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Ricardo Corrêa De ,araujo - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A superação da concepção Liberal de liberdade em Hannah Arendt
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia, 2020Co-Authors: Santos, Edson Kretle, Ricardo Corrêa De ,araujoAbstract:This article intends to confront two notions about the notion of liberty, central theme on Political Philosophy. On one side, we‘ll start on some observations of political Liberalism, where in the first moment, we’ll explore the book “Two Concepts of Liberty” by Isaiah Berlin. To this author the negative liberty - “being free of” and, not the positive liberty - “being free to”, should be the biggest worry of political bodies, that is, the State must exist to avoid that individual liberty is reduced by the own state interference or other subjects. Meeting this idea, and anchored in Arendt, we want to sustain that one of the big problems about political Liberalism is the not action (negative liberty), that is, the lack of participation from the citizens on subjects and on political decisions. Showing this, we will defend in Arendt the central role of positive liberty (political freedom) of action and speak, and, thereafter, the possibility of a civic republicanism as an alternative to the isolation and the political apathy conceived by the bourgeois liberty, since, to Arendt, Berlin’s bet and the Liberal Tradition are unsatisfying to think the events of contemporary politics.Este artigo pretende confrontar duas noções acerca da noção de liberdade, temática central na Filosofia Política. De um lado, partiremos de algumas reflexões do Liberalismo político, onde no primeiro momento, exploraremos a obra Dois Conceitos de Liberdade (Two Concepts of Liberty), de Isaiah Berlin. Para esse autor a liberdade negativa (negative liberty - “estar livre de”) e, não a liberdade positiva (positive liberty - “estar livre para”), deve ser a maior preocupação dos corpos políticos, ou seja, o Estado deve existir para evitar que a liberdade individual seja reduzida pela própria interferência do Estado ou de outros sujeitos. De encontro a essa ideia, e ancorados em Arendt, desejamos sustentar que um dos grandes problemas do Liberalismo político é a não ação (negative liberty), isto é, a falta de participação do cidadão nos assuntos e nas decisões políticas. Ao mostrar isso, defenderemos em Arendt o papel central da liberdade positiva (political freedom) da ação e da fala, e, consequentemente, a possibilidade de um republicanismo cívico como alternativa ao isolamento e apatia políticas gestados pela liberdade burguesa, uma vez que, para Arendt, a aposta de Berlin e da tradição Liberal são insuficientes para pensarmos os acontecimentos da política contemporânea. Palavras-chave: Política; Liberdade; Liberalismo; Cidadania; Arendt
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A superação da concepção Liberal de liberdade em Hannah Arendt
'Griot Revista de Filosofia', 2020Co-Authors: Santos, Edson Kretle, Ricardo Corrêa De ,araujoAbstract:This article intends to confront two notions about the notion of liberty, central theme on Political Philosophy. On one side, we‘ll start on some observations of political Liberalism, where in the first moment, we’ll explore the book "Two Concepts of Liberty" by Isaiah Berlin. To this author the negative liberty - "being free of" and, not the positive liberty - "being free to", should be the biggest worry of political bodies, that is, the State must exist to avoid that individual liberty is reduced by the own state interference or other subjects. Meeting this idea, and anchored in Arendt, we want to sustain that one of the big problems about political Liberalism is the not action (negative liberty), that is, the lack of participation from the citizens on subjects and on political decisions. Showing this, we will defend in Arendt the central role of positive liberty (political freedom) of action and speak, and, thereafter, the possibility of a civic republicanism as an alternative to the isolation and the political apathy conceived by the bourgeois liberty, since, to Arendt, Berlin's bet and the Liberal Tradition are unsatisfying to think the events of contemporary politics
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A superação da concepção Liberal de liberdade em Hannah Arendt: Array
