The Experts below are selected from a list of 166416 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Bjorn Bartling - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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endogenous social comparisons and the Internal Organization of firms
Managerial and Decision Economics, 2012Co-Authors: Bjorn BartlingAbstract:Should workers of a firm be Organizationally integrated to realize benefits from benchmarking? Or should they be separated to preclude horizontal social comparisons? This paper highlights a trade-off that arises if social comparisons in firms are endogenous. We analyze a principal multi-agent model in which the principal trades off the reduction of agents' risk exposures by use of relative performance evaluation and the thereby induced social comparisons for which agents must be compensated. Contrary to standard theoretical predictions, relative performance evaluation is optimal only if the performance measures are sufficiently correlated relative to the agents' regard for others. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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endogenous social comparisons and the Internal Organization of firms
Social Science Research Network, 2011Co-Authors: Bjorn BartlingAbstract:Should workers of a firm be Organizationally integrated to realize benefits from benchmarking? Or should they be separated to preclude horizontal social comparisons? This paper highlights a trade-off that arises if social comparisons in firms are endogenous. We analyze a principal multi-agent model in which the principal trades off the reduction of agents' risk exposures by use of relative performance evaluation and the thereby induced social comparisons for which agents must be compensated. Contrary to standard theoretical predictions, relative performance evaluation is optimal only if the performance measures are sufficiently correlated relative to the agents' regard for others.
John Van Reenen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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incomplete contracts and the Internal Organization of firms
Journal of Law Economics & Organization, 2014Co-Authors: Philippe Aghion, Nicholas Bloom, John Van ReenenAbstract:We survey the theoretical and empirical literature on decentralization within firms. We first discuss how the concept of incomplete contracts shapes our views about the Organization of decision-making. We then overview the empirical evidence on the determinants of decentralization and on the effects of decentralization on firm performance. A number of factors highlighted in the theory are shown to be important in accounting for delegation, such as heterogeneity and congruence of preferences as proxied by trust. Empirically, competition, human capital, and IT also appear to foster decentralization. There are substantial gaps between theoretical and empirical work and we suggest avenues for future research in bridging this gap (JEL O31, O32, O33, F23).
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incomplete contracts and the Internal Organization of firms
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Philippe Aghion, Nicholas Bloom, John Van ReenenAbstract:We survey the theoretical and empirical literature on decentralization within firms. We first discuss how the concept of incomplete contracts shapes our views about the Organization of decision-making within firms. We then overview the empirical evidence on the determinants of decentralization and on the effects of decentralization on firm performance. A number of factors highlighted in the theory are shown to be important in accounting for delegation, such as heterogeneity and congruence of preferences as proxied by trust. Empirically, competition, human capital and IT also appear to foster decentralization. There are substantial gaps between theoretical and empirical work and we suggest avenues for future research in bridging this gap.
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does product market competition lead firms to decentralize
The American Economic Review, 2010Co-Authors: Nicholas Bloom, Raffaella Sadun, John Van ReenenAbstract:There is a widespread sense that over the last two decades firms have been decentralizing decisions to employees further down the managerial hierarchy. Economists have developed a range of theories to account for delegation, but there is less empirical evidence, especially across countries. This has limited the ability to understand the phenomenon of decentralization. To address the empirical lacuna we have developed a research program to measure the Internal Organization of firms - including their decentralization decisions - across a large range of industries and countries. In this paper we investigate whether greater product market competition increases decentralization. For example, tougher competition may make local manager's information more valuable, as delays to decisions become more costly. Since globalization and liberalization have increased the competitiveness of product markets, one explanation for the trend towards decentralization could be increased competition. Of course there are a range of other factors that may also be at play, including human capital, information and communication technology, culture and industrial composition. To tackle these issues we collected detailed information on the Internal Organization of firms across nations. The few datasets that exist are either from a single industry or (at best) across many firms in a single country. We analyze data on almost 4,000 firms across twelve countries in Europe, North America and Asia. We find that competition does indeed seem to foster greater decentralization.
Nicholas Bloom - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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incomplete contracts and the Internal Organization of firms
Journal of Law Economics & Organization, 2014Co-Authors: Philippe Aghion, Nicholas Bloom, John Van ReenenAbstract:We survey the theoretical and empirical literature on decentralization within firms. We first discuss how the concept of incomplete contracts shapes our views about the Organization of decision-making. We then overview the empirical evidence on the determinants of decentralization and on the effects of decentralization on firm performance. A number of factors highlighted in the theory are shown to be important in accounting for delegation, such as heterogeneity and congruence of preferences as proxied by trust. Empirically, competition, human capital, and IT also appear to foster decentralization. There are substantial gaps between theoretical and empirical work and we suggest avenues for future research in bridging this gap (JEL O31, O32, O33, F23).
