Legal Scholarship

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Kathryn Zeiler - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the future of empirical Legal Scholarship where might we go from here
    2016
    Co-Authors: Kathryn Zeiler
    Abstract:

    The number of empirical Legal studies published by academic journals is on the rise. Given theory’s dominance over the last few decades, this is a welcome development. This movement, however, has been plagued by a lack of rigor and a failure of editors to require disclosure of data and procedures that allow for easy replication of published results. Law journals, the editorial boards of which are manned solely by law students, might face the toughest hurdles in ensuring publication of only high quality empirical studies and in implementing and enforcing disclosure policies. While scholars in other fields including economics, psychology, and political science seem to be taking steps to address widespread quality issues, little is being done to address the problems in the law literature. The purpose of this essay is to argue that most proposed solutions offered over the last decade or so have not taken hold because they do not generate incentives powered by the interests of actors in positions to affect change. Those that have caught on might be causing more harm than good. I offer a set of proposals grounded in a framework based on tapping into the interests of both law journal student-editors and authors who submit empirical Legal studies to law journals for publication. Improving the quality of empirical studies will require time and sustained effort, but the hope is that successful implementation of them (or others that provide strong incentives for change) will reduce the need for effort over time.

  • the future of empirical Legal Scholarship where might we go from here
    2016
    Co-Authors: Kathryn Zeiler
    Abstract:

    Introduction For some time now, scholarly journals have been editing and publishing empirical Legal studies. This includes both peer-reviewed journals, in fi elds such as law, economics, and psychology, and non-peer-reviewed, studentedited law journals. The number of empirical Legal studies that show up in the pages of journals has been on the rise as empirical methods improve and researchers gain easy access to a growing number of data sets. This addition to Legal Scholarship is welcome after decades of theory’s dominance. Prior to the entrance of empirical work onto the scene, we were drowning in a sea of predictions derived from unvalidated theories. Journals were fi lled with guesses, and we blindly applied theory in policymaking, if at all, in the absence of evidence that the relevant theoretical insights were accurate and robust. The situation has improved in recent years as we have sought to verify theories relevant to law and policy using data from a rapidly expanding number of sources. This is the good news. The troubling news is that empirical Scholarship in most fi elds is under fi re. Several studies published during the past decade have revealed the tenuous nature of a shockingly high percentage of some of the most widely cited empirical results. Empiricists are scrambling to fi nd eff ective ways to restore confi dence in published empirical studies. The situation in the fi eld of law is doubly worse. First, the average quality of empirical studies published in student-edited law reviews is undoubtedly lower than those published in peer-reviewed journals. This is partly because law review editorial boards, usually comprising solely law students, do not systematically require expert review of submitted work. Student editors are eager to publish empirical work, but too often lack the expertise to ensure that they publish only high-quality, replicable studies. This system encourages submissions by

  • against endowment theory experimental economics and Legal Scholarship
    2013
    Co-Authors: Gregory Klass, Kathryn Zeiler
    Abstract:

    Endowment theory holds the mere ownership of a thing causes people to assign greater value to it than they otherwise would. The theory entered Legal Scholarship in the early 1990s and quickly eclipsed other accounts of how ownership affects valuation. Today, one finds appeals to a generic “endowment effect” throughout the Legal literature. Recent experimental results, however, suggest that the empirical evidence for endowment theory is weak at best. When the procedures used in laboratory experiments are altered to rule out alternative explanations, the “endowment effect” disappears. This and other recent evidence suggest that mere ownership does not affect willingness to trade or exchange. Many experimental economists no longer ascribe to endowment theory. Legal scholars, however, continue to rely on endowment theory to predict Legal entitlements’ probable effects on expressed valuations. That reliance is no longer warranted. Endowment theory’s influence in Legal Scholarship provides important lessons about how Legal scholars and policymakers should, and should not, use results from experimental economics.

  • against endowment theory experimental economics and Legal Scholarship
    2013
    Co-Authors: Gregory Klass, Kathryn Zeiler
    Abstract:

    Endowment theory holds the mere ownership of a thing causes people to assign greater value to it than they otherwise would. The theory entered Legal Scholarship in the early 1990s and quickly eclipsed other accounts of how ownership affects valuation. Today, appeals to a generic “endowment effect” can be found throughout the Legal literature. More recent experimental results, however, suggest that the empirical evidence for endowment theory is weak at best. When the procedures used in laboratory experiments are altered to rule out alternative explanations, the “endowment effect” disappears. This and other recent evidence suggest that mere ownership does not affect willingness to trade or exchange. Many experimental economists no longer ascribe to endowment theory. Legal scholars, however, continue to rely on endowment theory to predict Legal entitlements’ probable effects on expressed valuations. That reliance is no longer warranted. Endowment theory’s influence in Legal Scholarship provides important lessons about how Legal scholars and policymakers should, and should not, use results from experimental economics.