'Griot Revista de Filosofia', 2020Co-Authors: Santos, Edson Kretle, Ricardo Corrêa De ,araujoAbstract:This article intends to confront two notions about the notion of liberty, central theme on Political Philosophy. On one side, we‘ll start on some observations of political Liberalism, where in the first moment, we’ll explore the book “Two Concepts of Liberty” by Isaiah Berlin. To this author the negative liberty - “being free of” and, not the positive liberty - “being free to”, should be the biggest worry of political bodies, that is, the State must exist to avoid that individual liberty is reduced by the own state interference or other subjects. Meeting this idea, and anchored in Arendt, we want to sustain that one of the big problems about political Liberalism is the not action (negative liberty), that is, the lack of participation from the citizens on subjects and on political decisions. Showing this, we will defend in Arendt the central role of positive liberty (political freedom) of action and speak, and, thereafter, the possibility of a civic republicanism as an alternative to the isolation and the political apathy conceived by the bourgeois liberty, since, to Arendt, Berlin’s bet and the Liberal Tradition are unsatisfying to think the events of contemporary politics.Este artigo pretende confrontar duas noções acerca da noção de liberdade, temática central na Filosofia Política. De um lado, partiremos de algumas reflexões do Liberalismo político, onde no primeiro momento, exploraremos a obra Dois Conceitos de Liberdade (Two Concepts of Liberty), de Isaiah Berlin. Para esse autor a liberdade negativa (negative liberty - “estar livre de”) e, não a liberdade positiva (positive liberty - “estar livre para”), deve ser a maior preocupação dos corpos políticos, ou seja, o Estado deve existir para evitar que a liberdade individual seja reduzida pela própria interferência do Estado ou de outros sujeitos. De encontro a essa ideia, e ancorados em Arendt, desejamos sustentar que um dos grandes problemas do Liberalismo político é a não ação (negative liberty), isto é, a falta de participação do cidadão nos assuntos e nas decisões políticas. Ao mostrar isso, defenderemos em Arendt o papel central da liberdade positiva (political freedom) da ação e da fala, e, consequentemente, a possibilidade de um republicanismo cívico como alternativa ao isolamento e apatia políticas gestados pela liberdade burguesa, uma vez que, para Arendt, a aposta de Berlin e da tradição Liberal são insuficientes para pensarmos os acontecimentos da política contemporânea. Palavras-chave: Política; Liberdade; Liberalismo; Cidadania; Arendt
Santos, Edson Kretle - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A superação da concepção Liberal de liberdade em Hannah Arendt
Universidade Federal do Recôncavo da Bahia, 2020Co-Authors: Santos, Edson Kretle, Ricardo Corrêa De ,araujoAbstract:This article intends to confront two notions about the notion of liberty, central theme on Political Philosophy. On one side, we‘ll start on some observations of political Liberalism, where in the first moment, we’ll explore the book “Two Concepts of Liberty” by Isaiah Berlin. To this author the negative liberty - “being free of” and, not the positive liberty - “being free to”, should be the biggest worry of political bodies, that is, the State must exist to avoid that individual liberty is reduced by the own state interference or other subjects. Meeting this idea, and anchored in Arendt, we want to sustain that one of the big problems about political Liberalism is the not action (negative liberty), that is, the lack of participation from the citizens on subjects and on political decisions. Showing this, we will defend in Arendt the central role of positive liberty (political freedom) of action and speak, and, thereafter, the possibility of a civic republicanism as an alternative to the isolation and the political apathy conceived by the bourgeois liberty, since, to Arendt, Berlin’s bet and the Liberal Tradition are unsatisfying to think the events of contemporary politics.Este artigo pretende confrontar duas noções acerca da noção de liberdade, temática central na Filosofia Política. De um lado, partiremos de algumas reflexões do Liberalismo político, onde no primeiro momento, exploraremos a obra Dois Conceitos de Liberdade (Two Concepts of Liberty), de Isaiah Berlin. Para esse autor a liberdade negativa (negative liberty - “estar livre de”) e, não a liberdade positiva (positive liberty - “estar livre para”), deve ser a maior preocupação dos corpos políticos, ou seja, o Estado deve existir para evitar que a liberdade individual seja reduzida pela própria interferência do Estado ou de outros sujeitos. De encontro a essa ideia, e ancorados em Arendt, desejamos sustentar que um dos grandes problemas do Liberalismo político é a não ação (negative liberty), isto é, a falta de participação do cidadão nos assuntos e nas decisões políticas. Ao mostrar isso, defenderemos em Arendt o papel central da liberdade positiva (political freedom) da ação e da fala, e, consequentemente, a possibilidade de um republicanismo cívico como alternativa ao isolamento e apatia políticas gestados pela liberdade burguesa, uma vez que, para Arendt, a aposta de Berlin e da tradição Liberal são insuficientes para pensarmos os acontecimentos da política contemporânea. Palavras-chave: Política; Liberdade; Liberalismo; Cidadania; Arendt
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A superação da concepção Liberal de liberdade em Hannah Arendt
