The Experts below are selected from a list of 226086 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Nemit Shroff - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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regulatory oversight and auditor Market Share
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Daniel Aobdia, Nemit ShroffAbstract:We examine whether regulatory oversight of an auditor increases the perceived assurance value of their audits and consequently their Market Share. We use the PCAOB international inspection program as a setting to generate within country variation in regulatory oversight. Specifically, non-U.S. auditors that participate in the audit of any SEC registered client are subject to PCAOB inspections but their competitors that do not do so are not subject to similar oversight. Using this difference in regulatory oversight, we find that PCAOB inspected non-U.S. auditors observe a 4 to 6% increase in their Market Share after PCAOB inspection reports are made public. Auditors with a large number of engagement level deficiencies and those publicly criticized for having deficient quality control systems do not observe any Market Share gain following their inspections. Market Share changes following PCAOB inspections are smaller in countries with strong rule of law and less corruption. We interpret our evidence as suggesting that regulatory scrutiny can help increase the assurance value of an audit. Our results highlight the role of public regulatory oversight in the audit Market.
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Regulatory oversight and auditor Market Share
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2017Co-Authors: Daniel Aobdia, Nemit ShroffAbstract:We examine whether auditor regulatory oversight affects the value of financial statement audits. Using the PCAOB international inspection program as a setting to generate within country variation in regulatory oversight, we find that non-U.S. auditors inspected by the PCAOB gain 4% to 6% Market Share from competing auditors after PCAOB inspection reports are made public. When inspection findings reveal that an auditor has many engagement-level deficiencies, Market Share gains following inspection reports are significantly smaller. Our evidence suggests that regulatory scrutiny increases the assurance value of an audit and highlights the role of public regulatory oversight in the audit Market.
Craig G Dunbar - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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factors affecting investment bank initial public offering Market Share
Journal of Financial Economics, 2000Co-Authors: Craig G DunbarAbstract:This paper examines the effect of several factors on the Market Share of investment banks that act as book managers in initial public offerings (IPOs) between 1984 and 1993. For established banks, IPO underpricing has a negative impact on Market Share, suggesting future issuers avoid banks that leave too much "money on the table". While average abnormal long-run performance has a positive impact on established bank's Market Share, association with extremely positive long-run performance damages Market Share. Abnormal underwriter compensation (cash spread plus expenses) has a positive impact on the Market Share of established banks. Since these banks expect increased future Market Share they place more at risk in current offerings and, therefore, charge higher compensation. Investment banks concentrating their activities in fewer industries lose Market Share. Banks Marketing IPOs in January or on Mondays also lose Market Share. Finally, association with withdrawn IPOs has a significantly negative effect on an investment bank's ability to compete for future offerings. These factors have a less significant effect, statistically and economically, on the Market Share of less established banks, consistent with the notion that less reputation is placed at risk.
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factors affecting investment bank initial public offering Market Share
Journal of Financial Economics, 2000Co-Authors: Craig G DunbarAbstract:Abstract This paper examines the effect of several factors on the Market Share of investment banks that act as book managers in initial public offerings (IPOs) between 1984 and 1995. For established banks, IPO first-day returns, one-year abnormal performance, abnormal compensation, industry specialization, analyst reputation, and association with withdrawn offers have a significant impact on changes in Market Share. These factors have a more significant effect on Market Share changes in low-volume IPO Markets. These factors have a less significant effect on Market Share, statistically and economically, for less established banks, consistent with the notion that less reputation is placed at risk.
Michael M Knetter - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Market Share and exchange rate pass through in world automobile trade
Journal of International Economics, 1996Co-Authors: Robert C Feenstra, Joseph E Gagnon, Michael M KnetterAbstract:Abstract Using a Bertrand differentiated products model we show that pass-through should be high for exporters based in a country with a very large Share of total destination Market sales. For source countries with small and intermediate Market Shares, the relationship is potentially nonlinear and sensitive to assumptions about demand and firm interactions. The model is estimated using a panel data set of automobile exports from four source countries to 12 destination Markets over the period 1970–1988. The relationship between pass-through and Market Share is significantly nonlinear: pass-through is lowest when the source country's Market Share is around 40 percent and highest when Market Share approaches 100 percent.
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is price adjustment asymmetric evaluating the Market Share and Marketing bottlenecks hypothesis
Journal of International Money and Finance, 1994Co-Authors: Michael M KnetterAbstract:Abstract Export price adjustment is asymmetric with respect to currency fluctuations in at least two circumstances. If firms face capacity constraints in distribution networks or quantitative trade restrictions, then pricing-to-Market may be greater during depreciations of the exporter's currency. If firms attempt to build Market Share subject to the threat of trade restrictions, then pricing-to-Market may be greater during appreciations of the exporter's currency. This paper tests for asymmetries using panel data on German and Japanese 7-digit industry exports. The data seldom reject the hypothesis of a symmetric response of prices to exchange rates.
