The Experts below are selected from a list of 360 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Mingyi Hung - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Investor Protection and analysts cash flow forecasts around the world
Review of Accounting Studies, 2007Co-Authors: Mark L Defond, Mingyi HungAbstract:We find that analysts are more likely to provide cash flow forecasts in countries with weak Investor Protection. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that market participants demand (and analysts supply) cash flow information when weak Investor Protection results in earnings that are less likely to reflect underlying economic performance. Our results suggest that information intermediaries respond to market-based incentives to attenuate the adverse effects of country-level institutional factors on earnings’ usefulness. These findings contribute to the literature by shedding light on the institutional determinants of analysts’ research activities, and on the nature of the financial information they generate.
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Investor Protection and the information content of annual earnings announcements international evidence
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2007Co-Authors: Mark L Defond, Mingyi Hung, Robert TrezevantAbstract:Abstract We draw on the Investor Protection literature to identify structural factors in the financial reporting environment that are likely to explain cross-country differences in the information content of annual earnings announcements. Using data from over 50,000 annual earnings announcements in 26 countries, we find that annual earnings announcements are more informative in countries with higher quality earnings or better enforced insider trading laws, and that annual earnings announcements are less informative in countries with more frequent interim financial reporting. We also find that, on average, earnings announcements are more informative in countries with strong Investor Protection institutions.
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Investor Protection and corporate governance evidence from worldwide ceo turnover
Journal of Accounting Research, 2004Co-Authors: Mark L Defond, Mingyi HungAbstract:Recent research asserts that an essential feature of good corporate governance is strong Investor Protection, where Investor Protection is defined as the extent of the laws that protect Investors' rights and the strength of the legal institutions that facilitate law enforcement. The purpose of this study is to test this assertion by investigating whether these measures of Investor Protection are associated with an important role of good corporate governance: identifying and terminating poorly performing CEOs. Our tests indicate that strong law enforcement institutions significantly improve the association between CEO turnover and poor performance, whereas extensive Investor Protection laws do not. In addition, we find that in countries with strong law enforcement, CEO turnover is more likely to be associated with poor stock returns when stock prices are more informative. Finding that strong law enforcement institutions are associated with improved CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is consistent with good corporate governance requiring law enforcement institutions capable of protecting shareholders' property rights (i.e., protecting shareholders from expropriation by insiders). Finding that Investor Protection laws are not associated with improved CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is open to several explanations. For example, Investor Protection laws may not be as important as strong law enforcement in fostering good governance, the set of laws we examine may not be the set that are most important in promoting good governance, or measurement error in our surrogate for extensive Investor Protection laws may reduce the power of our test of this variable.
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Investor Protection and corporate governance evidence from worldwide ceo turnover
Social Science Research Network, 2003Co-Authors: Mark L Defond, Mingyi HungAbstract:Recent research asserts that an essential feature of good corporate governance is strong Investor Protection, where Investor Protection is defined as both (1) the extent of the laws that protect Investors' rights and (2) the strength of the legal institutions that facilitate law enforcement. The purpose of this study is to test whether the two components of Investor Protection are associated with an important role of good corporate governance: identifying and terminating poorly performing CEOs. Our tests find no relation between CEO turnover and firm performance in countries with extensive laws protecting Investors. However, we find that CEO turnover is associated with poor firm performance in countries with strong law enforcement institutions. We also find that in countries with strong law enforcement, CEO turnover is associated with poor stock returns when stock prices are more informative, and with poor earnings otherwise. Further, our findings are robust to controlling for the influence of public opinion, the effects of block-holders, the level of financial market development, a country's legal origin, and several alternative research design specifications. Our results suggest that strong law enforcement institutions are important in fostering corporate governance mechanisms that eliminate unfit CEOs, but that extensive laws are not. This finding is consistent with: (1) limited Investor Protection laws being capable of cultivating good corporate governance as long as law enforcement institutions are strong; and (2) insiders (including directors and CEOs) in countries with weak law enforcement being more likely to engage in collusive behavior to expropriate shareholder wealth, thereby reducing directors' incentives to dismiss poorly performing CEOs. More generally these findings suggest that good corporate governance requires law enforcement institutions capable of protecting shareholders' property rights (i.e. protecting shareholders from expropriation by insiders), but does not require extensive shareholder Protection laws.
