The Experts below are selected from a list of 19998 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Elmar Wolfstetter - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Licensing Process innovations when losersʼ messages determine royalty rates
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2013
    Co-Authors: Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar Wolfstetter
    Abstract:

    Abstract We consider a Licensing mechanism for Process innovations that awards a limited number of unrestricted licenses to those firms that report the highest cost reductions, combined with royalty licenses to others. Firmsʼ messages are dual signals of their cost reductions: the message of those who win an unrestricted license signals their cost reduction to rival firms, while losersʼ messages influence the royalty rate set by the innovator. We explain why a sufficiently high threshold level for awarding the unrestricted license is essential to induce truth-telling, show that the innovator generally benefits from the proposed mechanism, and derive conditions for implementability by a modified second-price auction.

  • Licensing Process innovations when losers messages determine royalty rates
    Social Science Research Network, 2011
    Co-Authors: Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar Wolfstetter
    Abstract:

    We consider a Licensing mechanism for Process innovations that awards a limited number of fixed-fee licenses to those firms that report the highest cost reductions, combined with royalty licenses to others. Firms' messages are dual signals: the message of those who win a fixed-fee license signals their cost reduction to rival firms, whereas losers' message influence the royalty rate set by the innovator. We derive conditions for existence of a truth-telling equilibrium, explain why a sufficiently high reserve price is essential for such an equilibrium, and show that the innovator generally benefits from the proposed mechanism.

  • Licensing Process innovations when losers bids determine royalty rates i
    2011
    Co-Authors: Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar Wolfstetter, Sungbuk Ku Anam Dong
    Abstract:

    We consider a Licensing mechanism for Process innovations that auctions a limited number of xed-fee licenses, combined with royalty licenses to the losers of the auction, under incomplete information. Firms’ bids are dual signals: winning bids signal the winners’ cost reduction to their rival rms, whereas losers’ bids inuence the royalty rate set by the innovator. We derive conditions for existence of a monotone equilibrium, explain why a suciently high reserve price is essential for such an equilibrium, and show that the innovator generally benets from the proposed mechanism.

Cuihong Fan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Licensing Process innovations when losersʼ messages determine royalty rates
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2013
    Co-Authors: Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar Wolfstetter
    Abstract:

    Abstract We consider a Licensing mechanism for Process innovations that awards a limited number of unrestricted licenses to those firms that report the highest cost reductions, combined with royalty licenses to others. Firmsʼ messages are dual signals of their cost reductions: the message of those who win an unrestricted license signals their cost reduction to rival firms, while losersʼ messages influence the royalty rate set by the innovator. We explain why a sufficiently high threshold level for awarding the unrestricted license is essential to induce truth-telling, show that the innovator generally benefits from the proposed mechanism, and derive conditions for implementability by a modified second-price auction.

  • Licensing Process innovations when losers messages determine royalty rates
    Social Science Research Network, 2011
    Co-Authors: Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar Wolfstetter
    Abstract:

    We consider a Licensing mechanism for Process innovations that awards a limited number of fixed-fee licenses to those firms that report the highest cost reductions, combined with royalty licenses to others. Firms' messages are dual signals: the message of those who win a fixed-fee license signals their cost reduction to rival firms, whereas losers' message influence the royalty rate set by the innovator. We derive conditions for existence of a truth-telling equilibrium, explain why a sufficiently high reserve price is essential for such an equilibrium, and show that the innovator generally benefits from the proposed mechanism.

  • Licensing Process innovations when losers bids determine royalty rates i
    2011
    Co-Authors: Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar Wolfstetter, Sungbuk Ku Anam Dong
    Abstract:

    We consider a Licensing mechanism for Process innovations that auctions a limited number of xed-fee licenses, combined with royalty licenses to the losers of the auction, under incomplete information. Firms’ bids are dual signals: winning bids signal the winners’ cost reduction to their rival rms, whereas losers’ bids inuence the royalty rate set by the innovator. We derive conditions for existence of a monotone equilibrium, explain why a suciently high reserve price is essential for such an equilibrium, and show that the innovator generally benets from the proposed mechanism.

