The Experts below are selected from a list of 216 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Kannan Srikanth - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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effect of Mutual Knowledge in offshore outsourced software development projects
Academy of Management Proceedings, 2016Co-Authors: Joydeep Chatterjee, Kannan SrikanthAbstract:This paper investigates under what conditions Knowledge available to team members leads to positive performance outcomes. We surmise that Mutual Knowledge that enables the team members to coordinate their work efforts is beneficial for team performance up to a limit after which excess Mutual Knowledge causes a decline in performance. We further suggest that the inverted U relation between Mutual Knowledge and performance will be amplified when team size is low and neutralized when team size is high. Similarly we hypothesize that the inverted U relation between Mutual Knowledge and performance will be amplified when Onsite ratio is high and neutralized when Onsite ratio is low. We test these hypotheses in a sample of offshore outsourced software services projects and find support for all our assertions.
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bridging the Mutual Knowledge gap coordination and the commercialization of university science
Academy of Management Journal, 2013Co-Authors: Reddi Kotha, Gerard George, Kannan SrikanthAbstract:We examine why commercialization of interdisciplinary research, especially from distant scientific domains, is different from commercialization of inventions from specialized or proximate domains. We argue that anticipated coordination costs arising from the need to transfer technology to licensee firms and from the need for an inventor team's members to work together to further develop a technology significantly impact commercialization outcomes. We use a sample of 3,776 university invention disclosures to test whether variation in the types of experience of the scientists on a team influences the likelihood that an invention will be licensed. We proffer evidence to support our hypotheses that anticipated coordination costs influence whether an invention is licensed and that specific forms of team experience attenuate such coordination costs. The implications of these findings for theories of coordination, innovation, and entrepreneurship are discussed.
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bridging the Mutual Knowledge gap coordination and the commercialization of university science
Social Science Research Network, 2012Co-Authors: Reddi Kotha, Gerard George, Kannan SrikanthAbstract:We examine why commercialization of inter-disciplinary research, especially from distant scientific domains, is different from inventions from specialized or proximate domains. We argue that anticipated coordination costs arising from the need to transfer technology to the licensee firms and from the need for the inventor team to work together to further develop the technology significantly impact commercialization outcomes. We use a sample of 3,776 university invention disclosures to test whether the variation, in types of experience of the scientists within a team, influences the likelihood that an invention will be licensed. We proffer evidence to support our hypotheses that the anticipated coordination costs influence whether an invention is licensed, and that specific forms of team experience attenuate such coordination costs. The implications of these findings for theories of coordination, innovation, and entrepreneurship are discussed.
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bridging the Mutual Knowledge gap coordination and the commercialization of radical science
Academy of Management Proceedings, 2010Co-Authors: Reddi Kotha, Kannan Srikanth, Gerard GeorgeAbstract:This study examines why some inventions are commercialized. We focus on the coordination costs within the inventor team to further develop the technology and the coordination costs involved in transferring Knowledge to licensee firms. We test whether the variation in levels of Mutual Knowledge in scientist teams influences the likelihood that their inventions will be licensed. We test our predictions in a large sample of 4,575 invention disclosures by teams of scientists. We find a pattern of results that confirm that the anticipated coordination costs influence whether an invention is licensed. The implications for the literatures in coordination and innovation are discussed.
Akira Tanaka - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Mutual Knowledge of rationality in the electronic mail game
Research Papers in Economics, 2006Co-Authors: Koji Takamiya, Akira TanakaAbstract:This paper reexamines the paradoxical aspect of the electronic mail game (Rubinstein, 1989). The electronic mail game is a coordination game with payoff uncertainty. At a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, players cannot achieve the desired coordination of actions even when a high order of Mutual Knowledge of payoff functions obtains. We want to make explicit the role of Knowledge about rationality of players, not only that of payoff functions. For this purpose, we use an extended version of the belief system model developed by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995). We propose a certain way of embedding the electronic mail game in an belief system. And we show that for rational players to coordinate their actions, for any embedding belief systems, it is necessary that the upper bound order of Mutual Knowledge of payoff functions exceeds the upper bound order of Mutual Knowledge of rationality. This result implies that under common Knowledge of rationality, the coordination never occurs, which is similar to Rubinstein's result. We point out, however, that there exists a class embedding belief systems for which the above condition is also sufficient for the desired coordination.
