The Experts below are selected from a list of 300 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Keith J Holyoak - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Justified True Belief triggers false recall of knowing
Cognitive Science, 2013Co-Authors: Derek Powell, Zachary Horne, Angel N Pinillos, Keith J HolyoakAbstract:Philosophers traditionally held that knowledge is Justified True Belief. Gettier (1963) challenged this view with thought experiments in which someone has a Justified and True Belief, but an element of luck is involved that disqualifies the Belief from counting as knowledge. We examined laypeople’s concept of knowledge using a semantic integration paradigm modeled after that of Gentner (1981). Participants read stories in which a character ‘thought’ something was True. On a subsequent recall task, readers sometimes falsely recalled the verb ‘thought’ as ‘knew,’ implicitly indicating that the reader had attributed knowledge to the character. False recall of ‘knew’ occurred more frequently when the story described a Justified True Belief than an unJustified Belief. Justified True Belief triggered these recall errors even in a so-called “Gettier case”. The present findings suggest that semantic integration provides an empirical paradigm suitable for investigating lay notions about knowledge.
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CogSci - Justified True Belief Triggers False Recall of "Knowing"
Cognitive Science, 2013Co-Authors: Derek Powell, Zachary Horne, N. Ángel Pinillos, Keith J HolyoakAbstract:Philosophers traditionally held that knowledge is Justified True Belief. Gettier (1963) challenged this view with thought experiments in which someone has a Justified and True Belief, but an element of luck is involved that disqualifies the Belief from counting as knowledge. We examined laypeople’s concept of knowledge using a semantic integration paradigm modeled after that of Gentner (1981). Participants read stories in which a character ‘thought’ something was True. On a subsequent recall task, readers sometimes falsely recalled the verb ‘thought’ as ‘knew,’ implicitly indicating that the reader had attributed knowledge to the character. False recall of ‘knew’ occurred more frequently when the story described a Justified True Belief than an unJustified Belief. Justified True Belief triggered these recall errors even in a so-called “Gettier case”. The present findings suggest that semantic integration provides an empirical paradigm suitable for investigating lay notions about knowledge.
Derek Powell - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Justified True Belief triggers false recall of knowing
Cognitive Science, 2013Co-Authors: Derek Powell, Zachary Horne, Angel N Pinillos, Keith J HolyoakAbstract:Philosophers traditionally held that knowledge is Justified True Belief. Gettier (1963) challenged this view with thought experiments in which someone has a Justified and True Belief, but an element of luck is involved that disqualifies the Belief from counting as knowledge. We examined laypeople’s concept of knowledge using a semantic integration paradigm modeled after that of Gentner (1981). Participants read stories in which a character ‘thought’ something was True. On a subsequent recall task, readers sometimes falsely recalled the verb ‘thought’ as ‘knew,’ implicitly indicating that the reader had attributed knowledge to the character. False recall of ‘knew’ occurred more frequently when the story described a Justified True Belief than an unJustified Belief. Justified True Belief triggered these recall errors even in a so-called “Gettier case”. The present findings suggest that semantic integration provides an empirical paradigm suitable for investigating lay notions about knowledge.
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CogSci - Justified True Belief Triggers False Recall of "Knowing"
Cognitive Science, 2013Co-Authors: Derek Powell, Zachary Horne, N. Ángel Pinillos, Keith J HolyoakAbstract:Philosophers traditionally held that knowledge is Justified True Belief. Gettier (1963) challenged this view with thought experiments in which someone has a Justified and True Belief, but an element of luck is involved that disqualifies the Belief from counting as knowledge. We examined laypeople’s concept of knowledge using a semantic integration paradigm modeled after that of Gentner (1981). Participants read stories in which a character ‘thought’ something was True. On a subsequent recall task, readers sometimes falsely recalled the verb ‘thought’ as ‘knew,’ implicitly indicating that the reader had attributed knowledge to the character. False recall of ‘knew’ occurred more frequently when the story described a Justified True Belief than an unJustified Belief. Justified True Belief triggered these recall errors even in a so-called “Gettier case”. The present findings suggest that semantic integration provides an empirical paradigm suitable for investigating lay notions about knowledge.
Richard Brock - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Lucky Belief in science education: Gettier cases and the value of reliable Belief-forming processes
Science Education, 2018Co-Authors: Richard BrockAbstract:The conceptualisation of knowledge as Justified True Belief has been shown to be, at the very least, an incomplete account. One challenge to the Justified True Belief model arises from the proposition of situations in which a person possesses a Belief that is both Justified and True which some philosophers intuit should not be classified as knowledge. Though situations of this type have been imagined by a number of writers, they have come to be labelled Gettier cases. Gettier cases arise when a fallible justification happens to lead to a True Belief in one context, a case of ‘lucky Belief’. In this article, it is argued that students studying science may make claims that resemble Gettier cases. In some contexts, a student may make a claim that is both Justified and True but which arises from an alternative conception of a scientific concept. A number of instances of lucky Belief in topics in science education are considered leading to an examination of the criteria teachers use to assess students’ claims in different contexts. The possibility of lucky Belief leads to the proposal that, in addition to the acquisition of Justified True Beliefs, the development of reliable Belief-forming processes is a significant goal of science education. The pedagogic value of various kinds of claims is considered and, it is argued, the criteria used to judge claims may be adjusted to suit the context of assessment. It is suggested that teachers should be alert to instances of lucky Belief that mask alternative conceptions.