'Griot Revista de Filosofia', 2020Co-Authors: Santos, Edson Kretle, Ricardo Corrêa De ,araujoAbstract:This article intends to confront two notions about the notion of liberty, central theme on Political Philosophy. On one side, we‘ll start on some observations of political Liberalism, where in the first moment, we’ll explore the book "Two Concepts of Liberty" by Isaiah Berlin. To this author the negative liberty - "being free of" and, not the positive liberty - "being free to", should be the biggest worry of political bodies, that is, the State must exist to avoid that individual liberty is reduced by the own state interference or other subjects. Meeting this idea, and anchored in Arendt, we want to sustain that one of the big problems about political Liberalism is the not action (negative liberty), that is, the lack of participation from the citizens on subjects and on political decisions. Showing this, we will defend in Arendt the central role of positive liberty (political freedom) of action and speak, and, thereafter, the possibility of a civic republicanism as an alternative to the isolation and the political apathy conceived by the bourgeois liberty, since, to Arendt, Berlin's bet and the Liberal Tradition are unsatisfying to think the events of contemporary politics
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A superação da concepção Liberal de liberdade em Hannah Arendt: Array
'Griot Revista de Filosofia', 2020Co-Authors: Santos, Edson Kretle, Ricardo Corrêa De ,araujoAbstract:This article intends to confront two notions about the notion of liberty, central theme on Political Philosophy. On one side, we‘ll start on some observations of political Liberalism, where in the first moment, we’ll explore the book “Two Concepts of Liberty” by Isaiah Berlin. To this author the negative liberty - “being free of” and, not the positive liberty - “being free to”, should be the biggest worry of political bodies, that is, the State must exist to avoid that individual liberty is reduced by the own state interference or other subjects. Meeting this idea, and anchored in Arendt, we want to sustain that one of the big problems about political Liberalism is the not action (negative liberty), that is, the lack of participation from the citizens on subjects and on political decisions. Showing this, we will defend in Arendt the central role of positive liberty (political freedom) of action and speak, and, thereafter, the possibility of a civic republicanism as an alternative to the isolation and the political apathy conceived by the bourgeois liberty, since, to Arendt, Berlin’s bet and the Liberal Tradition are unsatisfying to think the events of contemporary politics.Este artigo pretende confrontar duas noções acerca da noção de liberdade, temática central na Filosofia Política. De um lado, partiremos de algumas reflexões do Liberalismo político, onde no primeiro momento, exploraremos a obra Dois Conceitos de Liberdade (Two Concepts of Liberty), de Isaiah Berlin. Para esse autor a liberdade negativa (negative liberty - “estar livre de”) e, não a liberdade positiva (positive liberty - “estar livre para”), deve ser a maior preocupação dos corpos políticos, ou seja, o Estado deve existir para evitar que a liberdade individual seja reduzida pela própria interferência do Estado ou de outros sujeitos. De encontro a essa ideia, e ancorados em Arendt, desejamos sustentar que um dos grandes problemas do Liberalismo político é a não ação (negative liberty), isto é, a falta de participação do cidadão nos assuntos e nas decisões políticas. Ao mostrar isso, defenderemos em Arendt o papel central da liberdade positiva (political freedom) da ação e da fala, e, consequentemente, a possibilidade de um republicanismo cívico como alternativa ao isolamento e apatia políticas gestados pela liberdade burguesa, uma vez que, para Arendt, a aposta de Berlin e da tradição Liberal são insuficientes para pensarmos os acontecimentos da política contemporânea. Palavras-chave: Política; Liberdade; Liberalismo; Cidadania; Arendt
Aristides N Hatzis - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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rule of law individual rights and the free market in the Liberal Tradition the case of greece
Social Science Research Network, 2014Co-Authors: Aristides N HatzisAbstract:The western Liberal Tradition is closely connected with the idea of rights and the rule of law. Rule of law is the idea of a civil society governed by a Constitution which sets limits to government power and protects individual rights against any authority, even against the political will of a majority. The development of the western democratic theory from Ancient Athens to the British parliamentary system, the American Constitution and the French Revolution is mostly a development of two different and often contrasting principles: the democratic principle of people’s sovereignty and the Liberal principle of the protection of individual rights. The balance between these two principles defines the quality of constitutional democracy. Greece was one of the first Liberal democracies of the modern era. Nevertheless, contemporary Greece lags behind modern Liberal democracies in many respects. The experience of Greece could be most useful for the new Arab democracies and Egypt in particular.
