The Experts below are selected from a list of 2883 Experts worldwide ranked by ideXlab platform
Shigeaki Hinohara - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the tokyo subway sarin attack disaster management part 1 community emergency response
Academic Emergency Medicine, 1998Co-Authors: Tetsu Okumura, Kouichiro Suzuki, Atsuhiro Fukuda, Akitsugu Kohama, Nobukatsu Takasu, Shinichi Ishimatsu, Shigeaki HinoharaAbstract:The Tokyo subway sarin attack was the second documented incident of Nerve Gas poisoning in Japan. Prior to the Tokyo subway sarin attack, there had never been such a large-scale disaster caused by Nerve Gas in peacetime history. This article provides details related to how the community emergency medical services (EMS) system responded from the viewpoint of disaster management, the problems encountered, and how they were addressed. The authors' assessment was that if EMTs, under Japanese law, had been allowed to maintain an airway with an endotracheal tube or use a laryngeal mask airway without physician oversight, more patients might have been saved during this chemical exposure disaster. Given current legal restrictions, advanced airway control at the scene will require that doctors become more actively involved in out-of-hospital treatment. Other recommendations are: 1) that integration and cooperation of concerned organizations be established through disaster drills; 2) that poison information centers act as regional mediators of all toxicologic information; 3) that a real-time, multidirectional communication system be established; 4) that multiple channels of communication be available for disaster care; 5) that public organizations have access to mobile decontamination facilities; and 6) that respiratory protection and chemical-resistant suits with gloves and boots be available for out-of-hospital providers during chemical disasters.
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the tokyo subway sarin attack disaster management part 3 national and international responses
Academic Emergency Medicine, 1998Co-Authors: Tetsu Okumura, Kouichiro Suzuki, Atsuhiro Fukuda, Akitsugu Kohama, Nobukatsu Takasu, Shinichi Ishimatsu, Shigeaki HinoharaAbstract:The authors report the national and international responses to the disaster produced by the Tokyo subway sarin attack. From a worldwide historical perspective, there had never been such a large-scale disaster caused by Nerve Gas during peacetime. Therefore, this event should be studied from various viewpoints in cooperation with members of the international community. To this end, the Japanese government should help coordinate a large-scale and detailed investigation of the Tokyo subway sarin attack, including the long-term effects of sarin. The authors also recommend that the Japanese Self Defense Forces should be used more effectively in large-scale disasters. The system of direct control of disaster management by the Japanese government could be useful in a large-scale disaster. Language: en
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the tokyo subway sarin attack disaster management part 2 hospital response
Academic Emergency Medicine, 1998Co-Authors: Tetsu Okumura, Kouichiro Suzuki, Atsuhiro Fukuda, Akitsugu Kohama, Nobukatsu Takasu, Shinichi Ishimatsu, Shigeaki HinoharaAbstract:Abstract. The Tokyo subway sarin attack was the second documented incident of Nerve Gas poisoning in Japan. The authors report how St. Luke's Hospital dealt with this disaster from the viewpoint of disaster management. Recommendations derived from the experience include the following: Each hospital in Japan should prepare an emergent decontamination area and have available chemical-resistant suits and masks. Ventilation in the ED and main treatment areas should be well planned at the time a hospital is designed. Hospital disaster planning must include guidance in mass casualties, an emergency staff call-up system, and an efficient emergency medical chart system. Hospitals should establish an information network during routine practice so that it can be called upon at the time of a disaster. The long-term effects of sarin should be monitored, with such investigation ideally organized and integrated by the Japanese government.
