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Tang Shan-yon - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A Study on Intergovernmental Transfers for National Poverty County Revenue Behavior:Based on 241 Hational Poverty Counties Empirical Analysis
2014Co-Authors: Tang Shan-yonAbstract:This paper analyzes Intergovernmental Transfers of revenue for this special group of behavioral changes.The contents of the study,are mainly from the national poverty county finance income scale changes,tax changes to changes in the degree of fiscal effort.Step by step the paper analyzes Intergovernmental Transfers and revenue behavior.From the results of empirical research,we find Intergovernmental Transfers indeed generated negative effect on national poverty counties in reverue.Local government does not actively organize their own revenue because of an inerese in trangfer payments.Therefore,in order to better play the role of transfer payments,transfer payments must adjust structure and improve the transfer payment incentives to reduce local government 's "speculative" behavior.
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Influence of Intergovernmental Transfers on Fiscal Revenue Behaviors of Ethnic Poverty Counties——Empirical Analysis Based on 241 Ethnic Poverty Counties
Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2014Co-Authors: Tang Shan-yonAbstract:This paper is an analysis on the influence of Intergovernmental transfer payments on fiscal revenue behaviors. Through an analysis on changes in the finance revenue scale,tax burden,and the degree of fiscal efforts of the ethnic poverty counties,the study is mainly focused on the relationship between Intergovernmental Transfers and fiscal revenue behaviors. The empirical research shows,the state's massive transfer payments to ethnic poverty counties every year has reduced the local governments' own fiscal revenue,which is indeed a failure in terms of transfer payment incentive. Therefore,governments should establish an incentive-compatible transfer payment system which will ensure that both Intergovernmental Transfers and local governments' own fiscal revenue will function well separately,free from the trouble of"substitution effect".
Jungbu Kim - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Political Decentralization, Subnational Political Capital, and Intergovernmental Transfers in Korea
The American Review of Public Administration, 2012Co-Authors: Jungbu KimAbstract:Faced with ever increasing pressures for better performance and financial bottom line, governments around the world are devolving more responsibilities to subnational governments. Especially in developing countries, this trend has coupled with increased demands for greater democracy and disaffection with the services provided by the central government. This article examines what has happened in South Korea since its devolution reform in 1995. Specifically, it examines political capital factors in determining the amount of Intergovernmental Transfers to the regional governments. The analysis shows that political decentralization has resulted in financial weakening of the subnational governments of general purposes and that although the incidence of Intergovernmental transfer is affected by the political considerations, Korea has substantially improved horizontal fiscal imbalance.
Nestor Clever Grión - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Do Intergovernmental Transfers affect the distribution of manufacturing production across regions in federal countries? Theory and evidence for Argentina
Regional & Federal Studies, 2017Co-Authors: Pedro E. Moncarz, Sebastián Freille, Alberto José Figueras, Nestor Clever GriónAbstract:ABSTRACTThe effect of changes in the distribution of top-to-bottom Intergovernmental Transfers on the location of manufacturing production is analysed using a modified version of the footloose capital model. An increase in the share of Transfers received by a region increases its share of manufacturing production the larger are transaction costs; the larger is the share of Transfers going directly to consumers; the larger is the share of manufacturing consumption vis-a-vis non-tradable consumption; and the easier consumers can substitute among manufacturing varieties. Using data for Argentina for 1983-2005, the empirical analysis appears to support the existence of two distinctive regimes, with smaller/poorer provinces benefiting in terms of the location of manufacturing production as a response to an increase in Transfers. Also, for these provinces, the benefits are greater if they are politically aligned with the federal government, especially through the receipt of discretionary Transfers. For large/ri...
Takaaki Masaki - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the impact of Intergovernmental Transfers on local revenue generation in sub saharan africa evidence from tanzania
World Development, 2018Co-Authors: Takaaki MasakiAbstract:Abstract Do Intergovernmental Transfers reduce revenues collected by local government authorities (LGAs)? There is already a well-established body of literature in public finance, which argues that Intergovernmental grants “crowd out” local revenues. Most existing studies, however, explore the fiscal implications of Intergovernmental Transfers in high-income countries where sound fiscal systems are taken for granted. In this paper, I explore the impact of Intergovernmental Transfers on local revenues in sub-Saharan Africa, a region where local fiscal capacity is limited and endogenously determined by financial support from international donors and the central government. I argue that in places where the existing capacity of LGAs to administer tax collection is weak and political costs of enforcing taxation are low—which are perennial features of many rural districts in Africa—Intergovernmental Transfers facilitate local revenue generation instead of undermining it. Analyzing newly available quarterly fiscal data on local revenues in Tanzania, I show that Intergovernmental grants improve the mobilization of local revenues, and also that the positive effect of fiscal Transfers on local revenue collection seems to be more pronounced in rural districts.
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WIDER Working Paper - The impact of Intergovernmental Transfers on local revenue generation in Africa Evidence from Tanzania
WIDER Working Paper, 2016Co-Authors: Takaaki MasakiAbstract:Do Intergovernmental Transfers reduce revenues collected by local government authorities (LGAs)? There is already a well-established body of literature in public finance, which argues that Intergovernmental grants ‘crowd out’ local revenues. Most existing studies, however, explore the fiscal implications of Intergovernmental Transfers in high-income countries where sound fiscal systems are taken for granted. In this paper, I explore the impact of Intergovernmental Transfers on local revenues in sub-Saharan Africa, a region where local fiscal capacity is limited and endogenously determined by financial support from international donors and the central government. I argue that in places where the existing capacity of LGAs to administer tax collection is weak and political costs of enforcing taxation are low—which are perennial features of many rural districts in Africa—Intergovernmental Transfers facilitate local revenue generation instead of undermining it. Analysing newly available quarterly fiscal data on local revenues in Tanzania, I show that Intergovernmental grants improve the mobilization of local revenues, and also that the positive effect of fiscal Transfers on local revenue collection is particularly pronounced in rural districts.
Daniel Treisman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in post soviet russia
British Journal of Political Science, 1996Co-Authors: Daniel TreismanAbstract:In Russia's lingering constitutional crisis, struggles over fiscal politics have taken on a broader institutional significance – at times even threatening to undermine the federal state. This article studies the evolving fiscal relationship between Moscow and the regional governments in the early post-Soviet period. To explain why some regions currently receive large net Transfers (subsidies, grants, other benefits) from the centre while others pay large net taxes, net central Transfers per capita have been regressed on a range of predictors reflecting social ‘need’, preferences of central politicians (electoral interests, pork barrel allocation, policy objectives) and lobbying capacity of regional governments. The most significant turn out to be three bargaining power variables that signal regional discontent and credible resolve to threaten economic and constitutional order – a low vote for President Yeltsin in the 1991 election, an early declaration of sovereignty and the incidence of strikes in the previous year.