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Lucky Belief in Science Education
Science & Education, 2018Co-Authors: Richard BrockAbstract:The conceptualisation of knowledge as Justified True Belief has been shown to be, at the very least, an incomplete account. One challenge to the Justified True Belief model arises from the proposition of situations in which a person possesses a Belief that is both Justified and True which some philosophers intuit should not be classified as knowledge. Though situations of this type have been imagined by a number of writers, they have come to be labelled Gettier cases. Gettier cases arise when a fallible justification happens to lead to a True Belief in one context, a case of ‘lucky Belief’. In this article, it is argued that students studying science may make claims that resemble Gettier cases. In some contexts, a student may make a claim that is both Justified and True but which arises from an alternative conception of a scientific concept. A number of instances of lucky Belief in topics in science education are considered leading to an examination of the criteria teachers use to assess students’ claims in different contexts. The possibility of lucky Belief leads to the proposal that, in addition to the acquisition of Justified True Beliefs, the development of reliable Belief-forming processes is a significant goal of science education. The pedagogic value of various kinds of claims is considered and, it is argued, the criteria used to judge claims may be adjusted to suit the context of assessment. It is suggested that teachers should be alert to instances of lucky Belief that mask alternative conceptions.
Zachary Horne - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Justified True Belief triggers false recall of knowing
Cognitive Science, 2013Co-Authors: Derek Powell, Zachary Horne, Angel N Pinillos, Keith J HolyoakAbstract:Philosophers traditionally held that knowledge is Justified True Belief. Gettier (1963) challenged this view with thought experiments in which someone has a Justified and True Belief, but an element of luck is involved that disqualifies the Belief from counting as knowledge. We examined laypeople’s concept of knowledge using a semantic integration paradigm modeled after that of Gentner (1981). Participants read stories in which a character ‘thought’ something was True. On a subsequent recall task, readers sometimes falsely recalled the verb ‘thought’ as ‘knew,’ implicitly indicating that the reader had attributed knowledge to the character. False recall of ‘knew’ occurred more frequently when the story described a Justified True Belief than an unJustified Belief. Justified True Belief triggered these recall errors even in a so-called “Gettier case”. The present findings suggest that semantic integration provides an empirical paradigm suitable for investigating lay notions about knowledge.
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CogSci - Justified True Belief Triggers False Recall of "Knowing"
Cognitive Science, 2013Co-Authors: Derek Powell, Zachary Horne, N. Ángel Pinillos, Keith J HolyoakAbstract:Philosophers traditionally held that knowledge is Justified True Belief. Gettier (1963) challenged this view with thought experiments in which someone has a Justified and True Belief, but an element of luck is involved that disqualifies the Belief from counting as knowledge. We examined laypeople’s concept of knowledge using a semantic integration paradigm modeled after that of Gentner (1981). Participants read stories in which a character ‘thought’ something was True. On a subsequent recall task, readers sometimes falsely recalled the verb ‘thought’ as ‘knew,’ implicitly indicating that the reader had attributed knowledge to the character. False recall of ‘knew’ occurred more frequently when the story described a Justified True Belief than an unJustified Belief. Justified True Belief triggered these recall errors even in a so-called “Gettier case”. The present findings suggest that semantic integration provides an empirical paradigm suitable for investigating lay notions about knowledge.
Brian Weatherson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Margins and Errors
Inquiry, 2013Co-Authors: Brian WeathersonAbstract:Abstract Timothy Williamson has argued that cases involving fallible measurement show that knowledge comes apart from Justified True Belief in ways quite distinct from the familiar ‘double luck’ cases. I start by describing some assumptions that are necessary to generate Williamson's conclusion, and arguing that these assumptions are well Justified. I then argue that the existence of these cases poses problems for theorists who suppose that knowledge comes apart from Justified True Belief only in a well defined class of cases. I end with some general discussion of what we can know on the basis of imperfect measuring devices.
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What Good are Counterexamples?
Philosophical Studies, 2003Co-Authors: Brian WeathersonAbstract:Intuitively, Gettier cases are instances of Justified True Beliefsthat are not cases of knowledge. Should we therefore conclude thatknowledge is not Justified True Belief? Only if we have reason totrust intuition here. But intuitions are unreliable in a wide rangeof cases. And it can be argued that the Gettier intuitions have agreater resemblance to unreliable intuitions than to reliableintuitions. What’s distinctive about the faulty intuitions, Iargue, is that respecting them would mean abandoning a simple,systematic and largely successful theory in favour of a complicated,disjunctive and idiosyncratic theory. So maybe respecting theGettier intuitions was the wrong reaction, we should instead havebeen explaining why we are all so easily misled by these kinds ofcases.