Learachel Kosnik - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • balancing environmental protection and energy production in the federal hydropower Licensing Process
    Land Economics, 2010
    Co-Authors: Learachel Kosnik
    Abstract:

    The U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) must balance environmental protection of riverine resources with the nation's growing demand for power production every time it issues a hydroelectric license. This paper models the bureaucratic agency's decision-making Process in issuing these licenses. Data on nearly 500 hydro-power licenses issued from 1983 to 2005 are utilized. It is discovered that legislative and institutional constraints are, by far, the largest influences on FERC's regulatory decisions, implying that if the current allocation of surface water in the United States is considered inefficient, the most effective way to alter this allocation is by passing new legislation, or by implementing institutional reform at FERC.

  • balancing environmental protection and energy production in the federal hydropower Licensing Process
    Social Science Research Network, 2008
    Co-Authors: Learachel Kosnik
    Abstract:

    The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission must balance environmental protection of riverine resources with the nation's growing demand for power production every time it issues a new hydroelectric license. This paper models the bureaucratic agency's decision making Process in issuing these licenses, in an effort to understand which factors most influence the regulatory decision. Data on nearly 500 hydropower licenses issued from 1983-2005 is utilized. It is discovered that legislative and institutional constraints are, by far, the largest influences on FERC's regulatory decisions. These results imply that if the current allocation of surface water in the United States between its competing environmental protection and energy production end uses is considered inefficient, the most effective way to alter the current allocation is by passing new legislation, or by implementing institutional reform at FERC.

Byoung Heon Jun - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Licensing Process innovations when losersʼ messages determine royalty rates
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2013
    Co-Authors: Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar Wolfstetter
    Abstract:

    Abstract We consider a Licensing mechanism for Process innovations that awards a limited number of unrestricted licenses to those firms that report the highest cost reductions, combined with royalty licenses to others. Firmsʼ messages are dual signals of their cost reductions: the message of those who win an unrestricted license signals their cost reduction to rival firms, while losersʼ messages influence the royalty rate set by the innovator. We explain why a sufficiently high threshold level for awarding the unrestricted license is essential to induce truth-telling, show that the innovator generally benefits from the proposed mechanism, and derive conditions for implementability by a modified second-price auction.

  • Licensing Process innovations when losers messages determine royalty rates
    Social Science Research Network, 2011
    Co-Authors: Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar Wolfstetter
    Abstract:

    We consider a Licensing mechanism for Process innovations that awards a limited number of fixed-fee licenses to those firms that report the highest cost reductions, combined with royalty licenses to others. Firms' messages are dual signals: the message of those who win a fixed-fee license signals their cost reduction to rival firms, whereas losers' message influence the royalty rate set by the innovator. We derive conditions for existence of a truth-telling equilibrium, explain why a sufficiently high reserve price is essential for such an equilibrium, and show that the innovator generally benefits from the proposed mechanism.

  • Licensing Process innovations when losers bids determine royalty rates i
    2011
    Co-Authors: Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar Wolfstetter, Sungbuk Ku Anam Dong
    Abstract:

    We consider a Licensing mechanism for Process innovations that auctions a limited number of xed-fee licenses, combined with royalty licenses to the losers of the auction, under incomplete information. Firms’ bids are dual signals: winning bids signal the winners’ cost reduction to their rival rms, whereas losers’ bids inuence the royalty rate set by the innovator. We derive conditions for existence of a monotone equilibrium, explain why a suciently high reserve price is essential for such an equilibrium, and show that the innovator generally benets from the proposed mechanism.

Naufal Sabda Auliya - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • reducing the effect of bureaucratization on business Licensing service in indonesia
    Asian Review of Public Administration, 2018
    Co-Authors: Muhammad Syafiq, Naufal Sabda Auliya
    Abstract:

    Excessive bureaucracy has caused some bureaucratic pathologies that have impacted on the low performance of Licensing services to start a business in Indonesia. The purpose of this study is to identify and analyze the problems in the business Licensing Process for starting a business, the barriers to simplify the Process in business Licensing service for starting business, and the strategy to optimize the business Licensing Process. Mixed methods of a qualitative nature have been used. Data shows that the problems in the business Licensing Process for starting a business are the number of required documents, the number of agencies involved, the emergence of unofficial fees, and the length of time. The barriers to simplifying the Licensing Process for starting a business are insufficient delegation of authority, lack of professional human resources, overlapping rules, less than optimal utilization of IT, and non-centralized population data. Some strategies that can be used in optimizing the simplification Process of Licensing service are synchronizing policies and regulations, delegating authority, optimizing the utilization of IT and capacity building of HR.