The Experts below are selected from a list of 42123 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Samuel T Tan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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how do accounting practices spread an examination of Law Firm networks and stock option backdating
The Accounting Review, 2021Co-Authors: Patricia M Dechow, Samuel T TanAbstract:We hypothesize that one way accounting practices spread is through Law Firm connections. We investigate this prediction by examining companies that avoided reporting compensation expense by engagin...
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how do accounting practices spread an examination of Law Firm networks and stock option backdating
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Patricia M Dechow, Samuel T TanAbstract:We hypothesize that one way accounting practices spread is through Law Firm connections. We investigate this prediction by examining companies that avoided reporting compensation expense by engaging in stock option backdating. We hypothesize that executives engaged in backdating because they were desensitized to its inappropriateness when they learned through their legal counsel that other companies were engaging in this practice. Using network analysis we find that backdating companies are highly connected to one another via shared Law Firms. In addition, we find that backdating spread first to the more highly connected companies and then to less well connected companies. Further, the likelihood that a company backdates is 1.4 to 3.3 times higher when its Law Firm has had another backdating company as a client. We find that sharing a Law Firm is incremental to and more economically significant than the impact of board interlocks and geographical location for explaining backdating. Our evidence is consistent with Law Firms acting as “observers” or “system supporters” in enabling executives to engage in backdating.
Patricia M Dechow - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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how do accounting practices spread an examination of Law Firm networks and stock option backdating
The Accounting Review, 2021Co-Authors: Patricia M Dechow, Samuel T TanAbstract:We hypothesize that one way accounting practices spread is through Law Firm connections. We investigate this prediction by examining companies that avoided reporting compensation expense by engagin...
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how do accounting practices spread an examination of Law Firm networks and stock option backdating
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Patricia M Dechow, Samuel T TanAbstract:We hypothesize that one way accounting practices spread is through Law Firm connections. We investigate this prediction by examining companies that avoided reporting compensation expense by engaging in stock option backdating. We hypothesize that executives engaged in backdating because they were desensitized to its inappropriateness when they learned through their legal counsel that other companies were engaging in this practice. Using network analysis we find that backdating companies are highly connected to one another via shared Law Firms. In addition, we find that backdating spread first to the more highly connected companies and then to less well connected companies. Further, the likelihood that a company backdates is 1.4 to 3.3 times higher when its Law Firm has had another backdating company as a client. We find that sharing a Law Firm is incremental to and more economically significant than the impact of board interlocks and geographical location for explaining backdating. Our evidence is consistent with Law Firms acting as “observers” or “system supporters” in enabling executives to engage in backdating.
Jay Rao - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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my fortune is the work of others a response to prof john c coffee jr regarding lockstep Law Firm partnerships and tournament theory
Social Science Research Network, 2020Co-Authors: Jay RaoAbstract:Recently, Prof. Coffee published a provocative opinion piece in slide form through the Columbia Law School Blue Sky Blog entitled "The Rise of the Mega-Law Firm: Some Reckless Reflections and Prickly Predictions" concerning the recent changes to the large Law Firm landscape. He makes several interesting points throughout his publication; however, the author respectfully disagrees with some of his contentions and also requests further clarification on certain points. To the extent the author understands Prof. Coffee’s choice of words, the author disagrees with Prof. Coffee that a lockstep compensation model might be appropriate at a Law Firm where all partners believe they are “equally gifted,” as the author contends a belief in equal giftedness should bear little relevance on a Law Firm’s decision to maintain a lockstep compensation model. Additionally, the author contends both lockstep Law Firm partnerships and nonlockstep Law Firm partnerships strongly benefit from partners who are “wholly committed to the Firm.” Further, the author strongly criticizes the tournament theory model, which has become closely linked with Cravath and has been applied to numerous Law Firms, accounting Firms, consulting Firms, financial institutions, and other organizations throughout the globe, on the grounds it is fundamentally fLawed. Of note, to the author’s knowledge, this article constitutes the first significant effort to challenge the tournament theory model and its application based on arguments grounded in Vedic/Hindu and Biblical/Christian core values. The response also discusses the up or out system employed by many major Law Firms, Law Firm performance reviews, and the legal academy.