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Mutual Knowledge of rationality in the electronic mail game
Social Science Research Network, 2006Co-Authors: Koji Takamiya, Akira TanakaAbstract:This paper reexamines the paradoxical aspect of the electronic mail game (Rubinstein, 1989). The electronic mail game is a coordination game with payo uncertainty. At a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, players cannot achieve the desired coordination of actions even when a high order of Mutual Knowledge of payo functions obtains. We want to make explicit the role of Knowledge about rationality of players, not only that of payo functions. For this purpose, we use an extended version of the belief system model developed by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995). We propose a certain way of embedding the electronic mail game in an belief system. And we show that for rational players to coordinate their actions, for any embedding belief systems, it is necessary that the upper bound order of Mutual Knowledge of payo functions exceeds the upper bound order of Mutual Knowledge of rationality. This result implies that under common Knowledge of rationality, the coordination never occurs, which is similar to Rubinstein’s result. We point out, however, that there exists a class embedding belief systems for which the above condition is also sucient
Pramod K Varshney - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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decentralized federated learning via Mutual Knowledge transfer
IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 2021Co-Authors: Pramod K VarshneyAbstract:In this paper, we investigate the problem of decentralized federated learning (DFL) in Internet of things (IoT) systems, where a number of IoT clients train models collectively for a common task without sharing their private training data in the absence of a central server. Most of the existing DFL schemes are composed of two alternating steps, i.e., model updating and model averaging. However, averaging model parameters directly to fuse different models at the local clients suffers from client-drift especially when the training data are heterogeneous across different clients. This leads to slow convergence and degraded learning performance. As a possible solution, we propose the decentralized federated learning via Mutual Knowledge transfer (Def-KT) algorithm where local clients fuse models by transferring their learnt Knowledge to each other. Our experiments on the MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100 datasets reveal that the proposed Def-KT algorithm significantly outperforms the baseline DFL methods with model averaging, i.e., Combo and FullAvg, especially when the training data are not independent and identically distributed (non-IID) across different clients.
Maya Hickmann - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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cohesive anaphoric relations in french children s narratives as a function of Mutual Knowledge
Language, 1995Co-Authors: Maya Hickmann, Michele Kail, Francoise RolandAbstract:This study examines how French children of 6, 9, and 11 years use referring expressions for reference maintenance in narratives elicited in two situations: children and their interlocutor were looking at a picture book together (Mutual Knowledge) or the inter locutor was blindfolded (no Mutual Knowledge). Local coreference has a strong impact on the selection of pronouns (coreferential) vs. nominals (non-coreferential) at all ages and in both situations. However, children from 9 years on produce more pronouns in the absence of Mutual Knowledge and the extent to which children mark story structure varies as a function of age and situation. Regardless of situation, 6-year-olds mark boundaries across successive pictures (external structure) and episodes (internal structure) by means of nominals. Although a similar pattern can be observed at other ages in the Mutual Knowledge condition, it gradually disappears with increasing age in the absence of Mutual Knowledge. It is concluded that discourse-internal func...
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french children s ability to introduce referents in narratives as a function of Mutual Knowledge
Language, 1992Co-Authors: Michele Kail, Maya HickmannAbstract:This study examines referent introductions in narratives produced by French children of 6, 9, and 11 years in two situations where they either could or could not assume Mutual Knowledge. In one situation (MK) the children and their interlocutor were looking at a picture book together; in the other (NMK) the interlocutor was blindfolded. Children in all age groups used more indefinite determiners in Situation NMK than in MK. However, some clear developmental changes were also found: the 6-year-olds used both definite and indefinite determiners in NMK; the 9-year-olds selected indefinite determiners in NMK and definite ones in MK; the 11-year-olds produced indefinite determiners not only in NMK, but also in MK. These results show that children acquire the rules governing referent introductions in three steps: (a) they have no systematic rule in the absence of Mutual Knowledge; (b) they acquire a rule associating appropriately different linguistic devices with the presence versus absence of Mutual Knowledge;...
Koji Takamiya - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Mutual Knowledge of rationality in the electronic mail game
Research Papers in Economics, 2006Co-Authors: Koji Takamiya, Akira TanakaAbstract:This paper reexamines the paradoxical aspect of the electronic mail game (Rubinstein, 1989). The electronic mail game is a coordination game with payoff uncertainty. At a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, players cannot achieve the desired coordination of actions even when a high order of Mutual Knowledge of payoff functions obtains. We want to make explicit the role of Knowledge about rationality of players, not only that of payoff functions. For this purpose, we use an extended version of the belief system model developed by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995). We propose a certain way of embedding the electronic mail game in an belief system. And we show that for rational players to coordinate their actions, for any embedding belief systems, it is necessary that the upper bound order of Mutual Knowledge of payoff functions exceeds the upper bound order of Mutual Knowledge of rationality. This result implies that under common Knowledge of rationality, the coordination never occurs, which is similar to Rubinstein's result. We point out, however, that there exists a class embedding belief systems for which the above condition is also sufficient for the desired coordination.
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Mutual Knowledge of rationality in the electronic mail game
Social Science Research Network, 2006Co-Authors: Koji Takamiya, Akira TanakaAbstract:This paper reexamines the paradoxical aspect of the electronic mail game (Rubinstein, 1989). The electronic mail game is a coordination game with payo uncertainty. At a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, players cannot achieve the desired coordination of actions even when a high order of Mutual Knowledge of payo functions obtains. We want to make explicit the role of Knowledge about rationality of players, not only that of payo functions. For this purpose, we use an extended version of the belief system model developed by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995). We propose a certain way of embedding the electronic mail game in an belief system. And we show that for rational players to coordinate their actions, for any embedding belief systems, it is necessary that the upper bound order of Mutual Knowledge of payo functions exceeds the upper bound order of Mutual Knowledge of rationality. This result implies that under common Knowledge of rationality, the coordination never occurs, which is similar to Rubinstein’s result. We point out, however, that there exists a class embedding belief systems for which the above condition is also sucient
