The Experts below are selected from a list of 4275 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Yadira Gonzalez De Lara - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Self-Enforcing, Public-Order Institutions for Contract Enforcement: Litigation, Regulation, and Limited Government in Venice, 1050–1350
Political Economy of Institutions Democracy and Voting, 2011Co-Authors: Yadira Gonzalez De LaraAbstract:The spectacular economic growth of Venice during the late medieval period (1050–1350) was based on the expansion of its trade along the Mediterranean and beyond. Crucial to this expansion was the mobilization of large amounts of capital into risky investments. However, this mobilization required the development of institutions that protected creditors and shareholders from expropriation by controlling merchants. This chapter finds that legal and administrative institutions conjointly provided investor protection and explores the interactions between these public-order institutions for contract enforcement and the emergence of a Limited Government, a coercion-constraining institution that motivated judges and regulators to use their coercive power for protecting rather than abusing investor rights.
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self enforcing public order institutions for contract enforcement litigation regulation and Limited Government in venice 1050 1350
2011Co-Authors: Yadira Gonzalez De LaraAbstract:The spectacular economic growth of Venice during the late medieval period (1050–1350) was based on the expansion of its trade along the Mediterranean and beyond. Crucial to this expansion was the mobilization of large amounts of capital into risky investments. However, this mobilization required the development of institutions that protected creditors and shareholders from expropriation by controlling merchants. This chapter finds that legal and administrative institutions conjointly provided investor protection and explores the interactions between these public-order institutions for contract enforcement and the emergence of a Limited Government, a coercion-constraining institution that motivated judges and regulators to use their coercive power for protecting rather than abusing investor rights.
Mark Dincecco - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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fiscal centralization Limited Government and public revenues in europe 1650 1913
The Journal of Economic History, 2009Co-Authors: Mark DinceccoAbstract:Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and Limited Government. This article uses a new panel data set to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and public revenues in Europe from 1650 to 1913. Panel regressions indicate that centralized and Limited regimes were associated with significantly higher revenues than fragmented and absolutist ones. Structural break tests also suggest close relationships between major turning points in revenue series and political transformations.
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Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650–1913
The Journal of Economic History, 2009Co-Authors: Mark DinceccoAbstract:Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and Limited Government. This article uses a new panel data set to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and public revenues in Europe from 1650 to 1913. Panel regressions indicate that centralized and Limited regimes were associated with significantly higher revenues than fragmented and absolutist ones. Structural break tests also suggest close relationships between major turning points in revenue series and political transformations.
Yang Fangfang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the local Government s role in development of culture industry from perspective of Limited Government
East China Economic Management, 2011Co-Authors: Yang FangfangAbstract:As a rising special industry,the cultural industry belongs to service category,and it has been paid more and more attention by the central and local Governments.From the perspective of theory of Limited Government,the paper analyzes the local Government's problems existing in culture development,and then,the paper proposes the principle that Governments should to follow,and reasonable role in cultural industry development what local Government should play is put forward.
Yang Fang-fang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Local Government's Role in Development of Culture Industry——From Perspective of Limited Government
East China Economic Management, 2020Co-Authors: Yang Fang-fangAbstract:As a rising special industry,the cultural industry belongs to service category,and it has been paid more and more attention by the central and local Governments.From the perspective of theory of Limited Government,the paper analyzes the local Government's problems existing in culture development,and then,the paper proposes the principle that Governments should to follow,and reasonable role in cultural industry development what local Government should play is put forward.
Julian A. Sempill - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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What Rendered Ancient Tyrants Detestable: The Rule of Law and the Constitution of Corporate Power
Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 2018Co-Authors: Julian A. SempillAbstract:The phrase “corporate tyranny” might seem to be nothing more than empty rhetoric, a muscular slogan with a plausible ring, but one lacking principled roots in the great tradition of political language which it echoes. In this Article, I aim to show that, on the contrary, it is indeed meaningful to apply the term tyranny in connection with contemporary corporate power—meaningful, that is, according to the criteria governing the use of that term within the Limited Government tradition’s Rule of Law discourse. I also aim to demonstrate that, according to traditional criteria, certain terms used to lament the harms occasioned by manipulative state power—namely, arbitrariness, slavishness and corruption —might plausibly be employed against the large business corporation. The implications are significant. If the present constitution of corporate power were shown to be hospitable to those ills, then the legitimacy of corporate power would have been called into question on distinctive Rule of Law grounds. The notion that economic power is a Limited Government problem was a central and recurrent theme in public debates in the United States from the American Revolution until the middle of the twentieth century. Since then, however, the notion of “Limited Government” has become synonymous with the limitation of state, rather than “private”, power; indeed, “Limited Government” has become a byword for the social philosophy that professes a belief in “small Government”—a philosophy which, in effect, supports corporate power. In the light of that received wisdom, it is not surprising that there has been little scholarly inquiry into whether, and if so, how, the underlying moral commitments of the Limited Government tradition are incompatible with certain forms of contemporary corporate power. Within the confines of this Article, there is not the space to do more than demonstrate that further inquiry in this area would be worthwhile.
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The Lions and the Greatest Part: the Rule of Law and the Constitution of Employer Power
Hague Journal on The Rule of Law, 2017Co-Authors: Julian A. SempillAbstract:On the Limited Government conception of the Rule of Law, it is axiomatic that the state may only act for the public good according to law, and not arbitrarily, on pain of forfeiting its authority. That axiom is a great legacy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’ anti-absolutist revolutions. The same period yielded another axiom, seldom noticed though nonetheless momentous. It is the belief, usually tacit, that the Rule of Law should not address the potentially arbitrary power of employers. This Article explores the origins of that axiom in the work of John Locke, one of the fountainheads of the Limited Government tradition. According to the way of seeing power that Locke propagated, there seems to be no reason to wonder whether the constitution of the modern employment relationship is hospitable to arbitrary power, in the Limited Government sense. Equally, there seems to be no point in asking whether the legitimacy of the employment relationship should depend upon its being constituted according to Limited Government constraints. However, as I demonstrate, such impressions are at odds with key moral and empirical features of Locke’s own analysis. Those tensions represent a challenge not only for Locke’s analysis, but also for the liberal Rule of Law project that Locke helped to found. It is a challenge that the tradition is yet to address.
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The Lions & the Greatest Part: The Rule of Law & the Constitution of Employer Power
2017Co-Authors: Julian A. SempillAbstract:On the Limited Government conception of the Rule of Law, it is axiomatic that the state may only act for the public good according to law, and not arbitrarily, on pain of forfeiting its authority. That axiom is a great legacy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’ anti-absolutist revolutions. The same period yielded another axiom, seldom noticed though nonetheless momentous. It is the belief, usually tacit, that the Rule of Law should not address the potentially arbitrary power of employers. This Article explores the origins of that axiom in the work of John Locke, one of the fountainheads of the Limited Government tradition. According to the way of seeing power that Locke propagated, there seems to be no reason to wonder whether the constitution of the modern employment relationship is hospitable to arbitrary power, in the Limited Government sense. Equally, there seems to be no point in asking whether the legitimacy of the employment relationship should depend upon its being constituted according to Limited Government constraints. However, as I demonstrate, such impressions are at odds with key moral and empirical features of Locke’s own analysis. Those tensions represent a challenge not only for Locke’s analysis, but also for the liberal Rule of Law project that Locke helped to found. It is a challenge that the tradition is yet to address.