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incomplete contracts and the Internal Organization of firms
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Philippe Aghion, Nicholas Bloom, John Van ReenenAbstract:We survey the theoretical and empirical literature on decentralization within firms. We first discuss how the concept of incomplete contracts shapes our views about the Organization of decision-making within firms. We then overview the empirical evidence on the determinants of decentralization and on the effects of decentralization on firm performance. A number of factors highlighted in the theory are shown to be important in accounting for delegation, such as heterogeneity and congruence of preferences as proxied by trust. Empirically, competition, human capital and IT also appear to foster decentralization. There are substantial gaps between theoretical and empirical work and we suggest avenues for future research in bridging this gap.
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does product market competition lead firms to decentralize
The American Economic Review, 2010Co-Authors: Nicholas Bloom, Raffaella Sadun, John Van ReenenAbstract:There is a widespread sense that over the last two decades firms have been decentralizing decisions to employees further down the managerial hierarchy. Economists have developed a range of theories to account for delegation, but there is less empirical evidence, especially across countries. This has limited the ability to understand the phenomenon of decentralization. To address the empirical lacuna we have developed a research program to measure the Internal Organization of firms - including their decentralization decisions - across a large range of industries and countries. In this paper we investigate whether greater product market competition increases decentralization. For example, tougher competition may make local manager's information more valuable, as delays to decisions become more costly. Since globalization and liberalization have increased the competitiveness of product markets, one explanation for the trend towards decentralization could be increased competition. Of course there are a range of other factors that may also be at play, including human capital, information and communication technology, culture and industrial composition. To tackle these issues we collected detailed information on the Internal Organization of firms across nations. The few datasets that exist are either from a single industry or (at best) across many firms in a single country. We analyze data on almost 4,000 firms across twelve countries in Europe, North America and Asia. We find that competition does indeed seem to foster greater decentralization.
Philippe Aghion - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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incomplete contracts and the Internal Organization of firms
Journal of Law Economics & Organization, 2014Co-Authors: Philippe Aghion, Nicholas Bloom, John Van ReenenAbstract:We survey the theoretical and empirical literature on decentralization within firms. We first discuss how the concept of incomplete contracts shapes our views about the Organization of decision-making. We then overview the empirical evidence on the determinants of decentralization and on the effects of decentralization on firm performance. A number of factors highlighted in the theory are shown to be important in accounting for delegation, such as heterogeneity and congruence of preferences as proxied by trust. Empirically, competition, human capital, and IT also appear to foster decentralization. There are substantial gaps between theoretical and empirical work and we suggest avenues for future research in bridging this gap (JEL O31, O32, O33, F23).
-
incomplete contracts and the Internal Organization of firms
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Philippe Aghion, Nicholas Bloom, John Van ReenenAbstract:We survey the theoretical and empirical literature on decentralization within firms. We first discuss how the concept of incomplete contracts shapes our views about the Organization of decision-making within firms. We then overview the empirical evidence on the determinants of decentralization and on the effects of decentralization on firm performance. A number of factors highlighted in the theory are shown to be important in accounting for delegation, such as heterogeneity and congruence of preferences as proxied by trust. Empirically, competition, human capital and IT also appear to foster decentralization. There are substantial gaps between theoretical and empirical work and we suggest avenues for future research in bridging this gap.
Margaret C. Levenstein - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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information systems and Internal Organization a study of the dow chemical company 1890 1914
The Journal of Economic History, 1993Co-Authors: Margaret C. LevensteinAbstract:My dissertation examines the relationship between innovation in information processing and innovation in management Organization and strategy. Economists and historians have for years credited new information systems and new accounting techniques with providing necessary support for the growth of the large firm. More recently some have taken to blaming these same innovations for the decline in competitiveness and short term vision of American manufacturers. Frequently, however, little reference is made to the actual content of these changes and their implications for management decision-making. My dissertation attempts to evaluate these claims by examining the managerial demands placed upon the information system of one manufacturing firm during a period of Organizational, technological, and strategic change. This case study draws on the Herbert Dow papers, which include company correspondence, financial statements, factory reports, lab books, etc. These records were formerly kept in boxes in the Company vault, protected by the secretary to Herbert Dow's successors (his son and then his son-in-law) whose diligence prevented their destruction. They are now housed in the company's archives: a one room schoolhouse where Mrs. Grace Dow taught before she married Herbert Dow. Before submerging myself in these voluminous records, I surveyed the literature on accounting systems in manufacturing firms during the late nineteenth century. Based on studies of the paper, nail, ice, textile, boat, auto, and machine tool industries, I propose a new periodization of changes in information systems. This periodization focuses less on changes in accounting technique than on changes in the function of information systems over this period. The first formal information systems were introduced to monitor people and processes. In firms where there had been increases in labor input
