The Experts below are selected from a list of 642 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Herrade Igersheim - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Rawls's justice theory and its relations to the concept of Merit Goods
    The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 2010
    Co-Authors: Ragip Ege, Herrade Igersheim
    Abstract:

    The purpose of this paper is to analyse the status that the concept of Merit Goods (as first stated by Musgrave in The Theory of Public Finance) has/should have in Rawls's theory. We first examine Rawls's position regarding this issue in A Theory of Justice. Next, we claim that the attitude of the 'second' Rawls about it is rather ambiguous and vacillates between exclusion and inclusion. We attempt to prove that thanks to the concepts Rawls has developed from 1985 onwards (especially the concept of public reason), he could have resorted to the concept of Merit Goods to cope better with his new objectives.

  • Rawls's theory of justice and its relations to the concept of 'Merit Goods'.
    European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 2009
    Co-Authors: Herrade Igersheim
    Abstract:

    The purpose of this paper is to analyse the status that the concept of Merit Goods (as first stated by Musgrave in The Theory of Public Finance) has/should have in Rawls's theory. We first examine Rawls's position regarding this issue in A Theory of Justice. Next, we claim that the attitude of the 'second' Rawls about it is rather ambiguous and vacillates between exclusion and inclusion. We attempt to prove that thanks to the concepts Rawls has developed from 1985 onwards (especially the concept of public reason), he could have resorted to the concept of Merit Goods to cope better with his new objectives.

Nicolò Bellanca - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Elements of a theory of social enterprise
    2013
    Co-Authors: Nicolò Bellanca
    Abstract:

    Idealtipicamente, l’impresa e sociale se offre, con un impegno vincolante di governance, i servizi dei commons e i Merit Goods, impiegando in maniera non privatistica la maggior parte degli eventuali profitti. Questa definizione viene argomentata discutendo le caratteristiche dei beni economici, l’arco di forme di cui l’impresa sociale si riveste, nonche le sue possibilita di ramificazione nel

  • For a theory of social enterprise and social finance
    2013
    Co-Authors: Nicolò Bellanca
    Abstract:

    On an ideal-typical basis, an enterprise is social when it supplies, under a restricting commitment of governance, commons-related services and Merit Goods and uses the majority of possible profits in a non-privatistic manner. This definition is debated by discussing the features of economic Goods, the frame of molds in which social enterprise explicates, its connection with social finance, as well as its possibilities of ramification within the economic system.

  • Elementi di una teoria dell'impresa sociale
    2011
    Co-Authors: Nicolò Bellanca
    Abstract:

    Idealtipicamente, l’impresa e sociale se offre, con un impegno vincolante di governance, i servizi dei commons e i Merit Goods, impiegando in maniera non privatistica la maggior parte degli eventuali profitti. Questa definizione viene argomentata discutendo le caratteristiche dei beni economici, l’arco di forme di cui l’impresa sociale si riveste, nonche le sue possibilita di ramificazione nel sistema economico.

  • Elementi di una teoria dell'impresa sociale [Elements of a theory of social enterprise]
    2011
    Co-Authors: Nicolò Bellanca
    Abstract:

    From an idealtypical perspective, an enterprise is social if it offers, with a binding commitment to governance, Merit Goods and services of the commons, using in a non-privatistic manner the most part of profits that may be obtained. This definition is discussed in relation to the characteristics of economic Goods, the range of forms that the social enterprise assumes, and its possibility of branching in the economic system.

Ragip Ege - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Rawls's justice theory and its relations to the concept of Merit Goods
    The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 2010
    Co-Authors: Ragip Ege, Herrade Igersheim
    Abstract:

    The purpose of this paper is to analyse the status that the concept of Merit Goods (as first stated by Musgrave in The Theory of Public Finance) has/should have in Rawls's theory. We first examine Rawls's position regarding this issue in A Theory of Justice. Next, we claim that the attitude of the 'second' Rawls about it is rather ambiguous and vacillates between exclusion and inclusion. We attempt to prove that thanks to the concepts Rawls has developed from 1985 onwards (especially the concept of public reason), he could have resorted to the concept of Merit Goods to cope better with his new objectives.

