The Experts below are selected from a list of 13341 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Olivier Blanchard - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the perverse effects of partial Labor Market Reform fixed duration contracts in france
Social Science Research Network, 2001Co-Authors: Olivier Blanchard, Augustin LandierAbstract:Rather than decreasering costs across the board, a number of European countries have allowedrms to hire workers onxed-term contracts. At the end of a given term, these contracts can be termi- nated at little or no cost. If workers are kept on however, the contracts become subject to normalring costs. We argue in this paper that the e®ects of such a partial Reform of employment protection may be perverse. The main e®ect may be high turnover in entry-level jobs, leading in turn to higher, not lower, unemployment. And, even if unemployment comes down, workers may actually be worse o®, going through many spells of unemployment and entry-level jobs, before obtaining a regular job. Looking at French data for young workers since the early 1980s, we conclude that the Reforms have substantially increased turnover, without a substantial reduction in unemployment duration. If anything, their e®ect on the welfare of young workers appears to have been negative.
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the perverse effects of partial Labor Market Reform fixed duration contracts in france
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001Co-Authors: Olivier Blanchard, Augustin LandierAbstract:Rather than decrease firing costs across the board, a number of European countries have allowed firms to hire workers on fixed-duration contracts. At the end of a given duration, these contracts can be terminated at little or no cost. If workers are kept on however, the contracts become subject to regular firing costs. We argue in this paper that the effects of such a partial Reform of employment protection may be perverse. The main effect may be high turnover in fixed-duration jobs, leading in turn to higher, not lower, unemployment. And, even if unemployment comes down, workers may actually be worse off, going through many spells of unemployment and fixed duration jobs, before obtaining a regular job. Looking at French data for young workers since the early 1980s, we conclude that the Reforms have substantially increased turnover, without a substantial reduction in unemployment duration. If anything, their effect on welfare of young workers appears to have been negative.
Augustin Landier - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the perverse effects of partial Labor Market Reform fixed duration contracts in france
Social Science Research Network, 2001Co-Authors: Olivier Blanchard, Augustin LandierAbstract:Rather than decreasering costs across the board, a number of European countries have allowedrms to hire workers onxed-term contracts. At the end of a given term, these contracts can be termi- nated at little or no cost. If workers are kept on however, the contracts become subject to normalring costs. We argue in this paper that the e®ects of such a partial Reform of employment protection may be perverse. The main e®ect may be high turnover in entry-level jobs, leading in turn to higher, not lower, unemployment. And, even if unemployment comes down, workers may actually be worse o®, going through many spells of unemployment and entry-level jobs, before obtaining a regular job. Looking at French data for young workers since the early 1980s, we conclude that the Reforms have substantially increased turnover, without a substantial reduction in unemployment duration. If anything, their e®ect on the welfare of young workers appears to have been negative.
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the perverse effects of partial Labor Market Reform fixed duration contracts in france
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001Co-Authors: Olivier Blanchard, Augustin LandierAbstract:Rather than decrease firing costs across the board, a number of European countries have allowed firms to hire workers on fixed-duration contracts. At the end of a given duration, these contracts can be terminated at little or no cost. If workers are kept on however, the contracts become subject to regular firing costs. We argue in this paper that the effects of such a partial Reform of employment protection may be perverse. The main effect may be high turnover in fixed-duration jobs, leading in turn to higher, not lower, unemployment. And, even if unemployment comes down, workers may actually be worse off, going through many spells of unemployment and fixed duration jobs, before obtaining a regular job. Looking at French data for young workers since the early 1980s, we conclude that the Reforms have substantially increased turnover, without a substantial reduction in unemployment duration. If anything, their effect on welfare of young workers appears to have been negative.
Hugo A Hopenhayn - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Labor Market policies and employment duration the effects of Labor Market Reform in argentina
Social Science Research Network, 2004Co-Authors: Hugo A HopenhaynAbstract:Over the last few years, the debate on Labor Market Reform has been at the center of economic policy debate in Argentina. This debate has been fueled by the sustained growth in the unemployment rate observed during the decade. One of the major targets of the attack on Labor Market regulation has been high dismissal costs.
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Labor Market policies and employment duration the effects of Labor Market Reform in argentina
Research Papers in Economics, 2001Co-Authors: Hugo A HopenhaynAbstract:Over the last few years, the debate on Labor Market Reform has been at the center of economic policy debate in Argentina. One of the major targets of the attack on Labor Market regulation has been high dismissal costs. Attempts to reduce dismissal costs for all existing jobs have faced strong opposition. As a compromise, and to stimulate job creation, employment promotion contracts for new jobs were introduced in 1995. These contracts are limited to a fixed term ranging from three months to two years. There is a growing concern about the volatility of these temporary jobs, referred to as junk contracts, and a predominant view that they tend to generate excessive turnover. This paper studies the effect of this Reform on job duration. The main findings are that the Reform generated an overall increase in the hazard rate, and particularly so for the first three months of employment.
