The Experts below are selected from a list of 360 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Steven A Gabriel - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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a bicriteria perspective on l penalty approaches a corrigendum to siddiqui and gabriel s l penalty approach for solving mpecs
arXiv: Optimization and Control, 2018Co-Authors: Kerstin Dachert, Steven A Gabriel, Sauleh Siddiqui, Javier Saezgallego, Juan M MoralesAbstract:This paper presents a corrigendum to Theorems 2 and 3 in Siddiqui S, Gabriel S (2013), An SOS1-Based Approach for Solving MPECs with a Natural Gas Market Application, Networks and Spatial Economics 13(2):205--227. In brief, we revise the claim that their L-penalty approach yields a solution satisfying complementarity for any positive value of L, in general. This becomes evident when interpreting the L-penalty method as a weighted-sum scalarization of a bicriteria optimization problem. We also elaborate further assumptions under which the L-penalty approach yields a solution satisfying complementarity.
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an sos1 based approach for solving mpecs with a Natural Gas Market application
Networks and Spatial Economics, 2013Co-Authors: Sauleh Siddiqui, Steven A GabrielAbstract:This paper presents a new method for solving mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints. The approach uses a transformation of the original problem via Schur’s decomposition coupled with two separate formulations for modeling related absolute value functions. The first formulation, based on SOS1 variables, when solved to optimality will provide a global solution to the MPEC. The second, penalty-based formulation is used to heuristically obtain local solutions to large-scale MPECs. The advantage of these methods over disjunctive constraints for solving MPECs is that computational time is much lower, which is corroborated by numerical examples. Finally, an application of the method to an MPEC representing the United States Natural Gas Market is given. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
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a generalized nash cournot model for the northwestern european Natural Gas Markets with a fuel substitution demand function the gammes model
Networks and Spatial Economics, 2013Co-Authors: Ibrahim Abada, Steven A Gabriel, Vincent Briat, Olivier MassolAbstract:This article presents a stochastic dynamic Generalized Nash-Cournot model to describe the evolution of the Natural Gas Markets. The major Gas chain players are depicted including: producers, consumers, storage, and pipeline operators, as well as intermediate local traders. Our economic structure description takes into account Market power and the demand representation tries to capture the possible fuel substitution that can be made between the consumption of oil, coal, and Natural Gas in the overall fossil energy consumption. The demand is made random because of the oil price fluctuations. We take into account the long-term aspects inherent to some Markets, in an endogenous way. This particularity of our description makes the model a Generalized Nash Equilibrium problem that needs to be solved using specialized mathematical techniques. The model has been applied to represent the European Natural Gas Market and to forecast, until 2035, after a calibration process, consumption, prices, production, and long-term contract prices and volumes. Finally, we defined and calculated the value of stochastic solution adapted to our model.
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Natural Gas Market Modeling
Complementarity Modeling in Energy Markets, 2012Co-Authors: Steven A Gabriel, Benjamin F Hobbs, Antonio J. Conejo, J. David Fuller, Carlos RuizAbstract:Natural Gas is a key fuel in energy Markets worldwide. It is produced from either onshore or offshore wells, processed to remove impurities, and then transported by either pipeline in Gaseous form or cooled to about -260 degrees F (about -160 degrees C) and then transported as liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to destinations around the world. The main consuming sectors that use it are residential, commercial, industrial, electric power, and to some extent transportation. At present, the world has abundant Gas supplies. According to [52], the global mean projected remaining recoverable resources is 16,200 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) or 150 times the current annual global consumption. About 9,000 Tcf is gauged to be economically available at less than or equal to $4 per million British Thermal Units (Btu) [52].
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the world Gas model a multi period mixed complementarity model for the global Natural Gas Market
Energy, 2010Co-Authors: Ruud Egging, Steven A Gabriel, Franziska HolzAbstract:Abstract We provide the description, mathematical formulation and illustrative results of the World Gas Model, a multi-period complementarity model for the global Natural Gas Market with explicit consideration of Market power in the upstream Market. Market players include producers, traders, pipeline and storage operators, LNG (liquefied Natural Gas) liquefiers and reGasifiers as well as Marketers. The model data set contains more than 80 countries and regions and covers 98% of world wide Natural Gas production and consumption. We also include a detailed representation of cross-border Natural Gas pipelines and constraints imposed by long-term contracts in the LNG Market. The model is calibrated to match production and consumption projections from the PRIMES [EC. European energy and transport: trends to 2030–update 2007. Brussels: European Commission; 2008] and POLES models [EC. World energy technology outlook – 2050 (WETO-H2). Brussels: European Commission; 2006] up to 2030. The results of our numerical simulations illustrate how the supply shares of pipeline and LNG in various regions in the world develop very differently over time. LNG will continue to play a major role in the Asian Market, also for new importers like China and India. Europe will expand its pipeline import capacities benefiting from its relative proximity to major Gas suppliers.
