The Experts below are selected from a list of 93 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Brent Cotter - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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LAWYERS’ ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS, INNOVATIVE MODELS OF LEGAL SERVICE, AND A TIME OF REGULATORY UPHEAVAL::
2018Co-Authors: Michaela Keet, Brent CotterAbstract:Current models of professional regulation still embody traditional norms around the lawyer’s role. This article explores the constraints of reactive, rule-based ethical frameworks, using the example of Settlement Counsel, an innovative negotiation structure to advance settlement in commercial Litigation. Settlement Counsel work alongside Litigation Counsel, on the same side of the Litigation file, but with carefully bifurcated roles. Drawing on interview data, the authors discuss the tensions encountered by settlement Counsel as they fit their work into traditional obligations around competence, loyalty, confidentiality, candour, and lawyer-client cross-communication. The authors present pathways chosen by settlement Counsel to ensure compliance. In today’s environment, however—with its emphasis on “accessible” outcomes and innovation—regulatory frameworks need to be more flexible and responsive. The emerging model of compliance regulation is explored, and is offered as a framework with capacity to evolve alongside innovations in the delivery of legal services.
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Lawyers' Ethical Obligations, Innovative Models of Legal Service and a Time of Regulatory Upheaval: Settlement Counsel as an Instructive Model
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Michaela Keet, Brent CotterAbstract:Current models of professional regulation still embody traditional norms around the lawyer’s role. This article explores the constraints of reactive, rule-based ethical frameworks, using the example of Settlement Counsel, an innovative negotiation structure to advance settlement in commercial Litigation. Settlement Counsel work alongside Litigation Counsel, on the same side of the Litigation file, but with carefully bifurcated roles. Drawing on interview data, the authors discuss the tensions encountered by settlement Counsel as they fit their work into traditional obligations around competence, loyalty, confidentiality, candour and lawyer-client cross-communication. The authors present pathways chosen by settlement Counsel to ensure compliance. In today’s environment, however – with its emphasis on “accessible” outcomes and innovation – regulatory frameworks need to be more flexible and responsive. The emerging model of compliance regulation is explored, and is offered as a framework with capacity to evolve alongside innovations in the delivery of legal services.
Randall S. Thomas - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the impact on shareholder value of top defense Counsel in mergers and acquisitions Litigation
Journal of Corporate Finance, 2017Co-Authors: C. N. V. Krishnan, Steven Davidoff Solomon, Randall S. ThomasAbstract:We examine the role of defense Litigation Counsel in mergers and acquisition (M&A) Litigation. We theorize that defense Litigation Counsel may be incentivized to settle Litigation on disadvantageous terms to shareholders in order to allow transactions to complete, and that more experienced Counsel will engage in this conduct at a greater rate. We find that top defense Litigation Counsel is more likely to be hired to complete transactions priced at lower takeover premiums. We control for endogeneity and find evidence that top defense Litigation Counsel negotiate cheaper and faster settlements than other defense Litigation Counsel, particularly when the transactions involved have lower offer premiums, and that top defense Litigation Counsel take advantage of multi-jurisdictional Litigation to achieve this result. Our results support the conclusion that top defense Litigation Counsel in M&A Litigation may be adept at settling valid claims in order to allow for deal completion. Finally, we discuss the implications of forum selection bylaws and the near demise of disclosure-only settlements for top defense Litigation Counsel, and argue that these changes may reduce competitive advantages that these law firms previously enjoyed.
