The Experts below are selected from a list of 324 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Mika Nieminen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • university research funding and publication performance an International Comparison
    Research Policy, 2010
    Co-Authors: Otto Auranen, Mika Nieminen
    Abstract:

    In current science policies, competition and output incentives are emphasized as a means of making university systems efficient and productive. By comparing eight countries, this article analyzes how funding environments of university research vary across countries and whether more competitive funding systems are more efficient in producing scientific publications. The article shows that there are significant differences in the competitiveness of funding systems, but no straightforward connection between financial incentives and the efficiency of university systems exists. Our results provoke questions about whether financial incentives boost publication productivity, and whether policy-makers should place greater emphasis on other factors relevant to high productivity.

  • University research funding and publication performance-An International Comparison
    Research Policy, 2010
    Co-Authors: Otto Auranen, Mika Nieminen
    Abstract:

    In current science policies, competition and output incentives are emphasized as a means of making university systems efficient and productive. By comparing eight countries, this article analyzes how funding environments of university research vary across countries and whether more competitive funding systems are more efficient in producing scientific publications. The article shows that there are significant differences in the competitiveness of funding systems, but no straightforward connection between financial incentives and the efficiency of university systems exists. Our results provoke questions about whether financial incentives boost publication productivity, and whether policy-makers should place greater emphasis on other factors relevant to high productivity. © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Peter D. Wysocki - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Earnings management and investor protection: An International Comparison
    Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance: A European Perspective, 2007
    Co-Authors: Christian Leuz, Dhananjay Nanda, Peter D. Wysocki
    Abstract:

    This paper examines systematic differences in earnings management across 31 countries. We propose an explanation for these differences based on the notion that insiders, in an attempt to protect their private control benefits, use earnings management to conceal firm performance from outsiders. Thus, earnings management is expected to decrease in investor protection because strong protection limits insiders' ability to acquire private control benefits, which reduces their incentives to mask firm performance. Our findings are consistent with this prediction and suggest an endogenous link between corporate governance and the quality of reported earnings. © 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  • earnings management and investor protection an International Comparison
    Journal of Financial Economics, 2003
    Co-Authors: Christian Leuz, Dhananjay Nanda, Peter D. Wysocki
    Abstract:

    This paper examines systematic differences in earnings management across 31 countries. We propose an explanation for these differences based on the notion that insiders, in an attempt to protect their private control benefits, use earnings management to conceal firm performance from outsiders. Thus, earnings management is expected to decrease in investor protection because strong protection limits insiders’ ability to acquire private control benefits, which reduces their incentives to mask firm performance. Our findings are consistent with this prediction and suggest an endogenous link between corporate governance and the quality of reported earnings.

  • investor protection and earnings management an International Comparison
    2002
    Co-Authors: Christian Leuz, Dhananjay Nanda, Peter D. Wysocki
    Abstract:

    This paper examines the relation between outside investor protection and earnings management. We argue that insiders, in an attempt to protect their private control benefits, use earnings management to conceal firm performance from outsiders. We hypothesize that earnings management decreases in investor protection because strong protection limits insiders’ ability to acquire private control benefits and hence reduces their incentives to mask firm performance. Using accounting data from 31 countries between 1990 and 1999, we present empirical evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Our result points to an important link between legal institutions, private control benefits and the quality of accounting earnings reported to capital market participants. These findings complement prior finance research that generally treats the quality of corporate reporting as exogenous. JEL classification: G34; G38; M41

Otto Auranen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • university research funding and publication performance an International Comparison
    Research Policy, 2010
    Co-Authors: Otto Auranen, Mika Nieminen
    Abstract:

    In current science policies, competition and output incentives are emphasized as a means of making university systems efficient and productive. By comparing eight countries, this article analyzes how funding environments of university research vary across countries and whether more competitive funding systems are more efficient in producing scientific publications. The article shows that there are significant differences in the competitiveness of funding systems, but no straightforward connection between financial incentives and the efficiency of university systems exists. Our results provoke questions about whether financial incentives boost publication productivity, and whether policy-makers should place greater emphasis on other factors relevant to high productivity.