Niels Petersen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • network analysis and Legal Scholarship
    2017
    Co-Authors: Emanuel Vahid Towfigh, Niels Petersen
    Abstract:

    In their contribution to this issue Mattias Derlen and Johan Lindholm use social network analysis to show that the European Court of Justice is a precedent-driven constitutional court that is comparable to the US Supreme Court with regard to the citation of precedents. The article and its use of network analysis as a method provoked a lively debate on the editorial board of the German Law Journal about comparative law theory and methods generally and the place of empirical (including network) analyses in the comparative law discipline. For this reason, the editorial board commissioned this “special section” of contributions dedicated broadly to approaches to comparative law. In his essay in this section, for example, Jens Frankenreiter offers a detailed assessment of Derlen’s and Lindholm’s analysis. In this piece, we take a broader perspective and look at the utility and the limits of network analysis for Legal Scholarship generally.

  • does Legal Scholarship need an empirical turn
    2010
    Co-Authors: Niels Petersen
    Abstract:

    In theory, the empirical and normative realm are analytically distinct spheres. It is not possible to draw conclusions, without making further qualifications, on what should be from what actually is. At the same time, norms do not say anything about the state of the reality. This theoretical distinction leads to a division of labor in the academic debate. Social scientists perform research on social facts, while Legal scholars focus on normative valuations. In practice, however, the empirical and the normative sphere are not as distinct as they appear to be in theory. Normative judgments often depend on factual circumstances. Therefore, empirical knowledge plays a crucial role in Legal interpretation and the development of Legal theories. Drawing from examples from German constitutional law, this contribution seeks to show that Legal interpretation is often based on questionable assumptions about reality. In a second part, the paper analyzes how empirical knowledge can be integrated into the Legal discourse. In this context, two models are discussed. One proposes that lawyers interpret social facts on their own. The other seeks to outsource the analysis of social facts to social scientists or expert witnesses. However, both proposals encounter problems: on the one hand, lawyers do not possess the methodological capacity for an empirical analysis. On the other hand, many empirical studies contain hidden normative judgments that might influence Legal decisions if the deciding judges are not aware of them. The article thus proposes a middle course for both Legal practice and Legal Scholarship.

Anthony E Varona - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Tammo Wallinga - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the common history of european Legal Scholarship
    2011
    Co-Authors: Tammo Wallinga
    Abstract:

    textabstractThis paper traces the common history of European Legal Scholarship from its beginning in the late 12th century to the development of national codifications which started some six centuries later. During this period, Roman law was of great importance in the universities, and Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis was the central text for Legal studies. We will look at the different approaches to this body of text that Legal Scholarship has taken over the years. Still, Roman law did not have a complete monopoly: we will have a look as well at Canon law and Moral Theology, which also developed a system of Legal norms, but on an entirely different basis. They paved the way for Natural law, which – in a critical dialogue with Roman law – paved the way for modern codifications.

  • the common history of european Legal Scholarship
    2011
    Co-Authors: Tammo Wallinga
    Abstract:

    This paper traces the common history of European Legal Scholarship from its beginning in the late 12th century to the development of national codifications which started some six centuries later. During this period, Roman law was of great importance in the universities, and Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis was the central text for Legal studies. We will look at the different approaches to this body of text that Legal Scholarship has taken over the years. Still, Roman law did not have a complete monopoly: we will have a look as well at Canon law and Moral Theology, which also developed a system of Legal norms, but on an entirely different basis. They paved the way for Natural law, which – in a critical dialogue with Roman law – paved the way for modern codifications.

Nicolas Lampach - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • the future of european Legal Scholarship empirical jurisprudence
    2019
    Co-Authors: Arthur Dyevre, Wessel Wijtvliet, Nicolas Lampach
    Abstract:

    To avert the twin threats of isolation and marginalization, we argue that European Legal research should embrace the methodology of the social sciences to a much greater extent than is currently the case. To fit the hybrid – academic and professional – character of the law school, research should emphasize questions of broad interest to lawyers and Legal reformers. We outline two lines of research, under the header of ‘Empirical Jurisprudence’, that, we believe, should be of fundamental interest to members of the Legal community at large: (i) law as the art of persuasion; and (ii) law as social product and instrument of social planning. We show that the questions demarcated by these two research programmes are, and have always been, of interest to lawyers, claims to the autonomy of the Legal discipline notwithstanding. We also argue that the rapidly expanding and increasingly eclectic array of empirical research techniques – from text mining to network analysis and machine learning – makes the turn to Empirical Jurisprudence especially promising.

  • the future of european Legal Scholarship empirical jurisprudence
    2017
    Co-Authors: Arthur Dyevre, Wessel Wijtvliet, Nicolas Lampach
    Abstract:

    To avert the twin threats of isolation and marginalization, we argue that European Legal research should focus on questions that are important to lawyers and Legal reformers and fully embrace the methodology of the social sciences. We identify two research programmes that, we believe, should be of fundamental interest to members of the Legal community at large: (1) law as the art of persuasion, and (2) law as social product and instrument of social planning. We show that the questions demarcated by these two research programmes are, and have always been, of interest to lawyers, claims to the autonomy of the Legal discipline notwithstanding. We also argue that the rapidly expanding and increasingly eclectic array of empirical research techniques—from text-mining to network analysis and machine learning—makes the turn to Empirical Jurisprudence especially promising.