Sauleh Siddiqui - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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north american Natural Gas Market and infrastructure developments under different mechanisms of renewable policy coordination
Energy Policy, 2021Co-Authors: Charalampos Avraam, John E Bistline, Maxwell Brown, Kathleen Vaillancourt, Sauleh SiddiquiAbstract:Abstract Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) accelerate renewables deployment but their impact on fuel-fired plants remains ambiguous. North American Natural Gas consumption has been growing due to its decreasing cost in North America, policy initiatives, and its relatively low CO2 emissions rate compared to coal. In this paper, we study the implications for the Natural Gas sector of more stringent RPS under different coordination schemes in an integrated North American Natural Gas Market. The scenarios assume that Renewable Energy Certificates generated in each region are traded 1) among all countries, 2) only within each country, and 3) only within model regions. We implement the three policies in four different energy and electricity models to generate projections of future Natural Gas consumption. Subsequently, we feed regional or country-level consumption changes of each model in each scenario to the North American Natural Gas Model. We find that lower RPS coordination among regions results in increased U.S. Natural Gas exports to Canada, increased U.S. Natural Gas prices, and decreased net U.S. Natural Gas exports to Mexico in the long term. Moreover, international coordination of RPS in the electricity sector leads to smaller price discrepancies in the U.S. Natural Gas Market when compared to the reference scenario.
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a bicriteria perspective on l penalty approaches a corrigendum to siddiqui and gabriel s l penalty approach for solving mpecs
arXiv: Optimization and Control, 2018Co-Authors: Kerstin Dachert, Steven A Gabriel, Sauleh Siddiqui, Javier Saezgallego, Juan M MoralesAbstract:This paper presents a corrigendum to Theorems 2 and 3 in Siddiqui S, Gabriel S (2013), An SOS1-Based Approach for Solving MPECs with a Natural Gas Market Application, Networks and Spatial Economics 13(2):205--227. In brief, we revise the claim that their L-penalty approach yields a solution satisfying complementarity for any positive value of L, in general. This becomes evident when interpreting the L-penalty method as a weighted-sum scalarization of a bicriteria optimization problem. We also elaborate further assumptions under which the L-penalty approach yields a solution satisfying complementarity.
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an sos1 based approach for solving mpecs with a Natural Gas Market application
Networks and Spatial Economics, 2013Co-Authors: Sauleh Siddiqui, Steven A GabrielAbstract:This paper presents a new method for solving mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints. The approach uses a transformation of the original problem via Schur’s decomposition coupled with two separate formulations for modeling related absolute value functions. The first formulation, based on SOS1 variables, when solved to optimality will provide a global solution to the MPEC. The second, penalty-based formulation is used to heuristically obtain local solutions to large-scale MPECs. The advantage of these methods over disjunctive constraints for solving MPECs is that computational time is much lower, which is corroborated by numerical examples. Finally, an application of the method to an MPEC representing the United States Natural Gas Market is given. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013
Rudolf Egging - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the world Gas model a multi period mixed complementarity model for the global Natural Gas Market
Energy, 2009Co-Authors: Rudolf Egging, Franziska Holz, Steven A GabrielAbstract:We provide the description and illustrative results of the World Gas Model, a multi-period complementarity model for the global Natural Gas Market. Market players include producers, traders, pipeline and storage operators, LNG liquefiers and reGasifiers as well as Marketers. The model data set contains more than 80 countries and regions and covers 98% of world wide Natural Gas production and consumption. We also include a detailed representation of cross-border Natural Gas pipelines and constraints imposed by long-term contracts in the LNG Market. The Base Case results of our numerical simulations show that the rush for LNG observed in the past years will not be sustained throughout 2030 and that Europe will continue to rely on pipeline Gas for a large share of its imports and consumption.
