The Experts below are selected from a list of 20358 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Ralph Ossa - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a new trade theory of GATT wto negotiations
Journal of Political Economy, 2011Co-Authors: Ralph OssaAbstract:I suggest a novel theory of GATT/WTO negotiations based on Krugman's "new trade" model. It emphasizes international production relocations and is easy to calibrate to bilateral trade data. Focusing on the major players in recent GATT/WTO negotiations, I find that it implies reasonable noncooperative tariffs as well as moderate gains from GATT/WTO negotiations.
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A “New Trade” Theory of GATT/WTO Negotiations
Journal of Political Economy, 2011Co-Authors: Ralph OssaAbstract:I suggest a novel theory of GATT/WTO negotiations based on Krugman's "new trade" model. It emphasizes international production relocations and is easy to calibrate to bilateral trade data. Focusing on the major players in recent GATT/WTO negotiations, I find that it implies reasonable noncooperative tariffs as well as moderate gains from GATT/WTO negotiations
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A 'New Trade' Theory of GATT/WTO Negotiations
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010Co-Authors: Ralph OssaAbstract:I suggest a novel theory of GATT/WTO negotiations based on the Krugman (1980) "new trade" model. It emphasizes international production relocations and is easy to calibrate to bilateral trade data. Focusing on the major players in recent GATT/WTO negotiations, I find that it implies reasonable noncooperative tariffs as well as moderate gains from GATT/WTO negotiations.
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a new trade theory of GATT wto negotiations
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010Co-Authors: Ralph OssaAbstract:I suggest a novel theory of GATT/WTO negotiations based on the Krugman (1980) "new trade" model. It emphasizes international production relocations and is easy to calibrate to bilateral trade data. Focusing on the major players in recent GATT/WTO negotiations, I find that it implies reasonable noncooperative tariffs as well as moderate gains from GATT/WTO negotiations.
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A 'New Trade' Theory of GATT/WTO Negotiations
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009Co-Authors: Ralph OssaAbstract:I suggest a novel theory of GATT/WTO negotiations based on Krugman's "new trade" model. It emphasizes international production relocations and is easy to calibrate to bilateral trade data. Focusing on the major players in recent GATT/WTO negotiations, I find that it implies reasonable noncooperative tariffs as well as moderate gains from GATT/WTO negotiations.
Chad P Bown - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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developing countries as plaintiffs and defendants in GATT wto trade disputes
The World Economy, 2004Co-Authors: Chad P BownAbstract:Developing countries have been increasing their participation in the formal institutions and proceedings of the multilateral trading system. A prominent example is their more frequent involvement as defendants and plaintiffs in GATT/WTO trade disputes. This paper provides an initial economic appraisal of developing country performance in the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system. We measure the economic resolution of these disputes through trade liberalisation gains, and our results suggest that developing country plaintiffs have had more success under WTO disputes than was the case under the GATT. We also document evidence on potential determinants of this success: the capacity for plaintiffs to make credible retaliatory threats and the guilty determinations by GATT/WTO panels. Finally, there is also some evidence that developing countries have recognised the importance of retaliatory threats and have responded by changing their pattern of dispute initiation under the WTO to better take advantage of the instances in which they have sufficient leverage to threaten retaliation and induce compliance with GATT/WTO obligations.
Albert Jeltsch - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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changing the dna recognition specificity of the ecodam dna adenine n6 methyltransferase by directed evolution
Journal of Molecular Biology, 2010Co-Authors: Sanjay Chahar, Hany Elsawy, Sergey Ragozin, Albert JeltschAbstract:EcoDam is an adenine-N6 DNA methyltransferase that methylates the GATC sites in the Escherichia coli genome. We have changed the target specificity of EcoDam from GATC to GATT by directed evolution, combining different random mutagenesis methods with restriction protection at GATT sites for selection and screening. By co-evolution of an enzyme library and a substrate library, we identified GATT as the best non-GATC site and discover a double mutation, R124S/P134S, as the first step to increase enzyme activity at GATT sites. After four generations of mutagenesis and selection, we obtained enzyme variants with new specificity for GATT. While the wild-type EcoDam shows no detectable activity at GATT sites in E. coli cells, some variants prefer methylation at GATT over GATC sites by about 10-fold in cells. In vitro DNA methylation kinetics carried out under single-turnover conditions using a hemimethylated GATC and a GATT oligonucleotide substrate confirmed that the evolved proteins prefer methylation of GATT sites to a similar degree. They show up to 1600-fold change in specificity in vitro and methylate the new GATT target site with 20% of the rate of GATC methylation by the wild-type enzyme, indicating good activity. We conclude that the new methyltransferases are fully functional in vivo and in vitro but show a new target-site specificity.
