The Experts below are selected from a list of 2805 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Robert F Ladenson - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

Delia Baldassarri - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • centralized sanctioning and Legitimate Authority promote cooperation in humans
    Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2011
    Co-Authors: Delia Baldassarri, Guy Grossman
    Abstract:

    Social sanctioning is widely considered a successful strategy to promote cooperation among humans. In situations in which individual and collective interests are at odds, incentives to free-ride induce individuals to refrain from contributing to public goods provision. Experimental evidence from public goods games shows that when endowed with sanctioning powers, conditional cooperators can discipline defectors, thus leading to greater levels of cooperation. However, extant evidence is based on peer punishment institutions, whereas in complex societies, systems of control are often centralized: for instance, we do not sanction our neighbors for driving too fast, the police do. Here we show the effect of centralized sanctioning and Legitimate Authority on cooperation. We designed an adaptation of the public goods game in which sanctioning power is given to a single monitor, and we experimentally manipulated the process by which the monitor is chosen. To increase the external validity of the study, we conducted lab-in-the-field experiments involving 1,543 Ugandan farmers from 50 producer cooperatives. This research provides evidence of the effectiveness of centralized sanctioning and demonstrates the causal effect of legitimacy on cooperation: participants are more responsive to the Authority of an elected monitor than a randomly chosen monitor. Our essay contributes to the literature on the evolution of cooperation by introducing the idea of role differentiation. In complex societies, cooperative behavior is not only sustained by mechanisms of selection and reciprocity among peers, but also by the legitimacy that certain actors derive from their position in the social hierarchy.

  • centralized sanctioning and Legitimate Authority in public goods provision evidence from a lab in the field experiment in uganda
    2011
    Co-Authors: Guy Grossman, Delia Baldassarri
    Abstract:

    This paper uses an innovative methodological framework, which combines "lab-in-the-field" experiments with observational data on 1,543 producers from 50 Ugandan farmer associations, to address the debate on the role sanctioning plays in fostering public goods provision. The experimental setup allows us to attest the positive impact of centralized-sanctioning institutions on cooperative behavior as well as to demonstrate that the size of this effect depends on the process by which these institutions are established: we show that elected leaders have greater legitimacy than randomly selected ones, elicit greater compliance, and lead to higher public goods provision. To assess the external validity of our findings, we relate our subjects’ behavior in the experiment to their level of cooperation in the farmer organization and show that farmers' deference to Authority in the controlled setting predicts cooperative behavior in their natural environment, in which they face a similar social dilemma.

  • centralized sanctioning and Legitimate Authority in the provision of public goods evidence from a lab in the field experiment in uganda
    2010
    Co-Authors: Guy Grossman, Delia Baldassarri
    Abstract:

    Social sanctioning is widely considered a viable solution to social dilemmas. Public Goods games have provided experimental evidence in support of the role sanctioning plays in sustaining cooperation even when incentives to free-ride are pervasive. Although in real life centralized systems of control are ubiquitous, experimental research has mostly focused on peer-punishment institutions. To test the effect of centralized punishment, we designed a novel adaptation of the public goods game in which sanctioning power is given to an external monitor. Our "lab in the field" experiment involved 1,554 farmers from 50 farmer cooperatives through Uganda and is the first study to provide evidence of the effectiveness of a centralized sanctioning institution. Moreover, we also demonstrate the importance of Legitimate Authority in fostering cooperation: participants are more responsive to the Authority of an elected rather than randomly chosen monitor. Finally, we relate players' behavior in the games to their level of cooperation in the farmer organization and show that farmers' performance in the game setting is consistent with their real life outcomes.

Pablo Kalmanovitz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • on the rights of warlords Legitimate Authority and basic protection in war torn societies
    American Political Science Review, 2016
    Co-Authors: Robert A Blair, Pablo Kalmanovitz
    Abstract:

    This article examines the legitimacy of the use of force by armed nonstate actors resisting the imposition of state rule over territories they control. We focus on the rights of warlords: subnational strongmen who seek autonomy within geographically demarcated territories, but not secession or control of the state itself. We argue that behind the resistance to state-building lies a twofold question of Legitimate Authority: the Authority of states to consolidate power within their own internationally recognized borders and the Authority of warlords to resist that expansion, by force if necessary, when it threatens social order and the protection of basic rights. This article draws on just war theory to develop a set of conditions under which such resistance may be justified, explores the argument's practical implications for state-building under the tutelage of third parties (e.g., the United Nations), and demonstrates its empirical relevance through an application to Afghanistan.

