The Experts below are selected from a list of 36252 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Jordan I Siegel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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finance and politics a review essay based on kenneth dam s analysis of Legal Traditions in the law growth nexus
Social Science Research Network, 2009Co-Authors: Mark J Roe, Jordan I SiegelAbstract:Strong financial markets are widely thought to propel economic development, with many in finance seeing Legal Tradition as fundamental to protecting investors sufficiently for finance to flourish. Kenneth Dam, in the Law-Growth Nexus, finds that the Legal Tradition view inaccurately portrays how Legal systems work, how laws developed historically, and how government power is allocated in the various Legal Traditions. Yet, after probing the Legal origins’ literature for inaccuracies, Dam does not deeply develop an alternative hypothesis to explain the world’s differences in financial development. Nor does he challenge the origins core data, which could be origins’ trump card. Hence, his analysis will not convince many economists, despite that his Legal learning suggests conceptual and factual difficulties for the Legal origins explanations. Yet, a dense political economy explanation is already out there and the origins-based data has unexplored weaknesses consistent with Dam’s contentions. Knowing if the origins view is truly fundamental, flawed, or secondary is vital for financial development policymaking, because policymakers who believe it will pick policies that imitate what they think to be the core institutions of the preferred Legal Tradition. But if they have mistaken views, as Dam indicates they might, as to what the Legal Traditions’ institutions really are and which types of laws really are effective, or what is really most important to financial development, they will make policy mistakes - potentially serious ones.
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finance and politics a review essay based on kenneth dam s analysis of Legal Traditions in the law growth nexus
Journal of Economic Literature, 2009Co-Authors: Mark J Roe, Jordan I SiegelAbstract:Strong financial markets are widely thought to propel economic development, with many in finance seeing Legal Tradition as fundamental to protecting investors suffi ciently for finance to flourish. Kenneth Dam finds that the Legal Tradition view inac curately portrays how Legal systems work, how laws developed historically, and how government power is allocated in the various Legal Traditions. Yet, after probing the Legal origins' literature for inaccuracies, Dam does not deeply develop an alternative hypothesis to explain the world's differences in financial development. Nor does he challenge the origins core data, which could be origins' trump card. Hence, his analy sis will not convince many economists, despite that his Legal learning suggests con ceptual and factual difficulties for the Legal origins explanations. Yet, a dense political economy explanation is already out there and the origins-based data has unexplored weaknesses consistent with Dams contentions. Knowing if the origins view is truly fundamental, flawed, or secondary is vital for financial development policy making because policymakers who believe it will pick policies that imitate what they think to be the core institutions of the preferred Legal Tradition. But if they have mistaken views, as Dam indicates they might, as to what the Legal Traditions' institutions really are and which types of laws are effective, or what is really most important to financial development, they will make policy mistakes?potentially serious ones.
Aldo Musacchio - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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can civil law countries get good institutions lessons from the history of creditor rights and bond markets in brazil
The Journal of Economic History, 2008Co-Authors: Aldo MusacchioAbstract:Does a Legal Tradition adopted in the distant past constrain a country's ability to provide the protection that investors need for financial markets to develop? I look at the relationship between Legal origin and the development of bond markets and find too much variation over time in bond market size, creditor protections, and court enforcement of bond contracts to assume that the adoption of a Legal system constrains future financial development. I examine the evolution of bond markets in Brazil, a French civil law country, and provide preliminary results of similar variation for a small cross-section of countries.
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can civil law countries get good institutions lessons from the history of creditor rights and bond markets in brazil
The Journal of Economic History, 2008Co-Authors: Aldo MusacchioAbstract:Does a Legal Tradition adopted in the distant past constrain a country's ability to provide the protection that investors need for financial markets to develop? This paper contributes to the literature that studies the connection between law and finance by looking at the relationship between Legal origin and the development of bond markets. The paper shows that there is too much variation over time in terms of bond market size, creditor protections, and court enforcement of bond contracts to assume that the adoption of a Legal system can constrain future financial development. The paper examines in detail the evolution of bond markets in Brazil, a French civil law country, and provides preliminary results of similar variation for a small cross-section of countries.