Ernst-ulrich Petersmann - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Establishment of a GATT Office of Legal Affairs and the Limits of ‘Public Reason’ in the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013Co-Authors: Ernst-ulrich PetersmannAbstract:The article offers an ‘insider story’ of the establishment of the Office of Legal Affairs in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) in 1982/83 and of its increasing involvement in assisting GATT dispute settlement panels and the Uruguay Round negotiations on a new World Trade Organization with compulsory jurisdiction for the settlement of trade disputes (Sections I and II). The transformation, within only one decade, of the anti-legal pragmatism in GATT 1947 into the compulsory WTO dispute settlement system amounted to a ‘revolution’ in international law. But the ‘public reason’ governing the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system remains limited, notably by (1) the domination of GATT/WTO decision-making by governments interested in limiting their own legal, democratic and judicial accountability vis-a-vis citizens for their often welfare-reducing trade restrictions and distortions; (2) the deliberate neglect for the customary law requirements of interpreting treaties and settling related disputes ‘in conformity with principles of justice and international law’, including ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’; (3) the treatment of citizens as mere objects of GATT/WTO law and institutions rather than as ‘democratic principals’ of all governance institutions, ‘agents of justice’ and main economic actors; and (4) the deliberate neglect for the GATT/WTO legal obligations of ‘consistent interpretation’, ‘judicial comity’ and ‘access to justice’ in domestic courts in the ‘dispute settlement system of the WTO’ (Sections III and IV).
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the GATT wto dispute settlement system international law international organizations and dispute settlement
1994Co-Authors: Ernst-ulrich PetersmannAbstract:Preface. I. Introduction: International Law, International Organizations and Dispute Settlement - The WTO Agreement as a Model for Protecting Freedom, Non-Discrimination and Rule of Law Across Frontiers? II. The GATT Dispute Settlement System 1948-1995: An Overview. III. Clarification and Development of GATT/WTO Law Through Violation Complaints: The Example of Trade-Related Environmental Measures. IV. Non-Violation Complaints and Situation Complaints in GATT/WTO Law: What is Their Legitimate Function? V. The New Dispute Settlement System of the 1994 WTO Agreement: An Overview. VI. The Future of the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: First Experiences and Remaining Problems. Tables. Annexes: A. Table of Panel Reports Issued Under Article XXIII of the GATT 1947. B. Table of Panel Reports Issued Under the Tokyo Round Agreements of 1979. C. Table of Disputes Initiated Under the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization in 1995. D. Text of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). E. The WTO Appellate Body Working Procedures for Appellate Review. Index.
Jung Hur - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Welfare Implications of Regionalism in the GATT: The Presence of Foreign Ownership
2001Co-Authors: Jung HurAbstract:This paper examines the welfare implications of an existence of free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs) in the GATT system, in the presence of cross-foreign ownership among countries. In particular, two GATT regimes are analyzed: a pure GATT regime without any regional free trade agreements, and modified GATT regime with either an FTA or a CU. This paper argues that, when foreign ownership exists significantly between the countries, no countries in the GATT have an incentive to form a regional trade agreement before they participate in multilateral tariff negotiations.
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Welfare Implications of Regionalism in the GATT
2001Co-Authors: Jung HurAbstract:This paper investigates the welfare implications of an existence of a free trade agreement (FTA) and a customs union (CU) within the GATT. Two types of GATT regimes are considered in a completely symmetric world: a pure GATT regime without any type of the regional trade agreements (RTAs), and a modified GATT regime with one of them. The main results are for a range of sufficiently high discount rate, first that free trade and global welfare efficiency can be supported under the pure GATT regime but not under the modified regimes, and second that a country's ranking of the both regimes depends on (1) whether it belongs to an RTA or not and (2) which one of the RTAs it belongs to. The insight of these results are that the regionalism in the GATT may restrict free trade and thus fails to achieve the highest global welfare.