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The impact on shareholder value of top defense Counsel in mergers and acquisitions Litigation
Journal of Corporate Finance, 2017Co-Authors: C. N. V. Krishnan, Steven Davidoff Solomon, Randall S. ThomasAbstract:Abstract Defense Litigation Counsel are retained by target firm management to defend them in mergers and acquisition (M&A) Litigation. We use hand collected data from a ten-year period (2003 − 2012) to examine whether the choice of defense Litigation Counsel affects the outcome of M&A Litigation and shareholder value. We construct league tables for defense Litigation firms and identify the top 10 defense Litigation firms. Comparing these firms with all other defense Litigation firms, we find that top defense Litigation Counsel are involved in a significantly higher proportion of cash deals, non-same-industry deals (implying a lower possibility of antitrust-related concerns), and friendlier deals, all of which are associated with smaller initial takeover premium proposals. We find evidence that, controlling for endogeneity, top defense Litigation Counsel negotiate cheaper and faster settlements than other defense Litigation Counsel thereby protecting low premium deals from more serious challenges. We also show that top defense Litigation Counsel are more effective in multijurisdictional Litigation cases, again obtaining cheaper and faster settlements in low premium deals, which we theorize shows that they are better able to handle the complexity and strategy that accompany these lawsuits.
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Divided Loyalties? The Role of Defense Litigation Counsel in Shareholder M&A Litigation
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016Co-Authors: C. N. V. Krishnan, Steven Davidoff Solomon, Randall S. ThomasAbstract:We examine the role of defense Litigation Counsel in mergers and acquisition (M&A) Litigation. We theorize that defense Litigation Counsel may be incentivized to settle Litigation on disadvantageous terms to shareholders in order to allow transactions to complete, and that more experienced Counsel will engage in this conduct at a greater rate. We find that top defense Litigation Counsel is more likely to be hired to complete transactions priced at lower takeover premiums. We control for endogeneity and find evidence that top defense Litigation Counsel negotiate cheaper and faster settlements than other defense Litigation Counsel, particularly when the transactions involved have lower offer premiums, and that top defense Litigation Counsel take advantage of multi-jurisdictional Litigation to achieve this result. Our results support the conclusion that top defense Litigation Counsel in M&A Litigation may be adept at settling valid claims in order to allow for deal completion. Finally, we discuss the implications of forum selection bylaws and the near demise of disclosure-only settlements for top defense Litigation Counsel, and argue that these changes may reduce competitive advantages that these law firms previously enjoyed.
Michaela Keet - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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LAWYERS’ ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS, INNOVATIVE MODELS OF LEGAL SERVICE, AND A TIME OF REGULATORY UPHEAVAL::
2018Co-Authors: Michaela Keet, Brent CotterAbstract:Current models of professional regulation still embody traditional norms around the lawyer’s role. This article explores the constraints of reactive, rule-based ethical frameworks, using the example of Settlement Counsel, an innovative negotiation structure to advance settlement in commercial Litigation. Settlement Counsel work alongside Litigation Counsel, on the same side of the Litigation file, but with carefully bifurcated roles. Drawing on interview data, the authors discuss the tensions encountered by settlement Counsel as they fit their work into traditional obligations around competence, loyalty, confidentiality, candour, and lawyer-client cross-communication. The authors present pathways chosen by settlement Counsel to ensure compliance. In today’s environment, however—with its emphasis on “accessible” outcomes and innovation—regulatory frameworks need to be more flexible and responsive. The emerging model of compliance regulation is explored, and is offered as a framework with capacity to evolve alongside innovations in the delivery of legal services.
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Lawyers' Ethical Obligations, Innovative Models of Legal Service and a Time of Regulatory Upheaval: Settlement Counsel as an Instructive Model
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Michaela Keet, Brent CotterAbstract:Current models of professional regulation still embody traditional norms around the lawyer’s role. This article explores the constraints of reactive, rule-based ethical frameworks, using the example of Settlement Counsel, an innovative negotiation structure to advance settlement in commercial Litigation. Settlement Counsel work alongside Litigation Counsel, on the same side of the Litigation file, but with carefully bifurcated roles. Drawing on interview data, the authors discuss the tensions encountered by settlement Counsel as they fit their work into traditional obligations around competence, loyalty, confidentiality, candour and lawyer-client cross-communication. The authors present pathways chosen by settlement Counsel to ensure compliance. In today’s environment, however – with its emphasis on “accessible” outcomes and innovation – regulatory frameworks need to be more flexible and responsive. The emerging model of compliance regulation is explored, and is offered as a framework with capacity to evolve alongside innovations in the delivery of legal services.
David C. Hricik - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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An Opinion of Counsel from Trial Counsel: A Handful of Sand?