Mark L Defond - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Investor Protection and analysts cash flow forecasts around the world
Review of Accounting Studies, 2007Co-Authors: Mark L Defond, Mingyi HungAbstract:We find that analysts are more likely to provide cash flow forecasts in countries with weak Investor Protection. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that market participants demand (and analysts supply) cash flow information when weak Investor Protection results in earnings that are less likely to reflect underlying economic performance. Our results suggest that information intermediaries respond to market-based incentives to attenuate the adverse effects of country-level institutional factors on earnings’ usefulness. These findings contribute to the literature by shedding light on the institutional determinants of analysts’ research activities, and on the nature of the financial information they generate.
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Investor Protection and the information content of annual earnings announcements international evidence
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2007Co-Authors: Mark L Defond, Mingyi Hung, Robert TrezevantAbstract:Abstract We draw on the Investor Protection literature to identify structural factors in the financial reporting environment that are likely to explain cross-country differences in the information content of annual earnings announcements. Using data from over 50,000 annual earnings announcements in 26 countries, we find that annual earnings announcements are more informative in countries with higher quality earnings or better enforced insider trading laws, and that annual earnings announcements are less informative in countries with more frequent interim financial reporting. We also find that, on average, earnings announcements are more informative in countries with strong Investor Protection institutions.
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Investor Protection and corporate governance evidence from worldwide ceo turnover
Journal of Accounting Research, 2004Co-Authors: Mark L Defond, Mingyi HungAbstract:Recent research asserts that an essential feature of good corporate governance is strong Investor Protection, where Investor Protection is defined as the extent of the laws that protect Investors' rights and the strength of the legal institutions that facilitate law enforcement. The purpose of this study is to test this assertion by investigating whether these measures of Investor Protection are associated with an important role of good corporate governance: identifying and terminating poorly performing CEOs. Our tests indicate that strong law enforcement institutions significantly improve the association between CEO turnover and poor performance, whereas extensive Investor Protection laws do not. In addition, we find that in countries with strong law enforcement, CEO turnover is more likely to be associated with poor stock returns when stock prices are more informative. Finding that strong law enforcement institutions are associated with improved CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is consistent with good corporate governance requiring law enforcement institutions capable of protecting shareholders' property rights (i.e., protecting shareholders from expropriation by insiders). Finding that Investor Protection laws are not associated with improved CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is open to several explanations. For example, Investor Protection laws may not be as important as strong law enforcement in fostering good governance, the set of laws we examine may not be the set that are most important in promoting good governance, or measurement error in our surrogate for extensive Investor Protection laws may reduce the power of our test of this variable.
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Investor Protection and corporate governance evidence from worldwide ceo turnover
Social Science Research Network, 2003Co-Authors: Mark L Defond, Mingyi HungAbstract:Recent research asserts that an essential feature of good corporate governance is strong Investor Protection, where Investor Protection is defined as both (1) the extent of the laws that protect Investors' rights and (2) the strength of the legal institutions that facilitate law enforcement. The purpose of this study is to test whether the two components of Investor Protection are associated with an important role of good corporate governance: identifying and terminating poorly performing CEOs. Our tests find no relation between CEO turnover and firm performance in countries with extensive laws protecting Investors. However, we find that CEO turnover is associated with poor firm performance in countries with strong law enforcement institutions. We also find that in countries with strong law enforcement, CEO turnover is associated with poor stock returns when stock prices are more informative, and with poor earnings otherwise. Further, our findings are robust to controlling for the influence of public opinion, the effects of block-holders, the level of financial market development, a country's legal origin, and several alternative research design specifications. Our results suggest that strong law enforcement institutions are important in fostering corporate governance mechanisms that eliminate unfit CEOs, but that extensive laws are not. This finding is consistent with: (1) limited Investor Protection laws being capable of cultivating good corporate governance as long as law enforcement institutions are strong; and (2) insiders (including directors and CEOs) in countries with weak law enforcement being more likely to engage in collusive behavior to expropriate shareholder wealth, thereby reducing directors' incentives to dismiss poorly performing CEOs. More generally these findings suggest that good corporate governance requires law enforcement institutions capable of protecting shareholders' property rights (i.e. protecting shareholders from expropriation by insiders), but does not require extensive shareholder Protection laws.