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Market Share and exchange rate pass through in world automobile trade
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1993Co-Authors: Robert C Feenstra, Joseph E Gagnon, Michael M KnetterAbstract:This paper explores the relationship between exchange rate pass-through and Market Share for monopolistically competitive exporters. Under fairly general assumptions we show that pass-through should be high for exporters based in a country with a very large Share of total destination Market sales. For source countries with small and intermediate Market Shares, the theoretical relationship is potentially nonlinear and sensitive to assumptions about the nature of consumer demand and firm interactions. The model is estimated using a panel data set of automobile exports from France, Germany, Sweden, and the United States to a variety of destinations over the period 1970-1988. The empirical relationship between pass-through and Market Share is significantly non-linear: pass-through is the lowest when the source country's Market Share is around 45 percent and it is highest when the source country's Share approaches 100 percent.
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Market Share and exchange rate pass through in world automobile trade
Research Papers in Economics, 1993Co-Authors: Robert C Feenstra, Joseph E Gagnon, Michael M KnetterAbstract:This paper explores the relationship between exchange rate pass-through and Market Share for monopolistically competitive exporters. Under fairly general assumptions we show that pass-through should be high for exporters based in a country with a very large Share of total destination Market sales. For source countries with small and intermediate Market Shares, the theoretical relationship is potentially nonlinear and sensitive to assumptions about the nature of consumer demand and firm interactions. The model is estimated using a panel data set of automobile exports from France, Germany, Sweden, and the United States to a variety of destinations over the period 1970-88. The empirical relationship between pass-through and Market Share is significantly nonlinear: pass-through is lowest when the source country's Market Share is around 45 percent and it is highest when the source country's Share approaches 100 percent.
Henri Servaes - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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what drives Market Share in the mutual fund industry
Social Science Research Network, 2011Co-Authors: Ajay Khorana, Henri ServaesAbstract:This article examines competition and investor behavior in the mutual fund industry for the universe of US mutual funds during 1976-2009. Over this period, industry assets increased by a factor of 200, the number of active fund families quadrupled, and the average Market Share of a family declined by four-fifths. We find that price competition and product differentiation are both effective strategies in obtaining Market Share. Families that pass along economies of scale to investors and those that charge lower fees than the competition gain Market Share, but only if these fees are above average to begin with. Loads and 12b-1 fees, however, have a positive effect on Market Share, consistent with the use of these types of fees for Marketing and distribution. Families that perform better, offer a wider range of products, and start more funds relative to the competition (a measure of innovation) also have a higher Market Share. Innovation is rewarded more if the new fund is more differentiated from existing offerings. Overall, our evidence suggests that mutual fund families compete effectively along both price and non-price dimensions.
Daniel Aobdia - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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regulatory oversight and auditor Market Share
Social Science Research Network, 2017Co-Authors: Daniel Aobdia, Nemit ShroffAbstract:We examine whether regulatory oversight of an auditor increases the perceived assurance value of their audits and consequently their Market Share. We use the PCAOB international inspection program as a setting to generate within country variation in regulatory oversight. Specifically, non-U.S. auditors that participate in the audit of any SEC registered client are subject to PCAOB inspections but their competitors that do not do so are not subject to similar oversight. Using this difference in regulatory oversight, we find that PCAOB inspected non-U.S. auditors observe a 4 to 6% increase in their Market Share after PCAOB inspection reports are made public. Auditors with a large number of engagement level deficiencies and those publicly criticized for having deficient quality control systems do not observe any Market Share gain following their inspections. Market Share changes following PCAOB inspections are smaller in countries with strong rule of law and less corruption. We interpret our evidence as suggesting that regulatory scrutiny can help increase the assurance value of an audit. Our results highlight the role of public regulatory oversight in the audit Market.
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Regulatory oversight and auditor Market Share
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2017Co-Authors: Daniel Aobdia, Nemit ShroffAbstract:We examine whether auditor regulatory oversight affects the value of financial statement audits. Using the PCAOB international inspection program as a setting to generate within country variation in regulatory oversight, we find that non-U.S. auditors inspected by the PCAOB gain 4% to 6% Market Share from competing auditors after PCAOB inspection reports are made public. When inspection findings reveal that an auditor has many engagement-level deficiencies, Market Share gains following inspection reports are significantly smaller. Our evidence suggests that regulatory scrutiny increases the assurance value of an audit and highlights the role of public regulatory oversight in the audit Market.