Guy Grossman - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • centralized sanctioning and Legitimate Authority promote cooperation in humans
    Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2011
    Co-Authors: Delia Baldassarri, Guy Grossman
    Abstract:

    Social sanctioning is widely considered a successful strategy to promote cooperation among humans. In situations in which individual and collective interests are at odds, incentives to free-ride induce individuals to refrain from contributing to public goods provision. Experimental evidence from public goods games shows that when endowed with sanctioning powers, conditional cooperators can discipline defectors, thus leading to greater levels of cooperation. However, extant evidence is based on peer punishment institutions, whereas in complex societies, systems of control are often centralized: for instance, we do not sanction our neighbors for driving too fast, the police do. Here we show the effect of centralized sanctioning and Legitimate Authority on cooperation. We designed an adaptation of the public goods game in which sanctioning power is given to a single monitor, and we experimentally manipulated the process by which the monitor is chosen. To increase the external validity of the study, we conducted lab-in-the-field experiments involving 1,543 Ugandan farmers from 50 producer cooperatives. This research provides evidence of the effectiveness of centralized sanctioning and demonstrates the causal effect of legitimacy on cooperation: participants are more responsive to the Authority of an elected monitor than a randomly chosen monitor. Our essay contributes to the literature on the evolution of cooperation by introducing the idea of role differentiation. In complex societies, cooperative behavior is not only sustained by mechanisms of selection and reciprocity among peers, but also by the legitimacy that certain actors derive from their position in the social hierarchy.

  • centralized sanctioning and Legitimate Authority in public goods provision evidence from a lab in the field experiment in uganda
    2011
    Co-Authors: Guy Grossman, Delia Baldassarri
    Abstract:

    This paper uses an innovative methodological framework, which combines "lab-in-the-field" experiments with observational data on 1,543 producers from 50 Ugandan farmer associations, to address the debate on the role sanctioning plays in fostering public goods provision. The experimental setup allows us to attest the positive impact of centralized-sanctioning institutions on cooperative behavior as well as to demonstrate that the size of this effect depends on the process by which these institutions are established: we show that elected leaders have greater legitimacy than randomly selected ones, elicit greater compliance, and lead to higher public goods provision. To assess the external validity of our findings, we relate our subjects’ behavior in the experiment to their level of cooperation in the farmer organization and show that farmers' deference to Authority in the controlled setting predicts cooperative behavior in their natural environment, in which they face a similar social dilemma.

  • centralized sanctioning and Legitimate Authority in the provision of public goods evidence from a lab in the field experiment in uganda
    2010
    Co-Authors: Guy Grossman, Delia Baldassarri
    Abstract:

    Social sanctioning is widely considered a viable solution to social dilemmas. Public Goods games have provided experimental evidence in support of the role sanctioning plays in sustaining cooperation even when incentives to free-ride are pervasive. Although in real life centralized systems of control are ubiquitous, experimental research has mostly focused on peer-punishment institutions. To test the effect of centralized punishment, we designed a novel adaptation of the public goods game in which sanctioning power is given to an external monitor. Our "lab in the field" experiment involved 1,554 farmers from 50 farmer cooperatives through Uganda and is the first study to provide evidence of the effectiveness of a centralized sanctioning institution. Moreover, we also demonstrate the importance of Legitimate Authority in fostering cooperation: participants are more responsive to the Authority of an elected rather than randomly chosen monitor. Finally, we relate players' behavior in the games to their level of cooperation in the farmer organization and show that farmers' performance in the game setting is consistent with their real life outcomes.

Uwe Steinhoff - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • doing away with Legitimate Authority
    Journal of Military Ethics, 2019
    Co-Authors: Uwe Steinhoff
    Abstract:

    I argue in this article that traditional just war theory did allow private, indeed even individual war, and that arguments in support of a Legitimate Authority criterion, let alone in support of th...

  • finlay on Legitimate Authority a critical comment
    2014
    Co-Authors: Uwe Steinhoff
    Abstract:

    Christopher J. Finlay claims “that a principle of moral or Legitimate Authority is necessary in just war theory for evaluating properly the justifiability of violence by non-state entities when they claim to act on behalf of the victims of rights violations and political injustice.” In particular, he argues that states, unlike non-state actors, possess what he calls “Lesser Moral Authority.” This Authority allegedly enables states to invoke “the War Convention,” which in turn entitles even individual soldiers on the aggressive side to use military violence against soldiers defending the victim state. Non-state actors, in contrast, have to fulfill more stringent requirements. If they do not, then even their attacks on military personnel can properly be called terrorist. In the following I will argue that Finlay’s attempt to show the importance of the Legitimate Authority criterion of just war theory and to demonstrate that non-state violence has to satisfy heavier burdens of justification than state violence fails for a number of reasons: his claim that defenders would wrong victims if they defended them against their will is mistaken, he overlooks the fact that non-state agents need not claim to fight on someone’s behalf, the full moral Authority he mentions is redundant, the powers he ascribes to “Lesser Moral Authority” are, depending on interpretation, either morally irrelevant or nonexistent, and his claim that granting states “Lesser Moral Authority” is beneficial from a “moral pragmatic” point of view while granting the same Authority to non-state actors is not, is unwarranted.