The Experts below are selected from a list of 171 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Joaquim Filipe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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ESAW - A normative and Intentional Agent model for organisation modelling
Engineering Societies in the Agents World III, 2003Co-Authors: Joaquim FilipeAbstract:This paper proposes a new Agent model, including normative aspects based on studies from social psychology. The three main model components are the Epistemic, Deontic and Axiologic components. This model structure facilitates the representation of normative organisational knowledge and processes as well as the relations between individual and social interests. Instead of manipulating the notions of belief, intention, desire, commitment, goal and obligation, the only primitives needed are belief and generalized goal.
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A normative and Intentional Agent model for organisation modelling
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2003Co-Authors: Joaquim FilipeAbstract:This paper proposes a new Agent model, including normative aspects based on studies from social psychology. The three main model components are the Epistemic, Deontic and Axiologic components. This model structure facilitates the representation of normative organisational knowledge and processes as well as the relations between individual and social interests. Instead of manipulating the notions of belief, intention, desire, commitment, goal and obligation, the only primitives needed are belief and generalized goal.
Kurt Gray - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Two Minds Vs. Two Philosophies: Mind Perception Defines Morality and Dissolves the Debate Between Deontology and Utilitarianism
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2012Co-Authors: Kurt Gray, Chelsea ScheinAbstract:Mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. Broadly, moral standing is linked to perceptions of mind, with moral responsibility tied to perceived agency, and moral rights tied to perceived experience. More specifically, moral judgments are based on a fundamental template of two perceived minds—an Intentional Agent and a suffering patient. This dyadic template grows out of the universal power of harm, and serves as a cognitive working model through which even atypical moral events are understood. Thus, all instances of immorality are perceived to involve both blameworthy Agents (i.e., acts) and suffering victims (i.e., consequences). Because moral cognition simultaneously concerns acts and consequences, theories which focus primarily on acts (i.e., deontology) or consequences (i.e., utilitarianism) do not accurately describe moral cognition. Indeed, the phenomenon of dyadic completion suggests that deontological and utilitarian concerns are not only simultaneously active, but also typically compatible and reinforcing: wrong acts have harmful consequences, and harmful consequences stem from wrong acts. The cognitive fusion of acts with consequences suggests that normative conflicts between deontology and utilitarianism are not reflected in everyday moral judgment. This in turn suggests that empirical conclusions drawn from moral dilemmas that pit utilitarianism against deontology—i.e., trolley problems—give an skewed account of moral cognition.
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mind perception is the essence of morality
Psychological Inquiry, 2012Co-Authors: Kurt Gray, Liane Young, Adam WaytzAbstract:Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an Intentional Agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (Agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering—that is, interpersonal harm—even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing Agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral Agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.
Adam Waytz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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mind perception is the essence of morality
Psychological Inquiry, 2012Co-Authors: Kurt Gray, Liane Young, Adam WaytzAbstract:Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an Intentional Agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (Agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering—that is, interpersonal harm—even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing Agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral Agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.
Karsten R. Stueber - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Problem Of Self-Knowledge
Erkenntnis, 2002Co-Authors: Karsten R. StueberAbstract:This article develops a constitutive account of self-knowledgethat is able to avoid certain shortcomings of the standard response to the perceived prima facieincompatibility between privileged self-knowledge and externalism. It argues that ifone conceives of linguistic action as voluntary behavior in a minimal sense, one cannot conceive ofbelief content to be externalistically constituted without simultaneously assuming that the Agent hasknowledge of his beliefs. Accepting such a constitutive account of self-knowledge does not, however,preclude the conceptual possibility of being mistaken about one’s mental states. Rather, self-knowledgehas to be seen as only a general constraint or as the default assumption of interpreting somebodyas a rational and Intentional Agent. This is compatible with the diagnosis of a localized lack of self-transparency.
Chelsea Schein - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Two Minds Vs. Two Philosophies: Mind Perception Defines Morality and Dissolves the Debate Between Deontology and Utilitarianism
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2012Co-Authors: Kurt Gray, Chelsea ScheinAbstract:Mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. Broadly, moral standing is linked to perceptions of mind, with moral responsibility tied to perceived agency, and moral rights tied to perceived experience. More specifically, moral judgments are based on a fundamental template of two perceived minds—an Intentional Agent and a suffering patient. This dyadic template grows out of the universal power of harm, and serves as a cognitive working model through which even atypical moral events are understood. Thus, all instances of immorality are perceived to involve both blameworthy Agents (i.e., acts) and suffering victims (i.e., consequences). Because moral cognition simultaneously concerns acts and consequences, theories which focus primarily on acts (i.e., deontology) or consequences (i.e., utilitarianism) do not accurately describe moral cognition. Indeed, the phenomenon of dyadic completion suggests that deontological and utilitarian concerns are not only simultaneously active, but also typically compatible and reinforcing: wrong acts have harmful consequences, and harmful consequences stem from wrong acts. The cognitive fusion of acts with consequences suggests that normative conflicts between deontology and utilitarianism are not reflected in everyday moral judgment. This in turn suggests that empirical conclusions drawn from moral dilemmas that pit utilitarianism against deontology—i.e., trolley problems—give an skewed account of moral cognition.