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Nobuo Kiriyama - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • institutional evolution in Economic integration a contribution to comparative institutional analysis for International Economic Organization
    University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 1998
    Co-Authors: Nobuo Kiriyama
    Abstract:

    A growing number of regional Economic integration arrangements ("RIAs") have attracted many researchers on International trade of various disciplines. Indeed, "[w]hen the WTO was established on 1 January 1995, most Members were parties to at least one regional agreement that had been notified to GATT."' Moreover, of all the agreements that GATT has been given notice of since 1948, thirty percent of them were signed between 1990942 and fifty-five 3percent of those currently in force were signed between 1990-95. It is interesting to note that if we remove those agreements that: i) are still in force, ii) involve more than two parties (not bilateral), and iii) are presented as free trade areas or customs unions (not preferential trade arrangements ("PTA")), there

Lawrence J Broz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • julia gray 2013 the company states keep International Economic Organizations and investor perceptions new york cambridge university press
    Review of International Organizations, 2014
    Co-Authors: Lawrence J Broz
    Abstract:

    Book Review of Julia Gray. 2013. The Company States Keep: International Economic Organizations and Investor Perceptions (New York: Cambridge University Press) J. Lawrence Broz The Review of International Organizations. Published online 10 April 2014 This excellent book is about the impact of membership in International Economic Organizations (IEOs) on sovereign credit risk. Gray’s key intuition is that membership changes in Organizations like the European Union (EU) and Mercosur are public events; therefore, when the professional investment community observes such changes, they reassess the creditworthiness of sovereign borrowers. When, for example, a high risk country joins an Organization composed primarily of low risk members, the entrant will be viewed more favorably by the investment community. In Gray’s terms, the entrant has joined a more prestigious “peer group” and is rewarded for this status upgrade with a lower interest rate. By the same token, the existing members of the Organization, having added a riskier member into their ranks, will see an increase in their costs of borrowing, as investors sense that the peer group has been “diluted” by the new member. Sovereign credit risk is thus affected by “The Company States Keep.” There’s more to it that, however. Gray’s most remarkable claim is that the effect of membership on sovereign risk is independent of anything that the Organization does or demands of its members. Organizations like the EU have rigorous accession requirements that aspiring entrants must meet. Such Organizations also have laws and institutions that constrain their members’ policy flexibility, as well as enforcement mechanisms to ensure that members stay within the rules. Scholars of International Organizations have studied these features in depth under the “legalism” and “rational design” frameworks. But Gray argues that institutional factors matter less to investor perceptions than the reputations of the national governments that populate International institutions. In this sense, Gray brings “the state” into the study of International Organizations for the first time. To support the claim that the character of member states affects sovereign risk independently of institutional or other factors, Gray addresses a host of alternative arguments in her regressions. She controls for prior domestic reforms enacted as part of the requirements for entry, as well as for policy reforms made after a nation enters an Organization. She also addresses selection bias and endogeneity, as well as the institutional features of IEOs that are commonly associated with rule enforcement and constraints on behavior. Remarkably, Gray finds that state membership matters above and beyond these other covariates. Her results imply that membership in International Economic Organizations is something like a brand name. If two countries were identical in every way except that one of them is a member of a “high-quality” International Organization and the other is not, the former country would enjoy a lower interest rate than the other. Importantly, “high quality” refers not to the norms, laws, and institutions of the International Economic Organization. In the limit, the Organization could be nothing but a meaningless placeholder. Instead, “high quality” refers to the reputations of the other members of the Organization.

Mark Shamtsyan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the bases of harmonization of regulations on food production and labeling in the customs union within the eurasian Economic community
    Acta Universitatis Cibiniensis. Series E: Food Technology, 2014
    Co-Authors: Mark Shamtsyan
    Abstract:

    The Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) is an International Economic Organization created to effectively advance the process of forming a Customs Union and Common Economic Space by member states and also to implement other goals and objectives connected with the enhancement of integration in the Economic and humanitarian spheres. One of the major challenges for the successful functioning of the common customs space of the members of the Customs Union, is the harmonization and unification of the legislation, including food legislation of the countries members of the Customs Union. Unification of the legislation related to the labeling of food products will promote the trade and will ensure the awareness of the consumers.