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a complementarity model for the european Natural Gas Market
Energy Policy, 2008Co-Authors: Rudolf Egging, Steven A Gabriel, Franziska Holz, Jifang ZhuangAbstract:In this paper, we present a detailed and comprehensive complementarity model for computing Market equilibrium values in the European Natural Gas system. Market players include producers and their Marketing arms which we call "traders", pipeline and storage operators, Marketers, LNG liquefiers, reGasifiers, tankers, and three end-use consumption sectors. The economic behavior of producers, traders, pipeline and storage operators, liquefiers and reGasifiers is modeled via optimization problems whose Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions in combination with Market-clearing conditions form the complementarity system. The LNG tankers, Marketers and consumption sectors are modeled implicitly via appropriate cost functions, aggregate demand curves, and ex post calculations, respectively. The model is run on several case studies that highlight its capabilities, including a simulation of a disruption of Russian supplies via Ukraine.
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examining Market power in the european Natural Gas Market
Energy Policy, 2006Co-Authors: Rudolf Egging, Steven A GabrielAbstract:In this paper, we develop a mixed complementarity equilibrium model for the European Natural Gas Market. This model has producers as Cournot players with conjectured supply functions relative to their rivals. As such, these producers can withhold production to increase downstream prices for greater profits. The other players are taken to be perfectly competitive and are combined with extensive pipeline, seasonal, and other data reflecting the current state of the Market. Four Market scenarios are run to analyze the extent of Market power by these producers as well as the importance of pipeline and storage capacity.
Franziska Holz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the world Gas model a multi period mixed complementarity model for the global Natural Gas Market
Energy, 2010Co-Authors: Ruud Egging, Steven A Gabriel, Franziska HolzAbstract:Abstract We provide the description, mathematical formulation and illustrative results of the World Gas Model, a multi-period complementarity model for the global Natural Gas Market with explicit consideration of Market power in the upstream Market. Market players include producers, traders, pipeline and storage operators, LNG (liquefied Natural Gas) liquefiers and reGasifiers as well as Marketers. The model data set contains more than 80 countries and regions and covers 98% of world wide Natural Gas production and consumption. We also include a detailed representation of cross-border Natural Gas pipelines and constraints imposed by long-term contracts in the LNG Market. The model is calibrated to match production and consumption projections from the PRIMES [EC. European energy and transport: trends to 2030–update 2007. Brussels: European Commission; 2008] and POLES models [EC. World energy technology outlook – 2050 (WETO-H2). Brussels: European Commission; 2006] up to 2030. The results of our numerical simulations illustrate how the supply shares of pipeline and LNG in various regions in the world develop very differently over time. LNG will continue to play a major role in the Asian Market, also for new importers like China and India. Europe will expand its pipeline import capacities benefiting from its relative proximity to major Gas suppliers.
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the world Gas model a multi period mixed complementarity model for the global Natural Gas Market
Energy, 2009Co-Authors: Rudolf Egging, Franziska Holz, Steven A GabrielAbstract:We provide the description and illustrative results of the World Gas Model, a multi-period complementarity model for the global Natural Gas Market. Market players include producers, traders, pipeline and storage operators, LNG liquefiers and reGasifiers as well as Marketers. The model data set contains more than 80 countries and regions and covers 98% of world wide Natural Gas production and consumption. We also include a detailed representation of cross-border Natural Gas pipelines and constraints imposed by long-term contracts in the LNG Market. The Base Case results of our numerical simulations show that the rush for LNG observed in the past years will not be sustained throughout 2030 and that Europe will continue to rely on pipeline Gas for a large share of its imports and consumption.
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modeling the european Natural Gas Market static and dynamic perspectives of an oligopolistic Market
2009Co-Authors: Franziska HolzAbstract:The European Natural Gas Market is characterized by an oligopolistic supply structure with mostly external suppliers, often combined with oligopolistic wholesale Markets in the European countries. Transport infrastructure (pipeline, liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facilities) is essential in the determination of trade flows. We use equilibrium modeling in the complementarity format to analyze this Market. Two different models with distinct ways of including the transport constraints are presented and used. We first describe the static GasMOD model that represents the European Market with a double marginalization structure. Bilateral capacity constraints of transport limit the trade flows between each pair of countries. Simulation runs with the static GasMOD model show that the security of European Natural Gas supplies can be ensured with a diversified import structure. LNG plays an important role because it increases the number of players in the European Market, thereby reducing the Market power and potential dominance of other players such as Russia. The static model is then extended to the GasMOD-Dynamic model, where investment in the transport infrastructure is included. The infrastructure is represented by a network graph and is used by both Market stages, exports and wholesales. Investments are chosen in a welfare optimal way with a net present value approach. Exemplary model runs with a small data set show that the existing transport capacity between European countries is considerably more constraining than the import links into Europe.