  • University research funding and publication performance-An International Comparison
    Research Policy, 2010
    Co-Authors: Otto Auranen, Mika Nieminen
    Abstract:

    In current science policies, competition and output incentives are emphasized as a means of making university systems efficient and productive. By comparing eight countries, this article analyzes how funding environments of university research vary across countries and whether more competitive funding systems are more efficient in producing scientific publications. The article shows that there are significant differences in the competitiveness of funding systems, but no straightforward connection between financial incentives and the efficiency of university systems exists. Our results provoke questions about whether financial incentives boost publication productivity, and whether policy-makers should place greater emphasis on other factors relevant to high productivity. © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Christian Leuz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Earnings management and investor protection: An International Comparison
    Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance: A European Perspective, 2007
    Co-Authors: Christian Leuz, Dhananjay Nanda, Peter D. Wysocki
    Abstract:

    This paper examines systematic differences in earnings management across 31 countries. We propose an explanation for these differences based on the notion that insiders, in an attempt to protect their private control benefits, use earnings management to conceal firm performance from outsiders. Thus, earnings management is expected to decrease in investor protection because strong protection limits insiders' ability to acquire private control benefits, which reduces their incentives to mask firm performance. Our findings are consistent with this prediction and suggest an endogenous link between corporate governance and the quality of reported earnings. © 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  • earnings management and investor protection an International Comparison
    Journal of Financial Economics, 2003
    Co-Authors: Christian Leuz, Dhananjay Nanda, Peter D. Wysocki
    Abstract:

    This paper examines systematic differences in earnings management across 31 countries. We propose an explanation for these differences based on the notion that insiders, in an attempt to protect their private control benefits, use earnings management to conceal firm performance from outsiders. Thus, earnings management is expected to decrease in investor protection because strong protection limits insiders’ ability to acquire private control benefits, which reduces their incentives to mask firm performance. Our findings are consistent with this prediction and suggest an endogenous link between corporate governance and the quality of reported earnings.

  • investor protection and earnings management an International Comparison
    2002
    Co-Authors: Christian Leuz, Dhananjay Nanda, Peter D. Wysocki
    Abstract:

    This paper examines the relation between outside investor protection and earnings management. We argue that insiders, in an attempt to protect their private control benefits, use earnings management to conceal firm performance from outsiders. We hypothesize that earnings management decreases in investor protection because strong protection limits insiders’ ability to acquire private control benefits and hence reduces their incentives to mask firm performance. Using accounting data from 31 countries between 1990 and 1999, we present empirical evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Our result points to an important link between legal institutions, private control benefits and the quality of accounting earnings reported to capital market participants. These findings complement prior finance research that generally treats the quality of corporate reporting as exogenous. JEL classification: G34; G38; M41

Dhananjay Nanda - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Earnings management and investor protection: An International Comparison
    Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance: A European Perspective, 2007
    Co-Authors: Christian Leuz, Dhananjay Nanda, Peter D. Wysocki
    Abstract:

    This paper examines systematic differences in earnings management across 31 countries. We propose an explanation for these differences based on the notion that insiders, in an attempt to protect their private control benefits, use earnings management to conceal firm performance from outsiders. Thus, earnings management is expected to decrease in investor protection because strong protection limits insiders' ability to acquire private control benefits, which reduces their incentives to mask firm performance. Our findings are consistent with this prediction and suggest an endogenous link between corporate governance and the quality of reported earnings. © 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  • earnings management and investor protection an International Comparison
    Journal of Financial Economics, 2003
    Co-Authors: Christian Leuz, Dhananjay Nanda, Peter D. Wysocki
    Abstract:

    This paper examines systematic differences in earnings management across 31 countries. We propose an explanation for these differences based on the notion that insiders, in an attempt to protect their private control benefits, use earnings management to conceal firm performance from outsiders. Thus, earnings management is expected to decrease in investor protection because strong protection limits insiders’ ability to acquire private control benefits, which reduces their incentives to mask firm performance. Our findings are consistent with this prediction and suggest an endogenous link between corporate governance and the quality of reported earnings.

  • investor protection and earnings management an International Comparison
    2002
    Co-Authors: Christian Leuz, Dhananjay Nanda, Peter D. Wysocki
    Abstract:

    This paper examines the relation between outside investor protection and earnings management. We argue that insiders, in an attempt to protect their private control benefits, use earnings management to conceal firm performance from outsiders. We hypothesize that earnings management decreases in investor protection because strong protection limits insiders’ ability to acquire private control benefits and hence reduces their incentives to mask firm performance. Using accounting data from 31 countries between 1990 and 1999, we present empirical evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Our result points to an important link between legal institutions, private control benefits and the quality of accounting earnings reported to capital market participants. These findings complement prior finance research that generally treats the quality of corporate reporting as exogenous. JEL classification: G34; G38; M41