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Labor Market policies and employment duration the effects of Labor Market Reform in argentina
Research Department Publications, 2001Co-Authors: Hugo A HopenhaynAbstract:Over the last few years, the debate on Labor Market Reform has been at the center of economic policy debate in Argentina. This debate has been fueled by the sustained growth in the unemployment rate observed during the decade. One of the major targets of the attack on Labor Market regulation has been high dismissal costs. Attempts to reduce dismissal costs for all existing jobs have faced strong opposition. As a compromise, and to stimulate job creation, employment promotion contracts for new jobs were introduced in 1995. These contracts are limited to a fixed term ranging from three months to two years.
Zhong Zhao - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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parental job loss and children s health ten years after the massive layoff of the soes workers in china
China Economic Review, 2014Co-Authors: Hong Liu, Zhong ZhaoAbstract:Abstract Beginning in the mid 1990s, China sped up its urban Labor Market Reform and drastically restructured its state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which resulted in massive layoff of the SOEs' workers and a high unemployment rate. In this paper, we investigate the impact of parental job loss on their children's health, using six waves of the China Health and Nutrition Survey covering the period from 1991 to 2006. We find that paternal job loss has a significant negative effect on children's health, while maternal job loss has no significant effect. The rationale behind the findings is that the income loss resulting from maternal job loss is much smaller; meanwhile, the unemployed mothers are likely to increase their time inputs to child care, and this may alleviate the negative effect of maternal job loss. Our findings from a fixed effects model are robust to various specifications and alternative approaches.
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parental job loss and children s health ten years after the massive layoff of the soes workers in china
2011Co-Authors: Hong Liu, Zhong ZhaoAbstract:Beginning in the mid 1990s, China sped up its urban Labor Market Reform and drastically restructured its state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which resulted in massive layoff of the SOEs' workers and a high unemployment rate. In this paper, we investigate the impact of the parents’ job loss on the health of their children, using six waves of the China Health and Nutrition Survey covering the period from 1991 to 2006. We find that paternal job loss has a significant negative effect on children's health, whilst maternal job loss has no significant effect. The rationale behind the findings is that the income loss resulting from maternal job loss is much smaller; at the same time, the unemployed mothers are likely to increase the time they devote to care of their children, and this may alleviate the negative effect resulting from maternal job loss. Our findings are robust to various specifications.
Adriana D Kugler - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the effect of job security regulations on Labor Market flexibility evidence from the colombian Labor Market Reform
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004Co-Authors: Adriana D KuglerAbstract:Job security provisions are widely believed to reduce dismissals and hiring. In addition, in developing countries job security is believed to reduce compliance with Labor regulations and to increase informal activity. Reductions in dismissal costs are, thus, often advocated as a way to increase Labor Market flexibility and to increase compliance with Labor regulations. This paper analyzes the impact of a substantial reduction in dismissal costs introduced by the Colombian Labor Market Reform of 1990. A theoretical model illustrates the effect of dismissal costs when there is a noncompliant sector. The model shows the direct effect of a reduction in dismissal costs on increased turnover as well as the second order effects on wages and on the composition of the compliant and noncompliant sectors. Using microdata from the Colombian National Household Surveys, I exploit the temporal variability in dismissal costs together with the variability in coverage between formal and informal workers (who are not covered and were, thus, not directly affected by the Reform). The differences-in-differences results indicate increased separations and accessions for formal workers relative to informal workers after the Reform. Moreover, the increase in worker turnover was greatest among younger workers, more educated workers, and workers employed in larger firms who are most likely to have been affected by the Reform. The estimates, together with the steady-state conditions of the model, suggest the Reform contributed to 10% of the reduction in unemployment during the period of study.
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the incidence of job security regulations on Labor Market flexibility and compliance in colombia evidence from the 1990 Reform
Research Department Publications, 2000Co-Authors: Adriana D KuglerAbstract:Utilizing differences-in-differences estimates, this paper reviews the impact of reduced firing costs on the dynamism of the Colombian Labor Market. The effects include raising exit rates into and out of unemployment, increasing compliance with Labor legislation by lowering the costs of formal production, and reducing unemployment from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. On the other hand, Labor Market Reform appeared to explain in part increasing unemployment during the late 1990s. In general, greater flexibility in hiring and firing is likely to translate into increased hiring relative to firing during expansions, but increased firing relative to hiring during recessions.
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the impact of firing costs on turnover and unemployment evidence from the colombian labour Market Reform
International Tax and Public Finance, 1999Co-Authors: Adriana D KuglerAbstract:Reductions in firing costs are often advocated as a way of increasing the dynamism of Labor Markets in both developed and less developed countries. Evidence from Europe and the U.S. on the impact of firing costs has, however, been mixed. Moreover, legislative changes both in Europe and the U.S. have been limited. This paper, instead, examines the impact of the Colombian Labor Market Reform of 1990, which substantially reduced dismissal costs. I estimate the incidence of a reduction in firing costs on worker turnover by exploiting the temporal change in the Colombian Labor legislation as well as the variability in coverage between formal and informal sector workers. Using a grouping estimator to control for common aggregate shocks and selection, I find that the exit hazard rates into and out of unemployment increased after the Reform by over 1 percent for formal workers (covered by the legislation) relative to informal workers (uncovered). The increase of the hazards implies a net decrease in unemployment of a third of a percentage point, which accounts for about one quarter of the fall in unemployment during the period of study.