Kevin Bruyneel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the american Liberal colonial Tradition
settler colonial studies, 2013Co-Authors: Kevin BruyneelAbstract:The American Liberal myths of the self-made man, of the Liberal individual, and of American exceptionalism all rely upon a disavowed relationship to the constitutive role of settler colonization in the foundation, development, and structure of the USA. I place political scientist Louis Hartz's 1955 work, The Liberal Tradition in America, at the center of this essay because his argument re-animates while posing as a critique of the narrative of American exceptionalism. We see in Hartz someone struggling, and not quite succeeding, to challenge the constraints of American political discourse. In this effort, Hartz implicitly suggests the presence of an American Liberal colonial Tradition, one that upsets the story of America's exceptionalist founding by seeing Liberalism and settler colonialism as mutually constitutive logics. In the end, Hartz sees but cannot fully grasp the explanatory power that comes with placing settler colonial logic at the center of a critique of the foundational myths of America.
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the american Liberal colonial Tradition
Social Science Research Network, 2013Co-Authors: Kevin BruyneelAbstract:In the late 17th Century, John Locke wrote, “in the beginning, all the world was America.” In the early 19th century, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote of Americans being “born equal.” In the mid-20th century, American political scientist Louis Hartz asked, “can a people ‘born equal’ ever understand peoples elsewhere that have to become so? Can it ever understand itself?” In different ways, these theorists reproduce and reflect the myth of America’s seemingly exceptional founding and posture towards the world. They also, implicitly, tell a story of an American Liberal Tradition that sees and disavows indigenous people, indigenous territorial presence, and settler colonialism. The American Liberal myths of the self-made man, of the Liberal individual, and of American exceptionalism all rely upon a disavowed relationship to the constitutive role of settler colonization in the foundation, development and structure of the United States. On closer reading, I find in Hartz’s ultimately failed critique of American Liberalism an awareness, if not quite an avowal, of the role of settler colonialism in the production of America’s central myths. I place Hartz’s work at the center of this essay because his argument re-animates while posing as a critique of the narrative of American exceptionalism. We see in Hartz someone struggling, and not quite succeeding, to challenge the constraints of American political discourse. In this effort, Hartz implicitly suggests the presence of an American Liberal colonial Tradition, one that upsets the story of America’s exceptionalist founding by seeing Liberalism and settler colonialism as mutually constitutive logics. In the end, Hartz sees but cannot fully grasp the explanatory power that comes with placing settler colonial logic at the center of a critique of the foundational myths of America. Through my reading of Hartz I hope that readers can find a different way to intervene in the powerful discourses of American Liberalism and exceptionalism without re-animating them, and this involves avowing the constitutive role of settler colonialism in American political development.
Diego Nunes - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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exTradition in fascist italy 1922 1943 and in brazil of getulio vargas 1930 1945 between the ascension of fascism criminal law and the survival of the Liberal Tradition of criminal law
Sequência: Estudos Juridicos e Politicos, 2019Co-Authors: Diego NunesAbstract:This paper aims to present the legal treatment given to exTradition in Fascist Italy and in the Brazil of Getulio Vargas to understand if the institute has suffered authoritarian torsions both on the field of domestic Law and on the diplomatic relations between these countries. On the Codice Rocco, the provision on exTradition was meant to strengthen the repression. On its turn, if on one side the 1938 Brazilian ExTradition Act relies on the elements of the institute created in the nineteenth century, it also adds important elements to the defence of a strong State. However, the Italian-Brazilian exTradition treaty of 1932 attached to the Liberal paradigm ended up protecting the individuals subjected to exTradition. Thus, were these rules truly of a fascist origin? The hypothesis is to realize that the “Fascism Criminal Law” is not quite a revolution, since despite introducing major changes it cohabits with the Liberal Tradition of Criminal Law.
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ExTradition in Fascist Italy (1922-1943) and in Brazil of Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945) between the ascension of “Fascism Criminal Law” and the survival of the Liberal Tradition of Criminal Law
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, 2019Co-Authors: Diego NunesAbstract:This paper aims to present the legal treatment given to exTradition in Fascist Italy and in the Brazil of Getúlio Vargas to understand if the institute has suffered authoritarian torsions both on the field of domestic Law and on the diplomatic relations between these countries. On the Codice Rocco, the provision on exTradition was meant to strengthen the repression. On its turn, if on one side the 1938 Brazilian ExTradition Act relies on the elements of the institute created in the nineteenth century, it also adds important elements to the defence of a strong State. However, the Italian-Brazilian exTradition treaty of 1932 attached to the Liberal paradigm ended up protecting the individuals subjected to exTradition. Thus, were these rules truly of a fascist origin? The hypothesis is to realize that the “Fascism Criminal Law” is not quite a revolution, since despite introducing major changes it cohabits with the Liberal Tradition of Criminal Law