The Experts below are selected from a list of 26430 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform

Yf Reykers - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • a permanent headquarters under construction the Military Planning and conduct capability as a proximate principal
    Journal of European Integration, 2019
    Co-Authors: Yf Reykers
    Abstract:

    This article studies the European Union (EU) Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), which was established in June 2017 and holds the strategic command of EU non-executive missions. While ...

  • a permanent headquarters under construction the Military Planning and conduct capability as a proximate principal
    Journal of European Integration, 2019
    Co-Authors: Yf Reykers
    Abstract:

    This article studies the European Union (EU) Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), which was established in June 2017 and holds the strategic command of EU non-executive missions. While this is the closest the EU has ever come to a permanent Military headquarters (HQ), the MPCC has not yet attracted much scholarly attention. This article fills this gap by applying principal-agent theorization about chains of delegation. It conceptualizes the MPCC as a proximate principal which has the potential to considerably affect control dynamics and information flows between Brussels and the mission command. Focusing on EUTM Mali, it assesses how the establishment of the MPCC affects control dynamics in non-executive CSDP missions. Empirics show that, despite some initial institutional friction, the establishment of the MPCC has mainly smoothened information flows from the mission to Brussels, particularly when the mission was militarily challenged, with little effect on PSC control or mission command autonomy

Eva Jensen - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Sensemaking in Military Planning: a methodological study of command teams
    Cognition Technology & Work, 2009
    Co-Authors: Eva Jensen
    Abstract:

    Sensemaking, understanding how to deal with the situation at hand, has a central role in Military command. This paper presents a method for measuring sensemaking performance in command teams during Military Planning. The method was tested in two experiments with Army captains serving as participants. The task was to produce parts of a brigade order within 6 h. The participants worked in teams of 5–7 individuals, 16 teams in the first experiment and 8 teams in the second experiment, with one team member acting as brigade commander. The independent variables were amount of information and type of communication, respectively. The characteristics of each team’s sensemaking process were assessed from video recordings of their Planning sessions. The quality of their plans was judged by Military experts. Although plan quality was unaffected by the experimental manipulations, the quality of the sensemaking process was related to the quality of the plans.

Lucia Falzon - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • using bayesian network analysis to support centre of gravity analysis in Military Planning
    European Journal of Operational Research, 2006
    Co-Authors: Lucia Falzon
    Abstract:

    Centre of gravity (COG) analysis is an integral and cognitively demanding aspect of Military operational Planning. It involves identifying the enemy and friendly COG and subsequently determining the critical vulnerabilities that have to be degraded or negated to influence the COG of each side. This paper describes a modelling framework based on the causal relationships among the critical capabilities and requirements for an operation. The framework is subsequently used as a basis for the construction, population and analysis of Bayesian networks to support a rigorous and systematic approach to COG analysis. The importance of this work is that it uses existing Planning process concepts to facilitate the construction of comprehensive models in which uncertainties and subjective judgements are clearly represented, thus enabling future re-use and traceability. The visual representation of the COG causal structure helps to clarify thinking and provides a way to record and impart this thinking. Moreover, it gives planners the capability to perform impact analysis, that is, to determine which actions are most likely to achieve a desirable end-state. The paper discusses the methodology, development and implementation of the COG Network Effects Tool (COGNET) suite for model population and model checking as well as impact analysis.

Chad M Briggs - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • disaster security using intelligence and Military Planning for energy and environmental risks
    2019
    Co-Authors: Chad M Briggs, Miriam Matejova
    Abstract:

    This book is for a broad audience of practitioners, policymakers, scholars, and anyone interested in scenarios, simulations, and disaster Planning. Readers are led through several different Planning scenarios that have been developed over several years under the auspices of the US Department of Energy, the US Air Force, and continued work at GlobalInt LLC. These scenarios present different security challenges and their potential cascading impacts on global systems - from the melting of glaciers in the Andes, to hurricanes in New York and Hawaii, and on to hybrid disasters, cyberoperations and geoengineering. The book provides a concise and up-to-date overview of the 'lessons learned', with a focus on innovative solutions to the world's pressing energy and environmental security challenges.

