The Experts below are selected from a list of 39 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Kenneth R Westphal - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Hegel’s Semantics of Singular Cognitive Reference, Newton’s Methodological Rule 4 and Scientific Realism Today (*)
Philosophical Inquiries, 2014Co-Authors: Kenneth R WestphalAbstract:Empirical investigations use empirical methods, data, and evidence. This banal observation appears to favour empiricism, especially in philosophy of science, though no rationalist ever denied their importance. Natural sciences often provide what appear to be, and are taken by scientists as, realist, causal explanations of natural phenomena, often in terms of forces or entities we do not perceive with our normal, unaided human senses. Empiricism has never been congenial to realism about such scientific posits. Bas van Fraassen’s “Constructive Empiricism” purports that realist interpretations of any “unobservables” mentioned by a scientific theory in principle always transcend whatever can be justified by that theory’s empirical adequacy, and that “explanations” are merely pragmatic, insofar as they are context‑specific to the presuppositions of whomever poses the question an explanation is to answer. Here I argue that “Constructive Empiricism” rests upon a series of flawed presumptions about natural science and about epistemology. I draw upon two main resources. One resource is the constraints upon specifically c ognitive reference to particulars, first identified by Kant (and later by Evans). The second is William Harper’s (2011) brilliant re‑analysis and defense of Newton’s Prin c ipia , which shows that, and how, Newton justified his realism about gravitational force. One surprise is that Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference (examined in §3) directly and strongly supports Newton’s Rule 4 of scientific method (§4), which strongly supports his realism about gravi‑ tational force (summarized in §2). A further surprise is that Hegel first recognized that this semantics of singular cognitive reference directly and strongly supports Newton’s meth odological Rule 4 of experimental philosophy in ways which support Newton’s realism about gravitational force, and about distance forces generally. The textual and exegetical issues these attributions require I examine elsewhere. Here I make these important findings available to philosophers and historians of science. (*) Invited paper
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hegel s semantics of singular cognitive reference newton s Methodological Rule 4 and scientific realism today
Philosophical Inquiries, 2014Co-Authors: Kenneth R WestphalAbstract:Empirical investigations use empirical methods, data, and evidence. This banal observation appears to favour empiricism, especially in philosophy of science, though no rationalist ever denied their importance. Natural sciences often provide what appear to be, and are taken by scientists as, realist, causal explanations of natural phenomena, often in terms of forces or entities we do not perceive with our normal, unaided human senses. Empiricism has never been congenial to realism about such scientific posits. Bas van Fraassen’s “Constructive Empiricism” purports that realist interpretations of any “unobservables” mentioned by a scientific theory in principle always transcend whatever can be justified by that theory’s empirical adequacy, and that “explanations” are merely pragmatic, insofar as they are context‑specific to the presuppositions of whomever poses the question an explanation is to answer. Here I argue that “Constructive Empiricism” rests upon a series of flawed presumptions about natural science and about epistemology. I draw upon two main resources. One resource is the constraints upon specifically c ognitive reference to particulars, first identified by Kant (and later by Evans). The second is William Harper’s (2011) brilliant re‑analysis and defense of Newton’s Prin c ipia , which shows that, and how, Newton justified his realism about gravitational force. One surprise is that Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference (examined in §3) directly and strongly supports Newton’s Rule 4 of scientific method (§4), which strongly supports his realism about gravi‑ tational force (summarized in §2). A further surprise is that Hegel first recognized that this semantics of singular cognitive reference directly and strongly supports Newton’s meth odological Rule 4 of experimental philosophy in ways which support Newton’s realism about gravitational force, and about distance forces generally. The textual and exegetical issues these attributions require I examine elsewhere. Here I make these important findings available to philosophers and historians of science. (*) Invited paper
Marjorie L. Devault - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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ETHNICITY AND EXPERTISE Racial-Ethnic Knowledge in Sociological Research
Gender & Society, 1995Co-Authors: Marjorie L. DevaultAbstract:Analysis of an interview conducted by a white researcher with an African American nutritionist points to the significance of racial-ethnic dynamics in the conduct of qualitative research. Interviewers who follow the standard Methodological Rule—to let findings “emerge” from their data—may fail to hear the significance of race-ethnicity in the accounts of informants. Close analysis suggests that talk will sometimes reveal racial-ethnic dynamics even when these are not explicit topics and that active attention to such structured inequalities produces a more robust analysis. Institutional ethnography and narrative analysis are discussed as alternatives to the grounded-theory approach to qualitative analysis.
Gao Tai-ping - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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On Scientific Criticism
Journal of Tianshui Normal University, 2020Co-Authors: Gao Tai-pingAbstract:Criticism is the ideological weapon for human development.Criticism is the epistemological Rule of the scientific criticism,.The dialectical unity is the Rule of the Methodological Rule of scientific criticism.The self-criticism is the intrinsic requirement of it.The real knowledge and ability are the essential prerequisites of scientific criticism.Innovation and construction are the purpose of it.
А.И. Троцак - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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The Principle of Sufficient Reason as a Correlate of Free Will and Moral Law in Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s Philosophy
2014Co-Authors: Alexey I. Trotsak, А.И. ТроцакAbstract:This article analyses the principle of sufficient reason in the systems of I. Kant and A. Schopenhauer, making the parallels with the Chr. Wolff’s metaphysics. Also the author demonstrates how the principle was being transformed from Wolff, through Kant to Schopenhauer and which kind of usage (dogmatic or critical) of the principle could be fruitful as Methodological Rule to the construction of philosophical system.
I. Schmelzer - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Generalization Of Lorentz-Poincaré Ether Theory To Quantum Gravity
arXiv: General Relativity and Quantum Cosmology, 1997Co-Authors: I. SchmelzerAbstract:We present a quantum theory of gravity which is in agreement with observation in the relativistic domain. The theory is not relativistic, but a Galilean invariant generalization of Lorentz-Poincare ether theory to quantum gravity. If we apply the Methodological Rule that the best available theory has to be preferred, we have to reject the relativistic paradigm and return to Galilean invariant ether theory.