The Experts below are selected from a list of 114453 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Graham Steel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A Secure Key Management Interface with Asymmetric Cryptography
2015Co-Authors: Marion Daubignard, David Lubicz, Graham SteelAbstract:Abstract. Cryptographic devices such as Hardware Security Modules are only as secure as their application programming Interfaces (APIs) that offer cryp-tographic functionality to the outside world. Design flaws and implementation errors in security APIs have been shown to cause vulnerabilities that may leak secrets such as keys and PINs. Ideally, we would like to design such Interfaces in such a way that we can formally prove security properties, even in the presence of some corrupted keys. In this work, we propose the first such provably secure Interface to support asymmetric key operations for key Management: Cachin and Chandran’s secure token Interface supports asymmetric key operations only for encrypting and signing data, but not for managing keys, while Cortier and Steel handle only symmetric keys. Due to the fact that anyone can encrypt under a public key, in order to secure integrity of the keys under Management, we must consider confidentiality and integrity properties separately and provide support for classical operations of public key infrastructure (e.g. certification of public keys).
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POST - A Secure Key Management Interface with Asymmetric Cryptography
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2014Co-Authors: Marion Daubignard, David Lubicz, Graham SteelAbstract:Cryptographic devices such as Hardware Security Modules are only as secure as their application programme Interfaces (APIs) that offer cryptographic functionality to the outside world. Design flaws and implementation errors in security APIs have been shown to cause vulnerabilities that may leak secrets such as keys and PINs. Ideally, we would like to design such Interfaces in such a way that we can formally prove security properties, even in the presence of some corrupted keys. In this work, we take such a design for a provably secure Interface for symmetric key Management, due to Cortier and Steel, and extend it to asymmetric cryptography, giving new security definitions and associated proofs. Asymmetric cryptography forces us to consider confidentiality and integrity properties separately and provide support for classical operations of public key infrastructure (e.g. certification of public keys). As far as we are aware this is the first such provably secure Interface to support asymmetric key operations for key Management: Cachin and Chandran's secure token Interface supports asymmetric key operations only for encrypting and signing data, not for managing keys.
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A Secure Key Management Interface with Asymmetric Cryptography
2013Co-Authors: Marion Daubignard, David Lubicz, Graham SteelAbstract:Cryptographic devices such as Hardware Security Modules are only as secure as their application programme Interfaces (APIs) that offer cryptographic functionality to the outside world. Design flaws and implementation errors in security APIs have been shown to cause vulnerabilities that may leak secrets such as keys and PINs. Ideally, we would like to design such Interfaces in such a way that we can formally prove security properties, even in the presence of some corrupted keys. In this work, we take such a design for a provably secure Interface for symmetric key Management, due to Cortier and Steel, and extend it to asymmetric cryptography, giving new security definitions and associated proofs. Asymmetric cryptography forces us to consider confidentiality and integrity properties separately and provide support for classical operations of public key infrastructure (e.g. certification of public keys). As far as we are aware this is the first such provably secure Interface to support asymmetric key operations for key Management: Cachin and Chandran's secure token Interface supports asymmetric key operations only for encrypting and signing data, not for managing keys.
Marion Daubignard - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A Secure Key Management Interface with Asymmetric Cryptography
2015Co-Authors: Marion Daubignard, David Lubicz, Graham SteelAbstract:Abstract. Cryptographic devices such as Hardware Security Modules are only as secure as their application programming Interfaces (APIs) that offer cryp-tographic functionality to the outside world. Design flaws and implementation errors in security APIs have been shown to cause vulnerabilities that may leak secrets such as keys and PINs. Ideally, we would like to design such Interfaces in such a way that we can formally prove security properties, even in the presence of some corrupted keys. In this work, we propose the first such provably secure Interface to support asymmetric key operations for key Management: Cachin and Chandran’s secure token Interface supports asymmetric key operations only for encrypting and signing data, but not for managing keys, while Cortier and Steel handle only symmetric keys. Due to the fact that anyone can encrypt under a public key, in order to secure integrity of the keys under Management, we must consider confidentiality and integrity properties separately and provide support for classical operations of public key infrastructure (e.g. certification of public keys).
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POST - A Secure Key Management Interface with Asymmetric Cryptography
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2014Co-Authors: Marion Daubignard, David Lubicz, Graham SteelAbstract:Cryptographic devices such as Hardware Security Modules are only as secure as their application programme Interfaces (APIs) that offer cryptographic functionality to the outside world. Design flaws and implementation errors in security APIs have been shown to cause vulnerabilities that may leak secrets such as keys and PINs. Ideally, we would like to design such Interfaces in such a way that we can formally prove security properties, even in the presence of some corrupted keys. In this work, we take such a design for a provably secure Interface for symmetric key Management, due to Cortier and Steel, and extend it to asymmetric cryptography, giving new security definitions and associated proofs. Asymmetric cryptography forces us to consider confidentiality and integrity properties separately and provide support for classical operations of public key infrastructure (e.g. certification of public keys). As far as we are aware this is the first such provably secure Interface to support asymmetric key operations for key Management: Cachin and Chandran's secure token Interface supports asymmetric key operations only for encrypting and signing data, not for managing keys.