Yang-ming Chang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Endogenous division rules as a family constitution: strategic altruistic transfers and sibling competition
    Journal of Population Economics, 2014
    Co-Authors: Yang-ming Chang, Zijun Luo
    Abstract:

    Based on the notions of parental altruism, sibling competition, and family constitution, we present a self-enforcing model where heterogeneous children have economic incentives to supply family-specific Merit Goods (e.g., companionship) to their parents for securing inheritable wealth and the altruistic parents decide on division rules according to an optimizing behavior. In our analysis of intergenerational cooperation and intragenerational competition, the altruistic parents care about the efficiency of the children-provided Merit Goods and the equity of the children’s incomes. For an optimal allocation of wealth, the parents strategically partition it into two pools: one to be distributed equally whereas the other unequally according to their children’s supply of Merit Goods. We look at motivation of the parents in allocating their wealth to the two different pools. The analysis of endogenous division rules has implications for the compatibility between equal postmortem transfers and unequal inter vivos gifts, both of which are consistent with parental altruism.

  • Transfers and bequests: a portfolio analysis in a Nash game
    Annals of Finance, 2007
    Co-Authors: Yang-ming Chang
    Abstract:

    This paper develops a two-stage non-cooperative Nash game framework of parental–children interactions to explain the equal division puzzle in bequests. In the analysis, a portfolio approach is adopted for characterizing how altruistic parents allocate their inheritable wealth between inter-vivos transfers and post-mortem bequests. The model includes elements of strategic altruism, exchange of family-specific Merit Goods, transfer-seeking behavior by competing siblings, and parents’ “post-mortem reputation” in bequest division. Allowing for children’s heterogeneity and interactions, we find that inter-vivos transfers are unevenly distributed between the children, despite an equal degree of parental altruism. Moreover, we show the compatibility of unequal inter-vivos transfers and equal bequests, regardless of earnings differentials across children.

  • Sibling Rivalry and Strategic Parental Transfers
    Southern Economic Journal, 2005
    Co-Authors: Yang-ming Chang, Dennis L. Weisman
    Abstract:

    This paper develops a noncooperative Nash model in which two siblings compete for their parents' financial transfers. Treating sibling rivalry as a “rent-seeking contest” and using a Tullock-Skaperdas contest success function, we derive the conditions under which more financial resources are transferred to the sibling with lower earnings. We find that parental transfers are compensatory and that the family as an institution serves as an “income equalizer.” Within a sequential game framework, we characterize the endogeneity of parental transfers and link it to parents' income, altruism, and children's supply of Merit Goods (e.g., parent-child companionship or child services). We show that Merit Goods are subject to a “moral hazard” problem from the parents' perspective.

Anwar Shah - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Sponsoring A Race To The Top : The Case For Results-Based Intergovernmental Finance For Merit Goods - Sponsoring a Race to the Top: The Case for Results-Based Intergovernmental Finance for Merit Goods
    Policy Research Working Papers, 2010
    Co-Authors: Anwar Shah
    Abstract:

    Intergovernmental finance is a significant source of sub-national finance in most countries. In both industrial and developing countries, formula based"manna from heaven"general purpose transfers dominate but co-exist with highly intrusive micro-managed"command and control"specific purpose transfers. Both these types of transfers undermine political and fiscal accountability. Reforms to bring in design elements that incorporate incentives for results-based accountability are resisted by both donors and recipients alike. This is because the donors perceive such reforms as attempts at chipping away at their powers and recipients fear such programs will be intrusive. This paper presents conceptual and practical underpinnings of grant designs that could further simplicity, objectivity, and local autonomy objectives while furthering citizen-centric results-based accountability. The paper further highlights a few notable recent initiatives in both industrial and developing countries that embrace such directions for reform. The paper concludes that results-based intergovernmental finance offers significant potential to minimize tradeoffs between local autonomy and accountability while furthering access to Merit Goods.

  • sponsoring a race to the top the case for results based intergovernmental finance for Merit Goods
    2010
    Co-Authors: Anwar Shah
    Abstract:

    Intergovernmental finance is a significant source of sub-national finance in most countries. In both industrial and developing countries, formula based"manna from heaven"general purpose transfers dominate but co-exist with highly intrusive micro-managed"command and control"specific purpose transfers. Both these types of transfers undermine political and fiscal accountability. Reforms to bring in design elements that incorporate incentives for results-based accountability are resisted by both donors and recipients alike. This is because the donors perceive such reforms as attempts at chipping away at their powers and recipients fear such programs will be intrusive. This paper presents conceptual and practical underpinnings of grant designs that could further simplicity, objectivity, and local autonomy objectives while furthering citizen-centric results-based accountability. The paper further highlights a few notable recent initiatives in both industrial and developing countries that embrace such directions for reform. The paper concludes that results-based intergovernmental finance offers significant potential to minimize tradeoffs between local autonomy and accountability while furthering access to Merit Goods.