Zhifeng Yang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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minority shareholders control rights and the quality of corporate decisions in weak Investor Protection countries a natural experiment from china
The Accounting Review, 2013Co-Authors: Zhihong Chen, Zhifeng YangAbstract:ABSTRACT : Using a 2004 Chinese securities regulation that requires equity offering proposals to obtain the separate approval of voting minority shareholders, we examine whether giving minority shareholders increased control over corporate decisions helps to reduce value-decreasing corporate decisions for firms domiciled in weak Investor Protection countries. We find that the regulation deters management from submitting value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership. There is also weak evidence that minority shareholders are more likely to veto value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership in the post-regulation period. Overall, our evidence suggests that in weak Investor Protection countries, the effect of granting minority shareholders increased control over corporate decisions on the quality of corporate decisions depends on the composition of minority shareholders. JEL Classifications: G32; G34; G38
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minority shareholders control rights and the quality of corporate decisions in weak Investor Protection countries a natural experiment from china
Social Science Research Network, 2012Co-Authors: Zhihong Chen, Zhifeng YangAbstract:Using a 2004 Chinese securities regulation that requires equity offering proposals to obtain the separate approval of voting minority shareholders, we examine whether giving minority shareholders increased control over corporate decisions helps reduce value-decreasing corporate decisions for firms domiciled in weak Investor Protection countries. We find that the regulation deters management from submitting value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership. There is also weak evidence that minority shareholders are more likely to veto value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership in the post-regulation period. Overall, our evidence suggests that in weak Investor Protection countries, the effect of granting minority shareholders increased control over corporate decisions on the quality of corporate decisions depends on the composition of minority shareholders.
Zhihong Chen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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minority shareholders control rights and the quality of corporate decisions in weak Investor Protection countries a natural experiment from china
The Accounting Review, 2013Co-Authors: Zhihong Chen, Zhifeng YangAbstract:ABSTRACT : Using a 2004 Chinese securities regulation that requires equity offering proposals to obtain the separate approval of voting minority shareholders, we examine whether giving minority shareholders increased control over corporate decisions helps to reduce value-decreasing corporate decisions for firms domiciled in weak Investor Protection countries. We find that the regulation deters management from submitting value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership. There is also weak evidence that minority shareholders are more likely to veto value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership in the post-regulation period. Overall, our evidence suggests that in weak Investor Protection countries, the effect of granting minority shareholders increased control over corporate decisions on the quality of corporate decisions depends on the composition of minority shareholders. JEL Classifications: G32; G34; G38
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minority shareholders control rights and the quality of corporate decisions in weak Investor Protection countries a natural experiment from china
Social Science Research Network, 2012Co-Authors: Zhihong Chen, Zhifeng YangAbstract:Using a 2004 Chinese securities regulation that requires equity offering proposals to obtain the separate approval of voting minority shareholders, we examine whether giving minority shareholders increased control over corporate decisions helps reduce value-decreasing corporate decisions for firms domiciled in weak Investor Protection countries. We find that the regulation deters management from submitting value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership. There is also weak evidence that minority shareholders are more likely to veto value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership in the post-regulation period. Overall, our evidence suggests that in weak Investor Protection countries, the effect of granting minority shareholders increased control over corporate decisions on the quality of corporate decisions depends on the composition of minority shareholders.
Gus Van Harten - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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key flaws in the european commission s proposals for foreign Investor Protection in ttip
2016Co-Authors: Gus Van HartenAbstract:Die deutsche Version dieses Artikels finden Sie unter: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2735076.In November 2015, the European Commission released a proposed text on foreign Investor Protection in the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). In this paper, I outline key flaws in this proposal, including language buried in the text that significantly undermines the EC's proposed provisions on the investment court system (ICS) and on the right to regulate.