Edgar Munoz - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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graphene oxide as sensitive layer in love wave surface acoustic wave sensors for the detection of chemical warfare agent simulants
Talanta, 2016Co-Authors: Isabel Sayago, D. Matatagui, Izabela Jurewicz, Rosa Garriga, José Luis Fontecha, M.j. Fernandez, Edgar MunozAbstract:A Love-wave device with graphene oxide (GO) as sensitive layer has been developed for the detection of chemical warfare agent (CWA) simulants. Sensitive films were fabricated by airbrushing GO dispersions onto Love-wave devices. The resulting Love-wave sensors detected very low CWA simulant concentrations in synthetic air at room temperature (as low as 0.2 ppm for dimethyl-methylphosphonate, DMMP, a simulant of sarin Nerve Gas, and 0.75 ppm for dipropylene glycol monomethyl ether, DPGME, a simulant of nitrogen mustard). High responses to DMMP and DPGME were obtained with sensitivities of 3087 and 760 Hz/ppm respectively. Very low limit of detection (LOD) values (9 and 40 ppb for DMMP and DPGME, respectively) were calculated from the achieved experimental data. The sensor exhibited outstanding sensitivity, good linearity and repeatability to all simulants tested. The detection mechanism is here explained in terms of hydrogen bonding formation between the tested CWA simulants and GO.
D. Matatagui - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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graphene oxide as sensitive layer in love wave surface acoustic wave sensors for the detection of chemical warfare agent simulants
Talanta, 2016Co-Authors: Isabel Sayago, D. Matatagui, Izabela Jurewicz, Rosa Garriga, José Luis Fontecha, M.j. Fernandez, Edgar MunozAbstract:A Love-wave device with graphene oxide (GO) as sensitive layer has been developed for the detection of chemical warfare agent (CWA) simulants. Sensitive films were fabricated by airbrushing GO dispersions onto Love-wave devices. The resulting Love-wave sensors detected very low CWA simulant concentrations in synthetic air at room temperature (as low as 0.2 ppm for dimethyl-methylphosphonate, DMMP, a simulant of sarin Nerve Gas, and 0.75 ppm for dipropylene glycol monomethyl ether, DPGME, a simulant of nitrogen mustard). High responses to DMMP and DPGME were obtained with sensitivities of 3087 and 760 Hz/ppm respectively. Very low limit of detection (LOD) values (9 and 40 ppb for DMMP and DPGME, respectively) were calculated from the achieved experimental data. The sensor exhibited outstanding sensitivity, good linearity and repeatability to all simulants tested. The detection mechanism is here explained in terms of hydrogen bonding formation between the tested CWA simulants and GO.
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love wave sensor array to detect discriminate and classify chemical warfare agent simulants
Sensors and Actuators B-chemical, 2012Co-Authors: D. Matatagui, I Gracia, Carles Cané, José Luis Fontecha, J.p. Santos, M.j. Fernandez, M C HorrilloAbstract:Abstract An array made up of Love wave sensors based on quartz/SiO 2 is proposed as a detection system for chemical warfare agents (CWA). The array is composed of one reference and six devices coated with different polymers means of spray coating technique. The system has been tested with well-known CWA simulants: dimethylmethyl phosphonate (DMMP), dipropyleneglycol methyl ether (DPGME), dimethylmethyl acetamide (DMA), dichloroethane (DCE), dichloromethane (DCM), and dichloropentane (DCP), detecting very low concentrations, such as 40 ppb of DMMP, a simulant of sarin Nerve Gas. Additionally, principal component analysis (PCA) as a data pre-processing and discrimination technique, and probabilistic neural networks (PNN) as a pattern classification technique, have been applied, obtaining a clear discrimination and a correct classification.
Gerald H. Stein - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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Prehospital management of sarin Nerve Gas terrorism in urban settings: 10 years of progress after the Tokyo subway sarin attack.
Resuscitation, 2005Co-Authors: Yasuharu Tokuda, Makiko Kikuchi, Osamu Takahashi, Gerald H. SteinAbstract:Chemical agents have been used previously in wartime on numerous occasions, from World War I to the Gulf War. In 1994 and1995, sarin Nerve Gas was used first in peacetime as a weapon of terrorism in Japan. The Tokyo subway sarin attack was the first large-scale disaster caused by Nerve Gas. A religious cult released sarin Gas into subway commuter trains during morning rush hour. Twelve passengers died and about 5500 people were harmed. Sarin is a highly toxic Nerve agent that can be fatal within minutes to hours. It causes the clinical syndrome of cholinergic hyperstimulation by inhibition of the crucial enzyme acetylcholinesterase. Therapy of Nerve agent toxicity is divided into three categories, decontamination, respiratory support, and antidotes. All of these therapies may be given simultaneously. This article reviews toxicology and management of this acute chemical emergency. To help minimize the possible catastrophic impact on the public, we make several recommendations based on analysis of the Tokyo subway sarin attack and systematically review the current scientific literature.