Social Science Research Network, 2009Co-Authors: David C. HricikAbstract:This article examines the ethical and liability issues that arise when patent Litigation Counsel authors an opinion of Counsel, often used to rebut a charge of willful infringement. Included is a discussion of advocate-as-witness disqualification, conflicts of interest, and privilege waiver.
C. N. V. Krishnan - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the impact on shareholder value of top defense Counsel in mergers and acquisitions Litigation
Journal of Corporate Finance, 2017Co-Authors: C. N. V. Krishnan, Steven Davidoff Solomon, Randall S. ThomasAbstract:We examine the role of defense Litigation Counsel in mergers and acquisition (M&A) Litigation. We theorize that defense Litigation Counsel may be incentivized to settle Litigation on disadvantageous terms to shareholders in order to allow transactions to complete, and that more experienced Counsel will engage in this conduct at a greater rate. We find that top defense Litigation Counsel is more likely to be hired to complete transactions priced at lower takeover premiums. We control for endogeneity and find evidence that top defense Litigation Counsel negotiate cheaper and faster settlements than other defense Litigation Counsel, particularly when the transactions involved have lower offer premiums, and that top defense Litigation Counsel take advantage of multi-jurisdictional Litigation to achieve this result. Our results support the conclusion that top defense Litigation Counsel in M&A Litigation may be adept at settling valid claims in order to allow for deal completion. Finally, we discuss the implications of forum selection bylaws and the near demise of disclosure-only settlements for top defense Litigation Counsel, and argue that these changes may reduce competitive advantages that these law firms previously enjoyed.
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The impact on shareholder value of top defense Counsel in mergers and acquisitions Litigation
Journal of Corporate Finance, 2017Co-Authors: C. N. V. Krishnan, Steven Davidoff Solomon, Randall S. ThomasAbstract:Abstract Defense Litigation Counsel are retained by target firm management to defend them in mergers and acquisition (M&A) Litigation. We use hand collected data from a ten-year period (2003 − 2012) to examine whether the choice of defense Litigation Counsel affects the outcome of M&A Litigation and shareholder value. We construct league tables for defense Litigation firms and identify the top 10 defense Litigation firms. Comparing these firms with all other defense Litigation firms, we find that top defense Litigation Counsel are involved in a significantly higher proportion of cash deals, non-same-industry deals (implying a lower possibility of antitrust-related concerns), and friendlier deals, all of which are associated with smaller initial takeover premium proposals. We find evidence that, controlling for endogeneity, top defense Litigation Counsel negotiate cheaper and faster settlements than other defense Litigation Counsel thereby protecting low premium deals from more serious challenges. We also show that top defense Litigation Counsel are more effective in multijurisdictional Litigation cases, again obtaining cheaper and faster settlements in low premium deals, which we theorize shows that they are better able to handle the complexity and strategy that accompany these lawsuits.
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Divided Loyalties? The Role of Defense Litigation Counsel in Shareholder M&A Litigation
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016Co-Authors: C. N. V. Krishnan, Steven Davidoff Solomon, Randall S. ThomasAbstract:We examine the role of defense Litigation Counsel in mergers and acquisition (M&A) Litigation. We theorize that defense Litigation Counsel may be incentivized to settle Litigation on disadvantageous terms to shareholders in order to allow transactions to complete, and that more experienced Counsel will engage in this conduct at a greater rate. We find that top defense Litigation Counsel is more likely to be hired to complete transactions priced at lower takeover premiums. We control for endogeneity and find evidence that top defense Litigation Counsel negotiate cheaper and faster settlements than other defense Litigation Counsel, particularly when the transactions involved have lower offer premiums, and that top defense Litigation Counsel take advantage of multi-jurisdictional Litigation to achieve this result. Our results support the conclusion that top defense Litigation Counsel in M&A Litigation may be adept at settling valid claims in order to allow for deal completion. Finally, we discuss the implications of forum selection bylaws and the near demise of disclosure-only settlements for top defense Litigation Counsel, and argue that these changes may reduce competitive advantages that these law firms previously enjoyed.