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a complementarity model for the european Natural Gas Market
Energy Policy, 2008Co-Authors: Rudolf Egging, Steven A Gabriel, Franziska Holz, Jifang ZhuangAbstract:In this paper, we present a detailed and comprehensive complementarity model for computing Market equilibrium values in the European Natural Gas system. Market players include producers and their Marketing arms which we call "traders", pipeline and storage operators, Marketers, LNG liquefiers, reGasifiers, tankers, and three end-use consumption sectors. The economic behavior of producers, traders, pipeline and storage operators, liquefiers and reGasifiers is modeled via optimization problems whose Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions in combination with Market-clearing conditions form the complementarity system. The LNG tankers, Marketers and consumption sectors are modeled implicitly via appropriate cost functions, aggregate demand curves, and ex post calculations, respectively. The model is run on several case studies that highlight its capabilities, including a simulation of a disruption of Russian supplies via Ukraine.
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a strategic model of european Gas supply Gasmod
Energy Economics, 2008Co-Authors: Franziska Holz, Christian Von Hirschhausen, Claudia KemfertAbstract:This paper presents a model of the European Natural Gas supply, GasMOD, which is structured as a two-stage-game of successive Natural Gas exports to Europe (upstream Market) and wholesale trade within Europe (downstream Market) and which explicitly includes infrastructure capacities. We compare three possible Market scenarios: Cournot competition in both Markets, perfect competition in both Markets, and perfect competition in the downstream with Cournot competition in the upstream Market (EU liberalization). We find that Cournot competition in both Markets is the most accurate representation of today's European Natural Gas Market, where suppliers at both stages generate a mark-up at the expense of the final customer (double marginalization). Our results yield a diversified supply portfolio with newly emerging (LNG) exporters gaining Market shares. Enforcing competition in the European downstream Market would lead to lower prices and higher quantities by avoiding the welfare-reducing effects of double marginalization. Binding infrastructure capacity restrictions strongly influence the results, and we identify bottlenecks mainly for intra-European trade relations whereas transport capacity in the upstream Market is globally sufficient in the Cournot scenario.
Zaifu Yang - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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an exploration of a strategic competition model for the european union Natural Gas Market
Energy Economics, 2016Co-Authors: Zaifu Yang, Rong Zhang, Zongyi ZhangAbstract:Abstract Following Jansen et al. (2012), we examine an unconventional Cournot model of the European Union Natural Gas Market with three major suppliers: Russian Gazprom, Norwegian Statoil, and Algerian Sonatrach. To reflect Russia's other strategic consideration besides profit, we incorporate a relative Market share into Gazprom's objective function. We prove that when Gazprom pursues the control of Market share along with profit, it will be good news for consumers but bad news for its pure profit maximising rivals. We further show that by seeking a proper Market share, Gazprom can achieve the same profit of a Stackelberg leader in a simultaneous move model as in the standard sequential move leader–follower model. Compared with Jansen et al.’s, our approach makes both the analysis considerably simpler and more transparent, and the model more applicable.
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an exploration of a strategic competition model for the european union Natural Gas Market
Research Papers in Economics, 2016Co-Authors: Zaifu Yang, Rong Zhang, Zongyi ZhangAbstract:Following Jansen et al. (2012), we examine an unconventional Cournot model of the European Union Natural Gas Market with three major suppliers Russian Gazprom, Norwegian Statoil, and Algerian Sonatrach. To reect Russia's other strategic consideration besides profit, we incorporate a relative Market share into Gazprom's objective function. We prove that when Gazprom pursues the control of Market share along with profit, it will be good news for consumers but bad news for its pure profit maximising rivals. We further show that by seeking a proper Market share, Gazprom can achieve the same profit of a Stackelberg leader in a simultaneous move model as in the standard sequential move leader-follower model. Compared with Jansen et al.'s, our approach makes the analysis considerably simpler and more transparent.