Tetsu Okumura - One of the best experts on this subject based on the ideXlab platform.
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the tokyo subway sarin attack disaster management part 1 community emergency response
Academic Emergency Medicine, 1998Co-Authors: Tetsu Okumura, Kouichiro Suzuki, Atsuhiro Fukuda, Akitsugu Kohama, Nobukatsu Takasu, Shinichi Ishimatsu, Shigeaki HinoharaAbstract:The Tokyo subway sarin attack was the second documented incident of Nerve Gas poisoning in Japan. Prior to the Tokyo subway sarin attack, there had never been such a large-scale disaster caused by Nerve Gas in peacetime history. This article provides details related to how the community emergency medical services (EMS) system responded from the viewpoint of disaster management, the problems encountered, and how they were addressed. The authors' assessment was that if EMTs, under Japanese law, had been allowed to maintain an airway with an endotracheal tube or use a laryngeal mask airway without physician oversight, more patients might have been saved during this chemical exposure disaster. Given current legal restrictions, advanced airway control at the scene will require that doctors become more actively involved in out-of-hospital treatment. Other recommendations are: 1) that integration and cooperation of concerned organizations be established through disaster drills; 2) that poison information centers act as regional mediators of all toxicologic information; 3) that a real-time, multidirectional communication system be established; 4) that multiple channels of communication be available for disaster care; 5) that public organizations have access to mobile decontamination facilities; and 6) that respiratory protection and chemical-resistant suits with gloves and boots be available for out-of-hospital providers during chemical disasters.
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the tokyo subway sarin attack disaster management part 3 national and international responses
Academic Emergency Medicine, 1998Co-Authors: Tetsu Okumura, Kouichiro Suzuki, Atsuhiro Fukuda, Akitsugu Kohama, Nobukatsu Takasu, Shinichi Ishimatsu, Shigeaki HinoharaAbstract:The authors report the national and international responses to the disaster produced by the Tokyo subway sarin attack. From a worldwide historical perspective, there had never been such a large-scale disaster caused by Nerve Gas during peacetime. Therefore, this event should be studied from various viewpoints in cooperation with members of the international community. To this end, the Japanese government should help coordinate a large-scale and detailed investigation of the Tokyo subway sarin attack, including the long-term effects of sarin. The authors also recommend that the Japanese Self Defense Forces should be used more effectively in large-scale disasters. The system of direct control of disaster management by the Japanese government could be useful in a large-scale disaster. Language: en
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the tokyo subway sarin attack disaster management part 2 hospital response
Academic Emergency Medicine, 1998Co-Authors: Tetsu Okumura, Kouichiro Suzuki, Atsuhiro Fukuda, Akitsugu Kohama, Nobukatsu Takasu, Shinichi Ishimatsu, Shigeaki HinoharaAbstract:Abstract. The Tokyo subway sarin attack was the second documented incident of Nerve Gas poisoning in Japan. The authors report how St. Luke's Hospital dealt with this disaster from the viewpoint of disaster management. Recommendations derived from the experience include the following: Each hospital in Japan should prepare an emergent decontamination area and have available chemical-resistant suits and masks. Ventilation in the ED and main treatment areas should be well planned at the time a hospital is designed. Hospital disaster planning must include guidance in mass casualties, an emergency staff call-up system, and an efficient emergency medical chart system. Hospitals should establish an information network during routine practice so that it can be called upon at the time of a disaster. The long-term effects of sarin should be monitored, with such investigation ideally organized and integrated by the Japanese government.