in a democratic rule of law is carried out by various government agencies or non-ministerial government institutions in accordance with their respective main tasks. In terms of repositioning the state Intelligence can be highlighted in terms of the implementation of the coordination of State Intelligence, BIN has a coordinative relationship with the Regional BIN (Binda). The coordination between BIN and Binda is coordinative which is carried out every day in relation to the nine strategic components. In the case of Intelligence operations, BIN did not coordinate with Binda because Binda was "open" so it was feared that information regarding Intelligence operations was known to the public. BIN as civil Intelligence should only have a coordinating function, and not have an operational function or to carry out Intelligence operations. Ideally, BIN as the coordinator of the central Intelligence community (Kominpus) and the Regional BIN (Binda) as the coordinator of the regional Intelligence community (Kominda) must have a clear coordinating line.Keywords: Repositioning, State Intelligence, State Security