William D Henderson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the elastic tournament the second transformation of the big Law Firm
Social Science Research Network, 2008Co-Authors: Marc Galanter, William D HendersonAbstract:In 1991, Galanter and Palay published 'Tournament of Lawyers: The Transformation of the Big Law Firm', which documented the regular and relentless growth of large U.S. Law Firms. The book advanced several structural and historical factors to explain these patterns, centering on the adoption of the promotion-to-partnership tournament. Systemic changes in the marketplace for corporate legal services in the intervening years suggest the need for an updated account of the modern large Law Firm.Using 'Tournament of Lawyers' as a starting point, we propose to fill this void in the literature. Marching through a wide array of empirical evidence covering the last twenty to thirty years, our findings corroborate some of the core theoretical insights of 'Tournament of Lawyers'. For example, the continuous upward growth of the partnership based on the tournament is clearly evidenced by a 'smooth' upward trajectory in the partnership ranks while associate hiring hews more closely to the underlying business cycle. On the other hand, the widening ranks of permanent 'off track' attorneys and non-equity partners, including the prevalence of de-equitizations, suggest the emergence of a more complex and elongated tournament structure that applies to both partners and associates. Under a new model, which we dub the 'elastic tournament,' the equity core is primarily reserved for partners who control access to key clients. This structure reduces cross-subsidies between Lawyers with differential value to the Firm, thus reducing the potential for large-scale lateral defections. Yet, this reduced sharing of risks and benefits simultaneously creates an environment in which it becomes more costly - at the individual Lawyer level - to faithfully adhere to professional and ethics principles that are in tension with client objectives. Arguably, these dynamics have made zealous advocacy the touchstone of ethical Lawyering. The diminution in sharing also reduces the time horizons of individual Lawyers and decreases their willingness to invest in Firmwide initiatives that do not simultaneously optimize their own practice. Amidst this widening collective action problem, the 'Firm' itself has remarkably little autonomy to pursue non-economic objectives, such as racial and gender diversity (particularly efforts directed at retention) or the training and mentoring of the next generation of Lawyers. Further, except in some exceptional cases, the influence of Firm culture, which may have moderated Lawyer self-interest in an earlier era, is weakened by the sheer size and geographic dispersion of the modern big Law Firm. Although this model is fundamentally 'stable' in the economic sense, it raises several philosophical and practical issues regarding Lawyer independence and the long-term viability of professional self-regulation.
Marc Galanter - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the elastic tournament the second transformation of the big Law Firm
Social Science Research Network, 2008Co-Authors: Marc Galanter, William D HendersonAbstract:In 1991, Galanter and Palay published 'Tournament of Lawyers: The Transformation of the Big Law Firm', which documented the regular and relentless growth of large U.S. Law Firms. The book advanced several structural and historical factors to explain these patterns, centering on the adoption of the promotion-to-partnership tournament. Systemic changes in the marketplace for corporate legal services in the intervening years suggest the need for an updated account of the modern large Law Firm.Using 'Tournament of Lawyers' as a starting point, we propose to fill this void in the literature. Marching through a wide array of empirical evidence covering the last twenty to thirty years, our findings corroborate some of the core theoretical insights of 'Tournament of Lawyers'. For example, the continuous upward growth of the partnership based on the tournament is clearly evidenced by a 'smooth' upward trajectory in the partnership ranks while associate hiring hews more closely to the underlying business cycle. On the other hand, the widening ranks of permanent 'off track' attorneys and non-equity partners, including the prevalence of de-equitizations, suggest the emergence of a more complex and elongated tournament structure that applies to both partners and associates. Under a new model, which we dub the 'elastic tournament,' the equity core is primarily reserved for partners who control access to key clients. This structure reduces cross-subsidies between Lawyers with differential value to the Firm, thus reducing the potential for large-scale lateral defections. Yet, this reduced sharing of risks and benefits simultaneously creates an environment in which it becomes more costly - at the individual Lawyer level - to faithfully adhere to professional and ethics principles that are in tension with client objectives. Arguably, these dynamics have made zealous advocacy the touchstone of ethical Lawyering. The diminution in sharing also reduces the time horizons of individual Lawyers and decreases their willingness to invest in Firmwide initiatives that do not simultaneously optimize their own practice. Amidst this widening collective action problem, the 'Firm' itself has remarkably little autonomy to pursue non-economic objectives, such as racial and gender diversity (particularly efforts directed at retention) or the training and mentoring of the next generation of Lawyers. Further, except in some exceptional cases, the influence of Firm culture, which may have moderated Lawyer self-interest in an earlier era, is weakened by the sheer size and geographic dispersion of the modern big Law Firm. Although this model is fundamentally 'stable' in the economic sense, it raises several philosophical and practical issues regarding Lawyer independence and the long-term viability of professional self-regulation.
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tournament of Lawyers the transformation of the big Law Firm
1991Co-Authors: Marc Galanter, Thomas PalayAbstract:"Tournament of Lawyers" traces in detail the rise of one hundred of the nation's top Firms in order to diagnose the health of the business of American Law. Galanter and Palay demonstrate that much of the large Firm's organizational success stems from its ability to blend the talents of experienced partners with those of energetic junior Lawyers driven by a powerful incentive-the race to win "the promotion-to-partner tournament." This calmly reasoned study reveals, however, that the very causes of the spiraling growth of the large Law Firm may lead to its undoing. "Galanter and Palay pose questions and offer some answers which are certain to change the way big Firm practice is regarded. To describe their work as challenging is something of an understatement: they at times delight, stimulate, frustrate and even depress the reader, but they never disappoint. "Tournament of Lawyers" is essential to the understanding of the business of the big Law Firms."-Jean and Colin Fergus, "New York Law Journal"