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Investorenschutz und klimaschutz dringende masnahmen bekommen ein preisschild foreign Investor Protection and climate action a new price tag for urgent policies
2015Co-Authors: Gus Van HartenAbstract:German Abstract: Mit dieser Publikation soll dargelegt werden, wie Investor-Staat-Klagen die politischen Krafteverhaltnisse zugunsten groser Konzerne verschieben und die eigentlich notwendigen Klimaschutzmasnahmen ins Hintertreffen geraten. Auserdem werden das Potential einer massiven Ausweitung von ISDS-Klagen und die damit verbundenen Risiken fur die Klimapolitik in geplanten Handelsabkommen und die zentralen Schwachstellen der letzten ISDS-Reformvorschlage der Europaischen Kommission diskutiert.English Abstract: From a climate perspective, not all investment is equal. Desirable investment in clean energy needs encouragement and Protection, while undesirable investment in fossil fuels needs clear policy signals to avoid further investment in destructive activities and stranding more assets. In this paper, evidence is presented on how foreign Investor Protection provisions in trade and investment agreements tilt the playing field in favor of entrenched incumbents and against urgent action on climate; on the potential for a massive expansion of Investor-state litigation and risks to climate policy in proposed trade deals; and on key flaws in recent European Commission proposals to reform Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).
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foreign Investor Protection and climate action a new price tag for urgent policies
2015Co-Authors: Gus Van HartenAbstract:From a climate perspective, not all investment is equal. Desirable investment in clean energy needs encouragement and Protection, while undesirable investment in fossil fuels needs clear policy signals to avoid further investment in destructive activities and stranding more assets. In this paper, evidence is presented on how foreign Investor Protection provisions in trade and investment agreements tilt the playing field in favor of entrenched incumbents and against urgent action on climate; on the potential for a massive expansion of Investor-state litigation and risks to climate policy in proposed trade deals; and on key flaws in recent European Commission proposals to reform Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).
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zentrale schwachstellen in den vorschlagen der eu kommission zum investitionsschutz in ttip key flaws in the european commission s proposals for foreign Investor Protection in ttip
2015Co-Authors: Gus Van HartenAbstract:The English version of this paper can be found at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2692122Deutsche Zusammenfassung: Im November 2015 hat die Europaische Kommission einen Entwurf fur den Investitionsschutz im Abkommen zur EU-US Transatlantischen Handels- und Investitionspartnerschaft (TTIP) veroffentlicht.1 Dieser Kommissionsvorschlag weist eine Reihe von Schwachstellen im Hinblick auf das System des Investitionsschutzes als auch hinsichtlich einiger Einzelaspekte auf. Diese Schwachstellen lassen insbesondere die Behauptung der Europaischen Kommission zweifelhaft erscheinen, sie habe das System der Investor-Staat-Schiedsverfahren (Investor-state dispute settlement, ISDS) reformiert und biete nun einen ausreichenden Schutz fur das staatliche Regulierungsrecht. Gleichzeitig verweisen diese Schwachstellen auf grundsatzliche Defizite in den Vorschlagen der Kommission zum Investitionsschutz in Abkommen wie dem TTIP. Mit dieser Analyse werde ich sechs zentrale Defizite darstellen.English Abstract: In November 2015, the European Commission released a proposed text on foreign Investor Protection in the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). In this paper, I outline key flaws in this proposal, including language buried in the text that significantly undermines the EC's proposed provisions on the investment court system (ICS) and on the right to regulate.
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private authority and transnational governance the contours of the international system of Investor Protection
Social Science Research Network, 2004Co-Authors: Gus Van HartenAbstract:Conventionally, Investors could not sue states directly under international law and arbitration tribunals did not have general jurisdiction over international investment disputes. This has changed, especially since the early 1990s, with the emergence of an international system of Investor Protection that combines Investor-state arbitration and broad standards of Investor Protection. The system elevates the legal status of Investors (but not other individuals) in international law by allowing them to make international claims for damages against host states. Although the system depends on state authority for its establishment and ongoing effectiveness, the system adopts private authority as a method of transnational governance by permitting private Investors to make claims and by giving private arbitrators the power to resolve those claims. This provides significant advantages to multinational enterprises at the expense of governmental flexibility in both capital-importing and capital-exporting states, as revealed by the recent explosion of Investor claims. This article examines the legal architecture of the system in order to demonstrate how it expands private authority in the context of transnational governance.