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A Secure Key Management Interface with Asymmetric Cryptography
2013Co-Authors: Marion Daubignard, David Lubicz, Graham SteelAbstract:Cryptographic devices such as Hardware Security Modules are only as secure as their application programme Interfaces (APIs) that offer cryptographic functionality to the outside world. Design flaws and implementation errors in security APIs have been shown to cause vulnerabilities that may leak secrets such as keys and PINs. Ideally, we would like to design such Interfaces in such a way that we can formally prove security properties, even in the presence of some corrupted keys. In this work, we take such a design for a provably secure Interface for symmetric key Management, due to Cortier and Steel, and extend it to asymmetric cryptography, giving new security definitions and associated proofs. Asymmetric cryptography forces us to consider confidentiality and integrity properties separately and provide support for classical operations of public key infrastructure (e.g. certification of public keys). As far as we are aware this is the first such provably secure Interface to support asymmetric key operations for key Management: Cachin and Chandran's secure token Interface supports asymmetric key operations only for encrypting and signing data, not for managing keys.
Enrique Terrazas - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The successful implementation of a licensed data Management Interface between a Sunquest(®) laboratory information system and an AB SCIEX™ mass spectrometer.
Journal of pathology informatics, 2013Co-Authors: Deborah L French, Enrique TerrazasAbstract:Background: Interfacing complex laboratory equipment to laboratory information systems (LIS) has become a more commonly encountered problem in clinical laboratories, especially for instruments that do not have an Interface provided by the vendor. Liquid chromatography-tandem mass spectrometry is a great example of such complex equipment, and has become a frequent addition to clinical laboratories. As the testing volume on such instruments can be significant, manual data entry will also be considerable and the potential for concomitant transcription errors arises. Due to this potential issue, our aim was to Interface an AB SCIEX TM mass spectrometer to our Sunquest® LIS. Materials and Methods: We licensed software for the data Management Interface from the University of Pittsburgh, but extended this work as follows: The Interface was designed so that it would accept a text file exported from the AB SCIEX TM × 5500 QTrap® mass spectrometer, pre-process the file (using newly written code) into the correct format and upload it into Sunquest® via file transfer protocol. Results: The licensed software handled the majority of the Interface tasks with the exception of converting the output from the Analyst® software to the required Sunquest® import format. This required writing of a pre-processor by one of the authors which was easily integrated with the supplied software. Conclusions: We successfully implemented the data Management Interface licensed from the University of Pittsburgh. Given the coding that was required to write the pre-processor, and alterations to the source code that were performed when debugging the software, we would suggest that before a laboratory decides to implement such an Interface, it would be necessary to have a competent computer programmer available.
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the successful implementation of a licensed data Management Interface between a sunquest laboratory information system and an ab sciex mass spectrometer
Journal of Pathology Informatics, 2013Co-Authors: Deborah L French, Enrique TerrazasAbstract:Background: Interfacing complex laboratory equipment to laboratory information systems (LIS) has become a more commonly encountered problem in clinical laboratories, especially for instruments that do not have an Interface provided by the vendor. Liquid chromatography-tandem mass spectrometry is a great example of such complex equipment, and has become a frequent addition to clinical laboratories. As the testing volume on such instruments can be significant, manual data entry will also be considerable and the potential for concomitant transcription errors arises. Due to this potential issue, our aim was to Interface an AB SCIEX TM mass spectrometer to our Sunquest® LIS. Materials and Methods: We licensed software for the data Management Interface from the University of Pittsburgh, but extended this work as follows: The Interface was designed so that it would accept a text file exported from the AB SCIEX TM × 5500 QTrap® mass spectrometer, pre-process the file (using newly written code) into the correct format and upload it into Sunquest® via file transfer protocol. Results: The licensed software handled the majority of the Interface tasks with the exception of converting the output from the Analyst® software to the required Sunquest® import format. This required writing of a pre-processor by one of the authors which was easily integrated with the supplied software. Conclusions: We successfully implemented the data Management Interface licensed from the University of Pittsburgh. Given the coding that was required to write the pre-processor, and alterations to the source code that were performed when debugging the software, we would suggest that before a laboratory decides to implement such an Interface, it would be necessary to have a competent computer programmer available.