Carlo Vittorio Giabardo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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disobeying courts orders a comparative analysis of the civil contempt of court doctrine and of the image of the common law judge
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Carlo Vittorio GiabardoAbstract:The aim of this article is to briefly tackle, from a comparative viewpoint, an academically quite overlooked topic: techniques of enforcement of lawful judgments. Despite a gradual convergence in many fields of law, common and civil law jurisdictions still maintain a striking diversity in the ways in which they react to non-compliance with court judgments. Whilst in common law Tradition, failure to comply with a judicial order is considered civil contempt of court, in civil law countries this Legal institution is simply unknown. Furthermore, it is only in civil law systems that failure to comply with a court judgment cannot be punished by imprisonment. My key question is: what are, if any, the “cultural” reasons that could explain this divergence of approach? First, discussing Mauro Cappelletti’s comparative methodology, I explore whether, and to what extent, civil contempt of court and its civilian counterparts are comparable. Then, focusing my attention on the common law model, I argue that many contemporary features of civil contempt can only be fully understood by looking at the particular image and unique social perception of the judge within the common law Legal Tradition.
Caroline Fohlin - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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does civil law Tradition and universal banking crowd out securities markets pre world war i germany as counter example
Enterprise and Society, 2007Co-Authors: Caroline FohlinAbstract:This article poses three main questions: Does the civil-law Tradition favor large, concentrated, universal banking systems? Does this sort of Legal system work against the development of active securities markets? Do powerful universal banks (whether or not Legal Tradition lies at the root of bank power) replace securities markets or prevent them from operating efficiently? Based on evidence from Pre-World War I Germany, this paper argues that the answer to all three questions is 'no.'
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economic political and Legal factors in financial system development international patterns in historical perspective
Research Papers in Economics, 2000Co-Authors: Caroline FohlinAbstract:Financial systems are often described either as bank-based, universal, and relational or as market-based, specialized, and arms-length; and for many years academics and policymakers have debated the relative merits of these different types of systems. This paper inquires into the underlying causes of financial system structure and development. Older theories dictated that financial institutions developed in relationship to the economy's level of development. Newer work has brought political and Legal factors to the fore: hypothesizing specific relationships between banking structure and state centralization and between financial development and Legal Tradition. This study classifies countries by type of financial system, and in doing, indicates that few banking systems fit the extreme paradigms of universal-relationship or specialized-arms length banking. On the other hand, despite several cases of temporary upheaval, and recent widespread movement toward conglomeration, banking system structure has remained remarkable stable over the last 100 to 150 years. Economic factors in the late nineteenth century provide relatively strong explanatory power for financial system development, market orientation, and banking structure at the eve of World War I and in the present day. Banking specialization and market orientation appear strongly associated with Legal Tradition, though it seems more likely that the three characteristics are jointly determined or that the Legal system variable simply proxies for a close or historical tie to the exporter of many political-economic institutions, England. Legal orientation exerted little impact on financial institution growth at the turn of the century and provides no consistent prediction of real economic growth rates over the past 150 years. Finally, political structure relates significantly to market orientation but not to banking system design or Legal Tradition. Nonetheless, many individual country histories make it clear that political forces played important roles in shaping regulations that in turn altered the course of financial institutions and markets. The results here simply suggest that these political forces appeared inconsistently and had no traceable, uniform relationship to the overall political system in place in the nineteenth century. The results underscore two principal themes: the weight of history in determining the growth and design of financial institutions and markets, and the importance of idiosyncratic forces that buffet institutions over time. Despite obvious connections among political, Legal, economic, and financial institutions, robust, long-term, causal relationships often prove to be elusive.