  • environmental security Military Planning and civilian research the case of water
    Environment, 2013
    Co-Authors: Shannon Olear, Chad M Briggs, Michael G Denning
    Abstract:

    The role of environmental security in the U.S. Military has been contentious and subject to shifting definitions, from the 1990s approach of environmental regulation to contemporary concepts of env...

  • climate security risk assessment and Military Planning
    International Affairs, 2012
    Co-Authors: Chad M Briggs
    Abstract:

    Climate and environmental changes pose emerging and unique challenges to international security—as the global community experiences issues of food insecurity, severe droughts and floods—and have cascading impacts on energy supplies and infrastructure. Environmental hazards may shift abruptly, posing new risks to vulnerable systems and critical nodes in ways that diverge from historical experience. Effective risk assessments and Planning will require understanding of how climate change will affect natural disasters and disaster response, and how hazards may be more extreme or unique from past experiences. This article discusses the role of climate change in affecting security Planning from a Military perspective, and how integration of scientific data and intelligence methods can foster assessment and effective response.

Tamkvaitis Titas - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.

  • Samogitian-Curonian Military defensive bridgehead: experiences of the first half of the 20th century
    'Vytautas Magnus University', 2021
    Co-Authors: Jokubauskas Vytautas, Ignatavičius Nedas, Tamkvaitis Titas
    Abstract:

    The article analyses the cases of Military actions in the territory of Western Lithuania and Latvia from 1915 to 1945. At the same time, attention is paid to the operational plans of the Lithuanian and Latvian Military forces in the second half of the 1930s. Using this method of analysis, based on Military history research, an alternative defence concept for small countries whose defence depends on allies not only with ground capabilities but also with naval Military capabilities and capabilities to conduct air operations, is disclosed. The strategic directions in which armies invade and retreat in the Eastern Baltic region in the first half of the twentieth century are essentially the same. Only changing technologies, capability of mobility and firepower, and growing/increasing opportunities have affected the pace and geography of Military action. In 1915, the Russian army did not concentrate its forces in Courland, and through it the German army saw the possibility of manoeuvring in the northern wing. This helped to defeat the enemy on the Venta-Dubysa river line and take advantage of the success and maintain the initiative to occupy the entire territory of Lithuania by the autumn and reach the left bank of the Daugava. These operations influenced the Military Planning of interwar Lithuania and Latvia. In 1941, the German forces invaded to the east in the same direction as in 1915, the only difference being that the enemy failed to stop them in Samogitia and Courland, although there was some stopping at Raseiniai near Dubysa. In 1944, the Red Army (RA) broke into the Baltic Sea near Palanga – which is what it failed to do in 1919 – forming the Courland pocket, a bridgehead in which German forces, defending the sea with a sea connection to Germany, were cut off for seven months, from 10 October to 9 May 1945. The Curonian Boiler/bridgehead forces surrendered only after the German capitulation. Klaipėda was defended by the German Military for more than 3 months: from October 10, 1944 to January 28, 1945, when there was a threat that the land route through the Curonian Spit would be interrupted; they abandoned the city and left it to the Red Army without a battle

  • Samogitian-Curonian Military defensive bridgehead: experiences of the first half of the 20th century
    'Vytautas Magnus University', 2021
    Co-Authors: Jokubauskas Vytautas, Ignatavičius Nedas, Tamkvaitis Titas
    Abstract:

    Straipsnyje analizuojami karinių veiksmų atvejai Vakarų Lietuvos ir Latvijos teritorijoje nuo 1915 m. iki 1945 m. Kartu dėmesys skiriamas XX a. 4-ojo dešimtmečio antrosios pusės Lietuvos ir Latvijos karinių pajėgų operacijų planams. Taip, remiantis karo istorijos tyrimais, atskleidžiant alternatyvią gynybinę koncepciją mažoms šalims, kurių gynyba priklauso nuo sąjungininkų ne tik su sausumos pajėgumais, bet ir su jūrine karine galia bei pajėgumais, leidžiančiais vykdyti operacijas ore. Strateginės kryptys, kuriomis veržiasi ir traukiasi kariuomenės Rytų Baltijos regione XX a. pirmojoje pusėje, iš esmės permanentiškai tos pačios. Tik kintančios technologijos, pajėgumų mobilumas ir ugnies galia bei augančios / didėjančios galimybės darė įtaką karinių veiksmų tempui ir geografijai. 1915 m. Rusijos kariuomenė netelkia pajėgų Kurše ir per jį šiauriniame sparne manevrui galimybę pamato Vokietijos kariuomenė. Tai padeda įveikti priešą Ventos–Dubysos upių linijoje ir išnaudojant pasisekimą bei išlaikant iniciatyvą iki rudens užimti visą dabartinę Lietuvos teritoriją ir pasiekti kairįjį Dauguvos krantą. Šios operacijos turėjo įtakos tarpukario Lietuvos ir Latvijos kariniam planavimui. 1941 m. Vokietijos pajėgos veržėsi į rytus tomis pačiomis kryptimis, kaip ir 1915 m., skirtumas tik tas, kad priešui nepavyko jų sulaikyti Žemaitijoje ir Kurše, nors menko stabtelėjimo prie Raseinių ties Dubysa būta. 1944 m. Raudonoji armija (RA) prasiveržia iki Baltijos jūros ties Palanga, t. y. padaro tai, ko jai nepavyko 1919 m., taip susiformuoja Kuršo katilas, arba placdarmas, kuriame Vokietijos pajėgos, jūra palaikydamos ryšį su Vokietija, gynėsi septynis mėnesius (nuo 1944 m. spalio 10 d. iki 1945 m. gegužės 9 d.). Kuršo katilo / placdarmo pajėgos pačios pasiduoda tik po Vokietijos kapituliacijos. Klaipėdą Vokietijos karinės pajėgos gynė pusketvirto mėnesio: nuo 1944 m. spalio 10 d. iki 1945 m. sausio 28 d., kai, kilus grėsmei, jog bus nutrauktas sausumos kelias per Kuršių neriją, apleido miestą ir jau be mūšio užleido raudonarmiečiams.The article analyses the cases of Military actions in the territory of Western Lithuania and Latvia from 1915 to 1945. At the same time, attention is paid to the operational plans of the Lithuanian and Latvian Military forces in the second half of the 1930s. Using this method of analysis, based on Military history research, an alternative defence concept for small countries whose defence depends on allies not only with ground capabilities but also with naval Military capabilities and capabilities to conduct air operations, is disclosed. The strategic directions in which armies invade and retreat in the Eastern Baltic region in the first half of the twentieth century are essentially the same. Only changing technologies, capability of mobility and firepower, and growing/increasing opportunities have affected the pace and geography of Military action. In 1915, the Russian army did not concentrate its forces in Courland, and through it the German army saw the possibility of manoeuvring in the northern wing. This helped to defeat the enemy on the Venta-Dubysa river line and take advantage of the success and maintain the initiative to occupy the entire territory of Lithuania by the autumn and reach the left bank of the Daugava. These operations influenced the Military Planning of interwar Lithuania and Latvia. In 1941, the German forces invaded to the east in the same direction as in 1915, the only difference being that the enemy failed to stop them in Samogitia and Courland, although there was some stopping at Raseiniai near Dubysa. In 1944, the Red Army (RA) broke into the Baltic Sea near Palanga – which is what it failed to do in 1919 – forming the Courland pocket, a bridgehead in which German forces, defending the sea with a sea connection to Germany, were cut off for seven months, from 10 October to 9 May 1945. The Curonian Boiler/bridgehead forces surrendered only after the German capitulation. Klaipėda was defended by the German Military for more than 3 months: from October 10, 1944 to January 28, 1945, when there was a threat that the land route through the Curonian Spit would be interrupted; they abandoned the city and left it to the Red Army without a battle