Philippe Basset - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Autonomous energy Management Interface for electrostatic series-parallel charge pump vibrational energy harvester
2017 15th IEEE International New Circuits and Systems Conference (NEWCAS), 2017Co-Authors: Mohammed Bedier, Armine Karami, Dimitri Galayko, Philippe BassetAbstract:This paper presents an autonomous energy Management Interface for electrostatic series-parallel charge pump vibrational energy harvester. It analysis the feasibility of an ultra low power Interface for high voltage output harvesters. It introduces a mixed signal high voltage low power intermediate stage designed in 0.35μm ams CMOS technology, that separates the charge pump Conditioning circuit (CC) and the load. It manages the energy extraction from the CC into a buffer capacitor. The energy is accumulated until there is enough to supply a load. This process is achieved autonomously and using only a pre-charged capacitor to supply the control blocks.
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NEWCAS - Autonomous energy Management Interface for electrostatic series-parallel charge pump vibrational energy harvester
2017 15th IEEE International New Circuits and Systems Conference (NEWCAS), 2017Co-Authors: Mohammed Bedier, Armine Karami, Dimitri Galayko, Philippe BassetAbstract:This paper presents an autonomous energy Management Interface for electrostatic series-parallel charge pump vibrational energy harvester. It analysis the feasibility of an ultra low power Interface for high voltage output harvesters. It introduces a mixed signal high voltage low power intermediate stage designed in 0.35µm ams CMOS technology, that separates the charge pump Conditioning circuit (CC) and the load. It manages the energy extraction from the CC into a buffer capacitor. The energy is accumulated until there is enough to supply a load. This process is achieved autonomously and using only a pre-charged capacitor to supply the control blocks.
David Lubicz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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A Secure Key Management Interface with Asymmetric Cryptography
2015Co-Authors: Marion Daubignard, David Lubicz, Graham SteelAbstract:Abstract. Cryptographic devices such as Hardware Security Modules are only as secure as their application programming Interfaces (APIs) that offer cryp-tographic functionality to the outside world. Design flaws and implementation errors in security APIs have been shown to cause vulnerabilities that may leak secrets such as keys and PINs. Ideally, we would like to design such Interfaces in such a way that we can formally prove security properties, even in the presence of some corrupted keys. In this work, we propose the first such provably secure Interface to support asymmetric key operations for key Management: Cachin and Chandran’s secure token Interface supports asymmetric key operations only for encrypting and signing data, but not for managing keys, while Cortier and Steel handle only symmetric keys. Due to the fact that anyone can encrypt under a public key, in order to secure integrity of the keys under Management, we must consider confidentiality and integrity properties separately and provide support for classical operations of public key infrastructure (e.g. certification of public keys).
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POST - A Secure Key Management Interface with Asymmetric Cryptography
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2014Co-Authors: Marion Daubignard, David Lubicz, Graham SteelAbstract:Cryptographic devices such as Hardware Security Modules are only as secure as their application programme Interfaces (APIs) that offer cryptographic functionality to the outside world. Design flaws and implementation errors in security APIs have been shown to cause vulnerabilities that may leak secrets such as keys and PINs. Ideally, we would like to design such Interfaces in such a way that we can formally prove security properties, even in the presence of some corrupted keys. In this work, we take such a design for a provably secure Interface for symmetric key Management, due to Cortier and Steel, and extend it to asymmetric cryptography, giving new security definitions and associated proofs. Asymmetric cryptography forces us to consider confidentiality and integrity properties separately and provide support for classical operations of public key infrastructure (e.g. certification of public keys). As far as we are aware this is the first such provably secure Interface to support asymmetric key operations for key Management: Cachin and Chandran's secure token Interface supports asymmetric key operations only for encrypting and signing data, not for managing keys.
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A Secure Key Management Interface with Asymmetric Cryptography
2013Co-Authors: Marion Daubignard, David Lubicz, Graham SteelAbstract:Cryptographic devices such as Hardware Security Modules are only as secure as their application programme Interfaces (APIs) that offer cryptographic functionality to the outside world. Design flaws and implementation errors in security APIs have been shown to cause vulnerabilities that may leak secrets such as keys and PINs. Ideally, we would like to design such Interfaces in such a way that we can formally prove security properties, even in the presence of some corrupted keys. In this work, we take such a design for a provably secure Interface for symmetric key Management, due to Cortier and Steel, and extend it to asymmetric cryptography, giving new security definitions and associated proofs. Asymmetric cryptography forces us to consider confidentiality and integrity properties separately and provide support for classical operations of public key infrastructure (e.g. certification of public keys). As far as we are aware this is the first such provably secure Interface to support asymmetric key operations for key Management: Cachin and Chandran's secure token Interface supports asymmetric key operations only for encrypting and signing data, not for managing keys.