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economic political and Legal factors in financial system development international patterns in historical perspective
Social Science Research Network, 2000Co-Authors: Caroline FohlinAbstract:Financial systems are often described either as bank-based, universal, and relational or as market-based, specialized, and arms-length; and for many years academics and policymakers have debated the relative merits of these different types of systems. This paper inquires into the underlying causes of financial system structure and development. Older theories dictated that financial institutions developed in relationship to the economy’s level of development. Newer work has brought political and Legal factors to the fore: hypothesizing specific relationships between banking structure and state centralization and between financial development and Legal Tradition. This study classifies countries by type of financial system, and in doing, indicates that few banking systems fit the extreme paradigms of universal-relationship or specialized arm’s length banking. On the other hand, despite several cases of temporary upheaval, and recent widespread movement toward conglomeration, banking system structure has remained remarkably stable over the last 100 to 150 years. Economic factors in the late nineteenth century provide relatively strong explanatory power for financial system development, market orientation, and banking structure at the eve of World War I and in the present day. Banking specialization and market orientation appear strongly associated with Legal Tradition, though it seems more likely that the three characteristics are jointly determined or that the Legal system variable simply proxies for a close or historical tie to the exporter of many political-economic institutions, England. Legal orientation exerted little impact on financial institution growth at the turn of the century and provides no consistent prediction of real economic growth rates over the past 150 years. Finally, political structure relates significantly to market orientation but not to banking system design or Legal Tradition. Nonetheless, many individual country histories make it clear that political forces played important roles in shaping regulations that in turn altered the course of financial institutions and markets. The results here simply suggest that these political forces appeared inconsistently and had no traceable, uniform relationship to the overall political system in place in the nineteenth century. The results underscore two principal themes: the weight of history in determining the growth and design of financial institutions and markets, and the importance of idiosyncratic forces that buffet institutions over time. Despite obvious connections among political, Legal, economic, and financial institutions, robust, long-term, causal relationships often prove to be elusive.
Mark J Roe - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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finance and politics a review essay based on kenneth dam s analysis of Legal Traditions in the law growth nexus
Social Science Research Network, 2009Co-Authors: Mark J Roe, Jordan I SiegelAbstract:Strong financial markets are widely thought to propel economic development, with many in finance seeing Legal Tradition as fundamental to protecting investors sufficiently for finance to flourish. Kenneth Dam, in the Law-Growth Nexus, finds that the Legal Tradition view inaccurately portrays how Legal systems work, how laws developed historically, and how government power is allocated in the various Legal Traditions. Yet, after probing the Legal origins’ literature for inaccuracies, Dam does not deeply develop an alternative hypothesis to explain the world’s differences in financial development. Nor does he challenge the origins core data, which could be origins’ trump card. Hence, his analysis will not convince many economists, despite that his Legal learning suggests conceptual and factual difficulties for the Legal origins explanations. Yet, a dense political economy explanation is already out there and the origins-based data has unexplored weaknesses consistent with Dam’s contentions. Knowing if the origins view is truly fundamental, flawed, or secondary is vital for financial development policymaking, because policymakers who believe it will pick policies that imitate what they think to be the core institutions of the preferred Legal Tradition. But if they have mistaken views, as Dam indicates they might, as to what the Legal Traditions’ institutions really are and which types of laws really are effective, or what is really most important to financial development, they will make policy mistakes - potentially serious ones.
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finance and politics a review essay based on kenneth dam s analysis of Legal Traditions in the law growth nexus
Journal of Economic Literature, 2009Co-Authors: Mark J Roe, Jordan I SiegelAbstract:Strong financial markets are widely thought to propel economic development, with many in finance seeing Legal Tradition as fundamental to protecting investors suffi ciently for finance to flourish. Kenneth Dam finds that the Legal Tradition view inac curately portrays how Legal systems work, how laws developed historically, and how government power is allocated in the various Legal Traditions. Yet, after probing the Legal origins' literature for inaccuracies, Dam does not deeply develop an alternative hypothesis to explain the world's differences in financial development. Nor does he challenge the origins core data, which could be origins' trump card. Hence, his analy sis will not convince many economists, despite that his Legal learning suggests con ceptual and factual difficulties for the Legal origins explanations. Yet, a dense political economy explanation is already out there and the origins-based data has unexplored weaknesses consistent with Dams contentions. Knowing if the origins view is truly fundamental, flawed, or secondary is vital for financial development policy making because policymakers who believe it will pick policies that imitate what they think to be the core institutions of the preferred Legal Tradition. But if they have mistaken views, as Dam indicates they might, as to what the Legal Traditions' institutions really are and which types of laws are effective, or what is really most important to financial development, they will make policy mistakes?potentially serious ones.
